Софизм прасангиков

Если бы согласились, то солгали бы. Вариант не приемлемый.

Приемлема. Поскольку самостоятельная предпосылка не ложь.

In PS(V) 1.14-16 Dignāga criticizes the definition of perception set
forth in the Vādavidhi: “Perception is a cognition [arising] from that
object” (tato ’rthād vijñānaṃ pratyakṣam); in PSV ad 1.15 he mentions
the sense faculty as being analogous to the atoms that do not assume
the same form as that appearing in the cognition, though they are the
cause of the cognition. That is to say, in this definition of perception
only the first condition is implied, not the second; thus Dignāga uses
a prasaṅga to indicate the fault of it not being taken into consider-
ation:
[The atoms cannot be the object-support of the cognition. Otherwise] it would follow that even the visual faculty and the other [causes]
would be the object-support. For they also – while existing in other ways [than the manner they appear in the cognition] in the ultimate sense
– are the cause (kāraṇa) of the cognitions with the appearance of a double moon, etc., or something blue, etc.

В чем же ошибка самостоятельной предпосылки? В том, что звук и буддисты и вайшешики одинаково воспринимают, но по разному интерпретируют?

Прасанга Дигнаги:

(Хотя, я понимаю- софистичность прасанг всем очевидна, да?)))))))))