Для тех кто ещё не заблудился в Буддизме

Т.е. их основная задумка - сбросить корреляционизм идеалистов. На это все направлено. Не ум воспринимает объект восприятия, ограниченный чувствами, а материя где-то там совершенно вовне плавает в непознаваемых глубинах. Но ум воспринимает реальное как есть, Великое Внешнее: оно вот так сложилось с момента Большого взрыва, что материя дает такой снимок в познании и никакой другой.

Самого Мейясу я не читал, только Вики. Поэтому не ручаюсь за 101% совпадения написанного и его авторской работы.

Про Хартмана я не в курсе. Это что-то еще более из ютуба.

объекты за-предельно онтологичны и ноуменальны.

Brassier is strongly critical of much of contemporary philosophy for what he regards as its attempt "to stave off the 'threat' of nihilism by safeguarding the experience of meaning – characterized as the defining feature of human existence – from the Enlightenment logic of disenchantment". According to Brassier, this tendency is exemplified above all by philosophers strongly influenced by Heidegger and Wittgenstein.

"Philosophy", exhorts Brassier, "would do well to desist from issuing any further injunctions about the need to re-establish the meaningfulness of existence, the purposefulness of life, or mend the shattered concord between man and nature. It should strive to be more than a sop to the pathetic twinge of human self-esteem. Nihilism is not an existential quandary but a speculative opportunity."

А потом появилась философия с рассуждениями о том, что реально, а что нет. Если Бог или нет. Реален ли мир или только кажется. И уже потом сформировался буддизм.

Так вот вопрос: что важнее - пройти свой путь предназначенный Дхармой, или досрочно его закончить и выпилится в НБО?

Да, это я грубо ошибся, сам же как-то поправлял на эту тему. Речь о недоступности уму.

Many accounts of Kant's philosophy treat "noumenon" and "thing-in-itself" as synonymous, and there is textual evidence for this relationship.[16] However, Stephen Palmquist holds that "noumenon" and "thing-in-itself" are only loosely synonymous, inasmuch as they represent the same concept viewed from two different perspectives,[17][18] and other scholars also argue that they are not identical.

Kant's writings show points of difference between noumena and things-in-themselves. For instance, he regards things-in-themselves as existing:

...though we cannot know these objects as things in themselves, we must yet be in a position at least to think them as things in themselves; otherwise we should be landed in the absurd conclusion that there can be appearance without anything that appears.[21]

He is much more doubtful about noumena:

But in that case a noumenon is not for our understanding a special [kind of] object, namely, an intelligible object; the [sort of] understanding to which it might belong is itself a problem. For we cannot in the least represent to ourselves the possibility of an understanding which should know its object, not discursively through categories, but intuitively in a non-sensible intuition.[22]

A crucial difference between the noumenon and the thing-in-itself is that to call something a noumenon is to claim a kind of knowledge, whereas Kant insisted that the thing-in-itself is unknowable. Interpreters have debated whether the latter claim makes sense: it seems to imply that we know at least one thing about the thing-in-itself (i.e., that it is unknowable). But Stephen Palmquist explains that this is part of Kant's definition of the term, to the extent that anyone who claims to have found a way of making the thing-in-itself knowable must be adopting a non-Kantian position.