МП без вне/внутри ума

Тождественен не всему познанию или уму целиком, а конкретному познанию одного объекта. Их два вида - единичные (чувственное) и общие (понятийные).

Единичное представление в принципе возможно, в йога-пратякше.

Свасамведана это не ведана.

Говорить об объекте свасамведаны - ввод реализма в феноменологическую установку. Это не правильно.

ум коровности это общее, а свасамведана сопровождающая данный ум единична.

     In Dignāga's system, self-cognition is a third factor apart from the dual appearance (ābhāsa) of cognition. To most readers of Dignāga, it is especially hard to distinguish self-cognition from the self-appearance of cognition. as Klein wonders whether the former is generated from the latter. Williams (1998: 4-5, n. 5) remarks that the dGe lugs understand self-cognition to be the self-appearance of cognition itself. For it is quite natural to assume that the apperceptive cognition is a secondary product of the subject of cognition, and has nothing to do with the object of cognition. Those who hold this view have committed themselves to a realistic presumption that the object of cognition is the external object independent of the cognition itself.

     The way that Dignāga understands the relationship between self-cognition and the self-appearance of cognition, in brief, is that the former possesses the latter but not vice versa. The cognition of blue, for instance, has a twofold appearance, namely, the appearance of blue as object and the appearance of the cognition itself as subject. The cognition of this cognition of blue, i.e., its self-cognition, again, possesses a twofold appearance, namely, "[on the one hand] the appearance of that cogilition which is in conformity with the object and [on the other hand] the appearance of itself". A strict distinction between the cognition of an object and the self-cognition of this cognition helps maintain the dual appearance of cognition, as Dignāga says: "That cognition has two forms is [known] from the difference between the cognition of the object and cognition of that [cognition]". Suppose that at a cognition only has the object-appearance for its object, the self-cognition would have no choice but to have this object-appearance for its object. This will collapse the distinction between cognition and self-cognition. If, on the other hand, the cognition has only the self-appearance, then both cognition and self-cognition will be marked by the same subjective aspect, and no difference between them can be found.

     The threefold structure of cognition that consists of self-cognition, selfappearance and object-appearance is further illustrated in terms of the distinction between the means, the object and the result of cognition. Dignāga stresses that this distinction is only metaphorically valid, because all these factors are devoid of activity (vyāpāra) in their ultimate nature. But in his pramāna theory he still assigns the roles of the means of cognition, object of cognition and result of cognition respectively to the self-appearance, object-appearance and self-cognition, as he expresses in the following famous verse:

Whatever the form in which it [viz., a coginition] appears, that [form] is [recognized as] the object of cognition (prameya). The means of cognition (pramāna) and [the cognition which is] its result (phala) are respectively the form of subject [in the cognition] and the cognition cognizing itself. Therefore, these three [factors of cognition] are not separate from one another."

     This is a classical formulation of the threefold division of cognition. The last point that states the unity of three divisions is especially important on a Yogacara point of view, because it confirms their idealistic position that all elements, including the object of cognition, are only appearance of consciousness. At this point, Dignāga criticizes the Sautrāntikas for their realistic position. ...