Иллюзорность (коротко объяснить буддийское учение об иллюзорном)

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СлаваА пишет:

Жизнь это текущий момент, в который Вы можете открыть что-то новое, а не вспоминать прошлое.

Без постоянных возвратов к прошлому, в воспоминаниях, в памяти, по тысяче раз на дню, это была бы не жизнь а нечто ужасное. Люди хотят чтобы была традиция. Вечное. Реальное.

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Впрочем, атман это и есть и вкус и цвет. Просто у каждого существа свой цвет тела, не такой как у других существ. Ну а что касается вкуса, то например вкус пота, - у каждого существа он свой, не такой как у других существ. Запах тела, это тоже атман. У каждого существа он свой. Не такой как у любого другого существа.

Серж · Зарегистрирован: 28.01.2011 Суждений: 4111

Можно ли коротко объяснить буддийское учение об иллюзорном и том что подобно иллюзии? В чём разница между иллюзорным и тем что подобно иллюзии? Я вот такой пример придумал. Стоит человек между трёх сосен, расположенных так что образуется что-то напоминающее треугольник. Видит он только две сосны а к третьей он стоит спиной. И думает что тут всегда было только две сосны и никакой третьей, никогда не было. Подходит он к одной из сосен, чтобы утвердить себя в своём выводе. Оборачивается. И видит ту сосну которую он не видел. Но видит он опять две сосны. И он забывает что за его спиной находится третья сосна, которую он не так давно видел глазами и считал её второй или там первой но не третьей. И он о ней забыл и опять считает что он находится среди двух сосен и что тут всегда было только две сосны а третьей никогда не было. И так продолжается веками. Вечно. Это та иллюзорность о которой говорится в буддизме? Это я о том, что количество людей может быть бесконечно... И о механизме забывания старых друзей, быть может закрученным природой. Хитро так закрученным. Но буддийская иллюзорность - это не об этом? Будда же отказался отвечать на вопрос, конечен мир или бесконечен? А мир это и есть множество существ.

ТМ · Зарегистрирован: 05.04.2005 Суждений: 12672

19. THE TEN UPAMĀNAS

[k. 6, 101c] Sūtra: These bodhisattvas accept that dharmas are like 1) a magic show, 2) a mirage, 3) the moon reflected in water, 4) space, 5) an echo, 6) a city of the gandharvas, 7) a dream, 8) a shadow, 9) a reflection in a mirror, 10) a creation (māyāmarīcidakacandrākāśapratiśrutkā-gandharvasvapnachāyapratibimbanirmāṇopamadharmādhimuktaiḥ).580
1. Like a magic show (māyā)
Śāstra: These ten comparisons serve to explain empty dharmas (śūnyadharma).
Question. - If all dharmas are empty (śūnya) like a magic show (māyā), why are they seen (dṛṣṭa), heard (śruta), felt (ghrāta), tasted (āsvadita), touched (spṛṣṭa) and known (vijñāta)? If they truly did not exist, how could one see them ... and know them? - Furthermore, if they are seen out of error although they do not exist, why do we not see sounds (śabda) and hear colors (rūpa)? - If all dharmas are equally empty (śūnya) and non-existent (asat), why are some of them visible (sanidarśana) and others invisible (anidarśana)? Being empty, dharmas are like a finger (aṅguli) of which the first nail (nakha) is non-existent and likewise the second. Why is it that we do not see the second nail and we see only the first?581 Therefore we know that the first nail, which really exists, is visible, whereas the second, which does not really exist, is invisible.
Answer. - Although the nature of dharmas (dharmalakṣaṇa) is empty, we can distinguish visible dharmas (sanidarśana) and invisible dharmas (anidarśana). Take, for example, magical elephants (hastin) and horses (aśva) and other things of this kind: we know very well that they are not real and yet we see their color, we hear their sounds; they correspond to the six sense-objects and they are not mixed up one with the other. In the same way, although dharmas are empty, we can see them, we can hear them, and they are not confused one with the other. Thus, in the Tö niu king (Therīsūtra) the therī asks the Buddha: "O Bhagavat, is [102a] ignorance (avidyā) internal (ādhyātmika)?"
"No."
"Is it external (bahirdhā)?"
"No."
"Is it both internal and external?"
"No."
"O Bhagavat, does this ignorance come from the previous lifetime (pūrvajanma)?"
"No."
"Does it come from the present lifetime (ihajanma) and does it pass to the next one (punarjanma)?"
"No."
"Does this ignorance have an arising (utpāda) and a cessation (nirodha)?"
"No."
"Is there a truly existent dharma that could be called ignorance?"
"No."
Then the therī said to the Buddha: "If ignorance is not internal, not external, neither internal nor external, if it does not pass from the previous lifetime to the present lifetime and from the present lifetime to the following lifetime, if it does not have a true nature, how can ignorance be the condition (pratyaya) for the formations (saṃskāra) and so on [for the twelve members of [pratītyasamutpāda] up to this accumulation of this mass of suffering (duḥkhaskandhasyotpādaḥ)? O Bhagavat, it is as if a tree has no root (mūla): how could it produce a trunk (skandha), knots (granthi), branches (śākhā), leaves (dala), flowers (puṣpa) and fruit (phala)?"
The Buddha replied: "The nature of dharmas is emptiness. However, worldly people (pṛthagjana), ignorant (aśrutavat) and without knowledge (ajñānavat), produce all kinds of afflictions (kleśa) in regard to dharmas, [of which the main one is ignorance]. This affliction is the cause and condition (pratyaya) for actions of body, speech and mind (kāyavāgmanaskarman) which are the cause of a new existence (punarjanma). As a result of this existence we experience suffering (duḥkha) or pleasure (sukha). Thus, if the affliction (i.e., ignorance) did not truly exist, there would be no actions of body, speech and mind, and we would not experience suffering or pleasure. When a magician (māyākāra) creates all kinds of objects by magic, are these magical products internal (ādhyātmika) according to you?"
"No."
"Are they external?"
"No.""Are they both internal and external?"
"No."
"Do they pass from the previous lifetime to the present lifetime and from the present lifetime to the next lifetime?"
"No."
"Do the products of magic have a birth (utpāda) and a cessation (nirodha)?"
"No."
"Is there really a dharma that is the product of magic?"
"No."
Then the Buddha said:
"Do you not see, do you not hear, the musical instruments (vādya, tūrya) produced by magic?"
"Yes, I see them and I hear them."
"Then", continued the Buddha, "if the magic show is empty (śūnya), deceptive (vañcaka) and without reality, how can one get musical instruments by magic?
"Bhagavat, although the magic show has no basis, one can hear it and see it."
"Well," said the Buddha, "it is the same for ignorance. It is not internal, it is not external, it is not both, neither is it neither internal nor external. It does not pass from the past lifetime to the present lifetime nor from the present lifetime to the next lifetime; it has no true nature, it has neither birth nor cessation. However, ignorance (avidyā) is the cause and condition (hetupratyaya) for the formations (saṃskāra) and so on up to the accumulation of this mass of suffering (duḥkha-skandhasyotpādaḥ). When the magic show is over, the products of magic vanish. In the same way, when ignorance is destroyed (kṣīṇa), the formations also are destroyed and so on [for the twelve members of pratītyasamutpāda] up to the complete disappearance of the mass of suffering."
Moreover, this example of the magic show demonstrates that, among beings, all conditioned dharmas (saṃskṛtadharma) are empty (śūnya) and without solidity (adhruva). And so it is said that all the formations (saṃskāra) are like a magic show that deceives little children; they depend on causes and conditions (hetupratyayāpekṣa), they are powerless and do not last for a long time
[102b] (acirasthitika). This is why the bodhisattvas regard dharmas as a magic show.
2. Like a mirage (marīci)
When the light of the sun (sūryāloka) and the wind (vāyu) stir up the dust (rajas), there is a mirage; in the desert (kāntāra), it appears as if there were gazelles (ghoṭakamṛga) and, on seeing them, not knowing, we assume the presence of water (vāri). It is the same for the characteristics of male and female (strīpuruṣa): when the sun of the fetters (saṃyojana) and the afflictions (kleśa) has heated up the dust of the formations (saṃskāra) and the wind of bad thoughts (mithyā-manasikāra) swirls in the desert of transmigration (saṃsāra), the person without wisdom asserts the characteristics of male and female (strīpuruṣa). This is a mirage.
Furthermore, if the sight of the mirage from afar (viprakṛṣṭa) calls up the notion of water (vārisaṃjñā), from close up (saṃnikṛṣṭa) this notion disappears. In the same way, when the ignorant person is far away from the holy doctrine (āryadharma), he is ignorant of the non-existence of self (anātman), the emptiness of dharmas (dharmaśūnyatā), and attributes to the aggregates (skandha), the elements (dhātu) and the bases of consciousness (āyatana) the characteristics of a person, male or female [which are foreign to it]. But when he has come close to the holy dharma, he discovers the true nature of dharmas (dharmasatyalakṣaṇa) and scatters the illusions (vañcana) and false notions (mithyāsaṃjñā). This is why the bodhisattvas regard dharmas as a mirage.
3. Like the moon reflected in water (udakacandra)
Actually, the moon (candra) is situated in space (ākāśa) but its reflection (bimba) appears in the water (udaka). In the same way, 'the moon' of the true Dharma (bhūtadharma) is in 'the space' of suchness (dharmatā) and the peak of existence (bhūtakoṭi), but its 'reflection' - the wrong notions of 'me' and 'mine' (ātmātmīyanimitta) - appear in the 'water' of the minds of fools (bālacitta), gods or men. This is why [dharmas] are like the moon reflected in water.
Furthermore, when a little child (bālaka) sees the moon reflected in the water, he is happy and wants to grab it, but the adults who see it make fun of him. In the same way, the ignorant person, seeing his body, believes in the existence of a personal self (atman): lacking true knowledge, he sees all kinds of dharmas and, having seen them, he is happy and wants to grasp (udgṛhṇati) the characteristics of male or female (strīpuruṣa), etc.; but the āryas who have found the Path make fun of him. A stanza says:
Like the moon reflected in water, like the water of a mirage,
Like attainments in a dream, death and birth are like that.
The person who wants to really secure them
Is a fool whom the āryas ridicule.
Finally, it is in clear water that one sees the reflection of the moon; when the water is disturbed, the reflection vanishes. In the same way, it is in the pure water of an ignorant mind (avidyācitta) that the pride of self (asmimāna) and the reflections of the fetters (saṃyojana) appear; but when the stick of wisdom (prajñādaṇḍa) stirs up the water of the mind, one no longer sees the self or the other reflections of the fetters. This is why the bodhisattvas think that dharmas are like the moon reflected in water.
4. Like space (ākāśa)
Space is just a name (nāmamātra) and not a real dharma.582 Space is invisible (adrśya) but, looking at it from afar, the eye perceives a light blue color. In the same way, dharmas are empty (śūnya) and non-existent (asat): the person who is still far away from pure true wisdom (anāsravasatyaprajñā) does not discover its true nature (satyalakṣaṇa) but sees in it ātman, men (puṃs) and women (strī), houses (gṛha) and cities (nagara), all kinds of different things (dravya), and his mind clings (abhiniviśate) to them. When a little child (bālaka) looks at the blue sky, he says that he sees a real color (varṇa); but those who fly up very high and come closer [to the sky] see nothing; it is when we look at it from a distance that we [102c] assert that we see a blue color. It is the same for dharmas. This is why the sūtra says that they are like space.
Moreover, space is always pure by nature (svabhāvaviśuddha), but when it is overcast and covered [by clouds], people say that it is impure (aviśuddha). In the same way, the dharmas are always pure by nature, but when they are obscured by desire (rāga), hatred (dveṣa) and delusion (moha), people declare them to be impure. Some stanzas say:
During the summer months (grīṣma), there is thunder, lightning and rain,
Dark clouds cover the sky, the weather is not calm;
In the same way, in ignorant ordinary people (pṛthagjana),
All sorts of afflictions (kleśa) cover over the mind.
In a wintry (hemanta) sky, sometimes the sun shines,
But usually it is dark and clouds cover it over.
In the same way, the person who has acquired the first or second fruit583
Is still darkened by the defilements of desire.
In a spring (vasanta) sky, the sun is about to shine forth,
But is still covered by dark clouds.
In the same say, in the person who has renounced desire (vītarāga) and has acquired the third fruit,584
Residues of ignorance and pride still hide the mind.
In autumn (śarad), the sun is not covered by clouds,
The sky is pure like the water of the oceans.
Having accomplished what had to be done (kṛtakṛtya), being of an immaculate mind,585
The arhat also is completely pure.
Moreover, space is without beginning, middle or end (apūrvamadhyacarama). It is the same for dharmas. In the Mahāyāna, the Buddha said to Siu p'ou t'i (Subhūti): "Space is beginningless, without middle and without end; and it is the same with dharmas." This text should be cited in full. This is why it is said that dharmas are like space.
Question. - Space is a truly existent dharma. Why? If space were not a real dharma, it would not have the activity (kāritra) of rising up or lowering, going or coming, bending or spreading out, leaving or entering, etc., since it would not have the room in which to move.
Answer. – i) If space were a truly existent dharma, it should have an abode (adhiṣṭhāna, āspada). Why? Because without an abode, there are no dharmas. If space resides in holes (chidra),586space would reside in space; therefore space does not reside in cavities. If it resided in any reality whatsoever, this abode would be real (bhūta) and not empty (śūnya) and thus space would be unable to reside there and would have nothing to accommodate it.
ii) Moreover, you say that space is the place of abiding (adhiṣṭhāna), but in a stone wall (śailabhitti) which truly exists, there is no place of abiding. If there is no place of abiding, there is no space. Since space has no abode, there is no space.
iii) Finally, space does not exist because it has no specific characteristic (lakṣaṇa).587 Each dharma has its own characteristic and it is because of this characteristic that we recognize its existence. Thus earth (pṛthivī) has solidity (khakkhaṭatva) as its characteristic; water (ap-), humidity (dravatva); fire (tejas), heat
(uṣṇatva); wind (vāyu), movement (īraṇatva);588consciousness (vijñāna), intellection (vijñaptitva); wisdom (prajñā), insight (bodhana); nirvāṇa, cessation (uccheda). Not having such a characteristic, space does not exist.
Question. - Space has a characteristic, but as you do not cognize it, you say [103a] that it does not exist. The characteristic of space is absence of rūpa (matter).
Answer. - That is not correct. Absence of rūpa means elimination of matter, but that is not a separate dharma any more than the extinguishing of a lamp (dīpa) is not a distinct dharma. This is why space has no self-nature.
Moreover, space does not exist. Why? You speak of rūpa by saying that the absence of rūpa is the self-nature of space; if that were so, insofar as rūpa does not arise, the specific nature of space does not exist.
Finally, you say that rūpa is an impermanent dharma (anitya), but that space is a permanent (nitya) dharma. Before rūpa existed, there should have therefore been a dharma called space, since it is eternal. If rūpa is not absent, the self-nature of space does not exist, and if this nature does not exist, space does not exist either. This is why space is a mere name without any reality. The dharmas are also like space; they are mere names without any reality. Consequently, the bodhisattvas believe that dharmas are like space.
5. Like an echo (pratiśrutkā)
In a narrow valley, a deep gorge or an empty house, when a sound (śabda) or a noise is made, from this sound [that is produced] another sound arises that is called an echo. The ignorant person thinks that there is somebody who is repeating his words, but the wise person knows that the echo is not due to a third person and that it is solely by a reverberation of the sound (śabdasparśa) that there is a new sound called an echo. The echo is empty (śūnya) of reality but it is able to deceive the ear organ (śrotrendriya). In the same way, when a person is about to speak, there is a wind (vāyu) in his mouth (mukha) called Yeou t'o na (udāna) that passes to the nostrils (nābhi); when it strikes the nostrils, an echo is produced and at the moment that it comes out, it strikes in seven places and subsides. That is language (abhilāpa). Some stanzas say:
The wind called udāna
Strikes the nostrils and rises up;
This wind then strikes in seven places:
The nape of the neck, the gums, the teeth and the lips,
The tongue, the throat and the chest.
Thus language is produced.
The fool does not understand that;Hesitant, obstinate, he produces dveśa and moha.
The person endowed with wisdom
Is not worried, does not cling,
And does not commit any mistake;
He adheres solely to the [true] nature of dharmas.
Bending and staying straight, bending and straightening up,
[The sound] that comes and goes manifests the language.
There is no agent there.
This [language] is a magic show.
How would anyone know
That this skeleton, this bundle of nerves,
Would be able to produce language
Like molten metal ejects water?
[103b] This is why the bodhisattvas regard dharmas as an echo.
6. Like a city of the gandharvas
When the sun rises, we see a city (nagara) of buildings with stories589 (kūṭāgāra), palaces (rājakula), with people coming in and going out. The higher the sun rises, the more indistinct this city becomes; it is just an optical illusion without any reality. This is what is called a city of the gandharvas. People who have never before seen it and who discover it some morning in the east believe in its reality and hurry towards it; but the closer they come, the more unclear it becomes and when the sun is high, it disappears. Tormented by hunger and thirst (kṣutpipāsā), the people who perceive a haze like a herd of gazelles (ghoṭakamṛga) believe in the presence of water and hasten towards it, but the closer they come, the more the illusion becomes blurred. Exhausted, worn out, they come to a high mountain or a narrow valley; they utter cries and groans and the echo replies to them; they believe in the presence of inhabitants and try to find them, but they tire themselves out in vain and find nothing. Finally, when they have reflected and understood, their illusion disappears. In the same way, the ignorant man thinks he sees an ātman and dharmas in the aggregates (skandha), the elements (dhātu) and the bases of consciousness (āyatana) which are empty (śūnya) of any reality. Prey to desire (rāga), anger (dveśa) and obstinacy (cittābhiniveśa), they wander in the four directions to satisfy their desire. Lost and deceived, they are plunged into poverty and misery. But when they have recognized the non-existence of the ātman and real dharmas by means of wisdom (prajñā), their mistake (viparyāsa) disappears.Furthermore, the city of the gandharvas is not a city; it is the mind of the person who sees it as such. In the same way, fools (bāla) conceive of that which is not a body as a body (kāya) and as a mind (citta) that which is not a mind.
Question. - A single example would suffice in understanding; why multiply the comparisons (upamāna) in this way?
Answer. – i) We have already answered this question [by saying] that the Mahāyāna is like the waters of the ocean and it contains absolutely all dharmas. Since the Mahāyāna multiplies the arguments (hetupratyaya), the large number of comparisons is not a fault.
ii) Moreover, the bodhisattvas have profound and sharp knowledge (jñāna); it is by means of all kinds of teachings (dharmaparyāya), reasonings (hetuprayāya) and comparisons (upamāna) that they eliminate dharmas. In order that people should understand, it is necessary to multiply the examples.
iii) Finally, in the texts of the śrāvakas, we never find the example of the city of the gandharvas,590 but there are all kinds of other comparisons to illustrate impermanence (anityatā). [For example, a sūtra says]: "Form (rūpa) is like a ball of foam (phenapiṇḍa); feeling (vedanā) like a water bubble (budbudha); perception (saṃjñā) like a mirage (marīci), volition (saṃskāra) like the trunk of a banana tree (kadalīskandha); consciousness (vijñāna) like a magic show (māyā) and a magic net (māyājāla)."591 In the sūtras, these are the comparisons used to illustrate emptiness. Since the city of the gandharvas is a different comparison, it is mentioned here.
Question. - In the śrāvaka texts, the body (kāya) is compared to a city;592why is the example of the city of the gandharvas given here?
Answer. - In the example of the city used by the śrāvakas, the subject of comparison exists as such (dravyasat), whereas the city has merely nominal existence (prajñaptisat). But in the city of the gandharvas, the subject of comparison itself is non-existent; it is like the burning brand flourished in a circle (alātacakra)593 that deceives the human eye. In the śrāvaka texts, the example of the city is used only to refute the ātman. Here we use the example of the city of the gandharvas so that the bodhisattvas of keen faculties (tīkṣnendriya) penetrate the emptiness of dharmas deeply, which is why these are compared to a city of the gandharvas.Answer. - In the example of the city used by the śrāvakas, the subject of comparison exists as such (dravyasat), whereas the city has merely nominal existence (prajñaptisat). But in the city of the gandharvas, the subject of comparison itself is non-existent; it is like the burning brand flourished in a circle (alātacakra)593 that deceives the human eye. In the śrāvaka texts, the example of the city is used only to refute the ātman. Here we use the example of the city of the gandharvas so that the bodhisattvas of keen faculties (tīkṣnendriya) penetrate the emptiness of dharmas deeply, which is why these are compared to a city of the gandharvas.that fly; it is by mental confusion that we see dead bodies that fly. It is not on account of that that the dream has no reality.
Answer. - Even though there are truly human heads and even though there are truly horns, a human head with horns is nothing but a false vision.
Question. - The universe (lokadhātu) is vast and, in the course of previous lifetimes (pūrvajanma), the causes and conditions [that determine these consciousnesses] have been varied. There may be strange lands (deśāntara) where the heads of people grow horns, where the people have but one hand or one foot, or where they are but one foot tall, or where they have nine heads. What is strange about humans having horns?
Answer. - It is possible that in other lands people may have horns; but in a dream, one sees only what one knows in this very land where 'people with horns' do not occur.
Moreover, some see in dreams the limits of space (ākāśa) or the limits of the directions (diś) [104a] and of time (kāla). How are such things true? In what place could space, directions and time be absent? This is why in a dream we see as existent things that do not exist.
You were asking how consciousness could be produced in the absence of conditions (pratyaya). Even though the conditions [consisting of] the five sense objects were lacking, the conditions [necessary for the production] of dharmas (dharmapratyaya) arise by the efficacy (balapravṛtti) of thinking (manasikāra) and of the mind. If somebody tells you about a man with two heads, this statement would produce [in you] a concept (saṃjñā) and, in a dream, you will see as existent that which does not exist. It is the same for the dharmas: they are non-existent and nevertheless they are seen (dṛṣṭa), heard (śruta) and cognized (vijñāta). A stanza says:
All dharmas
Are like
A dream, a magic show
A city of the gandharvas.
This is why the bodhisattvas believe that dharmas are like a dream.
8. Like a shadow (chāyā)
A shadow is visible but cannot be grasped. It is the same for dharmas: the organs (indriya) and the sense objects are seen (dṛṣṭa), heard (śruta), cognized (vijñāta) and felt (mata), but their reality is ungraspable. A stanza says:
True wisdom,
Ungraspable on all four sides,
Cannot be touchedLike a blazing inferno.
Dharmas are impregnable,
They must not be grasped.
Moreover, it is necessary that light be intercepted so that the shadow appears: without this interception, the shadow would be absent. In the same way, it is necessary that the fetters (saṃyojana) and the afflictions (kleśa) hide the light of correct seeing (saṃyagdṛṣṭi) so that the shadow of the ātman and of dharmas appear.
Moreover, the shadow walks when the person walks, the shadow moves when the person moves, the shadow stops when the person stops. In the same way, the shadow of good or bad actions (kuśalākuśalakarman) moves when the past existence (pūrvajanma) moves, but it remains stationary when the present existence (ihajanma) is stationary because the retribution of actions (karmavipaka) has not been cut. When the sins (āpatti) and merits (puṇya) are ripe (paripakva), the shadow disappears. Some stanzas say:
Action follows [its perpetrator] through the air,
It pursues him among the rocks,
It accompanies him in the depths of the earth,
It enters the waters of the ocean with him,
It pursues him always and everywhere:
The shadow of actions is indissoluble.
This is why dharmas are like a shadow.
Finally, the shadow is empty (śūnya), non-existent (asat); one may search hard for its reality but one can never find it. Similarly, all dharmas are empty and without reality.
Question. - It is not true that the shadow is empty and without reality. Why? It is said in the A p'i t'an (Abhidharma): "What is called 'visible'? Blue (nīla), yellow (pīta), red (lohita), white (avadāta), black (kṛṣṇa), deep red, light blue, light (āloka) and shadow (chāyā). Moreover, bodily action (kāyakarman) and the three kinds of derived matter (upādāyarūpa) are called 'visible' or rūpāyatana." Why do you say that the shadow does not exist? Furthermore, the shadow truly exists because it has causes and conditions (hetupratyaya): its cause is the tree (vṛkṣa); its condition is light (āloka); when these two principal [factors] come together, the shadow is produced. Why do you say that it does not exist? If there is no shadow, the other dharmas that also possess causes and conditions would not exist either. - Finally, [104b] this shadow has a visible color. Long (dīrgha) or short (krasva), big (mahat) or small (alpa), thick (sthūla) or thin (sūkṣma), crooked (kuṭīla) or straight (ṛiju); when the shape (saṃsthāna) moves, the shadow also moves. All of that is visible. This is why the shadow must exist.
Answer. - The shadow is empty (śūnya) and non-existent (asat). You quote a passage from the Abhidharma, but the interpretation that you give it is that of a person. People often mistreat the meaning of
307scriptural texts (dharmaprayāya) and take their inventions as reality. Thus it is said in the P'i p'o cha (Vibhāṣā): "The atoms (paramāṇu) are subtle, indestructible and incombustible; therefore they are eternal."594 And again, "The dharmas of the three times pass from the future (anāgata) to the present (pratyutpanna), and from the present to the past (atīta) without deteriorating."595 : these texts favor eternalism (śāśvata). On the other hand, it is also said:
" Conditioned dharmas (saṃskṛtadharma), arising and perishing ever anew, do not last (asthitika)."596 This text favors nihilism (uccheda). Why? Because [that which is conditioned] no longer exists after having existed. Thus in the Abhidharma, there are all sorts of statements that contradict the words of the Buddha. We cannot resort to it to establish that the shadow is a type of material dharma (rūpadharma).
When a rūpadharma arises, it necessarily has a smell (gandha), a taste (rasa), tangibility (spraṣtavya), etc. This is not the case for the shadow. Therefore it does not exist. The jug (ghaṭa), for example, is cognized by two organs (indriya), the eye organ (cakṣurindriya) and the organ of touch (kāyendriya). If the shadow existed, it should be cognized by these two organs. But that is not the case and, consequently, the shadow has no true substance. It is but a 'trompe-oeuil' (cakṣurvañcana). If one takes a burning brand and flourishes it rapidly in a circle, one draws a circle in the air with it, but this circle has no reality. Similarly, the shadow has no real substance. If it were a true substance, it could be destroyed or made to disappear, hut as long as its screen (saṃsthāna) is intact, the shadow is indestructible. This is why it is empty. Finally, since it depends on a screen (saṃsthānam apekṣate) and has no independence (aiśvarya), the shadow is empty. But even though it is empty, its notion exists and the eye sees it. This is why dharmas are compared to a shadow.
9. Like a reflection (bimba) in a mirror
The reflection in the mirror is not produced by the mirror (ādarśa), nor by the face (vaktra), nor by the person holding the mirror (ādarśadhara), nor by itself (svataḥ); but it is not without causes and conditions (hetupratyaya).597i) Why is it not produced by the mirror? Because there is no reflection if the face does not come in front of the mirror. Thus it is not produced by the mirror. ii) Why is it not produced by the face? Because there is no reflection without the mirror. iii) Why is it not produced by the person holding the mirror? Because there is no reflection without mirror or face. iv) Why is it not produced by itself? Because in the absence of the mirror and the face, there is no reflection. To be produced, the reflection depends (apekṣate) on the mirror and the face. Thus the reflection is not produced by itself. How is it not lacking causes and conditions? If it were without causes and conditions, it would exist eternally. If it existed eternally, it would be produced even in the absence of the mirror and the face. Thus it is not without causes and conditions.
It is the same for the dharmas: they are not produced by themselves (svataḥ), nor by another (parataḥ), nor by both together (ubhayataḥ); but they are not without causes and conditions.598
i) Why are they not produced by themselves? They are not produced by themselves because the ātman does not exist, because all dharmas come from causes and are not sovereign and because dharmas depend (apekṣante) on causes and conditions. ii) They are not produced by another. [104c] If they do not themselves exist, their neighbor would not exist either. Creation by another would suppress the efficacious rôle played by sins and merits (pāpapuṇyabala). Creation by another is of two types, good (kuśala) or bad (akuśala); the good must produce happiness (sukha), the bad must produce unhappiness (duḥkha). If there is a mixture of bad and good, what is the cause and condition from which the happiness arises and what is the cause and condition from which the unhappiness arises? If both are absent, the self and other are likewise absent. iii) If happiness and unhappiness arise without causes and conditions, the person would be eternally happy and free of all unhappiness. If there is neither cause nor conditions, the person could not realize the cause of happiness or escape the cause of unhappiness. All dharmas are necessarily from causes and conditions. It is stupid to ignore that. Thus a person gets fire (agni) from wood (dāru), water (udaka) from earth (pṛthivī), and wind (anila) from a fan (vījana). Each of these things has its causes and conditions. The causes and conditions of this mass of unhappiness and happiness are the following: the actions (karman) of the past lifetime (pūrvajanma) are the causes and the good or bad behavior (sucaritaduścarita) of the present lifetime (ihajanma) are the conditions from which suffering and happiness come. These are the different causes and conditions of suffering and happiness. In truth, there isno agent (kāraka) or any enjoyer (vedaka). The five aggregates (pañcaskandha) are without activity (kriyā) or enjoyment (vedanā). The ignorant person who finds happiness enjoys it and clings to it; if he finds unhappiness, he feels irritation; when his happiness disappears, he tries to recover it.
A child, seeing [its] reflection (bimba) in a mirror (ādarha), is happy and becomes infatuated with it; but when this well-loved reflection has disappeared, the child breaks the mirror to try to recover it; wise people make fun of it. In the same way, those who, having lost their happiness, try to regain it, are mocked by the āryas who have found the Path. This is why dharmas are like a reflection in a mirror.
Moreover, the reflection in a mirror is truly empty (śūnya), without arising (utpāda), without cessation (nirodha), but it deceives the eyes of fools (bāla). In the same way, dharmas are empty, without arising, without cessation, but they deceive the eyes of worldly people (pṛthagjana).
Question. - The reflection in the mirror is the result of causes and conditions. If there is a face, a mirror, a person holding the mirror and a light, provided these causes are brought together, the reflection is produced. Thus the reflection is both cause (hetu) and result (phala). Why do you say then that it is empty of reality, without arising or cessation?
Answer. - Being the result of causes and conditions, the reflection is not independent; therefore it is empty (śūnya). A truly existent dharma cannot be the result of causes and conditions. Why? If the cause (kāraṇa) pre-exists in the cause, there is no effect (kārya); if the cause does not pre-exist in the cause, there is no result either. Thus, if cream (dadhi) pre-exists in milk (kṣīra), the milk is not the cause of the cream, for the cream pre-exists. If the cream does not pre-exist in the milk, everything would happen as in water (udaka) where there is no cream: the milk is not the cause of the cream. If the cream existed without cause, why would water not produce cream?599 If the milk is the cause of the cream, the milk, which itself is not independent, also comes from a cause; it derives its origin from the cow (go); [105a] the cow takes its origin from water (udaka) and grass (tṛṇa), and thus there are infinite (ananta) causes. This is why it cannot be said that the result (kārya) exists (bhavati) in the cause (kāraṇa), or that it does not exist (na bhavati) in the cause, or that it both exists and does not exist (bhavati ca na bhavati ca), or that it neither exists nor does not exist (naiva bhavati na na bhavati) in the cause. Dharmas resulting from causes and conditions (pratītyasamutpanna) do not have self- nature (svabhāva). They are like a reflection in a mirror. Some stanzas say:
If dharmas come from causes and conditions,They are truly empty of self-nature;
If these dharmas were not empty.
They would not be the result of causes and conditions.
It is like reflections in a mirror;
They do not come from the mirror, nor from the face,
Nor from the person who holds the mirror,
Nor from themselves; but they are not without cause.
[Dharmas] are neither existent nor non-existent,
Not both existent and non--existent:
To refuse to accept these theses
Is what is called the Middle Way.
That is why dharmas are like the reflection in the mirror.
10. Like a metamorphosis (nirmāṇa) [manifestation. appearance]
The fourteen minds of metamorphosis (nirmāṇacitta) are: (1-2) In the first dhyāna, two minds, viz. that of kāmadhātu and that of the first dhyāna; (3-5) In the second dhyāna, three minds, viz., that of kāmadhātu, that of the first dhyāna and that of the second dhyāna; (6-9) In the third dhyāna, four minds, viz., that of kāmadhātu and those of the first, second and third dhyānas; (10-14) In the fourth dhyāna, five minds, viz., that of kāmadhātu and those of the first, second, third and fourth dhyānas.600
These fourteen minds of metamorphosis accomplish eight kinds of nirmāṇa: (1) reducing to the size of an atom (paramāṇu), (2) enlarging to the point of filling up space (ākāśa). (3) becoming as light as the feather of a crane (sārasaloman), (4) exercising sovereignty (vaśitvakaraṇa) by growing bigger, shrinking, lengthening, narrowing, etc., (5) possessing the Indrabala, the power that surpasses that of humans, (6) being far distant and coming close, (7) making the earth shake (kampana), (8) obtaining whatever one desires: being single and becoming many (eko bhūtva bahudhā bhavati), being many and becoming single (bahudhā bhūtva eko bhavati), passing through stone walls (tiraḥ kuḍyaṃ gacchati), walking on water (udake gacchati), walking in space (ākāśe kramati), touching the sun and the moon with one's hand (sūryacandramasau pāṇinā āmārṣṭi), transforming the four great elements, i.e., changing earth (pṛthivī) into water (ap-) and water into earth, fire (tejas) into wind and wind (vāyu) into fire, stone (śaila) into gold and gold (suvarṇa) into stone.601There are four other kinds of nirmāṇa: (1) In the realm of desire (kāmadhātu), substances (dravya) can be transformed by means of herbs (oṣadhi), precious objects (ratnadravya) and magical means; (2) beings endowed with the superknowledges (abhijñā) can transform substances by their magical power (ṛddhibala); (3) the devas, nāgas, asuras, etc., can transform substances by means of the power of retribution (vipākabala) of their [previous] lifetimes; (4) beings rewarded in a lifetime in the form realm (rūpadhātu) can transform substances by the power of concentration (samādhibala).602These imaginary creatures are not subject to birth (jāti), old age (jarā), sickness (vyādhi) and death (maraṇa); they experience neither unhappiness (duḥkha) nor happiness (sukha) and thus are different from humans. This is why they are empty and non-existent. In the same way, all dharmas are without arising (utpāda), duration (sthiti) and cessation (bhaṅga); this is why they are compared to nirmāṇas.
Furthermore, the products of nirmāṇa have no fixed substance (aniyatadravya); [105b] only insofar as they arise from the mind [of metamorphosis] do they have an activity (kriyā), but they do not truly exist. It is the same for human lifetimes; for origin, they have no cause; they come from the minds (citta, synonymous here with karman) of the past existence giving rise to the existence of the present life which is absolutely without reality. This is why dharmas are compared to a nirmāṇa.
When the nirmāṇa mind (nirmāṇacitta) has vanished, the manifestation (nirmāṇa) vanishes as well. It is the same with dharmas: when the causes and conditions (hetupratyaya) have disappeared, the fruit (phala) disappears as well, for it is dependent as is the product of nirmāṇa.
Although they are empty of reality, the nirmāṇas can cause beings to experience joy (muditā), hatred (dveṣa), sadness (daurmanasya), suffering (duḥkha) or confusion (moha). In the same way, although dharmas are empty and unreal, they can cause beings to experience joy (muditā), hatred (dveṣa), sadness (daurmanasya), fear (bhaya), etc. This is why they are compared to a nirmāṇa.
Moreover, the products of metamorphosis (nirmāṇajadharma) lack beginning, middle and end (apūrvamadhyacarama); it is the same with dharmas. When the nirmāṇas arise, they do not go anywhere; when they vanish, they do not go anywhere. It is the same with dharmas.
Finally, the nirmāṇas are pure (lakṣaṇaviśuddha) like space (ākāśa); they are not attached to (sakta) nor defiled by (kliṣṭa) sins or merits (pāpapuṇya). It is the same for the dharmas, for suchness (dharmatā), the true nature (tathatā) or the summit of existence (bhūtakoṭi) is itself (svataḥ) always pure (nityaśuddha). Thus the four great rivers of Jambudvīpa,603 each of which has five hundred tributaries, have their waters polluted in various ways; but when they flow into the great ocean, they are perfectly clear.Question. - It cannot be said that the nirmāṇas are empty. Why? Because the mind of metamorphosis [on which it is dependent] comes from the development (bhāvanā) of a samādhi. It is with this mind [of metamorphosis] that all kinds of nirmāṇas are realized. Whether it is a man or a thing, this nirmāṇa has a cause (hetu) and produces an effect (phala). How can it be empty?
Answer. - We must repeat the answer that we have already given with regard to the shadow (chaya). Although the cause and condition (hetupratyaya) of the nirmāṇa exist, the result, viz., the nirmāṇa, is empty. It is as empty as the speech (vāc) that comes out of the mouth. Even though the mind (citta) and the mouth (mukha) produce this word, it does not exist by the fact of the mind and the mouth alone. The object designated (ukta) by this word may just as well exist as not exist. If we talk about a second head (dvitīya śīrsaka) or a third hand (tṛtīya hasta), we cannot say that this head or this hand exists even though they arise from the mind [that conceives them] and the mouth [that speaks of them]. Thus the Buddha said: "By examining that which does not arise (anutpāda), one is freed from that which arises; by being based on the unconditioned (asaṃskṛta), one is freed from the conditioned (saṃskṛta)." Although the non-arisen dharma (anutpannadharma) does not exist, it can play the rôle of cause and condition (hetupratyaya), and it is the same for the unconditioned (asaṃskṛta). Although the nirmāṇa itself is empty, it can itself give rise to a mind. As with the other nine points of comparison (upamāna), magic show (māyā), mirage (marīcī), etc., it can engender all sorts of minds even though it does not exist.
Furthermore, the nirmāṇa cannot be included in the six causes (hetu) and the four conditions (pratyaya).604 As it is not associated (saṃprayukta) with them, it is empty (śūnya).
Finally, empty [things] are not empty because they are invisible (anidarśana) but because they lack true activity (kāritra). This is why dharmas are compared to a nirmāṇa.
Question. - Any dharma whatsoever is as empty (śūnya) as the ten points of comparison [used here in the sūtra]; why does the sūtra limit itself to these ten comparisons and not give as example mountains (parvata), rivers (nadī), stone walls (śailakuḍya), etc?
[105c] Answer. - Although all dharmas are empty, there are differences (viśeṣa) among them: emptiness is harder to see in some than in others. Here the sūtra compares {dharmas] the emptiness of which is hard to see [with other dharmas, e.g., magic show, mirage, etc.], the emptiness of which is easy to see..
Moreover, there are two types of dharmas: those that are the object of an erroneous judgment (cittābhiniveśasthāna) and those that are not the object of an erroneous judgment (cittānabhiniveśasthāna). Here we are using the second type in order to understand the first type.
Question. - Why are the ten points of comparison not the object of erroneous judgment?
Answer. - Because these ten points [magic show, mirage, etc.] do not last for a long time (acirasthitika) and because they arise and perish easily. This is why they are not the object of an erroneous judgment.
Moreover, there are people who know that these ten points bring about auditory and visual delusions, but who do not know that dharmas are empty. This is why the sūtra compares dharmas [to these ten points] here. If people believed in the reality of the ten points of comparison [used by the sūtra], they would not understand the various objections [raised here against the reality of dharmas] because they would hold [the magic show, the mirage, etc.] to be real. If these ten points of comparison do not fulfill their rôle [in the discussion], we would need to resort to yet other demonstrations (dharmaparyaya).

ТМ · Зарегистрирован: 05.04.2005 Суждений: 12672

Все иллюзия это нигилисты так говорят.

ТМ · Зарегистрирован: 05.04.2005 Суждений: 12672

Паша 1913
Иллюзия в том, что нет пяти органов чувств или в том, что они есть?

Росс · Гость

Фундаментальная сущность дхарм - их иллюзорность. Потому буддийский смысл "ничего не существует" не описывает просто голое отсутствие чего бы то ни было, поскольку такое понимание - всё ещё работа дхарм. Сфера представлений, чувств и концепций, коя ограничивается дхармами, в буддийски гносеологическом смысле - и есть иллюзия, заслоняющая действительное знание, джняну, праджню. То есть здесь не проходит ни позитивизм, ни нигилизм, ни релятивизм, ни какая-то другая концепция.

Паша 1913 · Гость

Паша 1913 пишет:

Впрочем, атман это и есть и вкус и цвет. Просто у каждого существа свой цвет тела, не такой как у других существ. Ну а что касается вкуса, то например вкус пота, - у каждого существа он свой, не такой как у других существ. Запах тела, это тоже атман. У каждого существа он свой. Не такой как у любого другого существа.

Это Вы верно заметили, что все люди индивидуальны. Но нельзя указать умственно на нечто конкретное или умственное что является этим атманом. Например, мы можем считать себя телом и тогда говорим вот эта одежда моего тела. Но нет того, про что он мог бы сказать вот Я Атман, а вот мое тело. Точнее можно так сказать если человек пережил это Я в своем опыте. Но это опыт в веданте, в буддизме считается, что такое Я-Атман нет.

СлаваА

СлаваА пишет:

Паша 1913 пишет:

Впрочем, атман это и есть и вкус и цвет. Просто у каждого существа свой цвет тела, не такой как у других существ. Ну а что касается вкуса, то например вкус пота, - у каждого существа он свой, не такой как у других существ. Запах тела, это тоже атман. У каждого существа он свой. Не такой как у любого другого существа.

Это Вы верно заметили, что все люди индивидуальны. Но нельзя указать умственно на нечто конкретное или умственное что является этим атманом. Например, мы можем считать себя телом и тогда говорим вот эта одежда моего тела. Но нет того, про что он мог бы сказать вот Я Атман, а вот мое тело. Точнее можно так сказать если человек пережил это Я в своем опыте. Но это опыт в веданте, в буддизме считается, что такое Я-Атман нет.

Ну вот, я вижу глазами мою руку и могу на неё указать пальцем другой руки, и сказать что эта рука - это мой атман. Что такое моя рука? Это цвета. Определённые цвета. Цвет. Или, я чувствую давление между моих губ на лице. Я могу утверждать что это ощущение давления - это и есть мой атман. Или, я чувствую ощущение давления в ноге, возникающее при сидении на кровати. Я могу утверждать что это ощущение давления - это мой атман. И я считаю что всё это - правда. Что все те утверждения, слова, об атмане это - правда. А Далай Лама 14 говорил "не возможно обнаружить атман". Наверное мне скажут, что мол атман же это нечто не меняющееся. А моё я - это нечто и меняющееся и не меняющееся. НЕ меняется та особенность моего тела, делающая моё тело отличающимся от тел всех других существ. Ну а меняется цвет моего тела, например когда есть загар, нет загара. Ну вот та особенность это и есть не меняющийся атман. Итак атман это то, что одновременно и меняется и не меняется. Я указал словами на не меняющийся атман. Как ещё указать? Но он есть.

СлаваА

Это, кстати, всё характеристики алаявиджняны, которая первые две Истины: представление мага-māyā , мираж - marīci, сон - svapna, оптическая иллюзия - timira. Потому что она семя заблуждения и объект ошибки.

СлаваА пишет:

Все иллюзия это нигилисты так говорят.

Еще прасангики и дзогченисты, те, у которых прасангика является верхом всех воззрений. (Не в курсе, есть ли иные). Не иллюзия у них только атман, которого нет, поэтому всё - иллюзия. Иллюзорные будды, ЖС, пробуждение и пр. Несмотря на то, что такая всеобщность ничего не объясняет, а является "нашлёпкой" с непонятными целями. Возможно, цель где-то обоснована, но лень искать. Скорее всего есть у Дж. Мипама, который в 19 веке жил и развенчал Цонкапу, как скрытого сватантрика. Там же про разницу "подобие иллюзии" и "иллюзия" должно быть, т.к. это дзогченовская тема.

Тут интересно, что синонимы мирских самскар и прочего расширяют на всё вообще, зачем-то. Т.е. если в начале сказано, что сломанная машина - это сломанные детали, а не 10 представлений, описывающих восприятие дикарей для ремонтника, то в ТБ, с восприятия дикарей, зачем-то, эти примеры расширяют вообще на всё. Надо поискать у него это место.

Паша 1913 · Гость

Вы указали только на меняющийся атман. На постоянный Вы не указали. Сегодня есть бледное тело, завтра загорелое, а через какое-то время старое, а потом его вообще нет.

Паша 1913 · Гость

СлаваА

Не меняющийся, постоянный, атман, это цвет тела, запах тела, звук голоса, например. В цвете-цветах тела, во внешнем виде тела, есть один - никогда не меняющийся цвет. Одновременно есть и другие, меняющиеся цвета. Но они - это он а он это они. Как же так, если они меняются а он не меняется? А вот так. Бывает такое. Это трудно объяснить? Но как вы объясните деятельность говорящих нирманакай, которых у Будды сотни? Они ходят, говорят, работают, но при этом НЕ являются живыми существами. Вы не можете это объяснить? Так удивительно ли то, что вы не сможете объяснить и то что я сказал об атмане?

Паша 1913 · Гость

Отсутствие той дхармы которая когда-то существовала, - это не изменение. Отсутствие это одно а изменение - это другое. Изменяться может только то, что существует. А не отсутствует. Исчезновение дхармы - это не изменение.

Росс · Гость

Правильно Паша. Если метафизическая логика не помогает - можно использовать старую проверенную временем схоластику.
"... изменяться может ТОЛЬКО то, что одновременно является и меняющимся и никогда не меняющимся. Это значит, что меняющимся может быть ТОЛЬКО то, что обладает своим не меняющимся атманом, постоянным атманом."
То есть добавить небольшую незаметную натяжку атмана - и никто не заметит. Very Happy

Неизменное и изменяющееся в буддизме - всё те же условные категории, инструменты мышления, работа дхарм. Потому, просто формальной логикой невозможно прийти к абсолютно удовлетворительному для всех результату реальной картины мира. Другое дело, если логика просто объясняет необходимость перейти на медитацию, дхияны, випашьяны, самапатти и т.д.

Горсть листьев

Горсть листьев пишет:

СлаваА пишет:

Если пишется некий текст, который претендует задеть интеллект, то он должен обладать логикой. Если я хочу прикоснуться к истине через слушание, то я лучше послушаю мантры.

Считаете, что лектор что-то неправильно изложил относительно анатты?

Да, нет вроде все правильно изложил. Но концовка улыбнула. Smile

"И в этом основной мотив буддийского учения о человеке: вместо вульгарного, обычного, никакого, человека толпы превратиться в высшее существо, полностью контролирующее самого себя и абсолютно свободное от всех видов зависимостей."
Анната аннатой, а необусловленного Господа отменять не надо. Smile