К вопросу об отрицании теории перерождений

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On first consideration, it would seem that the six internal and external sense bases should be understood simply as the six sense faculties and their objects, with the term ›yatana, base, having the sense of origin or source. Though many suttas lend support to this supposition, the Therav›da exegetical tradition, beginning already from the Abhidhamma period, understands the six pairs of bases as a complete scheme of classification capable of accommodating all the factors of existence mentioned in the Nik›yas. This conception of the six bases probably originated from the Sabba Sutta (35:23), in which the Buddha says that the six pairs of bases are “the all” apart fromwhich nothing at all exists. Tomake the six bases capable of literally incorporating everything, the Vibhaºga of the Abhidhamma Pi˛aka defines the mind base (man›yatana) as including all classes of consciousness, and the mental phenomena base (dhamm›yatana) as including the other three mental aggregates, subtle nonsensuous types of form, and even the unconditioned element, Nibb›na (see Vibh 70–73).

Seen from this angle, the six internal and external sense bases offer an alternative to the five aggregates as a scheme of phenomenological classification. The relationship between the two schemes might be seen as roughly analogous to that between horizontal and vertical cross-sections of an organ, with the analysis by way of the aggregates corresponding to the horizontal slice, the analysis by way of the six sense bases to the vertical slice (see Table 6). Thus, we are told, on an occasion of visual cognition, eye-consciousness arises in dependence on the eye and forms; the meeting of the three is contact; and with contact as condition there arise feeling, perception, and volition. Viewing this experience “vertically” by way of the sense bases, the eye and visible forms are each a separate base, respectively the eye base and the form base; eye-consciousness belongs to the mind base; and eye-contact, feeling, perception, and volition are all assigned to the mental phenomena base. Then, using the scalpel of thought to cut “horizontally” across the occasion of visual cognition,
we can ask what is present from the form aggregate? The eye and a visible form (and the body as the physical basis of consciousness). What from the feeling aggregate? A feeling born of eye-contact. What from the perception aggregate? A perception of a visible form. What from the aggregate of volitional formations? A volition regarding a form. And what from the consciousness aggregate? An act of eye-consciousness.

Strangely, though some connection between the aggregates and sense bases, as just sketched, is already suggested in at least two suttas (35:93, 121), the Nik›yas do not explicitly correlate the two schemes. Conscious correlation begins only with the Abhidhamma Pi˛aka, especially in the opening sections of the Dh›tukath›, which reflects the attempt of the early Buddhist community to merge the more pragmatic schemes of the suttas into a single all-inclusive system that assigned to every element a precisely defined place.

Nevertheless, though this treatment of the sense bases stems from an early period, the Nik›yas themselves usually present the six pairs of sense bases not as a complete phenomenological scheme but as starting points for the genesis of cognition. Often, because of their role in mediating between consciousness and its objects, the internal bases are spoken of as the “bases for contact” (phass›yatana). If this interpretation is adopted, then mind (mano), the base for the arising of mind-consciousness (manoviññ›°a), probably denotes the passive flow of mind from which active cognition emerges, and dhamm› the nonsensuous objects of consciousness apprehended by introspection, imagination, and reflection.

As with the aggregates, so with the sense bases, concern with their classification and interactions is governed not by an interest in theoretical completeness but by the practical exigencies of the Buddha’s path aimed at liberation from suffering. The sense bases are critically important because it is through them that suffering arises (35:106). Even more, it is said that the holy life is lived under the Buddha for the full understanding of suffering, and if others should ask what is the suffering that should be fully understood, the correct answer is that the eye and forms, the ear and sounds, etc., and all phenomena derived from them, are the suffering that should be fully understood (35:81, 152).
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Although the aggregates and sense bases jointly serve as the domain of craving and wrong views, a difference in emphasis can be discerned in the way the two sa˙yuttas connect these two defilements to their respective domains. The Khandhasa˙yutta consistently treats the aggregates as the objective referent of identity view (sakk›yadi˛˛hi), the views that seek to give substance to the idea of a self. When the puthujjana or “worldling” fashions a view about his or her identity, he or she always does so in relation to the five aggregates. We do not find any parallel text expressing identity view in terms of the sense bases. This difference in emphasis is understandable when we realize that the scheme of the aggregates spans a wider spectrum of categories than the sense bases themselves and therefore offers the worldling more variety to choose from when attempting to give substance to the notion of “my self.” This, it must be stressed, indicates a difference in emphasis, not a fundamental doctrinal difference, for the sense bases can be grasped upon with the notions “This is mine, this I am, this is my self” just as tenaciously as the aggregates can. Thus we even find a series of three suttas which state that contemplating the sense bases as impermanent, suffering, and nonself leads respectively to the abandoning of wrong view, identity view, and view of self (35:165–67). However, as a general rule, the sense bases are not taken up for a thematic exposition of identity view in the way the five aggregates are, which is certainly significant. We see too that the entire Di˛˛hisa˙yutta, on the diversity of views, traces all these views to a misapprehension of the aggregates, not of the sense bases.

In relation to the sense bases the interest in views recedes into the background, and a new theme takes centre stage: the need to control and master the senses. It is the sense faculties that give us access to the agreeable and disagreeable phenomena of the world, and it is our spontaneous, impulsive responses to these phenomena that sow the seeds of so much suffering. Within the untrained mind lust, hatred, and delusion, the three roots of evil, are always lying latent, and with delusion obscuring the true nature of things, agreeable objects are bound to provoke lust and greed, disagreeable objects hatred and aversion. These spontaneous reactions flood the mind and bid for our consent. If we are not careful we may rush ahead in pursuit of immediate gratification, oblivious to the fact that the fruit of sensual enjoyment is misery (see 35:94–98).