Прасанга ничего не утверждает?

"прасанга ничего не утверждает поэтому нечего опровергнуть" .

Исследующий: "Имеют мадхъямики тезисы или нет?" - должен признать ту "середину" (мадхъяму), которая делает (человека) "сторонником срединности" (мадхъямиком). Поэтому он вынужден признать и [лишенное крайностей] понимание, что ни одна пылинка не существует абсолютно, а [только] условно, -все [явления] подобны иллюзии, [поскольку возникают] взаимозависимо.
Следовательно, позиция есть.

     These positions can be understood as saying, ‘I agree with every view’, ‘I agree
with no view’ and ‘I agree with some views, and disagree with other views’.52 The
second view is the closest I have found in the Pāli canon of the view ‘all views are
false’.53 The Dīghanakha-sutta has Dīghanakha announcing his view to the Buddha.
Upon hearing it, the Buddha asks Dīghanakha: ‘This view of yours, Aggivessana,
“Nothing is acceptable to me” – is not at least that view acceptable to you?’54
Dīghanakha replies: ‘If this view of mine were acceptable to me, Master Gotama,
it too would be all the same, it too would be all the same.’55 The Buddha is attempting
to find out how this view is being held. Is Dīghanakha’s view a non-position, its
aim to overcome all cognitive standpoints, or is Dīghanakha holding to his view?
As the sutta continues, there are many who would reply in the same fashion as
Dīghanakha, ‘yet they do not abandon that view and they still take up another
view’.56 However, there are few, adopting Dīghanakha’s view, and replying as he
did ‘who abandon that view and do not take up some other view’.57

It is at this point that the other two views are introduced into the sutta. Then is
found the following:

The view of those recluses and brahmins who hold the doctrine and view
‘Everything is acceptable to me’ [the same evaluation is given to the
third view] is close to lust, close to bondage, close to delighting, close to
holding, close to attachment. The view of those recluses and brahmins
who hold the doctrine and view ‘Nothing is acceptable to me’ is close to
non-lust, close to non-bondage, close to non-delighting, close to nonholding,
close to non-attachment.58

Dīghanakha is delighted and shows his delight, ‘Master Gotama commends
my point of view’.59 However, Dīghanakha’s view is only ‘right’, the sutta suggests,
if the view is abandoned, and another not adopted. If it accomplishes a turning
away from all views, it could be a sammā-dihi. The text continues that none of
these three views should be ‘obstinately adhered to’60 with the thought ‘only this
is true, anything else is wrong’.61 Holding any of the views in this way would
cause ‘dispute’ (viggaho) with the holders of the other two views. This dispute
would lead to ‘quarrels’ (vivāda), ‘trouble’ (vighāta) and ‘vexation’ (vihesa). All
three views are condemned in the following way:

Foreseeing for himself dispute, quarrels, trouble and vexation, he abandons
that view and does not take up some other view. This is how there comes
to be the abandoning of these views; this is how there comes to be the
relinquishing of these views.62

It is in this context that Dīghanakha hears the dhamma, and has the knowledge
that, ‘all that is subject to arising is subject to cessation’.63 This is the achievement
of right-view. Dīghanakha is advised to let go of the view that ‘I agree with noviews’,
and transcend views, through the realisation of right-view. The view, ‘I
agree with no-views’ is a wrong-view, because this view can cause craving and
attachment. To achieve the abandonment of views, there must be a transformation
of thought and action which overcomes all attachment to views. It is right-view
that accomplishes this. I would suggest that this is a clear example of the proper
understanding of views in the Nikāyas. Wrong-views cause attachment, right-view
causes the abandoning of craving and attachment.

-- Notion of Ditthi. Paul Fuller. pp.154-155.