
Part Three

ANNOTATED ENGLISH
TRANSLATION
OF THE CHAPTER
ON THE MUNDANE PATH
(*Laukikamārga*)

Translation¹

[3.27. CHOOSING THE PATH]

There are² no more than two ways³ that lie ahead of the yogi⁴ who has reached⁵ [the basic level of] contemplation⁶ and has thus experienced some delight in abandonment.⁷ Which are these two? They are the mundane [way] and the supramundane [way].⁸ The novice ascetic⁹ who has reached [the basic level of] contemplation¹⁰ [thinks,] ‘I shall proceed by either the mundane way or the supramundane [way],’ [and further] cultivates¹¹ this very contemplation.¹² In as much as he intensely cultivates [it], as days and nights [of practice] pass one after another,¹³ the [above-mentioned] ease and focusing of the mind¹⁴ greatly increase. And when his contemplation has become fixed, steady, and firm, [when his] purified conviction¹⁵ with regard to the meditative object¹⁶ manifests itself, and [when] the characteristics¹⁷ are grasped from [the meditative object] in agreement with tranquillity and insight,¹⁸ then if willing to proceed by the mundane path, he undertakes [its] practice;¹⁹ or [if willing to proceed] by the supramundane path[, he takes up its practice].

[3.28. THE MUNDANE PATH]

[3.28.1. Categories of persons proceeding by the mundane path]

[3.28.1.1. FOUR CATEGORIES]

How many are the [categories of] persons who in the present life proceed by the very mundane path, not by the supramundane one? Answer: they are four, to wit, all the non-Buddhists; those who are Buddhist followers but who[se spiritual faculties] are weak and who have previously practised tranquillity;²⁰ likewise, those who[se spiritual

faculties] are keen but whose roots of the wholesome [factors] are unripe;^{2 1} and bodhisattvas wishing to attain Awakening not in the present life but in the future.^{2 2} These are the four [categories of] persons who in this very life^{2 3} are able to take the mundane path.^{2 4}

[3.28.1.2. TWO CATEGORIES]

Moreover, proceeding by the mundane path is twofold: that of ordinary people with complete bondage and that of adepts^{2 5} with partial bondage. What does this refer to? [It refers to] proceeding by means of detachment from sensual pleasures^{2 6} upon seeing the coarseness of sensual pleasures and the serenity of the first absorption,^{2 7} [be it] attainment [or] birth;^{2 8} [the process] is to be understood similarly up to the detachment from the station of nothing whatsoever.^{2 9} [Furthermore,] the attainment of non-ideation^{3 0} as well as the generation^{3 1} of the five supernatural faculties^{3 2} on the basis of meditative attainments [is also to be understood] likewise.^{3 3}

[3.28.2. The seven contemplations]

[3.28.2.1. THE PRACTICE OF THE SEVEN CONTEMPLATIONS FOR THE ATTAINMENT OF THE FIRST ABSORPTION]

[3.28.2.1.1. Enumeration of the seven contemplations]

The yogi intent upon [achieving] detachment from sensual pleasures attains it by means of the seven contemplations.^{3 4} Which are these seven contemplations? They are the [contemplation] perceiving characteristics, the [contemplation] leading to conviction, the [contemplation] engendering separation, the [contemplation] comprising delight, the investigating contemplation, the [contemplation] attaining the culmination of the practice, and the [contemplation which represents the] fruit of the culmination of the practice.^{3 5}

[3.28.2.1.2. Contemplation perceiving characteristics]

[3.28.2.1.2.1. Definition]

What is the contemplation perceiving characteristics? It is that contemplation by means of which [the ascetic] perceives the coarse characteristic of the sensual pleasures as well as the serene characteristic in the first absorption. And how does [the ascetic] perceive the coarse characteristic? By examining the six aspects of the sensual pleasures, [to wit,] meaning, thing, characteristic, category, time, and reasoning.^{3 6}

[3.28.2.1.2.2. Meaning]

To start with, he examines the meaning of coarseness. The sensual pleasures are detrimental, fraught with much misfortune, much calamity, much plague. The fact that the sensual pleasures are fraught with much detriment, and so on, up to being fraught with much plague, this is the meaning of coarseness.

[3.28.2.1.2.3. Thing]

He [also] examines the thing[s connected with sensual pleasures]. That is, [he examines that] there is lust for sensual pleasures inwards, [and] there is lust for sensual pleasures outwards.^{3 7}

[3.28.2.1.2.4. Characteristic]

He [also] examines the specific characteristic [as follows]. Those are defilement sensual pleasures, [and] those are object sensual pleasures.^{3 8} Furthermore, they are [sensual pleasures] giving rise to pleasure, giving rise to suffering, and giving rise to neither suffering nor pleasure.^{3 9} Those giving rise to pleasure are the basis of^{4 0} passion [as well as] the basis of the perversion of ideation^{4 1} and of mind. Those giving rise to suffering are the basis of hatred [as well as] the basis of wrath^{4 2} and enmity.^{4 3} Those giving rise to neither suffering nor pleasure are the basis of concealment [of one's faults],^{4 4} stubborn adherence [to one's views],^{4 5} deceit,^{4 6} dissimulation,^{4 7} lack of sense of shame, shameless behaviour^{4 8} as well as the basis of the perversion of view.^{4 9} These sensual pleasures are thus accompanied by [specific] depraved feelings and depraved defilements. In this way, he examines the specific characteristic of the sensual pleasures.

How does he examine the general characteristic? All these sensual pleasures are equally associated and connected with the suffering of birth, the suffering of old age, and so on, up to the suffering of [one's] wishes [remaining] unfulfilled.^{5 0} Even those hedonists^{5 1} who achieve [the] great[est] gratification of [their] sensual pleasures are not free from the law of birth, and so forth. Short-lived^{5 2} [indeed] is their achievement [of sensual gratification]. Thus he examines the general characteristic [of the sensual pleasures].

[3.28.2.1.2.5. Category]

How does he examine the category? These sensual pleasures fall into the black category.^{5 3} They are like a skeleton, like a chunk of meat, like a torch of hay, like a pit of embers, like a venomous snake, like a dream, like a borrowed ornament, and like a tree fruit.^{5 4} Even while striving [to gratify their] sensual pleasures,^{5 5} sentient beings experience the suffering generated by [the hardships associated with this] striving, [as they also] experience the suffering generated by [the effort required for the] protection [of their belongings], by disruption of affecti[ve relations], by non-contentment, by servitude, and by wrong deeds. All these should be understood just as previously [explained].^{5 6}

Likewise, the Exalted One said that he who indulges in sensual pleasures^{5 7} [is bound to meet with] five detriments:^{5 8} 'Sensual pleasures have little flavour, [beget] much suffering, much detriment.^{5 9} Surely, when indulging in sensual pleasures, there is no sufficiency or satisfaction or satiation.^{6 0} In such a way^{6 1} have sensual pleasures been censured by the Buddhas and Buddha's disciples, wise beings, rightly accomplished, true men. Surely, indulging in sensual pleasures leads [only] to accumulating fetters. I [therefore] declare^{6 2} that there is no evil and unwholesome act whatsoever which one will not commit [for the sake of sensual pleasures].'^{6 3}

Thus these sensual pleasures cause non-satiation, are common to many,^{6 4} are the cause of unrighteous and wicked deeds, increase the thirst for [further] sensual pleasures, are to be avoided by the wise, swiftly come to extinction,^{6 5} are dependent upon conditions [for coming into being], constitute the basis of carelessness, are hollow, impermanent [and] vain, their nature is falsehood and trickery, are like an illusion deceiving [only] the fools^{6 6}.^{6 7} Whether pertaining to this present life or to a future one, whether divine or human, sensual pleasures are the very domain of the Evil One,

the very crop [sown] by the Evil One,⁶⁸ where divers bad, unwholesome mental factors arise, to wit, covetousness,⁶⁹ malice,⁷⁰ violence,⁷¹ or what[ever] further [factors] which constitute obstacles⁷² for the noble disciple practising [spiritual cultivation].⁷³ In various ways do these sensual pleasures fall, for most part, into the black category. Thus he examines the category.

[3.28.2.1.2.6. Time]

How does he examine the time? [Whether] in the past, future, or present, these sensual pleasures are constantly and incessantly thus fraught with much misfortune, much plague, much detriment. Thus he examines the time.

[3.28.2.1.2.7. Reasoning]

How does he examine the reasoning?⁷⁴ [The objects of] sensual pleasures are gathered, achieved, and accumulated with great struggle, great eagerness, great pains, by various and manifold skills. Furthermore, even when successfully accumulated and achieved, they merely serve to counteract only suffering whenever it arises, outwards, for the sake of [one's] household, [to wit, one's] mother and father, child and wife,⁷⁵ female and male slaves,⁷⁶ servants, day-labourers, friends, companions,⁷⁷ kinsmen and relatives;⁷⁸ or [inwards,] for the sake of one's own body, material, coarse, made of the four elements, growing upon boiled rice⁷⁹ [or] coarse gruel,⁸⁰ always requiring ointment,⁸¹ bathing,⁸² and massage,⁸³ [yet] bound to⁸⁴ breaking, splitting, scattering, and destruction.⁸⁵ Food is [but] a remedy for the suffering of hunger. Clothes are [but] a prevention of the suffering of cold and heat as well as [being meant] to cover [one's] shameful private parts. A sleeping place or a seat is [but] a prevention of the suffering of drowsiness and fatigue or walking and standing [respectively]. The medicine needed by the sick is [but] a prevention of the suffering of disease. These sensual pleasures are thus [but] remedies for suffering. Therefore, they should be not enjoyed with passion or attachment but rather⁸⁶ [be experienced] like a medicine [taken] by a sick [person] afflicted with disease only in order to alleviate the illness.⁸⁷

This is also [taught in] the Trustworthy Tradition [of Buddhist scriptures]⁸⁸ [which say] that these sensual pleasures are coarse in this or that way. Inwardly, intuition⁸⁹ also arises [confirming] me [this fact]. The inferential [type of reasoning] also shows the same.⁹⁰ And the nature of these sensual pleasures [existing] from beginningless times, [their] generally accepted essence,⁹¹ the essence beyond thinking, is like this[, too]. Neither should it be thought of nor reflected upon. In such a way should reasoning be examined.

[3.28.2.1.2.8. Concluding remarks]

Having perceived the characteristic of coarse[ness] of the sensual pleasures in this way, to wit, through the six aspects, he [then] perceives the characteristic of seren[ity] in the first absorption [in the following way]: in the first absorption, there is absolutely no such coarseness which exists in the realm of sensual pleasures; being free from this coarseness, the first absorption is serene. He perceives the characteristic of seren[ity] in the first absorption in this way. Thus, with his attention pertaining to the concentrated level [of thought], he perceives the coarse characteristic in sensual pleasures and the serene characteristic in the first absorption.⁹² This is called the contemplation

perceiving characteristics. Verily, this contemplation should be known as being mixed with listening and reflection.^{9 3}

[3.28.2.1.3. Contemplation leading to conviction]

Having thus ascertained the sensual pleasures and the first absorption by means of [respectively] the coarse and the serene characteristic correctly examined,^{9 4} he transcends [the level of] listening and reflection and becomes convinced [of these two characteristics] exclusively in the form of [meditative] cultivation. He cultivates tranquillity and insight, [each] having the characteristic [of coarseness and serenity] as [its] meditative object.^{9 5} And cultivating [in like manner], he repeatedly concentrates on and [consequently] becomes convinced of the coarseness and serenity examined in such a way.^{9 6} This is called the contemplation leading to conviction.^{9 7}

[3.28.2.1.4. Contemplation engendering separation]

Because of assiduous practice, cultivation, [and] zealous exercise, for the first time is the path leading to the elimination of defilements generated by him. And upon kindling the path leading to the elimination of defilements, the contemplation which accompanies it is called [contemplation] engendering separation.^{9 8}

[3.28.2.1.5. Contemplation comprising delight]

For the first time, because of the abandonment of the defilements belonging to [the realm of] sensual pleasures which should be abandoned in the beginning and [also] because of the elimination of the noxiousness corresponding to these [defilements], he thereupon becomes [able to] rejoice at [this] abandonment and separation.^{9 9} And seeing benefit in the abandonment [of defilements], he experiences some joy and pleasure [born of this]^{1 0 0} separation.^{1 0 1} Just for the purpose of eliminating torpor, drowsiness, [and] agitation,^{1 0 2} he repeatedly gladdens [/encourages] [his mind] through the contemplation conducive to cheering up,^{1 0 3} [and] makes [his mind] loathe through the contemplation conducive to loathing.^{1 0 4} This is called the contemplation comprising delight.^{1 0 5 1 0 6}

[3.28.2.1.6. Investigating contemplation]

He who thus rejoices at abandonment [as well as] at spiritual cultivation [and] meditates correctly, due to being firmly grounded in the practice of wholesome categories, is not possessed [/ensnared] by^{1 0 7} the defilements associated with sensual pleasures, whether he wanders about or dwells [in one place].^{1 0 8} [At this moment,] it occurs to him: '[Could it be the case that] I do not experience lust^{1 0 9} for [the objects of] the sensual pleasures,^{1 1 0} [though it] actually [still] exists [within my mind]? Or can it be that [I do not experience it because] it does not exist [any more]?' Wishing to investigate [this], he directs his attention to this or that pleasing, agreeable image [/characteristic]. Since the latent proclivities have not been completely abandoned by him, as he directs his attention to this image [/characteristic], he experiences a mental state of fondness [for it], intentness [upon it], indulgence [in it]. [Thus his] equanimity does not stand firm, nor [does his] disgust, dislike, aversion, [and] repulsion [towards sensual pleasures function]. It [then] occurs to him: 'My mind is not properly freed, nor is it liberated from sensual pleasures; my mind is restrained by effort, as water is held

[by a dam], it is not [yet] restrained by [its very] nature.^{1 1 1} Let me dwell even more in rejoicing at abandonment [and] spiritual cultivation for further [approaching] the complete abandonment of these latent proclivities.⁷ This is called the investigating contemplation.^{1 1 2}

[3.28.2.1.7. Contemplation attaining the culmination of the practice]

He dwells still more in rejoicing at abandonment [and] spiritual cultivation, intent upon [the practice of] tranquillity and insight, and repeatedly investigates [the defilements]. And while he cultivates the antidote, and time after time investigates the [defilements which have been] abandoned and [those which have] not [been] abandoned [yet],^{1 1 3} his mind is temporarily freed from all the defilements of the realm of sensual pleasures. But this does not amount to a complete eradication^{1 1 4} of [their] seeds for ever. At this point, the contemplation at the end of the preparatory path of the first absorption,^{1 1 5} [which serves as an] antidote for all [these] defilements, is generated. This is called the contemplation attaining the culmination^{1 1 6} of the practice.^{1 1 7}

[3.28.2.1.8. Contemplation representing the fruit of the culmination of the practice]

Immediately following it, [the ascetic] reaches the first absorption proper^{1 1 8} having the [previous contemplation]^{1 1 9} as [its] condition [and] cause. [It is] the contemplation which accompanies the first absorption proper.^{1 2 0} This is called the contemplation [representing] the fruit of the culmination of the practice.^{1 2 1}

[3.28.2.1.9. Additional clarifications]

[3.28.2.1.9.1. Experience of joy and pleasure in the contemplations]

[The ascetic] abiding in the contemplation engendering separation and in the [contemplation] comprising delight gladdens^{1 2 2} his body with joy and pleasure born of separation in such a way that they faintly manifest themselves^{1 2 3} from time to time. At the time of [abiding in] the contemplation attaining the culmination of the practice, [he] suffuses^{1 2 4} [his body with them] in such a way that they profusely and amply manifest themselves from time to time. Furthermore, for [the ascetic] abiding in the contemplation which represents the fruit of the culmination of the practice, there is no [part] whatsoever of the entire body which is not suffused [or] could be still suffused^{1 2 5} with joy and pleasure born of separation.^{1 2 6} At this moment,^{1 2 7} he dwells having attained the first absorption which is separated from sensual pleasures, is separated from bad and unwholesome factors, is possessed of rough examination, is possessed of subtle investigation,^{1 2 8} [has] joy and pleasure born of separation,^{1 2 9} [and is endowed] with five limbs. The [ascetic] is [now] called one who stands firm in the fruit of the practice of the path of the antidote for the realm of sensual pleasures [as well as] one who has reached detachment from sensual pleasures.

[3.28.2.1.9.2. Elimination of the defilements through the practice of the contemplations]

By means of the contemplation perceiving characteristics, [the ascetic] correctly ascertains what is to be abandoned. He also correctly discerns what is to be attained. And he directs [his] mind towards the abandonment of what is to be abandoned and

towards the attainment of what is to be attained. And by means of the contemplation leading to conviction, he embarks upon the correct practice for abandonment and attainment. By means of the contemplation engendering separation, he eliminates the strong defilements.¹³⁰ By means of the [contemplation] comprising delight, he eliminates the middling kind of defilements. By means of the investigating [contemplation], he makes [his] mind abide in freedom from the conceit [/vain misapprehension] of attainment.¹³¹ By means of the [contemplation] attaining the culmination of the practice, he eliminates the weak kind of defilements. By means of the [contemplation which represents the] fruit of the culmination of the practice, he enjoys the [very] fruit of the cultivation of these types of contemplations which have [thus] been cultivated, [indeed] well cultivated.¹³²

[3.28.2.1.9.3. Relation with the set of four contemplations]

Furthermore, both the contemplation perceiving characteristics and the contemplation leading to conviction are called the suitable contemplation which accompanies the antidote of reviling [the defilements].¹³³ Both the contemplation engendering separation and the [contemplation] attaining the culmination of the practice represent the antidote contemplation which accompanies the antidote of abandoning [the defilements]. Herein, the contemplation comprising delight constitutes both the antidote [contemplation] and the [contemplation which engenders] cheering up. Herein, the investigating contemplation is called the examining contemplation. It should thus be known that the four contemplations, to wit, the suitable [one], the [one which is] antidote, the [one which engenders] cheering up, and the examining [one],¹³⁴ are included in the six contemplations [above, i.e., from the contemplation perceiving characteristics to the contemplation attaining the culmination of the practice].¹³⁵

[3.28.2.2. THE PRACTICE OF THE SEVEN CONTEMPLATIONS FOR THE ATTAINMENT OF THE REMAINING MEDITATIVE LEVELS]

[3.28.2.2.1. Introductory remarks]

Just as the attainment of the first absorption [is obtained] by means of the seven contemplations, so [is] the attainment of the second, third, and fourth absorptions [as well as] the attainment of the stations¹³⁶ of [boundless] space,¹³⁷ of [boundless] consciousness,¹³⁸ of nothing whatsoever, and the station of neither ideation nor non-ideation [obtained] by means of the same seven contemplations.^{139 140}

[3.28.2.2.2. The attainment of the second absorption]

The contemplation perceiving characteristics, [generated] for the attainment of the second absorption, is [that] by means of which [the ascetic] perceives the coarse characteristic in [the acts of] rough examination [and subtle investigation]¹⁴¹ as well as the serene characteristic in the second absorption, which has no rough examination [and subtle investigation]. He who has attained the first absorption, [and] has [indeed] obtained it, thus looks upon the coarseness in rough examination [and subtle investigation]: 'Rough examination is [the mental factor] which [although] pertaining to the level of concentrated [thought],¹⁴² operates on the meditative object unsteadily,¹⁴³ and due to initially occurring, is coarse mental verbalisation¹⁴⁴ with regard to the meditative object. Subtle investigation is [the mental factor] which is

connected to [and] follows this [rough examination] and is subtler mental verbalisation with regard to the meditative object [on which, however, it] similarly operates unsteadily.^{1 4 5} Furthermore, these [acts of] rough examination and subtle investigation are mental functions, arise when the mind arises, occur together [/simultaneously] [with it], are united [with it], [and] operating on the same meditative object. Thus they arise internally [i.e., within the mental continuum], but are comprised in the external base.^{1 4 6} And all [these acts] verily [occur] in the past, future, and present, are produced from causes [and] conditions, are [characterised by] arising and decay,^{1 4 7} are temporary, appear for [only] a short while, cause agitation to the mind, are disturbing, manifest themselves as the absence of perfect serenity. If compared to^{1 4 8} the superior level, owing to the fact that [they are] associated with dwelling in suffering, they belong to the black [category] [and] are accompanied by only little joy and pleasure born from separation. And by its nature, this level is such that mental processes possessed of rough examination and subtle investigation constantly, ceaselessly operate for [one] dwelling in it, [and therefore, this level] is not serene, [not] completely serene,^{1 4 9} — by such aspects and others, he should perceive the coarse characteristic in the [acts of] rough examination [and subtle investigation].^{1 5 0} There is absolutely no coarse characteristic of this sort in the second absorption, which is not possessed of rough examination [and subtle investigation]. Therefore, the second absorption is serene due to the disappearance of this coarseness.^{1 5 1}

The remaining contemplations [generated] for the attainment of the second absorption should be properly understood as previous[ly explained for the first absorption].

[3.28.2.2.3. The attainment of the remaining absorptions and the immaterial stations]

The seven contemplations should properly be understood in the same way with respect to each level up to the attainment of the station of neither ideation nor non-ideation. Furthermore, the coarse characteristic with respect to all inferior levels up to the station of nothing whatsoever should, in brief, be understood as twofold: [it is characteristic] for the lower levels [1] that one dwells in more suffering^{1 5 2} and in less serenity and [2] that one has a shorter lifespan.^{1 5 3} [The ascetic] properly examines this twofold coarse characteristic by means of the six aspects^{1 5 4} with regard to whatever level he wishes to become detached from; and [reagarding the levels] above, he properly examines the serene characteristic [through the seven contemplations] up to the contemplation representing the fruit of practice.^{1 5 5 1 5 6}

[3.28.3. Glosses upon the canonical formulae of the eight meditative attainments]

[3.28.3.1. FIRST ABSORPTION]

[3.28.3.1.1. Gloss upon ‘separated from sensual pleasures’]^{1 5 7}

‘Separated from sensual pleasures’: sensual pleasures are twofold, [i.e.,] defilement sensual pleasures and object sensual pleasures.^{1 5 8} Separation from sensual pleasures is also twofold, [i.e.,] separation from the union [with defilements] and separation from the object [of the sensual pleasures].^{1 5 9}

[3.28.3.1.2. Gloss upon ‘separated from bad and unwholesome factors’]

‘Separated from bad and unwholesome factors’: [bad and unwholesome factors] are secondary defilements,¹⁶⁰ unwholesome factors which have their causes in sensual pleasures,¹⁶¹ to wit, [those factors which make] bodily misdeeds, verbal misdeeds, mental misdeeds, [such as] taking up a [stabbing] weapon, taking up a staff, strife, fight, quarrel, dispute, guile, deception, fraud, [and] untrue words occur.¹⁶² By abandoning these, [the ascetic becomes] **separated from bad and unwholesome factors**.

[3.28.3.1.3. Gloss upon ‘possessed of rough examination, possessed of subtle investigation’]

Due to not seeing [yet] the deficiency in rough examination and subtle investigation, [the first absorption is] ‘**possessed of rough examination, possessed of subtle investigation**’ in the form of [being accompanied by acts of]¹⁶³ rough examination and subtle investigation pertaining to its own level, which are antidotes for sensual pleasures [and represent] wholesome [factors].^{164 165}

[3.28.3.1.4. Gloss upon ‘born of separation’]

Separation from sensual pleasures is [obtained with the achievement of]¹⁶⁶ the contemplation attaining the culmination of the practice. [Joy and pleasure] immediately arise from it, having it as its cause [and] condition. Therefore, [the canonical formula] says, ‘**born of separation**’.

[3.28.3.1.5. Gloss upon ‘joy and pleasure’]

Due to the achievement of the goal wished for [and] desired, due to not seeing [yet] the deficiency in joy, due to the disappearance of all noxiousness, [and] because of the [resulting] great mental and bodily malleability[, i.e.,] ease,¹⁶⁷ [the first absorption is said to be characterised by]¹⁶⁸ ‘**joy and pleasure**’.^{169 170}

[3.28.3.1.6. Gloss upon ‘the first absorption’]

[It is called] ‘**the first**’ because one counts in regular order and because [by attaining it, the ascetic] rises up above the realm of sensual pleasures for the first time. [It is called] ‘**absorption**’ due to the correct reflection¹⁷¹ upon the meditative object as well as to being linked to [this object] by means of one-pointed mindfulness.¹⁷²

[3.28.3.1.7. Gloss upon ‘having attained’]

[In the canonical formula, it is said] ‘**having attained**’ because [the ascetic has reached] the state of [the contemplation which represents the] fruit of the culmination of the practice.

[3.28.3.1.8. Gloss upon ‘dwells’]

And subsequently, having completed the intense practice of meditative cultivation, [the ascetic is able to] obtain [the absorption at] will, [able to] obtain [it] without any labour, [able to] obtain [it] without any difficulty, and spends in¹⁷³ this meditative attainment a whole night, a whole day, [or] when he wishes [so], as much as up to seven

nights and days. Therefore, [the canonical formula] says, ‘dwells’.¹⁷⁴

[3.28.3.2. SECOND ABSORPTION]

[3.28.3.2.1. Gloss upon ‘due to the stilling of the rough examination and the subtle investigation, due to [achieving] inner clarity’]¹⁷⁵

Having turned [his] mind away from the characteristics of the concentration possessed of rough examination and subtle investigation, [the ascetic] binds [his mind] to the characteristics of the concentration without rough examination and subtle investigation. Having discarded [/withdrawn from] the meditative object unsteadily operating,¹⁷⁶ owing to the [attainment of a] homogeneous [mental] state,¹⁷⁷ [the ascetic] directs and fixes [his] mind, [which has become] serene and clear, to a meditative object steadily operating. Therefore, [the canonical formula] says, ‘due to the stilling of the rough examination and the subtle investigation, due to [achieving] inner clarity’.¹⁷⁸

[3.28.3.2.2. Gloss upon ‘due to the singleness of mind’]

Because of the repeated cultivation of this very concentration without rough examination and subtle investigation, [the ascetic] transcends the stage [in which it is still] broken and interrupted by rough examination and subtle investigation¹⁷⁹ and attains an unbroken and uninterrupted stage. Therefore, [the canonical formula] says, ‘due to the singleness of mind’.¹⁸⁰

[3.28.3.2.3. Gloss upon ‘without rough examination, without subtle investigation’]

[The second absorption is called] ‘without rough examination, without subtle investigation’ because of the complete abandonment of the rough examination [and] the subtle investigation.

[3.28.3.2.4. Gloss upon ‘born of concentration’]

Concentration is [obtained with the achievement of] the contemplation attaining the culmination of the practice [at this meditative level]. Because it arises immediately after it, having it as its cause [and] condition, therefore, [the canonical formula] says, ‘born of concentration’.¹⁸¹

[3.28.3.2.5. Gloss upon ‘joy and pleasure’]

Due to the achievement of the goal wished for and desired, due to not seeing [yet] the deficiency in joy, [the ascetic is] in [a state] accompanied by rejoicing and [mental] satisfaction, due to the disappearance of all noxiousness [which corresponds to] the category of the defilements of the first absorption [characterised by]¹⁸² rough examination and subtle investigation, due to being accompanied by pleasure [manifested as] mental and bodily malleability[, i.e.,] ease which counteracts this [noxiousness],¹⁸³ [the canonical formula says,] ‘joy and pleasure’.¹⁸⁴

[3.28.3.2.6. Gloss upon ‘the second’, etc.]

[It is called ‘the second absorption’ because] it is ‘the second’ when counting in regular order. All [the remainder of the canonical formula] should be understood in the

same way as previous[ly explained for the first absorption].

[3.28.3.3. THIRD ABSORPTION]

[3.28.3.3.1. Gloss upon ‘due to detachment from joy’]¹⁸⁵

[The ascetic] sees the deficiency in the characteristics¹⁸⁶ of joy. Therefore, [the canonical formula] says, ‘due to detachment from joy’.¹⁸⁷

[3.28.3.3.2. Gloss upon ‘dwells equanimous’]

At this stage, for the [ascetic] exerting [his] mind on the third absorption, which is free from joy, the twofold defect causing agitation to the mind has disappeared, [to wit,] rough examination and subtle investigation [already] at [the level] the second absorption, and now joy. Therefore, it is said, ‘dwells equanimous’. For these two factors are what causes agitation to the mind [and] acts as an impediment to uninterrupted equanimity.¹⁸⁸ Concerning this point, in the first absorption, there are rough examination and subtle investigation, and therefore uninterrupted equanimity [can]not operate. In the second absorption, there is joy, and therefore uninterrupted equanimity [can]not operate here either. Therefore, this [kind of] equanimity does not exist in the first and second absorptions. Therefore, it is said that in the third absorption the meditator ‘dwells equanimous’.

[3.28.3.3.3. Gloss upon ‘mindful, discerning’]

Being equanimous, he [can] dwell with [his] mindfulness¹⁸⁹ fully manifested in such a way that those ideations and acts of attention accompanying joy do not appear. If, however, those ideations and acts of attention accompanying joy sometimes appear because of losing the mindfulness due to lack of [sufficient] practice, [the ascetic] quite swiftly comprehends them with [his] wisdom, quite correctly knows [them], and does not put up with [them] whenever they arise. [Instead,] he removes [them], brings [them] to an end, makes his mind indifferent [to them].¹⁹⁰ Therefore, [the canonical formula] says, ‘mindful, discerning’.¹⁹¹

[3.28.3.3.4. Gloss upon ‘free from joy’]¹⁹²

At this stage, for [the ascetic] thus dwelling equanimous, mindful, [and] discerning, as a result of assiduous practice, of cultivation, of intense training, the feeling accompanied by joy, which has caused pleasurable excitement to the mind, is eliminated, and a feeling ‘free from joy’, serene, completely serene arises in [his] mind as remedy to joy.

[3.28.3.3.5. Gloss upon ‘and he experiences pleasure with [his] body’]

At this stage, he experiences pleasure as a feeling and pleasure as ease with [his] material body¹⁹³ [as well as his] mental body.¹⁹⁴ Therefore, [the canonical formula] says, ‘and he experiences pleasure with [his] body’.

[3.28.3.3.6. Gloss upon ‘which the Noble Ones describe [with the words]

“[he is] equanimous, mindful, dwelling in pleasure”,

[he] dwells having attained the third absorption’]

Below the third absorption, there is neither pleasure of this sort nor uninterrupted

equanimity. And above the third absorption, though equanimity is obtained, there is, however, no pleasure. Because below this [level both] pleasure and equanimity are absent and above [this level] pleasure is absent, it is this abode, i.e., the third absorption, **‘which the Noble Ones describe** (with reference to the person enjoying [/dwelling in] [its] obtainment) **[with the words] “[he is] equanimous, mindful, dwelling in pleasure”, [he] dwells having attained the third absorption”**.¹⁹⁵ Furthermore, **‘Noble Ones’** [refer to] the Buddhas and the Buddhas’ disciples.

[3.28.3.4. FOURTH ABSORPTION]

[3.28.3.4.1. Gloss upon ‘due to the abandonment of pleasure’]¹⁹⁶

Due to the similarity of the antidote, the antidote [leading] to the abandonment of pleasure is not mentioned; only the abandonment of pleasure [to which] this antidote is applied is mentioned. But what is this antidote? It consists in equanimity, mindfulness, and discernment. Due to the repeated practice of this [antidote], [the ascetic who] has transcended the third absorption abandons pleasure, which pertains to the third absorption. Therefore, [the canonical formula] says, **‘due to the abandonment of pleasure’**.¹⁹⁷

[3.28.3.4.2. Gloss upon ‘due to the abandonment of pleasure and due to the abandonment of pain as well as due to the fact that [mental] satisfaction and dissatisfaction have already disappeared before’]

At this stage, the meditator transcends [both] pleasure and pain.¹⁹⁸ Therefore, summing up both what has been previously abandoned and what is now abandoned,¹⁹⁹ [the canonical formula] thus says, **‘due to the abandonment of pleasure and due to the abandonment of pain as well as due to the fact that [mental] satisfaction²⁰⁰ and dissatisfaction²⁰¹ have already disappeared before’**.

[3.28.3.4.3. Gloss upon ‘neither painful nor pleasant’]

Due to the abandonment of pleasure upon attaining the fourth absorption and of pain upon attaining the second absorption, due to the disappearance of [mental] satisfaction upon attaining the third absorption [and] of dissatisfaction upon attaining the first absorption,²⁰² it is a fact²⁰³ that by now—due to the abandonment of pleasure and pain—only the feeling of neither-pain-nor-pleasure²⁰⁴ remains for him. Therefore, [the canonical formula] says, **‘neither painful nor pleasant’**.²⁰⁵

[3.28.3.4.4. Gloss upon ‘pure with regard to equanimity and mindfulness’]

At this stage, all defects pertaining to the lower levels beginning with the first absorption, to wit, rough examination, subtle investigation, joy, [and] breathing in and out,²⁰⁶ have been abandoned. And due to their abandonment, the equanimity and mindfulness at this [level] are entirely pure, completely purified so that the mind of the [ascetic] who has attained the fourth absorption stands firm, immovable, with all unsteadiness vanished. Therefore, [the canonical formula] says, **‘pure with regard to equanimity and mindfulness’**.²⁰⁷

[3.28.3.4.5. Gloss upon 'the fourth', etc.]

'The fourth' should be understood as previous[ly explained] in the [case of the] first absorption, and so on.

[3.28.3.5. FIRST IMMATERIAL ATTAINMENT]

[3.28.3.5.1. Gloss upon 'due to the surmounting of the ideation of matter']²⁰⁸

Due to the concentration upon²⁰⁹ the [infinity of] space, [the ascetic] has surmounted the ideation of colour linked with dark-blue, yellow, red, white, etc.²¹⁰ in the sense that [/in so far as]²¹¹ [these phenomena] do not manifest themselves [any longer] and in the sense of disgust [and] dispassion [towards matter].²¹² Therefore, [the canonical formula] says, '**due to the surmounting of the ideation of matter**'.²¹³

[3.28.3.5.2. Gloss upon 'due to the disappearance of the ideation of resistance']

Due to the surmounting of these [ideations], owing to [their] lack of manifestation, the ideation of obstruction, which is of various sorts, of many, distinct kinds, [and] caused by the accumulation of [different] colour[s], has vanished, too. Therefore, [the canonical formula] says, '**due to the disappearance of the ideation of resistance**'.²¹⁴

[3.28.3.5.3. Gloss upon 'due to not paying attention to the ideation of variety']

And, furthermore, because of the vanishing of these, the ideations [based upon] accumulation which occur with respect to those differentiated combinations [still] remaining,²¹⁵ to wit, ideations [such as] food, drink, carriage, clothes, ornament, house, park, forest, army, mountain, etc., to these, [he] gives absolutely no heed.²¹⁶ Therefore, [the canonical formula] says, '**due to not paying attention to the ideation of variety**'.

[3.28.3.5.4. Gloss upon 'infinite space']

Having thus annihilated the ideations of matter, resistance, [and] variety, he concentrates upon space as being infinite. Therefore, [the canonical formula] says, '**infinite space**'.

[3.28.3.5.5. Gloss upon 'dwells having attained the station of the infinity of space']

Having transcended the liminal [attainment], after [the contemplation] attaining the culmination of the practice, he reaches the [attainment] proper²¹⁷ [which coincides with] the fruit of the culmination of the practice. Therefore, [the canonical formula] says, '**[he] dwells having attained the station of the infinity of space**'. As long as he does not reach [the attainment] proper, his meditative object [/support] is the [infinite] space [only]. But when he has attained [it], [his meditative object] is this [infinite space] as well as the aggregates of his own level others than the [infinite space itself]. In [the case of] the liminal [attainment], however, [the meditative object] also [includes] the aggregates of lower levels.²¹⁸

[3.28.3.6. SECOND IMMATERIAL ATTAINMENT]

[3.28.3.6.1. Gloss upon 'due to the complete surmounting of the station of infinite space, [thinking] "consciousness is infinite"']^{2 1 9}

Wishing to attain the station of the infinity of consciousness [which corresponds] precisely [to] the consciousness focusing upon space as being infinite, by means of the consciousness through which he concentrated upon space [as being] infinite, he turns away [his mind] from the ideation of infinite space and concentrates upon that very consciousness as being infinite.^{2 2 0} He [then] surmounts the station of the infinity of space comprising both the liminal [attainment] [and] the [attainment] proper. Therefore, [the canonical formula] says, 'due to the complete surmounting of the station of the infinity of space, [thinking] "consciousness is infinite"'.^{2 2 1}

[3.28.3.6.2. Gloss upon 'dwells having attained the station of the infinity of consciousness']

Having surmounted the liminal [attainment] of the station of the infinity of consciousness [which also coincides with the first six contemplations] up to the contemplation attaining the culmination of the practice, he reaches the [attainment] proper [which coincides with] the fruit of the culmination of the practice. Therefore, [the canonical formula] says, 'dwells having attained the station of the infinity of consciousness'.^{2 2 2}

[3.28.3.7. THIRD IMMATERIAL ATTAINMENT]

[3.28.3.7.1. Gloss upon the entire canonical formula]^{2 2 3}

[Prompted by the wish to] proceed upwards^{2 2 4} from the station of infinite consciousness, he seeks an object^{2 2 5} beyond consciousness, related to anything, whether material or not,^{2 2 6} but does not find [any]. Not finding such an object, he surmounts the station of infinite consciousness with its liminal [attainment] [as well as the attainment] proper and becomes convinced that there is no object whatsoever. Verily he [thus] becomes convinced of the ideation of nothing whatsoever. As a result of intensely practising the conviction of the ideation [of nothing whatsoever], he surmounts the liminal [attainment] of the station of nothing whatsoever [which coincides with the six contemplations] up to the contemplation attaining the culmination of the practice and reaches the [attainment] proper [which coincides with] the fruit of the culmination of the practice. Therefore, [the canonical formula] says, 'Having completely surmounted the station of infinite consciousness, [thinking] "there is nothing whatsoever", [he] dwells having attained the station of nothing whatsoever'.^{2 2 7}

[3.28.3.8. FOURTH IMMATERIAL ATTAINMENT]

[3.28.3.8.1. Gloss upon 'neither ideation']^{2 2 8}

[Prompted by the wish to] proceed upwards from the station of nothing whatsoever, [developing] the ideation of coarse[ness] [and] the ideation of detriment with regard to the ideation of the station of nothing whatsoever, he turns away [his mind] from the ideation of the station of nothing whatsoever.

Previously, at the time of the attainment of the station of nothing whatsoever, he surmounted the ideation of something; now he has surmounted the ideation of nothing whatsoever. Therefore, [the canonical formula] says, 'neither ideation', ['ideation']

referring [here] to the ideation of something or the ideation of nothing whatsoever [both of which are now eliminated].

[3.28.3.8.2. Gloss upon ‘nor non-ideation’]

On the other hand, his ideation has not completely ceased as in the [attainment of] non-ideation or the attainment of cessation. It is nothing but [the fact that] this ideation is subtle [and] operates on [its] object without [grasping any] characteristic [/image].^{2 2 9} Therefore, [the canonical formula] says, ‘**nor non-ideation**’.^{2 3 0}

[3.28.3.8.3. Gloss upon the entire canonical formula]^{2 3 1}

Having thus become convinced of this station, [he] surmounts the station of nothing whatsoever with [its] liminal [attainment] [and the attainment] proper as well as the liminal [attainment] of the station of neither ideation nor non-ideation, [which coincides with the six contemplations] up to the contemplation attaining the culmination of the practice, and reaches [the attainment] proper [which coincides with] the fruit of the culmination of the practice. Therefore, [the canonical formula] says, ‘**having completely surmounted the station of nothing whatsoever, [the ascetic] dwells having attained the station of neither ideation nor non-ideation**’.^{2 3 2}

[3.28.3.9. CONCLUDING REMARKS]^{2 3 3}

At the time of the attainment of the absorptions, the sign [by which one knows that the absorptions take place] is that [his] body appears as if entering the lower [subterranean world of] Rasātala; at the time of the immaterial attainments, [his body appears] as if flying up in the sky. In case [these signs appear], the right practice [is maintained] through looking [upon them] with indifference, by [keeping his mind in] a mode of tranquillity.^{2 3 4}

[3.28.4. The two attainments without mental activity]

[3.28.4.1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS]

The two attainments without mental activity are the attainment of non-ideation and the attainment of cessation. Only ordinary people reach the attainment of non-ideation, [which is generated] by means of the contemplation which turns away from ideation; on the other hand, only the Noble Ones [can reach] the attainment of cessation.^{2 3 5} Entrance into these attainments is [brought about] by two contemplations, to wit, in the case of the attainment of non-ideation, by means of the contemplation which turns away from ideation; in the case of the attainment of cessation, by means of the contemplation which proceeds upwards from [the station of] neither ideation nor non-ideation and completely suppresses [any] object [from the mind].^{2 3 6 2 3 7}

[3.28.4.2. ATTAINMENT OF NON-IDEATION]

Having resorted to a contemplation which turns away from ideation [by thinking] that ‘ideation is [like] illness, ideation is [like] a boil,^{2 3 8} ideation is [like] an arrow; serene is this, exquisite is this, to wit, [the state] of non-ideation’,^{2 3 9} [the meditator]^{2 4 0} pursues [the practice of] non-mindfulness and non-attention with regard to whatever ideation arises. As a result of cultivation, [while] at [the stage of] the

preparatory path, the state connected with mental activity ^{2 4 1} is still [going on]. But as soon as he has reached [the attainment of non-ideation], his mind does not function any more. This cessation of [all] factors [pertaining to] the mind and the concomitant mental functions, thus [generated] in [the meditator] detached from [the Heavenly World of] the Splendid Perfection [but] not detached from [the Heavenly World of] the Great Reward ^{2 4 2} by means of the contemplation preceded ^{2 4 3} by the ideation of riddance, is called the attainment of non-ideation. ^{2 4 4} And, furthermore, this is how he obtains this [attainment]. ^{2 4 5}

[3.28.4.3. ATTAINMENT OF CESSATION]

The Noble One who has attained the station of neither ideation nor non-ideation, wishing to dwell in the supremely serene dwelling, makes [his] mind proceed upwards from the station of neither ideation nor non-ideation. ^{2 4 6} [His] mind[, driven to] proceed upwards, does not find any object [/support]. Not finding [any object], [the mind] ceases [to operate], does not function [any more]. This cessation of [all] factors [pertaining to the] mind and mental concomitant functions, thus [generated] in the adept detached from the station of nothing whatsoever or in a Worthy One by means of the contemplation preceded by the ideation of dwelling [temporarily in serenity], ^{2 4 7} is called the attainment of cessation. ^{2 4 8} And, furthermore, this is how he obtains this [attainment]. ^{2 4 9}

[3.28.5. The five supernatural faculties]

[3.28.5.1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS] ^{2 5 0}

The generation of the five supernatural faculties is achieved on the basis of the meditative attainments. ^{2 5 1} And how is it achieved? [It is achieved] in the following way: the meditator [first] obtains the pure absorption. ^{2 5 2} [Then] relying on this pure absorption, directing his mind by means of the attention pertaining to the level of concentrated [thought] precisely to a teaching whose chief topic is [the achievement of the] supernatural faculties, ^{2 5 3} [a teaching] which he has listened to, grasped [and] mastered, to wit, [a teaching] with reference to the range of miraculous powers ^{2 5 4} or the [recollection of] the previous lives, the divine ear, the [knowledge of] the deaths and births [of all sentient beings], ^{2 5 5} [or the knowledge of the] ways of thought [of other sentient beings], ^{2 5 6} he becomes thoroughly knowledgeable about meaning and thoroughly knowledgeable about [the wording of the] teaching. ^{2 5 7} For the [ascetic who is thus] thoroughly knowledgeable about meaning, thoroughly knowledgeable about [the wording of the] teaching, [and] who conditions his mind again and again in this way, as a result of intense training, there comes the time, there comes the right moment when the five supernatural faculties, [which represent] the fruits of his cultivation, [eventually] arise. ^{2 5 8}

[3.28.5.2. THE TWELVE IDEATIONS]

[3.28.5.2.1. Enumeration of the ideations]

Moreover, [the ascetic,] thus thoroughly knowledgeable about meaning, thoroughly knowledgeable about the [wording of the] teaching, cultivates twelve ideations for the generation of all [these] supernatural faculties. [The twelve ideations

are] as follows: the ideation of lightness, the ideation of softness, the ideation of the space realm [/element], the ideation of the body-mind fusion,^{2 5 9} the ideation of conviction,^{2 6 0} the ideation [consisting in] the recollection of the succession of the acts previously experienced, the ideation of sound combinations and noises of different kinds, the ideation of the visible characteristic of light, the ideation of the specific changes in physical appearance determined by defilements, the ideation of the [eight] liberations, the ideation of the [eight] bases of mastery, and the ideation of the [ten] totalities.^{2 6 1}

[3.28.5.2.2. Ideation of lightness]

The ideation of lightness is that by means of which [the ascetic] becomes convinced of his own body^{2 6 2} being light as a *tūla*-cotton tuft or a *karpāsa*-cotton tuft in the whirlwind.^{2 6 3} Becoming [completely] convinced [of this] in such a manner, he [can] make his own body move hither and thither by means of the same contemplation which has lead [him] to [attain] the conviction [of lightness]. Namely, [he can move his body] from the bed to the stool, [and then back] from the stool to the bed, [and] in the same way, from the bed to the grass-seat, [and again back] from the grass-seat to the bed.^{2 6 4 2 6 5}

[3.28.5.2.3. Ideation of softness]

The ideation of softness is that by means of which [the ascetic] becomes convinced of [his] body being soft like silk or raw silk or woven silk.^{2 6 6} This ideation of softness thus [described] is [also] nourishing and facilitating for the ideation of lightness in such a way that being facilitated by it, the ideation of lightness becomes extensive, developed, and abundant.

[3.28.5.2.4. Ideation of the space realm]

The ideation of the space realm [/element] is the ideation by means of which [the ascetic] becomes convinced of the lightness and softness of his own body. If he wishes to go somewhere, then by means of the contemplation leading to [this] conviction, he becomes convinced that any [kind of] matter^{2 6 7} which stands in-between [and] causes an obstruction to the movement is [just empty] space.

[3.28.5.2.5. Ideation of the mind-body fusion]

The ideation of the mind-body fusion is that by means of which the mind is fused into the body or the body into the mind, due to which [/through which] his body becomes lighter, softer, more malleable, brighter, obedient to the mind, [perfectly] connected to the mind, [and] operates [entirely] depending upon the mind.^{2 6 8}

[3.28.5.2.6. Ideation of conviction]

[3.28.5.2.6.1. Definition]

The ideation of conviction is the ideation by means of which [the ascetic] becomes convinced that what is remote is near, what is near is remote, what is subtle is coarse, what is coarse is subtle, earth is water, water is earth. In the same way, it should be done with each element with regard to each other in full.^{2 6 9} Likewise, he also intensely envisages^{2 7 0} magical creations, be they magical creations of visible objects or magical creations of sounds.^{2 7 1}

[3.28.5.2.6.2. Miraculous powers obtained through the mastery of the the first five ideations]^{2 7 2}

Thus, by means of these five ideations perfected through cultivation, [the ascetic] acquires a diverse range of miraculous powers: having been one, he manifests himself [his body]^{2 7 3} as many, to wit, by means of the ideation of conviction [with regard to magical] creations; then, having manifested himself [his body] as many, [he] becomes one, to wit, by means of the ideation of conviction which makes the [magical] creations disappear; with [his] body, [he can] pass unhindered through walls, mountains, ramparts[, and so on]; [he] emerges from and plunges into the ground as if into water; he walks on water without sinking^{2 7 4} as if on [solid] ground; [he] ascends into the sky cross-legged as if a winged bird; or [he] rubs [and] strokes with [his] hand the Sun [and] the Moon, [which] have such great majesty [and] potence; [he] wields power with [his own] body up to Brahma's World.^{2 7 5} [The ascetic] does all this by means of the ideation of conviction assisted by the ideations of lightness, softness, space realm, [and] mind-body fusion—[this] should be understood in due order.^{2 7 6}

The wielding of power over Brahma's World with [his own] body is of two sorts: [1] [he] wields power by [actually] going [there]; [2] and [he wields power] over the four elements and a part of the derived matter^{2 7 7} beneath [the level of] Brahma's World by means of conviction [which works] according to [his] wish.^{2 7 8}

[3.28.5.2.7. Ideation [consisting in] the recollection of the succession of the acts previously experienced]

The ideation [consisting in] the recollection of the succession of the acts previously experienced is that by means of which [the ascetic] becomes aware of his whole life [lit., course of activity] which he has experienced so far from childhood [onwards]—as far as his memory [can] reach [back] and does not fail—[to wit,] where [he] has gone, stood, sat, lain, [and so on] in detail, recollecting each [act] clearly^{2 7 9} in due sequence [and] without omission.^{2 8 0} Due to the [assiduous] cultivation of this [ideation], the fruit of the cultivation is^{2 8 1} [the ability to] 'recollect [his] various previous lives [lit., habitations]' [as described] in full detail^{2 8 2} [in the canonical formula] up to 'with [all their] aspects [and] particulars'.^{2 8 3}

[3.28.5.2.8. Ideation of sound combinations and noises of different kinds]

The ideation of sound combinations and noises of different kinds consists in^{2 8 4} the cultivation of [this] ideation after having grasped the characteristic of^{2 8 5} what[ever] noise arises, mixed [or] divers, of various groups of people sitting [or] meeting together in a village or a town or a guild or a townsmen's assembly or [any other] gathering or a spacious house or an inner chamber (that which is called confused sound) or the noise of a flowing river. By means of this [ideation], [the ascetic] keeps [his mental] focusing, through the attention pertaining to the concentrated level [of thought], [directed] towards sounds noble [or] ignoble,^{2 8 6} divine [or] human, remote [or] near. Due to the assiduous practice of this [ideation], he obtains the divine ear [representing] the fruit of the cultivation, through which [he can] hear sounds divine [or] human, whether they are remote or near.^{2 8 7}

[3.28.5.2.9. Ideation of the visible characteristic of light]

The ideation of the visible characteristic of light [is as follows]: having grasped the characteristic of light as previous[ly explained],^{2 8 8} [the ascetic] directs [his] attention to this very characteristic. And having grasped the characteristic from a variety of sentient beings, [he] directs [his] attention to this very characteristic by distinguishing between the performance of wholesome [and] unwholesome acts, etc. This is the ideation of the visible characteristic of light. Due to the [assiduous] cultivation of this [ideation], [he] obtains the knowledge of the deaths and births [of all sentient beings] [representing] the fruit of [this] cultivation, through which [he can see] ‘by means of the pure divine eye’ [, and so on, as described] in full detail [in the canonical formula] up to ‘[how sentient beings] after the destruction of the body are born in a good destination, a heavenly world, amongst deities’.^{2 8 9}

[3.28.5.2.10. Ideation of the specific changes in physical appearance determined by defilements]

The ideation of the specific changes in physical appearance determined by defilements^{2 9 0} is that by means of which [the ascetic] observes [and] ascertains the peculiar physical condition of the sentient beings: of the impassioned, [of] the hateful, [of] the stupid, of those whose minds are enwrapped by defilements [and] secondary defilements [such as] wrath, enmity, concealing [one’s faults], ardent desire,^{2 9 1} deceiving, dissimulation, lack of sense of shame [and] shameless behaviour.^{2 9 2} Such is the peculiar physical condition, the specific change in the physical appearance of one who is passionate, to wit, [his] senses are agitated, [his] senses are excited, [and he] has a smiling face. Such is the peculiar physical condition, the specific change in the physical appearance of one who is hateful, to wit, [his] face is pale, [he] speaks in convulsive utterances,^{2 9 3} [and] has a frown [on his face]. Such is the peculiar physical condition, the specific change in the physical appearance of one who is stupid, to wit, [he is] tongue-tied, even if [he] ponders over the meaning, [he] is unable to understand [it], [and he] utters vulgar speech.^{2 9 4} Through these aspects thus [described] and the like, [the ascetic] directs his attention having grasped the characteristic from the peculiar physical condition, the specific change in the physical appearance of [all types of persons] up to one enwrapped by lack of sense of shame [and] shameless behaviour. Due to the assiduous practice of this [ideation], there arises [in him] the knowledge of the others’ ways of thought [representing] the fruit of [this] cultivation, through which employing [his own] mind, [the ascetic] fully knows the mind, [such as] the rough thinking, the subtle thinking[, and so on]^{2 9 5} of other sentient beings, of other persons, as [it is] in reality.^{2 9 6}

[3.28.5.2.11. Ideation of the eight liberations, eight bases of mastery, and ten totalities]

The cultivation of the ideation of the [eight] liberations, [eight] bases of mastery, [and] [ten] totalities^{2 9 7} ([which] should be understood as previous[ly explained], i.e., in the *Level of Concentration*)^{2 9 8} is the cultivation by which [the ascetic] generates noble miraculous power[s], [such as that] related to the transformation of things, [that] related to magical creations, [that] related to conviction^{2 9 9} [and further spiritual achievements] like^{3 0 0} freedom from impurity,^{3 0 1} cognition [arising from] the wish

[to know an object as it is in reality],³⁰² [and] the four [types of] thorough knowledge, to wit, the thorough knowledge concerning the teachings, the thorough knowledge concerning the meaning, the thorough knowledge concerning the explanation [of words and doctrines], [and] the thorough knowledge concerning the eloquence [in preaching and exposition].^{303 304}

[3.28.5.3. CONCLUDING REMARKS]

This is the difference between the noble and the ignoble miraculous powers: whatever thing [the ascetic] transforms, whatever magical creation [he] produces, of whatever [he] becomes convinced by means of the noble miraculous power, it actually becomes so, not otherwise. And all the [things thus created] can fulfil [their usual] function. On the other hand, [what is created] by means of the ignoble [miraculous power] verily does not become so but appears merely as a magician's show.³⁰⁵ It should be known that in such a way [the ascetic] generates the five supernatural faculties by means of these twelve ideations, due to assiduous practice [and] according to what is suitable in each case, and [he also generates] according to what is suitable in each case the noble qualities³⁰⁶ not [held] in common with ordinary people.³⁰⁷

[3.28.6. Rebirth in different heavenly worlds in accordance with the meditation level]³⁰⁸

[3.28.6.1. HEAVENLY WORLDS CORRESPONDING TO THE FIRST ABSORPTION]

[Depending on whether the ascetic] has practised the first absorption slightly, intermediately, [or] intensely, [he] is accordingly³⁰⁹ [re-]born³¹⁰ in the community [/category]³¹¹ of the Brahma's Retinue deities,³¹² of the Brahma's Ministers [deities], and of the Great Brahma [deities].

[3.28.6.2. HEAVENLY WORLDS CORRESPONDING TO THE SECOND ABSORPTION]

[Depending on whether the ascetic] has practised the second absorption slightly, intermediately, [or] intensely, [he] is accordingly [re-]born in the community of the Small Light deities, of the Boundless Light [deities], and of the Radiant Brightness [deities].

[3.28.6.3. HEAVENLY WORLDS CORRESPONDING TO THE THIRD ABSORPTION]

[Depending on whether the ascetic] has practised the third absorption slightly, intermediately, [or] intensely, [he] is accordingly [re-]born in the community of the Small Splendour deities, of the Boundless Splendour [deities], and of the Splendid Perfection [deities].

[3.28.6.4. HEAVENLY WORLDS CORRESPONDING TO THE FOURTH ABSORPTION]

[Depending on whether the ascetic] has practised the fourth absorption slightly, intermediately, [or] intensely, [he] is accordingly [re-]born in the community of the

Unclouded deities, of the Merit-Abundance [deities], and of the Great Reward [deities]. If, furthermore, a Non-Returner practises the contaminated [fourth absorption] [in such a way that it is] mixed with the non-contaminated fourth absorption, [then depending on whether he] has practised this [method], slightly, intermediately, intensely, more intensely [or] most intensely, [he] is accordingly [re-]born in the community of the deities of the five Pure Abodes, to wit, amongst the Not-[Fully-]Prosperous ones,^{3 1 3} the Untormented ones, the Good-Looking ones, the Good-Appearing Ones, [and] the Highest Ones.^{3 1 4 3 1 5}

[3.28.6.5. HEAVENLY WORLDS CORRESPONDING TO THE IMMATERIAL ATTAINMENTS]

[Depending on whether the ascetic] has practised [the attainments of] the stations of [the infinity of] space, of [the infinity of] consciousness, of nothing whatsoever, [and] of neither ideation nor non-ideation slightly, intermediately [or] intensely, [he] is [re-]born in the community of the deities belonging to the stations of [the infinity of] space, of [the infinity of] consciousness, of nothing whatsoever, [and] of neither ideation nor non-ideation [respectively]. And [since] these deities are immaterial, there exists, therefore, no difference caused by dissimilarity in the [physical] place, but there is [only] specificity determined by the [nature of the] dwelling [itself].^{3 1 6}

[3.28.6.6. HEAVENLY WORLD CORRESPONDING TO THE ATTAINMENT OF NON-IDEATION]

[If the ascetic] has practised the attainment of non-ideation, [he] is [re-]born in the community of the deities [who are] beings without ideation.^{3 1 7}

[3.28.7. Characteristics of the person detached from sensual pleasures]

What are the characteristics of one who is detached from sensual pleasures? Answer: He has calm bodily actions, immovable senses, and his position [is kept as long as necessary and] does not quickly come to an end.^{3 1 8} He [can] spend a long time in the same position without being weary and does not eagerly desire [to shift it] quickly [to] another position. And he is^{3 1 9} soft-spoken, quiet-spoken, and does not delight in crowds, does not delight in associating [with people],^{3 2 0} and his way of speaking is firm [/calm]. Having seen with [his] eyes visible objects, he perceives [them merely as] visible objects [and] does not experience [lit., perceive] [any] passion for [these] visible objects. In the same way, he perceives sounds, smells, tastes, [and] tangible objects but [experiences no passion at all for sounds, and so on,] up to no passion at all^{3 2 1} for tangible objects. And he is fearless, has profound understanding, is possessed of^{3 2 2} an all-embracing ease in [his] mind and body, is uncovetous, not agitated, patient, and no thoughts [directed at] sensual pleasures, etc.^{3 2 3} disturb his mind. The characteristics of one who is detached from sensual pleasures should thus be known as [comprising] such features.

*

This first [chapter of Yogasthāna IV] thus [set forth] above is the detailed exposition of the proceeding by the mundane path.^{3 2 4}

NOTES

¹ The English translation follows the text of the Sanskrit critical edition. Divergences in the Tibetan and Chinese renderings are recorded in the footnotes to the respective editions and, whenever relevant to the understanding of the original, are also discussed in the endnotes to the English translation. Textual unit digits and paragraphs correspond to the division adopted throughout the trilingual edition. (For the explanation of the text division and unit numeration, see Editing Conventions). The titles of the subchapters, sections, subsections, etc. belong to me and, like all other additions and clarifications in the English translation, are inserted within square brackets. If the literal sense of a word appears to be relevant for the context, I write it in square brackets and abbreviate it as: '[lit.]' or explain it in an endnote. Whenever the meaning of a term, phrase, or sentence can be construed in more than one way, I insert such semantic alternatives within square brackets preceded by a slash: '[/]' or '[or:]'. Difficult cases of interpretation of such semantic alternatives are discussed in the endnotes. For the basic principles underlying my translation style, see Part One, Introduction.

² The Skt. sentence begins with *tatra*. Quite frequently, in philosophical treatises and exegetical works, this word has no other semantic and stylistic value than to announce the beginning of a passage, paragraph, or entry. Here as well as in most similar occurrences below, I do not translate it. Simply starting a new paragraph or passage in the English translation is sufficient to convey the semantico-stylistic functions of *tatra*. However, when required by the wording or when it has (what I perceive to be) a stronger sense, I render the word as 'herein', etc.

³ Skt. *gati*. The nuances of this word, alongside other lexemes of the same semantic family, are discussed in Gonda's "Ways" in Indian Religions' (1975, 317-336; for *gati*, see pp. 331-334). Amongst the connotations relevant to our passage, the following should be mentioned: 'way', 'journey', 'movement', 'course', 'going to , or attainment of (a goal)', and 'the right way or course'. According to Gonda, the term also means 'mode of existence' (p. 331), 'transmigration', 'goal', 'state' (p. 333), etc. Its primary semantic field, however, is permeated by dynamism, which Gonda describes as the 'force inherent in the nouns in *-ti*' (ibid., p. 332). On the suffix *-ti-*, see also Wackernagel and Debrunner [1954] 1987, vol. II,2, p. 622ff.

Gonda translates *gati* in its Buddhist sense of five or six destinations in the cycle of rebirths as 'mode of existence' (p. 331). However, it can be argued that here, too, the meaning of the term is rather that of 'where one goes [or: may go]', being similar in its morpho-semantic structure to nouns like *vasati-* which *heißt in der ältesten Sprache „Nest, Behausung"* (Wackernagel and Debrunner [1954] 1987, vol. II,2, p. 635), *kṣiti-* "*Wohnstätte*" (ibid., p. 636), etc.

⁴ I translate the Sanskrit *yogin* as 'yogi', a word which has now become a well-established part of the modern English lexicon (albeit its frequent association with Hindu or calisthenics yoga). On the other hand, I render *yogācāra* as 'ascetic'. Our text does not seem to make a doctrinally relevant distinction between the two words, but I found it useful to preserve a lexical difference in the translation. On the three classes of *yogācāra*, see ŚrBh Shukla ed., pp. 284-285 (= ŚrBh, Wayman, p. 95). We owe the best and most comprehensive survey of the word *yogācāra* in Buddhist literature to Jonathan Silk (2000).

The main hero of the spiritual saga depicted in the ŚrBh as well as the grammatical subject of many of its sentences is this *yogācāra* or *yogin*. When using a personal pronoun to refer to its main hero, the ŚrBh invariably employs the masculine form of *sa* (obviously, in various grammatical cases). By modern standards, this usage may be taken as betraying sexist prejudices. The authors of the ŚrBh do not express their views on the capability of female

meditators to practise and accomplish spiritual achievements, and this makes it difficult to determine with precision their position on this issue. Judging, however, from other sources, there is no doubt that female ascetics did exist and were active in the Buddhist community (for some examples of *yogācārā* or *yogācārā bhikṣuṇī*, see Silk 2000, 283-284). There are no cogent reasons to believe that they practiced a different system of spiritual cultivation. It is, therefore, quite possible, that in spite of their biased usage of the personal pronoun, the ŚrBh authors may have conceived of their spiritual path as equally open to female ascetics. As to my own usage, I have consistently used ‘he’ throughout the translation. The reason is simple: my task here is, I believe, to offer a replica as faithful as possible of the original and not to impose my views on it. Needless to say that I am personally convinced that female ascetics are as capable as their male counterparts to practise spiritual cultivation and attain its highest fruits and that this ought to be stylistically reflected or at least clearly stated.

⁵ We find a similar expression at ŚrBh-Gr (18) 8, 12-10, 2: *yo labdhamanaskārasyordhvaṃ laukikena mārgeṇa gacchato lokottareṇa vā yo lakṣaṇapratisamvedī manaskāraḥ* |.

⁶ Skt. *manaskāra* is a key concept in the ŚrBh. The term is polysemic, and there are different types of *manaskāra* classified into various taxonomic sets (e.g., ŚrBh Sh ed. 278-280 = W 94-95; see also my Synoptic Presentation). Here, the ŚrBh seems to refer to the preceding passage in Yogasthāna III which speaks of ‘the attention pertaining to the concentrated level of the material sphere’ *rūpāvacāro* [...] *samāhitabhūmiko manaskāraḥ* (MS 113a3L; Sakuma 1990, vol. 2, p. 28, ll. 5-6; cf. Sh 443, 16-17, who reads *rūpārth[ā]nuro*—it is true that °va° in *rūpāvacāro* has a longer (accidental?) upper stroke, but this has nothing to do with Shukla’s reading; *rūpāvacāro* is guaranteed by Tib. *gzugs na spyod pa* (text edited in Sakuma 1990, vol. 2, p. 65, ll. 16-17) and Ch. 色界 (T30.465a4))

The term *manaskāra* is usually translated in modern Buddhist studies as ‘attention’, ‘mental orientation’, etc. In Abhidharma literature, it represents an important psychological function and doctrinal category. The *Kośa* lists *manaskāra* as one of the eleven *mahābhūmikas* or functions omnipresent in all mental activity (*sarvacetasī*) (cf. AKBh 54, 17: *kārikā* II, 24). AKBh 54, 23 defines it as: *manaskāras cetasa ābhogaḥ*, ‘*manaskāra* refers to the orientation of the mind’. The equivalent passage in Xuanzang’s translation reads: 作意謂能令心警覺 or ‘*manaskāra* means that by which the mind is made to be alert’ (T29.19a21). De la Vallée Poussin renders the sentence as ‘le *manaskāra* est l’inflexion (*ābhoga*) de la pensée (*cetas*)’ (Poussin vol. 1, p. 154). The basic meaning of *ābhoga*, which comes from √ *bhuj*, is ‘bending’, ‘curve’, or ‘winding’. In the above context, it refers to directing or applying the mind on a cognitive object. One could also say that *ābhoga* represents an ‘effort’ (which is actually one of the derived senses of the word!) made in order ‘to curve’ or ‘to bend’ the mind into the desired form.

An identical definition is found at Trim 20,11-12 (cf. Tiwary ed. 1967, 40). Sthiramati continues: *ābhujanam ābhogaḥ. ālambane yena cittam abhimukhikriyate. sa punar ālambane cittadhāraṇakarmā*. ‘Orientation means being directed. It is that by which the mind is made to face the object. Furthermore, its function is to keep the mind fixed unto the object.’ The parallel passage in Xuanzang’s translation of the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* reads: 作意謂能警心爲性。於所緣境引心爲業。 (T31.11c6) ‘The nature of attention is its being able to alert the mind. Its function is to keep the mind fixed to the object’. (cf. Cook tr. 1999, 69, for a somewhat different rendering).

As far as the above sense is regarded, *manaskāra* can certainly be translated as ‘attention’ or ‘mental orientation’. When clearly referring to this psychological function, I also translate *manaskāra* as ‘attention’. However, rendering *manaskāra* in the *sapta manaskārāḥ*, the key conceptual and technical framework of Yogasthāna IV in the ŚrBh, as ‘attention’ or ‘mental orientation’ would not convey its full and exact meaning. *Manaskāra* is here more than what

'attention' usually means in English. It represents the very backbone of the spiritual practice leading the yogi to the mastery of the eight meditative attainments (the mundane path) or to the realisation of the Four Noble Truths and consequent Liberation (the supramundane path). Though not common in modern Buddhist studies, translating it as 'contemplation' does, I believe, more justice to this sense. Rendering one word in the source-language by means of two or more different terms in the target-language may upset our sense of balance and uniformity, but such an approach seems unavoidable in quite a few cases. To the extent translation can be said to represent an art, criticism for lack of perfect equivalence may be justifiable (though this is, admittedly, a classicist argument for uniformity, which a romantic would anyway repudiate!). To the extent translation can be declared to come closer to science, I think there are no a priori reasons which would invalidate the fact that different connotations of one word in the source-language may be reflected by different terms when the target-language has no lexeme sharing a similar or quasi-similar semantic sphere.

A similar rendering for *manaskāra* is actually used by Schmithausen (1987a). Other solutions include those put forward by Griffiths (1983, 426-432) and Choi (2001, 77-86). In his translation of a passage in the AbhSamBh parallel to the ŚrBh (see below), Griffiths renders *manaskāra* as 'act of attention'. This seems to me rather weak to convey the sense of intense and repeated exercise which *manaskāra* implies. Choi's translation of *manaskāra* in the *Xianyang lun* passages parallel to the ŚrBh (see below) as *Konzentrationsakt* may be appropriate for the German language, but in English, 'concentration act' or even 'concentration' do not appear to convey the whole intensity of the Sanskrit term.

Rendering *manaskāra* as 'contemplation' cannot be said, however, to constitute a perfect solution. The English word 'contemplation' is itself full of connotations, and some of them are counterproductive to the meaning of *manaskāra*. Christian mystics and philosophers like Richard of St Victor, St Thomas Aquinas, St John of the Cross tend to speak of 'meditation' as a diligent investigation of an object or doctrine and 'contemplation' as an intuitive grasp of the truth accompanied by a state of spiritual bliss (for a discussion of the words 'meditation' and 'contemplation' as well as the way they are rendered in the context of Indian religion, see Bader 1990, 25-32). In Christian terminology, *manaskāra* would rather correspond (though not perfectly and not at all its stages) to 'meditation', but to me, the latter term seems too broad. I shall therefore reserve the word for a more general usage. Besides, leaning too much towards the traditional Christian vocabulary is not perhaps the most felicitous choice when dealing with Indian spirituality. Furthermore, nowadays Christian terminology may often sound abstruse and irrelevant, and many of us may feel more at home with modern psychological categories rather than with theological distinctions. After all, readers of Buddhist literature and studies do not necessarily share the same cultural background which would make Christian vocabulary an exclusive terminological standard.

Closely connected with *manaskāra*, both in terms of psychological function and manner of translation, is *samādhi*, itself far from being a monolithic word. *Samādhi* in Buddhist literature has witnessed a long and diverse history of denotations and connotations (for a discussion of *samādhi* in Buddhist sources, especially in early Prajñāpāramitā literature, see Deleanu 2000, 72-75). In the *Kośa*, *samādhi* is included together with *manaskāra* in the same group of eleven universal (or omnipresent) mental functions (*mahābhūmika*). Its definition is: '*samādhi* means focusing of the mind' *samādhiś cittasyaikāgratā*. (AKBh 54,23-24). When speaking of *samādhi* as a universal mental function, I render it as 'concentration'. *Samādhi* in a more general sense of spiritual training will be translated as 'meditation' (see, for instance, 'right meditation' (*samyaksamādhi*) in the noble eightfold path (*āryaṣṭāgamārga*)). In a Mahāyāna context, especially in the Prajñāpāramitā mysticism, *samādhi* should be rendered as 'contemplation'. (This overlaps with one of the equivalents for *manaskāra* in the ŚrBh, but in the present book,

there is no context which requires to distinguish between the two Sanskrit words used in this sense.)

For a study of the seven contemplations in the SamBh (also compared with the ŚrBh), see Gengitani 1994.

⁷ Cf. ŚrBh Sh, 433, 3-6; Sakuma 1990, vol. 2, p. 27, ll. 6-9.

In the *Lam rim chen mo* (Kelsang and Odani 1991 ed., 109, 11-13), Tsong-kha-pa, making a direct reference to the sentence here (*Rnyal 'byor gyi gnas bzhi ba'i mgor* 'at the beginning of Yogasthāna IV'), states that after the (presentation of the) attainment of the (basic level of) contemplation, the mundane and the supramundane paths are expounded.

⁸ See the definition of the two paths in Yogasthāna I (ŚrBh-Gr 60-61). Cf. also T43.119c7ff. For general presentations of the two paths, see Poussin vol. 4, pp. 119-120; Griffiths 1983, 212ff; Gunaratana 1985, 175ff; etc. Many important aspects connected to the history of the two paths have been brilliantly analysed by Frauwallner (1995, Chapter VII 'The Abhismayavāda').

⁹ The levels of practitioners in the ŚrBh are defined as beginners (*ādīkarmika*), adepts (*kṛtaparicaya*), and practitioners who have transcended the practice of contemplation (*atīkrāntamanaskāra*) (ŚrBh-Gr (18) 22-26) (see also note 28 to Chapter One, Part One). The first category is subdivided into beginners in concentration (*manaskārādīkarmika*), who cannot experience the focusing of the mind (*cittaiḅgratām na sprśati*) (ŚrBh-Gr (18) 22, 6-7), and beginners in the purification of defilements (*kleśaviśuddhyādīkarmika*) (ŚrBh-Gr (18) 22, 8-11). The latter, though having attained concentration (*adhigate 'pi manaskāre*) (ŚrBh-Gr (18) 22, 8), have not yet put into practice their meditative capabilities of eliminating mental defilements, which is the real aim of spiritual cultivation. Thus, they embark upon the purification of defilements by 'generating, grasping, and training in the contemplation of perceiving characteristics of that [object meditated upon]' (*val lakṣaṇapratīsamvedīno manaskārasyārambhaḥ pratigrahaś cābhyāsaḥ*) (ŚrBh-Gr (18) 22, 9-10). According to this taxonomy, the novice ascetic in our passage seems to have already graduated, so to speak, from the first level of spiritual apprenticeship and, now able to focus his or her mind, will undertake the first of the seven contemplations (i.e., *lakṣaṇapratīsamvedī manaskāraḥ*) either on the mundane or on the supramundane path.

¹⁰ 'The novice yogi who has [attained] contemplation' (*ayam yogi ādīkārmiḅkaḥ samanaskāro*) is defined in the preceding passage in Yogasthāna III (Sh 433, 14-18; Sakuma vol. 2, p. 28, ll. 4-7).

¹¹ Skt. *bahulikaroti* 'intensely practise' (or: 'to devote oneself', as rendered in PED, s.v.). The compound often appears in the stock phrase *āsevitabham bhāvetabham bahulikātabham* (e.g., MN I 454, 24; etc.) usually describing meditative training. See PTS Concordance vol. 1, p. 350 (s.v. *āsevati*) and vol. 3, p. 361 (s.v. *bahulikāta*, *bahulikaroti*, etc.).

¹² This, too, seems to refer to *rūpāvacāro* [...] *samāhitbhūmiko manaskāraḥ* (see note 6 above).

¹³ For a similar expression in the ŚrBh, see Sh 410, 10ff.

¹⁴ The direct reference seems to be to the 'small degree of bodily ease, mental ease, [and] focusing of the mind' (*parītā kāyaprasrabdhīś cittaprasrabdhīś cittaiḅgratā*) which is mentioned at Sh 443, 21 (=MS 113a3R-113a4L). These concepts are discussed in a passage in Yogasthāna III, immediately preceding the present chapter (MS 112b5R-113a1M; Sh 432, 8-433, 18; Sakuma vol. 2, p. 26, l. 2- p. 28, l. 7).

For the preparatory part of the yogi's training, see Synoptic Presentation above.

¹⁵ For different types of *adhīmokṣa* in our text, see Sh 281-283.

More than 70 years ago, de la Vallée Poussin remarked, *ce terme fait difficulté* (Poussin vol. 1, p. 154, n. 5). After a detailed examination of quite a few Buddhist sources, the Belgian scholar

opts for ‘approbation’. Adopted as such, an English rendering like ‘approbation’ does not seem, however, to fit very well, at least not in a context like ours (see below for other translations employed by de la Vallée Poussin).

AKBh 54, 23, defines the term as: *adhimokṣo ‘dhimuktiḥ*. The latter word is glossed upon by Yaśomitra as follows: ‘ascertainment (*adhimukti*) means the accurate determination (*avadhāraṇa*) of an object in terms of its qualities. According to other [schools or exegets], it means delight (*ruci*); according to ascetics, it is meditating in conformity with one’s decision (*niścaya*) [as to how the object should be viewed]’ (*adhimuktis tadālambanasya guṇato ‘avadhāraṇam. rucir ity anye. yathāniścayaṃ dhāraṇeti yogācāraccittāḥ*; AKVy 128, 2-4). (The compound *yogācāraccittāḥ* is also seen at AKVy 126, 24, but though not impossible, it might be a corrupt reading to be emended to **yogācāraccintāḥ* ‘those whose reflection is upon spiritual practice’; cf. Tib. *rnal ’byor spyod pa sems par byed pa dag* D Gu 116a7 = AKVy 128, 4, and D Gu 115a1 = AKVy 126, 24.) Skt. *avadhāraṇa* and *niścaya* are equally hard to render, but both words appear to convey the point of reaching ascertainment or cognitive decision as to what the object in question actually is. De la Vallée Poussin translates here *avadhāraṇa* as ‘considération’ but, more precisely, the Sanskrit term represents the moment of attaining certainty rather than the whole process of consideration. Let us note, however, that in his translation of the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, de la Vallée Poussin translates *avadhāraṇa* as ‘détermination’ (de la Vallée Poussin tr. 1928, vol. 1, p. 257), which is more precise. (In the same translation we find, however, the same term rendered ‘judgement’; see *ibid.*, vol. 1, p. 310). As for *ruci*, which appears to be another sense of *adhimukti*, it probably refers in this context to the ‘delight’ or satisfaction of reaching ascertainment concerning the cognitive object.

In his commentary on the *Trīṃśikā*, Sthiramati says: ‘Ascertainment (*adhimokṣa*) means accurate determination (*avadhāraṇa*) in perfect accordance [with the reality] (*tathaiva*) regarding an entity which is definitely known (*niścite vastuni*). The word “definitely known” (*niścita*) means the negation of “[that which is] not definitely known” (*aniścita*). An entity which from the point view of reasoning (*yukti*) or of the Trustworthy Teaching (*āptopadeśa*) [i.e., the Buddhist doctrine], admits of no doubt is [said to be] definitely known. The firm establishment (*abhiniveśana*) of the entity in the mind by exactly (*eva*) that aspect by which it has become definitely known, aspects such as impermanence, suffering, etc., is the precise determination (*avadhāraṇa*) that “this is such and not otherwise”, [which is called] ascertainment (*adhimokṣa*). And its effect is to confer immutability (*asamhāryatā*). For the man who excels in ascertainment cannot be turned away from his own well-established doctrine by opponents [belonging to] other [schools].’ (*adhimokṣo niścite vastuni tathavādhāraṇam* (Lévi: °*avadhāraṇam*). *niścitagrahaṇam aniścitaḥpratiṣedhārtham* (Lévi: °*artham*). *yuktita āptopadeśato vā yad vastu asamdigdham tan niścitam, yenaivākāreṇa tan niścitam anityaduḥkḥādyākāreṇa tenaivākāreṇa tasya vastunaś cetasy abhiniveśanam ‘evam etan nānyathā’ ity* (Lévi: *nānyathety*) *avadhāraṇam adhimokṣaḥ. sa ca asamhāryatādānakarmakaḥ. adhimuktīpradhāno hi svasiddhāntāt parapravādhīr apahartum na śakyate*. (Trim 25, 25-30 = MS D10b1-b3, in Mimaki Katsumi, Tachikawa Musashi, and Yuyama Akira, eds. 1989) (the punctuation in the citation above belongs to me). Amongst the modern translations of *adhimokṣa* in this passage (Ui tr. 1952, 60; Tiwary tr. 1967, 53; Aramaki tr. 1976, 90; Lévi 1932, 84-85), Lévi’s ‘conviction’ and Aramaki’s 確信 ‘ascertainment’ are worth mentioning. Here it may be of interest to take a look at a Hindi translation, too. The first sentence of the citation above reads in Tiwary’s rendering: ‘making an accurate determination of an object which is ascertained in exactly that manner is ascertainment’ (*niścit vastu kā usī prakār avadhāraṇ karnā hī adhimokṣ hai*). (McGregor 1993, s.v., renders the modern Hindi terms *avadhāraṇ* as ‘ascertainment, accurate determination’, and *niścit* as ‘ascertained, not subject to doubt’.) It should be noted that the key Sanskrit terms remain untranslated, a practice which reminds,

mutatis mutandis, of the Japanese *kundoku* 訓讀 translation of Classical Chinese.

In Xuanzang's translation of the *Cheng weishi lun* 成唯識論, we also find a long section dedicated to the explanation of the term. Let us quote here the most relevant part: 'What is ascertainment (**adhimokṣa* 勝解)? Its nature is accurate determination (**avadhāraṇa* 印持) regarding an object which is definitely known (**niścite vastuni* 於決定境). Its effect is [cognitive] immutability (**asamhāryatā* 不可引轉). By virtue of the evidence 證 [coming from] the [transmitted] Teaching (**āgama* 教) and reasoning (**yukti* 理), be it correct or false, one judges and determines with regard to a cognition object. On this account, other reasons (異緣) cannot [intervene and cause any] change [in cognition]. In the case of an object of doubt, ascertainment (**adhimokṣa* 勝解) is completely absent, as it is also absent when the mind is uncertain.' (云何勝解? 於決定境, 印持爲性。不可引轉爲業。謂邪正等教理證力, 於所取境, 審決印持。由此異緣不能引轉。故猶豫境, 勝解全無, 非審決心, 亦無勝解。T31.28b10-13) (cf. de la Vallée Poussin 1928 tr., vol. 1, p. 310; Cook tr. 1999, 167). The characters 教理證 can be interpreted in two ways. In the *Cheng weishi lun shuji* 成唯識論述記, Ji (T43.429b12-21) understands it as transmitted teaching (*āgama*), reasoning (*yukti*), and perception (*pratyakṣa*). He defines 證 as the direct perception obtained through the cultivation of meditation or by means of the various cognitive faculties (證者即修禪定, 或諸識現量等; T43.429b18-19). The traditional KIK rendering (*Yuga-bu* 瑜伽部 Section, vol. 7, p. 132) as well as modern translators like de la Vallée Poussin and Cook construe the compound similarly. This is, no doubt, a semantically and doctrinally viable alternative. I think, however, that it is also possible to take 證 as 'evidence' and regard it as the head of a genitive construction governing 'teaching' 教 and 'reasoning' 理. This reading is actually supported by Sthiramati's text cited above, which I follow here. We should also take into account the fact that Xuanzang's usual rendering of *pratyakṣa* is 現 or 現量. Another possibility, which practically amounts to a similar conclusion, is that 理證 is a binome rendering *yukti*. Such a usage is actually seen in Xuanzang's translation of the *Kośa* (e.g., T29.87c2). The latter possibility has, however, the disadvantage of presupposing for the passage here a stylistic asymmetry (a one-character word 教 vs a binomic lexeme 理證).

Systematic and detailed as they may be, these Abhidharmic definitions do not, however, exhaust the semantic sphere of *adhimukti*. The word is also used in the sense of 'strong inclination' or 'zealous application' (see Edgerton's illuminating entries on *adhimukti*, *adhimukta*, *adhimucyate*, *ti*, etc. in BHSD, s.vv.). Its usage in texts and passages dedicated to spiritual cultivation, the ŚrBh included, seems to be too wide to be captured by only one term. *Adhimukti* seems to encompass here three closely connected mental processes: (1) the yogi's effort to apply himself intently upon his meditative object; (2) the ability to represent the object mentally (frequently as prescribed by the Buddhist doctrine rather than as simply reflected by direct perception) (cf. Schmithausen 1982b, 67); and (3) the capacity to internalise it, i.e., to become convinced of this representation. A very good illustration on how actually *adhimokṣa* operates in meditation is found at AKBh 338, 2-18. In this passage, Vasubandhu describes how the ascetic (*yogācāra*) contemplates the impure (*aśubhā*) first by concentrating on a certain spot (of his own choice) on his body and then visualising its flesh as undergoing putrefaction, falling off (in view of Tib. *myags zhing zag pa* and Xuanzang's Ch. 爛墮, Pradhan's *kledapitā*^o (MS reading is not certain; see p. 338, n. 3) should be emended to *kledapāta*; see also Silk 2000, p. 289, n. 87), and eventually the whole body becoming a skeleton. Then the yogi proceeds by becoming convinced (*adhimucyate*; or as Silk 2000, 289, renders, 'zealously applies his attention [to visualize...]') that the monastery, the region where here lives, and finally the whole

earth surrounded by the ocean is filled with skeletons. Obviously, in such cases, the ascertainment is not that of a directly perceived reality but of an image induced by meditation.

In most (but not all) occurrences below, I shall render *adhimokṣa* as ‘conviction’ and *adhimucyate* as ‘becoming convinced’, but it should be borne in mind that the semantic sphere of the word is much wider. Unfortunately, the English term ‘conviction’ stresses more the result rather than the entire psychological process implied by *adhimokṣa*. See also notes 209, 246, and 270 below.

The term *adhimokṣa* is discussed in Sakurabe 1997, 34-39; Schmithausen 1982, 408-409; Odani 2000, 206-209; etc.

¹⁶ The meditative object (*ālambana*) basically refers to impurity (*aśubhā*), friendliness (*maitrī*), dependent origination (*idaṃpratīyayātāpratītyasamutpāda*), analysis of the elements (*dhātuprabheda*), and mindfulness of breathing (*ānāpānasmṛti*) which are discussed in Yogasthāna III, Subchapter 3.26.2., etc. (see Synoptic Presentation above) (Sh 411, 5 ff.).

¹⁷ Skt. *nimitta*. For different types of *nimitta* in our text, see ŚrBh Sh 280-281; 411,5 ff. and W 122. See also the typology in the SamBh (pp. 122-128), where 32 categories of *nimitta* are defined. For *nimitta* described in the context of the five categories (*pañca vastūni*) in the *Viniścayasāṃgrahaṇī*, see Kramer ed. and tr. 2005 (Tibetan text: pp. 75-76, etc.; German translation: pp. 112-115, etc.; and discussion: pp. 26-34). On the relation between *nimitta* and *vastu* in the YoBh, see Motomura 2005. For more details and bibliographic information, see Section II, Chapter Five, Part One above. More generally on the meaning of *nimitta* in Buddhist literature, see Yokoyama 1976b.

The term has a wide range of meaning, and even in the particular context of meditation, its precise denotation and connotations are not easy to determine. A concise but very useful discussion of its usage in the ŚrBh and related texts is found in Schmithausen 1982a, p. 63, n. 15a (also containing references to relevant modern studies). In its basic usage, *nimitta* refers to the characteristic(s)/mark(s)/sign(s) (as directly perceived but more often as defined *a priori* by the Buddhist doctrine) which is/are grasped and internalised through meditation or reflection. This ‘characteristic’ means, to use Schmithausen’s terminology (*ibid.*), sometimes the actual form in which the meditation object appears to the yogi (*Erscheinungsform des Übungsobjektes*) and sometimes the mental image grasped from the representation of this appearance (*das in die Vorstellung aufgenommene Bild dieser Erscheinungsform*). This mental image can pass through various stages of refinement. The *locus classicus* explaining them and how they are produced is the *Vism* (see especially, p. 101, § 27 - p.104, § 41).

In what follows, I shall usually translate *nimitta* as ‘characteristic’. This ‘characteristic’ is often handled by the meditator as a mental image (whether directly perceived or represented) or as a support for further reflection.

¹⁸ Skt. *samathavipaśyanāpakṣyāc ca* is an ablative followed by *ca* and not a nominative plural with *ca* (i.e., *samathavipaśyanāpakṣyās ca*) as construed by Wayman (see also note 7 to Skt. crit. ed.). The ablative reading is guaranteed by other similar occurrences in the ŚrBh. We have, for example, *tatra maitribhāvanāprayuktenādikarikaṇa bahirdhā mitrapakṣā<d amitrapakṣā>d udāsīnapakṣāc nimittam udgrhya [...]* (MS 111b2M; here I follow the edited text in Maithrimurthi 1999, 281, German tr., 301; cf. Sh 426,20-427,1). The Chinese rendering 於奢摩他品及毘鉢舍那品善取其相 may also suggest a similar reading (於 usually renders locative but is also used for ablative; cf. BDJ, s.v.). The Tibetan translators may have chosen a less literal rendering here: *zhi gnas dang lhag mthong gi phyogs kyi mtshan ma rnams kyang yongs su zin par gyur pa* ‘having also seized the characteristics of the category of tranquillity and insight’.

¹⁹ Skt. *prayogam ārabhate* ‘undertakes the practice’. The term *prayoga* often has the sense of ‘preparatory practice’, but as clearly stated at the beginning of this passage, our ascetic has

already reached a basic level in meditative training. A large part of Yogasthāna III actually details the preparatory exercises which the yogi is supposed to practise. Now it is time for him to embark upon the spiritual path proper, whether in its mundane or supramundane variety. It is true that the yogi has to practice his chosen path in a systematic way, therefore passing through an initial phase of training (*prayoga?*), but I think that the word *prayoga* is used here in a more general sense, referring to the whole set of exercises which characterise that course of cultivation. It actually seems that *prayogam ārabhate* simply means in this context ‘starts practising’ or, to put it more colloquially, ‘gets down to practice’.

²⁰ Skt. *pūrvasamathacaritas* seems to imply ascetics who have previously practised only or mainly tranquillity, i.e., meditative attainments without the insight (*vipaśyanā*), i.e., reflection upon impermanence, etc.

²¹ This seems to refer to those persons who have keen faculties (cf. Tib. and Ch.) but have not yet reached the four roots of the wholesome [factors] (*catvāri kuśalamūlāni*) and probably not even the aids to liberation (*mokṣabhāgiya*). On the *catvāri kuśalamūlāni*, see, for example, AKBh 274,18ff; 342,8ff; and especially, 345,20ff; on the *mokṣabhāgiya*, see AKBh 349, 2ff.

Wayman understands ‘likewise’ (*tathā*) as referring to *sāmatha* (W 125). I think, however, that *tathā* implies here ‘Buddhist followers’ (*ihadhārmika*), who are still at a low spiritual level. Nothing is said in this passage about the exact stage of the ascetics in question, but most probably the authors of the ŚrBh had in mind the category of beginners (*ādikarmika*). At ŚrBh-Gr (18) 24, 5-7, a beginner is defined as one who ‘has not [yet] generated the roots of the wholesome [factors] [which constitute] the aids to penetration’ (*nirvedhabhāgiyāni kuśalamūlāni notpādayati*).

Saeki Jōin, the KDK translator of the YoBh, explains this category of persons as ‘those who have long cultivated meditation and subdued various manifest defilements only by the six practices 六行’ (p. 134, n. 9). ‘The roots of the wholesome [factors]’ 善根 are glossed upon by the same translator as referring to the *catvāri kuśalamūlāni* 四善根. The KDK note tells us that the practitioner is at a stage when due to unripe roots of wholesome [factors], he cannot contemplate Suchness 眞如 (p. 134, n. 10; see also the addition in the KDK text of 四 in square brackets before 善根). This probably refers to the fact that without ripe roots of the wholesome factors, the practitioner cannot enter the path of vision (*darśanamārga*). It is not clear, however, what these six practices 六行 actually mean in this context. According to the *Kośa*, the heat (*uśmagata*), which is the first root of the wholesome [factors] (*kuśalamūla*), is born of the application of the mindfulness to phenomena (*dharmasmṛtyupasthāna*) (AKBh 343,11-12), but the latter, as far as I can see, contains nothing related to the ‘six practices’. The only occurrence of 六行 in the YoBh is in the *Śrutamāyī bhūmiḥ* (T31.353c19), where it appears to refer to the six recollections (*ṣaḍ anusmṛtayaḥ*), i.e., recollection of the Buddha 佛, Dharma 法, Saṅgha 僧, the practice leading to Nirvana 趣涅槃行 (probably *śīlānusmṛti* or the recollection of virtue), the practice leading to charity 趣資財行 (*tyāgānusmṛti*), and the practice leading to birth in Heavens 趣生天行 (*devatānusmṛti* or the recollection of deities). These six recollections do not seem, however, to play any important role in the attainment of the four roots of the wholesome [factors]. The same six recollections are also described in detail in the *Vism* (pp. 162-197). In Śrāvakayāna Buddhism, these recollections are generally confined to lower levels of practice or regarded as collateral forms of spiritual training. In the *Vism* (101, § 27), for instance, the recollections of the virtues of the Buddha, Dhamma, and Saṅgha form only a part of the preparatory techniques for attaining the first absorption (*jhāna*).

See also the different classifications in the *Gotrabhūmi* and *Avatārabhūmi* of the ŚrBh, especially ŚrBh-Gr 58, 8.

²² An equally possible rendering is ‘a bodhisattva who wishes to attain Awakening in a future

life but is not yet able to reach it in the present life'. The exact interpretation of this category is not easy. In a Śrāvakayāna context, which our text presumably reflects, it should refer to the previous lives of Śākyamuni or any of the former Buddhas. (For the Sarvāstivādin understanding of the term *bodhisattva*, see the *Mahāvibhāṣāśāstra* T27.886c- 887b; on the concept of *bodhisattva* in Śrāvakayāna Abhidharma, see also Nishi 1975, 165-217.) Another possibility is, however, to see here a Mahāyānist influence and understand 'bodhisattva' as denoting the Path-seekers who postpone their Awakening motivated by their messianic mission. The latter would better explain Xuanzang's rendering 一切菩薩 'all bodhisattvas' (no equivalent, however, for 一切 'all' in Skt. and Tib). Of course, it is possible that the MS used by Xuanzang contained **sarva*, but it is not excluded that 一切 is an editorial addition of the Chinese master. However, even if we take the Chinese rendering as representing the original reading, a Śrāvakayānika interpretation is still possible: 'all' in the sense of every former Buddha in his life before Awakening. In passage 3.28.3.3.6. of the ŚrBh, we also find the plural *buddhās*, but this fragment, too, offers no clue as to how the authors of the ŚrBh conceived of these Buddhas.

Let us also note that in the Sanskrit text, all these four categories of persons appear in singular. Stylistically, however, it seemed to me that plural forms sound better in English. Semantically it appears that in spite of their grammatical number, the first three categories refer to more than one individual (see especially the first class which though in singular is accompanied by *sarva*, leaving thus no doubt that a plural sense was meant). The fourth category may have a singular reference, but even if we construe 'bodhisattva' within a Śrāvakayānika framework, a plural meaning referring to the former lives of Śākyamuni and the previous Buddhas is not out of the question.

^{2 3} Skt. *dr̥ṣṭa eva dharme*. The phrase frequently occurs in Pali (*diṭṭhe dhamme, diṭṭhe va dhamme*) and Sanskrit Buddhist literature. It basically means 'in this present life'. In their seminal study on *dhamma* in the Pali Canon (1920, 99-101), Magdalene and Wilhelm Geiger discuss the term and translate it as *im gegenwärtigen Leben* or *bei Lebzeiten*. We owe a more detailed and helpful study on *diṭṭhadhamma* in the Pali canonical and commentarial literature to Kunihiko Tasaki (1989). In a very recent contribution, Rishō Hotori (2005) argues that in a compound like *diṭṭhadhammasukkhavihāra* (Pali)/*dr̥ṣṭadharmasukkhavihāra* (Skt.), the interpretation of *diṭṭhadhamma/dr̥ṣṭadharmā* should be that of an impersonal locative absolute construction: 'as soon as a situation or condition (*dhamma/dharma*) is seen or appears' (p. 153). It is true that impersonal locative absolute constructions are possible in Pali (see Hendriksen 1944, 43-44; cf. also von Hinüber 1968, 296-304), but the interpretation proposed by Hotori is an unnecessary complication and all the occurrences examined by him can be better construed along the semantic lines discussed by Geiger and Tasaki (see above).

^{2 4} Skt. *laukikamārgayāyin* (see note 16 to Skt. crit. ed.). The compound literally means '[one] travelling [proceeding by] the mundane path'.

See also T31.687c.

^{2 5} An adept or (advanced) learner (Skt., *śaikṣa*; Pali, *sekha*) is in the Śrāvakayāna tradition a holy or noble person (*ārya*) who has obtained any of the three fruits below Arhatship. The latter is called a 'person who needs no more practice' (lit., 'non-learner') (*aśaikṣa, asekhā*), i.e.,. See BDJ, s.v. 有學; Nyanatiloka, s.v. *sekha*. See also note 28 to Chapter One, Part One above.

^{2 6} It is difficult to find a proper word covering all the nuances of the Sanskrit *kāma*. It refers both to sensual pleasures and desires or longing for them. The German language, which allows for a much richer and subtler word-formation, makes it possible to translate *kāma* as [*sinnlichen*] *Begierden-und-Genüsse* or '[sensual] desires-and-pleasures' (like, for instance, Sakuma 1990, vol. 2, p. 132). In English, I am afraid, such a compound would sound less natural. My choice for 'sensual pleasures' should, however, be understood as including both

their enjoyment and yearning for them.

The ŚrBh is certainly aware of the semantic complexity of the term. This can be seen in passage 3.28.2.1.2.4. below which makes a distinction between *klesakāmāḥ* (referring to desires) and *vastukāmāḥ* (meaning the objects of desire).

²⁷ This is how I render Skt. *dhyāna* and Pali *jhāna*. There is no term in English capable of covering the whole semantic range of the word, and one solution is to leave it untranslated, an alternative of which I avail myself occasionally. Though unable to escape the pitfalls and limitations of the *traduttore = traditore* fate, I usually prefer, however, to render the word as ‘absorption’. In his detailed study on *jhāna* in Pali sources, Gunaratana (1985, 3) agrees that ‘absorption’ is the most appropriate translation for *jhāna* which one can find in the English language. However, he chooses to use this term for rendering *appanā* and leaves *jhāna* untranslated. It is hard to find decisive arguments concerning the ultimate lexical suitability of such difficult terms, but I think that ‘absorption’ for *dhyāna/jhāna* raises no special problems. As for *appanā* (though not occurring in this chapter of the ŚrBh), I would prefer ‘complete concentration’, which is one of the renderings suggested by the editors of CPD, s.v., and PD, s.v. Or a term like ‘fixation’ employed by Pe Maung Tin and Mrs Rhys Davids in *The Expositor* (*Atthasālinī*), p. 189 (translating Dhs-a 142), may represent an alternative worth considering.

²⁸ Skt. <sa>*samāpattiyupapattika* (as clearly expressed by the prefix *sa-*) refers to the double aspect under which meditative states are understood in Buddhism. On the one hand, they are mental attainments (*samāpatti*) of different levels of consciousness obtained through meditation. On the other hand, they represent the birth (*upapatti*) in an cosmic sphere corresponding to the level of meditation attained. See AKBh 432, 4-5: *dvividhā dhyānāni samāsato dvividhāni dhyānāny upapattisamāpattidhyānabhedāt*. The correspondence between the meditative attainments and the different existential planes or Heavens is detailed in sections 3.28.6.-3.28.6.6. below.

We also find the compound *samāpattiyupapatti* at AKBh 36, 17-18, and the similar *upapattisamāpattiḥ* at AKBh 434, 1. A practically identical synonymous pair in the AKBh is *dhyānasamāpatti* and *dhyānopapatti*. At AKBh 190, 21-22, we are told that there is an exact correspondence between the shortcomings (*apakṣāla*) of the absorption levels (*dhyāna*) and those of their corresponding existential realms. These shortcomings refer to the psychological imperfections accompanying the first three absorption levels which, though clearly superior to the realm of sensual pleasure, hinder, nevertheless, the attainment of the complete mental serenity experienced in the fourth *dhyāna*. Early Buddhist sources actually describe the first three *jhānas* as unstable or agitated (*iñjita*) and declare only the fourth absorption to be stable or non-agitated (*aniñjita*) (MN I 454-455). AN V 134-135 uses the metaphorical term ‘thorn’ (*kaṇṭaka*) to denote the shortcomings hampering the meditative attainments (cf. also Poussin vol. 3, p. 107, n. 1; vol. 5, p. 161, n. 2). AKBh lists eight such shortcomings (AKBh 441, VIII.11). The AKBh also discusses three types of acts (*karman*), i.e., meritorious (*puñya*), non-meritorious (*apuñya*), and non-agitated or stable (*ānejya* or *āneñjya*; Tib. *mi gyo ba*; Ch. 不動). The latter refers to the retribution in the upper realms of material (*rūpāvacara*) and immaterial (*ārūpyāvacara*) existence (cf. AKBh 227ff). On the other hand, the AKBh admits that there are differences in the feelings (*vedanā*) experienced in the meditative attainments and the feelings (*vedanā*) experienced in the corresponding cosmic realms (*tat kiṃ yā dhyānasamāpattiṣu vedanā tā eva dhyānopapattiṣu | netyāha |* AKBh 441, 20-21) (see also AKBh p. 442, VIII.12).

²⁹ Skt. *ākimcanyāyatana*. This is the ‘station’ or ‘base’ (*āyatana*; see note 136 below) corresponding to the seventh absorption. The ascetic obtains detachment from a *dhyāna*- or *ārūpya*-level by observing its coarseness, i.e., its imperfections compared to the superior

contemplative state. For the ascetic proceeding by the mundane path, however, this cannot happen with regard to the eighth attainment of neither ideation nor non-ideation (*naivasamjñānāsamjñāsamāpatti*). Detachment from this level corresponds to Awakening, and this can be achieved only by practising the supramundane path. The AKBh 366, 10-12 makes this clear: **lokottareṇa vairāgyaṃ bhavāgrāt || 45c || na laukikena. kiṃ kāraṇam? tata ūrdhvaṃ laukikābhāvat svabhūmikasya cāpratipakṣatvāt.** (Both Pradhan and Shastri (p. 974, ll. 4-5) read: *vā pratipakṣatvāt*. The text must, however, be emended as suggested above. The Tibetan translation runs as: *de'i gong na 'jig rten pa med pa'i phyir dang | rang gi sa pa'i gnyen po ma yin pa'i phyir ro* | (P Ngu 32a1). Cf. also T29.127a25-6: 自地不能治自地故. The necessity to emend *pratipakṣatvāt* to *apratipakṣatvāt* is also pointed out by Hirakawa (Corrigenda in AKBh-I vol. 1, p. 435) and Griffiths (1983, 297, n. 199). Pradhan's reading can be explained as mis-deciphering *vā* instead of *cā* (*ca+a^o*), the two *akṣaras* being virtually identical. Tib. *dang* [...] *gnyen po ma yin pa'i phyir ro* clearly suggests that the original must have been *cāpratipakṣatvāt*, a reading which actually fits the context better.) **[It is] by the supramundane [path that the ascetic obtains] detachment from the summit of existence || 45c ||** Not by the mundane [path]. Why? Because there is no higher mundane [realm] and because [one stage] is not a remedy [to the defilements] pertaining to its own stage.' (cf. Griffiths' s translation, p. 297; see also Griffiths 1983, pp. 292-294: *bhavāgra* on the supramundane path, and pp. 296-302: translation of the whole passage; Lamotte tr. 1944-1980, vol. 1, p. 1035, n. 1; pp. 1035ff; Poussin, vol. 4, p. IX).

³⁰ Skt. *asamjñīsamāpatti* 'attainment of non-ideation' or 'attainment of unconsciousness'. Cf. Poussin vol. 1, pp. 198-213: very detailed discussion in relation to *nirodhasamāpatti*; p. 200, in relation to *bhūmi* of *apramāṇa*; p. 310, in relation to *ālambanapratyaya*; vol. 2, pp. 122-3, in relation to rebirth; vol. 3, p. 200, in relation to *vipāka*. Cf. Griffiths 1983, 255ff; 306; 311; 584. Mochizuki, vol. 5, p. 4838. For the ŚrBh treatment of this concept and practice, see section 3.28.4.2. below. Cf. also notes 244 and 245 below.

³¹ Skt. *abhinirhāra*. In the sense of 'generation, accomplishment, production', *abhinirhāra*, *abhinirharati*, etc. are often used in relation to *abhijñā* (e.g., SadPuṇḍ 141, 11ff), *samādhi* (e.g. BoBh 141, 23-24; 175, 10-11).

³² The *pañca abhijñāḥ* or *abhijñānāni* (see note 22 to Skt. crit. ed.) are the first five in the standard set of six supernatural knowledges or faculties (*ṣaḍ abhijñāḥ*). The *Kośa* lists them as: miraculous powers (*rddhi*), divine ear (*divyaśrotra*), knowledge of [others'] ways of thought (*cetaḥpariyāyijñāna*), recollection of one's own previous lives (*pūrvanivāsānusmṛti*), and knowledge of the death and birth [of all sentient beings] (*cyutyupapādajñāna*) (also known as *divyacakṣuḥ* or 'divine eye'). These five faculties can also be obtained by ordinary people (*pṛthagjana*). A sixth *abhijñā* called the 'knowledge of the destruction of contaminants' (*āsravaḥṣayajñāna*) is attainable only by the Noble Ones (*ārya*). Cf. AKBh 421, 6ff; Poussin vol. 5, p. 97ff; BoBh 58; MVyut §§ 14-15; Mochizuki 1933, vol.2, 1261; vol. 3, 2080-1; vol. 5, 5060 (especially as it occurs in PPUpad). See also passage 3.28.5.1. and relevant notes below.

³³ MS reads here: *tathā asamjñīsamāpattiḥ | dhyānasamapattisamniśrayeṇa ca abhijñānānām pañcānām abhinirhāraḥ*. Wayman (p. 126) reads and emends as follows: *tathā asamjñīsamāpatti(m) dhyānasamapatti(m) samniśrayeṇābhijñānām pañcānām abhinirhāraḥ* (my underlying). His translation of this sentence is: 'so also as the accomplishment of the five supernormal faculties (*abhijñā*) by taking recourse to non-ideational equipoise and to *dhyāna* equipoise' (ibid.). Wayman's understanding appears to be that the accomplishment of the five supernormal faculties is based on the 'non-ideational equipoise' and '*dhyāna*-equipoise'. While the latter is doctrinally correct and apparently implied by our text here, *asmjñīsamāpatti* does not appear to play any role in obtaining the five supernatural faculties. According to the AKBh (422, 2), 'the five supernatural faculties depend on the level of the fourth *dhyāna*' (*pañcābhijñāḥ*

caturthadhyānabhūmikāḥ) (= Ch. 前之五通依四靜慮. T29.143a3-4). The *Kośa* continues then with a passage explaining why their basis cannot be the four immaterial attainments. See also ŚrBh, passage 3.28.5.1. and note 251 below. It is true that the *asmjñīsamāpatti* is not an immaterial attainment, but neither can it be equated with a material *dhyāna* (though it is obtained on the basis of the fourth absorption). The interpretation ‘non-ideational equipoise’ and ‘*dhyāna*-equipoise’ is therefore doctrinally problematic.

Besides, there are linguistic reasons pleading against such an emendation. The Skt. MS clearly has the nominative singular form of *asmjñīsamāpattiḥ* and, equally important, it contains *ca*, which Wayman does not read. The syntactic position of *ca* actually renders Wayman’s reading quite unlikely. The Tib. version also appears to understand only the supernatural faculties as being dependent upon *dhyāna*: *bsam gtan la brten nas mngon par shes pa lnga*. It is not impossible to construe the preceding *de bzhin du ‘du shes med pa la snyoms par ‘jug pa dang* as a juxtaposed phrase connected with *bsam gtan* by *dang*, but I find this reading improbable here. The whole sentence contains many noun phrases connected by *dang*, and *de bzhin du ‘du shes med pa la snyoms par ‘jug pa dang* is only one of them.

The Ch. translation reads: 又依靜慮等能引無想定等及發五神通等 ‘Furthermore, based upon absorptions, [the ascetic] can trigger the attainment of non-ideation, etc. and generates the five supernatural faculties’ The rendering contains some elements different from the Skt. First, we notice the presence of 等 ‘etc.’, which probably refers here to the *nirodhasamāpatti* (see section 3.28.4. below, where it forms a pair with the *asmjñīsamāpatti*). Second, Xuanzang seems to read *dhyānasamapattisamñīrayeṇa* as referring to both *asmjñīsamāpatti* and *abhijñāna*. It is true that the attainment of non-ideation is based on the fourth *dhyāna* (e.g., AKBh 69, 4-5: *dhyāne’ ntye* || 42 ||: *antya dhyānam caturtham tatparyāpannā ‘sau nānyabhūmikā*), but though Xuanzang’s understanding is doctrinally possible, the extant Sanskrit original of our ŚrBh passage does not support such a reading. The position of *ca* excludes this reading, and the only way to make *abhinirhārah* refer to *asmjñīsamāpatti* is to hypothesise that Xuanzang’s MS read: **tathā asmjñīsamāpatter dhyānasamapattisamñīrayeṇa abhijñānānām ca pañcānām abhinirhārah* (with *asmjñīsamāpatti* in genitive and *ca* after *abhijñānānām*). Anyway, the extant Skt. text (as well as the Tib. version) makes perfect sense and require no emendation.

^{3 4} Literally, the sentence reads: ‘The yogi intent upon [achieving] detachment from sensual pleasures attains detachment from sensual pleasures by means of the seven contemplations.’

Furthermore, the prefix *anu-* of the verb *anuprāpnoti* probably carries here a nuance of gradualness (cf. Tib. *rjes su thob*, which faithfully renders the prefix *anu* = *rjes su*). The connotational value of the verb is: ‘the yogi [...] gradually attains [...]’.

^{3 5} The seven contemplations are a praxis-related model peculiar to the ŚrBh (see also ŚrBh-Gr (18), 10). References to these contemplations in other parts of the YoBh or later Buddhist sources appear to rely, directly or indirectly, upon the ŚrBh. For instance, we find them alluded to in verses 48B-51 of the *Ābhīprāyikāthagāthā*. The *Nirdeśa* commenting upon these verses clearly identifies the practice with the seven contemplations: *atra lakṣaṇapratīsamvedyādibhiḥ saptabhir manaskārair laukikalokottaramārgaviśuddhyā sopadhinirupadhinirvāṇaphalādhīprajñam śikṣāviśuddhiḥ paridīpitā* (Maeda 1991, 91; for the whole context, see pp. 90-92; cf. also Wayman 1984, 357; translation and commentary, pp. 365-6). We also find the seven contemplation in the SamBh (115, 3-5; see also pp. 119-120) and also briefly discussed in the Viniś (T31.692b10-16).

The seven contemplations are also seen at AbhSam 68, 22-69, 1, and AbhSamBh 80, 4-30 (both passages are also edited and translated in Griffiths 1983, 426-434). In these texts, they are similarly described as being employed to obtain the four absorptions and the subsequent attainments: *saptabhir manaskāraiḥ prathamam dhyānam samāpadyate evam yāvan naivasamjñānāsamjñāyatanañ ca* (AbhSam, quoted after Griffiths 1983, 427). As Griffiths notes

(1983, p. 429, n. **; cf. also p. 359, n. 39), the corresponding AbhSamBh passage appears to summarise the main points related to the seven contemplations in the ŚrBh and sometimes make use of some parts of it verbatim. Actually, Xuanzang's translation of this passage is preceded by a short note (probably added by the Chinese master?) clearly stating the parallelism: 'The detailed explanation [of the seven contemplations below] is like [in] the final Yogasthāna of the Śrāvakabhūmi' 此廣分別如聲聞地後瑜伽處 (T31.736b26). The *Xianyang lun* contains a parallel description of the seven contemplations, which is edited, translated, and annotated in Choi pp. 77-86. The direct source of this passage in the *Xianyang lun* is, no doubt, the ŚrBh. Tsong-kha-pa, making direct references to the ŚrBh, also mentions the seven contemplations in his magnum opus, the *Lam rim chen mo* (Kelsang and Odani, ed., p. 111, ll. 11-18; see also Wayman 1997, 165-170).

³⁶ These six aspects are also expounded in detail in Yogasthāna III (MS 99a2M-99a7M; Sh 368,10-370.2; W 111-112).

³⁷ The ŚrBh often uses *vastu* in such contexts to refer to the inner-outer distinction. See, for example, a similar pattern in the discussion of the category (*pakṣa*) of friendliness (*maitrī*) (Skt. passage edited at Maithrimurthi 1999, p. 278, II.2.B.; Tib. passage at *ibid.*, p. 287; German translation at *ibid.*, p. 297; see also *ibid.*, p. 297, n. 5). Although our text is not clear about this, this distinction seems to be parallel to the dichotomy between defilement sensual pleasures (*kleśakāmāḥ*) and object sensual pleasures (*vastukāmāḥ*), which is made in the next passage (see also note 38 below).

³⁸ I construe 'defilement sensual pleasures' (*kleśakāmāḥ*) and 'object sensual pleasures' (*vastukāmāḥ*) as *karmadhāraya* compounds. Rather than two types of sensual pleasures, *kleśakāma* and *vastukāma* denote different aspects of *kāma*: the former stresses the defiling nature of the sensual pleasures, while the latter emphasises the external objects at which they are directed. A similar understanding is seen in the *Mahāniddeśa ad Sn 766 (Kāmasutta): kāmā ti uddānato dve kāmā, vatthukāmā ca kilesakāmā ca* (Nid I 1). The commentary continues by defining the sensual pleasures [consisting in] objects (*vatthukāmā*) as 'pleasing visible objects, pleasing sounds, pleasing smells, pleasing tastes, pleasing tangible objects' (*manāpikā rūpā, manāpikā saddā, manāpikā gandhā, manāpikā rasā, manāpikā poṭṭhabbā*). It then enumerates concrete objects which could entice sensual pleasures, ranging from carpets (*attharaṇā*) and clothes (*pāpuraṇā*) to royal cities (*rājadhāniyo*) and kingdoms (*raṭṭham*). To sum up, 'sensual pleasures [consisting in] objects are whatever objects which may lead to lust' (*yaṃ kiñci rajanīyaṃ vatthu, vatthukāmā*) (Nid I 1). As to the *kilesakāmā*, they represent a long list of synonyms or quasi-synonyms of sensual pleasures: 'the wish is a sensual pleasure [representing defilement], the passion is a sensual pleasure [representing defilement], the ardent passion is a sensual pleasure [representing defilement], the [lustful] intention is a sensual pleasure [representing defilement], [...] *chando kāmo, rāgo kāmo, chāndarāgo kāmo, saṃkappo kāmo, [...]* (Nid I 2) (A similar definition is found at Vibh 256: *chando kāmo, rāgo kāmo, chāndarāgo kāmo, saṃkappo kāmo, rāgo kāmo, saṃkapparāgo kāmo: ime vuccanti kāmā*). The Nid I -a implies that the synonyms and quasi-synonyms are arranged in a series showing the growing intensity of sensual pleasures (*chandoti dubbalarāgo. rāgoti tato balavataro. upari tayopi rāgā imehi balavatarā*; quoted from Chaṭṭha Saṅgāyana).

The *Cintamayī bhūmiḥ* also discusses the two types of sensual pleasures in several passages. In the CintBh (Skt. text found in ŚrBh MS 27b3M-5M; T30.370a20-29), the elimination of the object sensual pleasures (*vastukāma*) is defined as 'clearly perceiving that the vicissitudes of the householder's life are like a prison and seeking liberation [instead]' (I follow the Chinese translation: 云何斷事欲? [...] 了知居家迫迮猶如牢獄, 思求出離. T30.370a20-23). Renouncing lay life and entering the path of the homeless recluse do not mean, however, that

sensual pleasures can be eliminated for ever (Skt.: *sa ca bhavaty avītarāgaḥ kāmebhyaḥ*) MS 27b4L; Ch.: 欲貪猶未永離 T30.370a24). The elimination of the defilement sensual pleasures (*kleśakāma*), on the other hand, refers to the eradication of all sensual pleasures without remainder (Skt.: *aseṣaṃ kāmarāgaprahāṇāya* MS 27b4M; Ch.: 爲令欲貪無餘斷 T30.370a26) by practising spiritual austerities in the wilderness (往趣曠野山林, 安居邊際臥具, 或住阿練若處乃至或在空閑靜室。T30.370a26-28). The text seems to imply that by renouncing lay life the mendicant is no longer in contact with objects enticing lust. Thus, many of the gross material temptations encountered in the secular life can be cut off merely by physically separating oneself from such an environment. The lure of sensual pleasures, however, continues to defile one's mind, and this can be eradicated only by ascetic practices (see also T30.376a2-10).

We find in the same CintBh a more detailed definition of the object sensual pleasures (*vastukāma*) and the defilement sensual pleasures (*kleśakāma*). The text subdivides *vastukāma* in two subcategories: *tatra vastukāmā dhānyam yasyādhiṣṭhānam kṣetravastu, dhanam ca yasyādhiṣṭhānam hiraṇyavastu* < | > (YoBh MS 137b5) (cf. Tib. D Tshi 259b7-260a1; Ch.: 事欲有二。一者穀彼所依處謂田事。二者財彼所依處謂金銀等事。T30.387c1-3). 'Object sensual pleasures are [those consisting in] grain whose base is [such a] thing [as] the cultivated land and [those consisting in] wealth whose base is [such a] thing [as] gold.' (Skt. *kṣetravastu* is rendered into Tibetan as *zhing gi dngos po*, literally, 'field-property' or 'field-action', and into Chinese as 田事 'field-occupation', i.e., 'farming'. It should be noted that in Pali the compound *khetta-vatthu* can also mean 'possession of land & goods' (PED, s.v.). It must be also noticed that in the second sentence, Tib. has only *dbyig gi dngos po*, while Ch. adds 'silver, etc.' after 'gold'.) These activities and the attachment to the things which they generate are further detailed. Then, the definition of the *kleśakāma* follows: *kleśakāmāḥ { | } katame < | > yā* [MS reads *kā*, which hardly makes sense; Tib. *gang yin pa* suggests emendation to *yā*] *vastukāmāsvādānusāriṇi* [MS reads: 'anusāriṇi, but I emend in the light of Tib.: *rjes su 'brang ba'i rnam par shes pa*] *vijñāne <'> bhigryddhiḥ* [*visarga* appears to have been added afterwards] *yaḥ* [Tib. suggests that *ca* should be added here] *samkalparāgaḥ < | > tasya teṣu teṣu vastu {ṣu} kāmēṣu kleśakāmena durbalīkṛte cetasi teṣāṃ vastukāmānām vipariṇāmād anyathibhāvād utpadyante parisravāḥ śokaparidevaduḥkhadaurmanasyopāyāsāḥ* | (YoBh MS 138a1) (cf. Tib. D Tshi 260a4-6; Ch.: 煩惱欲者謂: 於事欲隨逐愛味依耽著識發生種種妄分別貪。又於事欲由煩惱欲令心沈沒成下劣性。若彼事欲變壞散失便生諸漏, 愁歎憂悲種種苦惱纏繞其心。T30.380c13-18). (I am indebted to Prof. Schmithausen for having kindly checked the Skt. MS.) 'What are defilement sensual pleasures? [Those sensual pleasures] which are the greed representing the passion [born of] false discriminations [and arising] on the basis of the consciousness following the relish of the object sensual pleasures. In his mind, which has become feeble with respect to every object sensual pleasure [as well as] through the defilement sensual pleasures, because of the transformation and alteration of these object sensual pleasures, there arise troubles, sorrow, lamenting, suffering, dissatisfaction, [and] mental disturbances.'

In its discussion of the two aspects of *kāma*, the Vinīś stresses the primacy of the *kāmakleśa*: it is the defiled sensual pleasures that generate the object sensual pleasures and thus give birth to much corruption and misfortune (妄分別貪名士夫欲。以何因緣唯煩惱欲說名為欲非事欲耶? 答: 以煩惱欲性染污故, 又唯煩惱欲能欲事欲故。又煩惱欲發動事欲, 令生種種雜染過患。T30.625b26-29; the discussion continues up to 625c13). The Tibetan translation of the passage is critically edited in Ahn 2003, 127ff, and its German translation is found at *ibid.*, 309ff.

To-ryun 道倫 glosses upon the two aspects as follows: 貪名煩惱欲, 五塵名事欲。(T42.472c7) 'The greed is called defilement sensual pleasure; the five dust[y sense-fields, i.e., visible objects, sounds, smells, tangible objects] are called object sensual pleasures'. In his subcommentary on the *Avatamsakasūtra*, Chengguan 澄觀, who quotes the YoBh, succinctly

describes the two aspects of *kāma* as 煩惱約內, 事欲約外. (T36.486b22-23) ‘the defilement [sensual pleasures] sum up the interior [aspect]; the object sensual pleasures sum up the exterior [aspect]’. In his Commentary on the *Avatamsakasūtra* (T35.783c27-28), Chengguan also refers at these two aspects, this time quoting *juan* 33 of the ŚrBh. (What I refer to as the ‘subcommentary’ is the *Da fangguang fo huayan sui shu yan yi chao* 大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔, in which Chengguan expounds 演 the meaning 義 of the *Avatamsakasūtra* following 隨 his own commentary 疏 on this sutra.)

See also passage 3.28.3.1.1. and respective notes below.

³⁹ The noun qualified by *sukhasthānīyāḥ*, *duḥkhashthānīyāḥ*, and *aduḥkhāsukhasthānīyāḥ* must be ‘sensual pleasures’. Skt. *sthāniya* means here ‘giving rise to’ (cf. Pali *āsavaṭṭhāniya* ‘giving rise to *asavas*, CPD s.v.). Xuanzang translates as: 順樂受處、順苦受處、順不苦不樂受處 or ‘locus suitable for [or: in accordance with] pleasant feelings’, etc. Ch. 受 ‘feeling’ is probably an editorial addition to make clear that ‘pleasant’, etc. refer to *vedanā*.

⁴⁰ For the grammatical peculiarity of the compounds with *-adhiṣṭhāna* ‘basis of’ in *fine compositi*, see Choi 2001, p. 118, n. 336.

⁴¹ Skt. *saṃjñā* (Pali, *saññā*) is admittedly difficult to render into modern concepts, but I think that ‘ideation’ approximates a large part of the broad semantic sphere covered by the term.

The *Kośa* defines the term in the following way: *saṃjñā nimittodgrahaṇātmikā* || 14c-d || *yāvan nilapitādirghahrasvastrīpuruṣamitrāmītrasukhaduḥkhādinimittodgrahaṇam asau saṃjñā-skandhaḥ*. (AKBh 10, 15-16) ‘*saṃjñā* has the nature of the grasping of characteristics || 14c-d ||. This aggregate of *saṃjñā* is the grasping of characteristics such as blue, yellow, long, short, woman, man, friend, foe, pleasant, suffering, etc.’ (cf. also AKBh 45, 20-21). Skt. *udgrahaṇa* literally means ‘picking up’ or ‘extracting’ and refers here to selectively perceiving those essential characteristics which define an object or concept. In this sense, I think that it matches the basic understanding of perception (as opposed to sensation) in modern psychology. The term is explained in Britannica as: ‘**perception**, the process whereby sensory stimulation is translated into organized or meaningful experience’ (vol. 9, p. 279; cf. also ‘Human Perception’, vol. 25, pp. 481-502). For instance, the physiological reactions in the eye which respond to light, colour, etc. represent sensation. Integrating and organising these physiological reactions in such a way as to permit the recognition of the light, color, etc. as representing, say, a picture constitute perception (see Hockenbury & Hockenbury 2000, 88ff). Though ‘perception’ is often adopted by modern translators as a rendering for *saññā/saṃjñā*, the examples given by Vasubandhu show that the Buddhist tradition construed the term as more complex and comprehensive than the perception of qualia such as blue. Recognising someone as friend or foe supposes far more mental operations than a simple colour perception. The same holds true for pleasure and suffering. This is obviously not a mere reaction of attraction or rejection (which is usually covered by the concept of *vedanā*), and a *saṃjñā* of *sukha* or *duḥkha* seems to imply a certain degree of conscious judgement.

In this context, Seyfort Ruegg’s pertinent remarks (1998, 138) on the the unsuitable translation of *saṃjñā* as ‘perception’ can also be mentioned. Seyfort Ruegg suggests “‘notion, idea”, (or eventually, “apperception””) (ibid.). Although not a technical term regularly employed in modern psychology, ‘ideation’ seems to me also capable to convey the wide range of meanings covered by *saññā/saṃjñā*. It may actually be the lack of its precise scientific definition that makes it possible for ‘ideation’ to accommodate a broad semantic spectrum.

⁴² Skt. *krodha* ‘wrath’ is often used in classical Sanskrit literature with the sense of manifested or outward anger which is preceded and determined by inner grudge (*manyu*) (see Hara 2001). AKBh, 312, 18, defines the term as: *vyāpādavihimsāvarjitaḥ sattvāsattvayor āghātāḥ krodhaḥ* ‘*krodha* is anger towards beings or things without malice and without [actual] violence’ (see

AKVy 494, 13-18, especially for the meaning of *vyāpāda* and *vihimsā*; for the sense of *āghāta*, see BHDS, s.v.; cf. also Poussin vol. 4, p. 90, translating the term as ‘irritation’). According to the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, *krodha* has the function of serving as the basis of violent acts such as taking up the staff, taking up the sword, etc. (see AbhSam 8, 13-14: *krodhaḥ katamaḥ | pratyupasthite apakāranimitte prati[ghām]śikaś cetasa āghātaḥ | śāstrādānaḍḍādānādi-saṁrambhasanniśrayadānakarmakaḥ ||*; on *saṁrambha*, see note 71 below; for *śāstrādāna* and *daṇḍādāna*, see note 162 below) (cf. also AbhSamBh 7, 13-14). See also note 43 below.

⁴³ Skt. *upanāha* ‘enmity’ is defined at AKBh, 313, 15, as follows: *āghātavastubahulikāra upanāhaḥ* ‘enmity means repeated [/intense] performance of acts of harming’. See also AbhSam 8, 14-15.

⁴⁴ Skt. *mraṅka* ‘concealment’. The word is defined by the *Kośa* as follows: ‘*mraṅka* refers to hiding [one’s] errors’ (*avadyapracchādanam mraṅkaḥ*) (AKBh 312, 20). TrimBh 30, 11ff (=Ms D14b4-b5), gives a longer explanation but the basic understanding remains the same: ‘*mraṅka* refers to hiding one’s own errors’ (*mraṅka ātmano vadyapracchādanā*). Interesting to note that like our ŚrBh passage, the TrimBh also associates *mraṅka* with bewilderment: ‘The fact that *mraṅka* pertains to bewilderment is because of its aspect of hiding’ (*mohāmsikatvam tu mraṅkasya pracchādanākāratvāt*).

⁴⁵ The word rendered here as ‘stubborn adherence’ is spelled *pradāsa* in ŚrBh, AKBh, etc. and *pradāsa* in MVyut (# 1964), *Dharmasaṁgraha*, etc. BWDJ, s.v., and BHSD, s.v., record both forms as free variants. The edited text of the TrimBh (Lévi, 29,31 and 30,15; Tiwary, 64 and 66) reads *pradāsa*, but the original MS spelling appears to be *pradāsa*. The MSS used by Lévi (now catalogued as MSS No. 5-136VI and No. 1-1697VI of the National Archives in Kathmandu) have been reproduced photographically by Mimaki, Tachikawa, and Yuyama (1989), who name them MS C and MS D. The word in question occurs in folio 14a, line 7 (Mimaki, Tachikawa, and Yuyama 1989, pp. 37-38, corresponding to Lévi, 29,31) and reads *pradāsa*. Folio 14b, line 7 (Mimaki, Tachikawa, and Yuyama 1989, p. 39 = Lévi, 30,15) also reads *pradāsa*. On the other hand, MS I (which is a modern copy of D) apparently emends the *pradāsa* reading of D to *pradāsa*. It seems that the scribe consistently writes here *sa/si* for what usually is spelled as *śa/śi* (Folio 14b, line 7; see also, for instance, MS *°dāsītā* and *dāsi*, which is emended by Lévi (p. 30, n. 2) to *°dāsītā* and *dāsi* respectively). These occurrences may attest to a scribal tradition consistently spelling the word and other related terms with *-s*. This is not, however, the only tradition. The so-called MS J, which is now stored at the Cultural Palace of the Nationalities in Beijing and contains the *Trimsīkāvijñaptikārikāḥ*, spells the word as *pradāsa* (folio 1a, line 6, Mimaki, Tachikawa, and Yuyama 1989, 159). (Let us note that this is a palm-leaf MS which is only one folio (recto and verso), and is written in a script very close to the ŚrBh MS, being most probably earlier than the MSS C and D of the TrimBh.)

Both forms probably go back to a Prakrit form similar or identical to the Pali *palāsa/paḷāsa* ‘unmercifulness, malice, spite’ (PED, s.v.), a word which was considered by the traditional Pali commentators as a near synonym of *yugaggāha* (var. lec. *yuddhadhāsa*) or ‘control, dominance, domineering, imperiousness’. Vbh-a glosses the word as *samadhuraggahaṇam* or ‘taking the leadership altogether’ (PED, s.v. *yugaggāha*). We see that the Pali term already was used with two distinct senses: ‘spite’ and ‘dominance’, which appear to have been also inherited by the Buddhist Sanskrit tradition. It is hard to determine whether originally two different Middle Indic roots were at the basis of this word or whether the lexeme was first used with one sense and later acquired its other meaning. According to the PED, *palāsa/paḷāsa* was Sanskritised as *pra+dāsa* (‘enemy’), which is a frequent phonemic change (on Pali *l* corresponding to the Sanskrit *d*, see also Mizuno 1989, 42). If this is the case, we should take into account the fact that *dāsa* also means ‘slave, servant’, and this may have reinforced the original Pali polysemy of the word. As seen from the examples below, one usage evolved into the semantic sphere of

'violence' (linked with *dāsa* 'enemy'?) and the other into the meaning of 'adherence' or 'dependence' (connected with *dāsa* 'slave'.(?)).

Now as for Abhidharmic definitions, let us first see the *Kośa*, which appears to be closer to the usage of *pradāsa* in the ŚrBh. According to the AKBh 313, 14-15, the word is defined as: '*pradāsa* is stubborn adherence to culpable acts [/things]; because of it, one does not accept well-founded remonstrance' (*sāvadyavastuḍḍhagrāhitā prādāso yena nyāyasamjñaptim na grhñāti*; Ch. 惱謂堅執諸有罪事。由此不取如理諫悔。T29.109c9-10). Vasubandhu considers that '*pradāsa* comes from attachment to wrong views' (*drṣṭyāmarśāt pradāsas tu* (AKBh 314, 1) ; 惱從見取起 (T29.109c8). *Drṣṭyāmarśa*, more usually known as *drṣṭiparāmarśa*, is one of the five pernicious views (see below note 45).

On the other hand, we have the 'classical' Vijñānavādin interpretation of the notion which is substantially different. TrimBh 30, 15ff (MS D14b7ff.) describes the concept as: '*pradāsa* means hurting by harsh words' (*pradāsaś caṇḍavacodāsītā*) (in the MS spelling: °*dāsītā*, which is read as *dāsītā* by Lévi and Tiwary; see above). (BWDJ lists both *dāsītā* as a feminine noun meaning 'cursing, abusing', citing MVyut as its source (cf. MVyut # 2109: *caṇḍa-vaco-dāsītā: tshig brlang(s) pos zher 'debs pa*; 動言, 毒言罵), and *dāsīta* as a Prakrit form of *damśita* < √ *damś* 'to bite', etc.) The TrimBh continues as follows: '**harsh words** mean extreme insults by means of exceedingly violent attacks' (*caṇḍam vacaḥ pragāḍham pārūṣyam marmaghaṭṭanayogena*) (Lévi and Tiwary insert *daṇḍa* after *pārūṣyam*). After a few more lines of lexical explanations, it adds: 'and being based on anger and spite, its nature is mental resentment; it, therefore, is just a part of [the psychological factor of] hate and cannot be distinguished [from it] as a [separate] entity' (*ayam ca krodhopanāhapūrvakaś cetasa āghātasvabhāva iti pratighāmsika eva na dravyato bhidyate*). In the terminology of the *Kośa*, this definition of *pradāsa* as a proclivity for violent insult would rather fall under the category of *vihimsā*. (cf. AKBh 313, 16: *vihethanam vihimsā yena prahārapārūṣyādibhiḥ parān vihethayate* '*vihimsā* means violence, by means of which one hurts others by blows, insults, and so on'; Ch.: 害謂於他爲逼迫。由此能行打罵等事。T29.109c10-11). TrimBh 31, 13-17 has, nevertheless, its own concept of *vihimsā* which is understood as a mental state leading to physical violence ranging from killing to threatening.

To return to our ŚrBh passage, its understanding of *pradāsa* seems to be closer to the *Kośa*. First, it is not associated with the sensual pleasures giving rise to suffering, like wrath and enmity. (A 'classical' Vijñānavādin understanding would have implied a connection with like psychological factors.) Second, in the same context, the ŚrBh speaks of the perversion of view, with which *pradāsa* is also linked in the AKBh. The latter actually establishes a causal relation: *drṣṭyāmarśa* generates stubborn adherence. We do not know if the ŚrBh authors shared a similar view. Apart from mentioning wrong views in the same context with *pradāsa*, the ŚrBh does not elaborate upon the relation between the two factors.

The original meaning of the Tib. '*tshig pa* is 'to burn', 'to glow', 'to be in rut', and was probably used as an equivalent for *pradāsa* because of the 'biting' effect of the fire. Modern dictionaries also give the sense of 'anger' or 'spite', but this might be a later derivation, probably due to Buddhist lexical influence. (Goldstein 1994, p. 938, s.v., translates '*tshig pa* as 'anger'.) BTsh (s.v.) renders the word into Chinese as 煩躁 or 'irritation' and has a sub-entry on the Buddhist meaning of '*tshig pa* based on the Vijñānavādin usage of '*tshig pa* = *pradāsa*. The Ch. equivalent of *pradāsa* is 惱, which basically means 'affliction, vexation'. This word likewise seems to imply a semantic sphere closer to 'hurting'.

^{4 6} Skt. *māyā* 'deceit'. The term is explained at AKBh 313, 13 as: '*māyā* means deceiving others' (*paravañcanā māyā*; Ch. 誑謂惑他。T29.109c13). TrBh 30, 29-31, 3 (cf. Tiwary tr., 67) defines the notion using partly similar words: '*māyā* is showing non-existent things [as if they

were really existent] in order to deceive others' (*māyā paravañcanāya abhūtārtha-samdarśanatā*) (MS D 15a7-15b1; the MS contains a scribal error: *paravacanā*^o; Lévy and Tiwary spell: *paravañcanā yābhūtārtha*^o). The subsequent explanation centres upon the false claims of special merits in religious practice made in order to obtain material profit and respect. *Māyā* is not different from the combined work of passion (*rāga*) and confusion (*moha*) (*iyam ca sahitābhyām rāgamohābhyām abhūtān* [...]), and is thus a mere designation rather than an entity of its own (*prajñaptita eva na dravyata iti* [...]).

⁴⁷ Skt. *sāṭhya* 'dissimulation' is defined at AKBh 313, 13-14 as follows: *cittakauṭilyam sāṭhyam yena yathābhūtaṁ nāviṣkaroti, vikṣipaty aparispṛuṭam vā pratipadyate 'sāṭhya* is the crookedness of the mind by means of which one does not reveal [things] as they actually are, [and instead] distorts [facts] or answers in an unclear way' (Ch.: 諂謂心曲。由此不能如實自顯。或矯非撥。或設方便令解不明。 T29.109c12-13). (I render *kauṭilya* as 'crookedness' in an attempt to stay close to the Sanskrit word which has both the literal meaning of 'curvature' and the derived sense of moral 'dishonesty'; cf. also the Ch. 曲 which means both 'to bend' and 'wicked, dishonest').

The TrimBh 31, 3 (MS D15b1-b2) (Tiwary tr., 67-68) says: '*sāṭhya* is the crookedness of mind comprised in the subterfuge [used] for hiding one's own faults' (*sāṭhyam svadoṣapracchādanopāyasamgrhītaṁ cetasaḥ kauṭilyam*). (MS D spells *sāṭhyam*, which, as already pointed out in note 45 above, is part of a series of occurrences of *sa* adopted instead of *śa*; MS I emends to *sāṭhyam*). The exact interpretation of *śamgrhītaṁ* is admittedly not easy, and this has led to various rendering in modern translations. Though I do not think that *Schelmerei* 'mischeif' for *sāṭhya* is the happiest choice, Jacobi's translation is the most faithful: *Schelmerei (sāṭhya) ist die Ungradheit des Geistes, die in dem Mittel zur Verdeckung eigener Fehler einbeschlossen ist* (Jacobi tr., 1932, 38). *Sāṭhya* is obviously similar to 'concealing' (*mraṁśa*), and Sthiramati clarifies what distinguishes one from another. 'This is why *sāṭhya* is different from the *mraṁśa*. This [i.e., the latter] is plainly hiding without resort to [misleading] speech' (*ata eva sāṭhyam mraṁśād bhidyate. sa hi spṛuṭam eva pracchādayati na kākvā*. TrimBh 31,5-6).

The AKBh (314, 1-4) considers that *sāṭhya* is born of wrong views (*dṛṣṭi*). According to the TrimBh 31,6-7, *sāṭhya*, like *māyā*, is a mere designation of the combined work of passion (*rāga*) and confusion (*moha*). Our ŚrBh passage does not elaborate upon these psychological categories, and this precludes a conclusion on its exact understanding. From the little we can infer, it seems, however, that the ŚrBh is, once again, somewhat closer to the *Kośa* tradition. First, it does not place *sāṭhya* in the class of sensual pleasures giving rise to pleasure, in which *rāga* is included. Second, *sāṭhya* appears in the same context with *dṛṣṭiviparyāsa*. Things are, however, not so simple, because the TrimBh associates *sāṭhya* with both passion and confusion. Besides, the ŚrBh itself puts *saṁjñācittaviparyāsa* in the same category with *rāga*.

⁴⁸ 'Lack of sense of shame' (*āhrikya* or *ahrī*) appears to refer here to shamelessness with respect to oneself, often regarded as different from 'shameless behaviour' (*anapatrāpya*) or shamelessness with respect to others. This is not, however, the only meaning of the pair in Buddhist literature. *Hirī-ot(i)appa*, translated by PED as 'shame and fear of sin' (s.v. *hiri*) (cf. also *ahirika*, *ahirika* and *anottappa*), often appear together in the Pali Canon (MN I 171, SN II 220, It 34, AN II 78, Ja I 127, 206; etc.).

In the *Kośa*, Vasubandhu discusses two different definitions of the terms. The first one reflects the traditional understanding of the term (also found in Pali canonical texts) and is adopted in the AKBh. This does not mean, however, that Vasubandhu rejects altogether the second interpretation, presented as the opinion of 'others'. *Kārikā* II.32a-b says: 'Disrespect is *ahrī*; *atrapā* is not seeing the fear of the blameworthy' (*ahrīr agurutā; avadye bhayādarsītvam*

atrapā. AKBh 59; Ch. 無慚愧不重，於罪不見怖。T29.21a5). The *Bhāṣya* gives then a detailed explanation of the two terms: ‘*āhrikyā* is disrespect, irreverence, lack of fear of and obedience to virtues and the virtuous, [it] is a factor which is the opposite of respect’ (*guṇeṣu guṇavatsu cāguravatā apratiśatā abhayam avasavartitā āhrikyam, gauravapratidvandvo dharmah*. AKBh 59, 19-20; Ch.: 於功德及有德者無敬無崇無所忌難無所隨屬說名無慚。即是恭敬所敵對法。T29.21a6-8). ‘**Blameworthy** refers to what is criticised by the virtuous. Not seeing the danger [of it] is called *anapatrāpya*. **Fear** [/danger] refers here to the undesired consequences [of one’s actions], in the sense of “being feared on this account”.’ (*avadyam nāma yad vigarhitam sadbhiḥ. tatrābhayadarśitā ‘napatrāpyam. bhayam atrāniṣtam, phalam, bhīyate ‘smād iti*. AKBh 59, 22-23; Ch. 爲諸善士所訶厭法說名爲罪。於此罪中不見怖畏說名無愧。此中怖言顯非愛果能生怖故。T29.21a8-10). Skt. *bhaya* means ‘danger’ as well the ‘fear’ resulting from seeing danger, and Vasubandhu apparently has both senses in mind. After a discussion concerning whether the compound *bhayādarśitva* means ‘seeing of the lack of danger’ (*abhayasya darśana*) or ‘non-seeing of the danger’ (*bhayasyādarśana*) (the latter being, of course, the correct solution here), Vasubandhu also notes another understanding of the two terms: ‘Others say, however, that *āhrikyā* is shamelessness about [one’s] faults with respect to oneself, [while] *anapatrāpya* is [shamelessness] with respect to others’ (*anye punar āhuḥ: ātmāpekṣayā doṣair alajjanam āhrikyam, parāpekṣayā ‘napatrāpyam iti*. AKBh 59, 26-60,1; Ch. 有餘師說：於所造罪自觀無恥名曰無慚。觀他無恥說名無愧。T29.21a17-18). The term ‘others’ is linked by de la Vallée Poussin with the opinion expressed at *Dhātupāṭha* III. 3 and I. 399 (Poussin vol. 1, p. 171, n.1). Vasubandhu appears to consider both definitions of the terms, i.e., ‘disrespect’ and ‘lack of fear of undesirable consequences’ vs ‘shamelessness with respect to oneself’ and ‘shamelessness with respect to others’, as equally viable (AKBh 60, 1-6). *Kārikā* V.48 (AKBh 312-313; T29.109b18-19) says that *āhrikyā* is derived from passion (*rāga*) and *anapatrāpya* is generated by ignorance (*avidyā*).

In later works, Vasubandhu seems to prefer the second definition of the terms. The *Pañcaskandhakaprakaraṇa* says: ‘What is lack of sense of shame? Its nature is not feeling shame with respect to oneself about one’s committed sins. What is shameless behaviour? Its nature is not feeling shame with respect to others about one’s own committed sins’ (translated from the Chinese: 云何無慚？謂：於所作罪不自羞恥爲性。云何無愧？謂：於所作罪不羞恥他爲性。T31.849b15-16; cf. also Anacker’s translation from Tibetan, 1984, 69).

The pair also appears in the Trim, and (if Sthiramati’s explanation reflects Vasubandhu’s own understanding) the definition in the TrimBh is, once again, in conformity with the dichotomy of shamelessness inwardly or outwardly directed. TrimBh 31, 17 says: ‘shamelessness with respect to oneself on account of [one’s] blameworthy [acts] is *āhrikyā*’ (*āhrikyam svayam avadyenālajjā*). It then continues with ‘shameless behaviour’ defined as: ‘shamelessness with respect to others on account of [one’s] blameworthy [acts] is *anapatrāpya*’ (*anapatrāpyam parato ‘vadyenālajjā*). (TrimBh 31, 18-19). Sthiramati also explains that the two proclivities are only convenient designations for the manifestation of passion and ignorance (i.e., in the case of *āhrikyā*), on the one hand, and hatred and ignorance (i.e., for *anapatrāpya*), on the other. ‘While [it is true that] all incorrect actions are caused by passion, hatred, or ignorance, the passion and the hatred not operating simultaneously, [*āhrikyā* and *anapatrāpya*] are designated respectively [i.e., as manifestations of either passion and ignorance or hatred and ignorance]; they do not exist independently’ (*rāgadveṣamohaparakāreṣu sarvāsatkāryaprabhavahetuṣu rāgadveṣayor ayaugapadyād yathāsambhavam prajñapyate, na tu svatantram asti*. TrimBh 31, 21-22).

Amongst modern renderings of the terms, Bucknell’s (1984, 16ff.) translation of *hiri* as ‘sense

of shame' and of *ottappa* as 'fear of blame' is worth mentioning here.

⁴⁹ Skt. *dr̥ṣṭiviparyāsa* 'perversion of view' is an old Buddhist concept whose history is closely related to the four applications of mindfulness (Pali, *cattāro satipaṭṭhānāni*; Skt., *catvāri smṛtyupasthānāni*). We find the concept of view perversion expounded, for instance, at AN II 52, 1-7: 'Mendicants, there are these four perversions (*vipallāsā*) of ideation, of mind, and of view. Which are these four? Mendicants, regarding what is [actually] impermanent as permanent is a perversion of ideation, of mind, and of view. Mendicants, regarding what is [actually] suffering as non-suffering is a perversion of ideation, of mind, and of view. Mendicants, regarding what is [actually] non-self as self is a perversion of ideation, of mind, and of view. Mendicants, regarding what is [actually] impure as pure is a perversion of ideation, of mind, and of view' (*cattāro 'me bhikkhave saññāvipallāsā cittavipallāsā diṭṭhivipallāsā. katame cattāro? anicce bhikkhave niccan ti saññāvipallāso cittavipallāso diṭṭhivipallāso, adukkhe bhikkhave dukkhan ti saññāvipallāso cittavipallāso diṭṭhivipallāso, anattani bhikkhave attā ti saññāvipallāso cittavipallāso diṭṭhivipallāso, asubhe bhikkhave subbhan ti saññāvipallāso cittavipallāso diṭṭhivipallāso.*)

Buddhist literature usually lists five pernicious views: the view of the existence of a self (*satkāyadr̥ṣṭi*), the extreme views [of either nihilism or eternalism] (*antagrāhadr̥ṣṭi*), incorrect views [which deny the Buddhist Truths] (*mīthyādr̥ṣṭi*), attachment to incorrect views (*dr̥ṣṭiparāmarśa*), and attachment to [non-Buddhist] rituals and vows [wrongly regarded as efficacious practices for the attainment of the Awakening] (*śilavrataparāmarśa*). We find these five views, for instance, in the *Kośa* (*kārikās* V.3 and V.7-8, followed by a detailed exposition in the *Bhāṣya*: AKBh 281-283; see also Poussin, vol. 4, especially, notes to pp. 15-17 for sources and interpretation of *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi*). It is in this context that the four perversions are introduced. 'The four perversions are regarding what is [actually] impermanent as permanent, regarding what is [actually] suffering as happiness, regarding what is [actually] impure as pure, [and] regarding what is [actually] non-self as self' (*catvāro viparyāsāḥ: anitye nityam iti, duḥkhe sukhān iti, aśucau śucīti, anātmany ātmeti*. AKBh 283, 5-7; cf. the AN passage quoted above). *Kārikā* V.9 and its commentary (AKBh 283-284) elaborate upon the relation between the five views and the four perversions. 'The group of four perversions [is actually derived] from three views' (*dr̥ṣṭitrayād viparyāsacatuṣkam.*) (AK V.9a). AKBh 283, 9-10, explains that the eternalist fallacy implied by the *antagrāhadr̥ṣṭi* can be considered a perversion; *dr̥ṣṭiparāmarśa* includes the perversions of mis-perceiving happiness and purity where such things do not actually exist; and *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi* implies the perversion of believing in a self. The three causes or principles (*kāraṇa*) which define *viparyāsa* are 'being perverted' (*viparīta*; cf. Tib. *phyin ci log*; Ch. 倒), '[wrong] reasoning' (*nītirāṇa*; *nges rtog*; 推), and '[erroneous] attribution' (*samāropa*; *sgro 'dogs*; 增). The last quarter of the verse reads: 'but the ideation and the mind [are perverted] because of it [i.e., the view]' (*samjñācitte tu tadvaśāt*) (AK V.9d), which is commented upon as: 'It is because of the perversion of view that the ideation and the mind associated with it are called perversions' (*dr̥ṣṭiviparyāsavaśād eva tatsamprayukte samjñācitte viparyāsāv ukte.*) (AKBh 284, 2).

On the other hand, the *Savitarkāśavicārabhūmi* of the YoBh appears to present a rather different view on the relation between these three perversions. The text actually speaks of seven perversions which represent the perversions of ideation, view, and mind (*samjñāviparyāsa*, *dr̥ṣṭiviparyāsa*, and *cittaviparyāsa*) plus the four distortions, i.e., regarding impermanence as permanence (*anitye nityam iti viparyāsa*), suffering as happiness (*duḥkhe sukhān iti viparyāsa*), impurity as purity (*aśucau śucīti viparyāsa*), and non-self as self (*anātmany ātmeti viparyāsa*) (YoBh 166, 6ff; Skt. and Tib. texts critically edited in Ahn 2003, 74ff; cf. also German translation in *ibid.*, 188ff). The central role, or at least the initial role in the generation

mechanism, is played here by the perversion of ideation, which is defined as being ‘the [false] imagination [with regard to] ideation (*saṃjñāparikalpa*), which takes impermanence as permanence, suffering as happiness, purity as impurity, and non-self as self’ (*yo ‘nitye nityam iti, duḥkhe sukham iti, aśucau śucīti, anātmany ātmeti saṃjñāparikalpaḥ*; Ahn 2003, p. 74, § 7.2.a; YoBh 166,9-10; Bhattacharya’s ed. wrongly spells *aśacau* for *aśucau*). It is based upon this false imagination with regard to ideation that the perversion of view becomes established. ‘What is the perversion of view? It is that which [leads to] acceptance, consent, determining, [and] clinging with regard to precisely these [distortions, i.e., impermanence, etc.] thus [falsely] imagined [with regard to] ideation’ (*dr̥ṣṭiviparyāsaḥ katamaḥ? yat tatraiva tathā saṃjñāparikalpite kṣānti rucir vyavasthāpanābhiniveśaḥ*; Ahn 2003, p. 74, § 7.2.b; YoBh 166, 11-12; cf. Ch.: 見倒者謂：即於彼妄想所分別中忍可欲樂建立執著。T30.314b9-11). This, in turn, serves as the foundation of the perversion of mind. ‘What is the perversion of mind? It is that which [leads to] defilements [consisting in] passion, etc. with regard to precisely these [distortions, i.e., impermanence, etc.] thus clung to’ (*cittaviparyāsaḥ katamaḥ? yat tatraiva tathābhiniṣṭe rāgādisaṃkleśaḥ*; Ahn 2003, p. 74, § 7.2.c; YoBh 166, 13; cf. Ch.: 心倒者謂：即於彼所執著中貪等煩惱。T30.314b11-12). See also Ahn’s German translation (pp. 188-194) and his footnotes which contain excellent discussions concerning the historical background of *viparyāsa* in general as well as the philological problems related to this passage in particular. Cf. also Schmithausen 1987a, vol. 1 pp. 232-3 and vol. 2, pp. 542-3, notes 1445 and 1446.

To return to our ŚrBh passage, it is hard to know with certainty what mechanism of *viparyāsa* the authors presupposed. The association of pleasure-engendering sensual pleasures, suffering-engendering sensual pleasures, and neither-suffering-nor-pleasure-engendering sensual pleasures with the three perversions seems peculiar to our text. As a matter of fact, sensual pleasures which give rise to suffering as well as those engendering neither suffering nor pleasure appear rather unusual unless qualified. I assume that the former refers to such sensual pleasures which eventually result in hatred and wrath because of not being fulfilled or creating antagonism with other living beings. The latter category is not very clear. I conjecture that it implies that mental states like concealing of one’s faults, etc. do not usually generate by themselves pleasure or suffering. Such states have only an indirect role in the gratification of sensual pleasures.

The association of the view perversion with the class of sensual pleasures engendering neither suffering nor pleasure is also difficult to understand. The reason behind it might be that *dr̥ṣṭiviparyāsa* was considered an intellectual category arising from sensual pleasures without the mediation of *rāga* or *dveṣa*. It may be relevant to remember here that the Chinese translation of the ŚrBh contains an additional element: 是愚癡依處 **mohādhiṣṭānāḥ* (see Ch. crit. ed.). This (especially if it reflects the original text) may point to the mechanism underlying the association of *dr̥ṣṭiviparyāsa* with the sensual pleasures engendering neither suffering nor pleasure. The perversion of view may have been regarded as originating in *moha* and consisting in the theoretical incorrect view that *kāma* represents true pleasure (*sukha*), is lasting (*nitya*), etc. On the other hand, *citta*- and *saṃjñāvīparyāsa* may have been taken to include some emotional involvement and hence mediated by passion (*kāmarāga*). We cannot know whether this was indeed the understanding of the ŚrBh authors, but this seems, at least, to be the interpretation hinted at by Hongjing 弘景. This Chinese scholar-monk, active in the generation following Xuanzang, wrote his commentary on the YoBh, the *Yuqie shi di lun shu* 瑜伽師地論疏, sometime during 648-712. The work is no longer extant, but it is frequently cited by To-ryun (see Yūki [1962] 1985, 261-262; cf. Chapter Six, Part One). Honjing’s (and apparently other masters’) comment upon this aspect reads as follows: 景師等云：“大乘就貪義說：想倒及以心倒故貪依處，即是想倒、心倒依處也。順不苦樂受處是愚癡依處乃至是見倒依處者：因癡起見，故癡依處，即是見倒依處。” (T42.470c5-9) ‘Master [Hong]Jing and others say:

“Concerning the meaning of passion [/lust], the Great Vehicle [/Ji] (?) expounds that since the perversion of ideation and the perversion of mind [take] passion as [their] basis, this is the basis of the perversion of ideation and the perversion of mind. **Those giving rise to neither suffering nor pleasure are the basis of confusion up to are the basis of the perversion of view** [refers to the fact that] [the wrong] views arise because of confusion, therefore the basis of confusion is the basis of the perversion of view.” (*Dacheng* 大乘 may refer here not to the ‘Great Vehicle’ teaching but to one of the reverential names used for Ji 基, also called 大乘基 (see note 34 to Chapter Six, Part One above). Furthermore, if the former is the case, then the meaning of ‘Great Vehicle’ may reflect the usage initiated by Xuanzang, who called his doctrinal position as ‘Great Vehicle’ 大乘 or ‘One Vehicle’ 一乘 rather than ‘Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda’; see Yoshimura 2003b, 218-220.)

Finally, let us also note that the ŚrBh does not seem to presuppose the centrality of the perversion of ideation as the YoBh passage cited above does. Besides, it lists the perversion of mind together with *saṃjñāviparyāsa*, quite unlike the mechanism suggested by the YoBh. And though the YoBh associates *rāga*, etc. with the perversion of mind, this does not necessarily mean that its scheme is identical with the one presupposed in our ŚrBh passage.

⁵⁰ The set of eight forms of sufferings (*aṣṭau duḥkhatāḥ*) consists of birth (*jātiduḥkham*), old age (*jarāduḥkham*), sickness (*vyādhiduḥkham*), death (*marañaduḥkham*), being conjoined with what one likes (*priyaviprayogaduḥkham*), being disjoined with what one dislikes (*apriyasamprayogaduḥkham*), not obtaining what one wishes (*yad apicchayā paryeṣamāṇo na labhate tad api duḥkham*), or, in short, the suffering of the five aggregates to which one clings (*saṃkṣeṣeṇa pañcopādānaskandhaduḥkham*) (MVyut § 112) (on the *pañcopādānaskandhāḥ*, see note 239 below). What the ŚrBh calls *icchāvighātaduḥkhata* and puts at the end of the list corresponds to the seventh type of suffering in the MVyut enumeration.

⁵¹ Skt. *kāmopabhogin*, which I render rather freely as ‘hedonist’, is often used as an attribute describing ordinary people (see, for example, BoBh 302, 14). A more literal rendering is ‘[those] enjoying sensual pleasures’ or ‘[those] having [at their disposal large amounts of] objects [for the gratification] of the sensual pleasures’. The purport of the passage is that even the happiest life of the most privileged human beings remains inexorably subject to impermanence and suffering.

⁵² Cf. Pali *tāva-kālika* ‘for the time being; temporary’ (PED, s.v.; PTS Concordance, s.v. vol. 2, p. 219) and *kālika* ‘temporal, vanishing’. See also BoBh 27, 1: *tāvatkālikavihāra*; and 63, 4-5: *tāvatkālikayogena*. Xuanzang renders the word as 暫時 ‘temporary’ (the same binome is used in his translation of the BoBh occurrences above). Tib. *brnyan ma* for *tāvatkālika* appears to be rare in the YoBh, the usual renderings being *re zhig*, *dus de tsam zhig*, etc. (cf. YoBh-I, s.v. 暫時). Actually, *brnyan ma* does not seem to be a very frequent term in Buddhist translations. Lokesh Chandra records only one occurrence: *brnyan ma 'dra = yācittopama* ‘like [something] borrowed’, found in the *Rāṣṭrapālāparipṛcchā* (see TSD Supplement, s.v.) (on *yācita*, which is a symbol impermanence, see BHSD, s.v.). Tib. *brnyan pa* means ‘to borrow’ as well as ‘reflection’, ‘appearance’, ‘image’, etc. It often occurs as an abbreviation of *gzugs brnyan*, translating words like *chāyā*, *pratibimba*, *pratibhāsa*, *mūrti*, etc. It is also used in *sgra brnyan* or ‘echo’. (Cf. also TED, ‘the twelve expressions illustrative of illusion’ s.v. *sgyu ma*.) BTsh (s.v. *brnyan ma*) also gives the meaning of *tshab ma* ‘a substitute’ (cf. the corresponding Chinese rendering 代替品). In our ŚrBh passage, the literal meaning of *brnyan ma* seems to be: ‘even the accomplishment of these is borrowed [for a limited time, i.e., not really owned]’.

⁵³ In Buddhist vocabulary, ‘black’ (*kṛṣṇa*) refers to what is negative or pernicious. ‘Black’ categories are often contrasted to ‘white’ (*śukla*) or positive ones. At ŚrBh-Gr (18) 40, 6-13, in a passage listing different mental factors (*dharma*) in the context of the four applications of

mindfulness (*smṛtyupasthāna*), the pernicious states of mind are described as ‘black categories’ and the wholesome ones are called ‘white categories’ (*kṛṣṇaśuklapakṣa*) (ŚrBh-Gr (18) 40, 11-12; MS omits *pakṣa* but Tib. *phyogs* and Ch. 品 clearly suggest *pakṣa*; the editors of ŚrBh-Gr (18) have *pakṣya* but *pakṣa* makes, I think, a better reading). ‘Black and white categories’ are explained as ‘corresponding to defilement and purification’ (*samkleśavyavadānapakṣyāḥ*) (ŚrBh-Gr (18) 40, 12-13).

⁵⁴ These eight comparisons, phrased slightly differently, also appear as stanzas 46-47 of the *Ābhiprāyikārthagāthā* in the *Cintāmayībhūmi* of the YoBh. For Skt. text and translation, see Maeda 1991, 89-90; Wayman 1984, 356 and 365. For Tib, see also P Yi 42a7ff; Ch. is found at T31.366c23-26 (verses); 369c10-23 (*Nirdeśa*); 766c1-7 (commentary). Cf. also W 127 and KDK, p. 136, n. 14 and n. 15.

In the *Ābhiprāyikārthagāthānirdeśa*, it is explained that ‘the detrimental nature [of the sensual pleasures] is indicated by mentioning the [eight] similes [which are] well-known to the whole world’ (*sarvalokaprasiddhair upamopanyāsair ādinavatvaṃ darśayati*) (Maeda 1991, 89) (Maeda has *sarvalokasiddhair*, but the YoBh MS 112a3 reads as above; cf. Tib. *grags pa*). (I am indebted to Prof Schmithausen for checking the YoBh MS). The *Nirdeśa* actually explains these similes as being concrete illustrations of the eight detriments (*aṣṭāv ādinavāḥ*) of the sensual pleasures which form the subject of *gāthās* 44-45 of the same text (Maeda 1991, 89). The ŚrBh (see passage 3.28.2.1.2.2. above) also speaks of five detriments of pleasures, which are, however, only partly similar to the *aṣṭāv ādinavāḥ* and are not likened to the eight similes.

As far as canonical antecedents are concerned, Pali texts (e.g. Vin II 25-26, MN I 130, AN III 97) contain references to ten similes for pleasures. Seven of them are identical with the comparisons employed by ŚrBh; one likens pleasures to the head of a snake (*sappasirūpamā*), which corresponds to the venomous snake in our text. The other two compare pleasures to a slaughter-house or, according to CPD (s.v.), a butcher’s knife and chopping block (*asisūnūpamā*) and to an impaling-stake (*sattisūlūpamā*). (Cf. also Nidd II 71; Sn 61; Dh 186; Th 2 and 358; Ja II 313; Vism 124; etc.).

The last simile in our ŚrBh passage needs some further clarifications. The Tibetan rendering is *shing kim pa ka*’i ‘*bras bu* or ‘*kimpāka* fruit’, which corresponds to neither the Sanskrit MS nor the Chinese translation. *Kimpāka* or *Trichosanthes palmata* is explained by Monier-Williams as ‘a Cucurbitaceous plant’ or its ‘fruit’ (MW, s.v.; cf. also PW, s.v.; BWDJ, s.v.; TED, s.v. *kim pa ka*, which gives the scientific name *Cucumis colocynthis* alongside with *Trichosanthes palmata*). *Kimpāka* as a metaphor of the transience and deceptiveness of sensual pleasures is a well-known Buddhist image (cf. also TED, s.v. *kim pa ka*). Monier-Williams describes the *kimpāka* fruit as being ‘of a very bad taste’, but the Buddhist canon seems to share a quite different view. The *Kimpakka-jātaka* (Ja I 367-369) gives a fairly detailed description of the fruit which the Buddhist author(s) had in mind. In Chalmers’s translation (Ja I tr., pp. 212-213), which renders *kimpakka* literally as ‘what-fruit’, its description reads as follows: ‘In form, smell and taste, its trunk, boughs, leaves and fruit resembled a mango’ (p. 212). The text also says: ‘Very fair to view is the What-tree, very fragrant and sweet; but when eaten, it racks the inwards and brings death’ (p. 212). The Tibetan translation of the ŚrBh would rather seem to presuppose such an image. This actually fits better *kimpāka* as a metaphor for pleasures, which may outwardly seem ‘fragrant and sweet’ but once enjoyed, ‘rack the inwards and bring death.’ Let us also notice that the word *kimpāka* also means ‘childish’ and ‘stupid’, which most probably added a paronomastic effect to the simile.

Concerning the *Trichosanthes palmata* (mentioned by Monier-Williams), it would seem rather unlikely that such a plant can grow in Tibet since no member of the family *Cucurbitaceae* ‘tolerates frost or cold’ (Britannica, vol. 3, p. 777). We could surmise that the addition of

kiṃpāka by the Tibetan translation team is rather improbable since the name of the plant would have brought no botanic familiarity to most of the local readers and audiences. It is hence more plausible to suppose that the MS used by the Tibetan translators contained an extra compound: **kiṃpākavṛkṣaphala*.

⁵⁵ Grammatically, *paryeṣamāṇa* and *paryeṣaṇā* ‘striving after’ are forms derived from the *paryeṣate* ‘examines’, a verb frequently used in our chapter (for a list of the verbal forms of *eṣ/īṣ*, see Gotō 1993, 124-128). The verb basically means ‘to seek’, and this leads to different connotations, as actually illustrated in our passage. On the one hand, we have seeking for pleasures, which is precisely the act which the ascetic wants to renounce. On the other hand, we have seeking for the very essence of these pleasures, i.e., examining them, which becomes the method of eliminating the sensual pleasures. The Ch. translation actually makes a distinction in this respect: it renders the former as 追求 and the latter as 尋思.

⁵⁶ This refers to ŚrBh MS 46a7M-47a2M; Sh 78, 2-81,5; ŚrBh-Gr 120-125; W 141-143 (Engl. tr., pp. 151-153) (Tib.: P 36b4-38a6; D 30b5-32a3; Ch.: T31.408b14-409a6). (Cf. also T31.625b26ff). The passage in question belongs to the section on moderation in eating (*bhojane mātrajñatā*), and the term used here is Skt. *ādinava* (Tib. *nyes dmigs*; Ch. 過患) ‘detriment’, ‘disadvantage’, ‘evil consequence’, ‘danger’, ‘wretchedness’, etc. (cf. also CPD, s.v.; PD, s.v.). The types of detriment linked to striving after food are classified into the following six categories: (1) the detriment generated by hardships and adversities such as cold, heat, etc., which one has to go through for earning (*samudānanā*) one’s food; (2) the detriment generated by the efforts which one has to do for protecting (*āraṅkā*) one’s goods from robbers, etc.; (3) the detriment generated by the disruption of the affective relations (*snehaparibhramśa*) between human beings, whether members of the same family or people not related to oneself, over the sharing of the food; (4) the detriment generated by the king’s non-contentment (*atṛpti*) with his territory and the ensuing war with other lands; (5) the detriment generated by the state of servitude (*asvātantrya*) of soldiers who have to risk their life for the king; and (6) the detriment generated at the time of death by one’s regret over one’s evil deeds (*duṣcarita*) and their actual karmic retribution which will result in rebirth in hell, amongst hungry ghosts, or as an animal. The detriment caused by earning or, to be more precise, accumulation (*samudānanākṛta*) appears to correspond to the suffering generated by striving (*paryeṣaṇākṛta*) in our passage. For the rest, the terminological parallelism is evident.

⁵⁷ Skt. *kāmān pratiṣevataḥ*; see also *kāmān [...]* *pratiṣevamāṇasya* below. The verb *pratiṣevati* is often used in this sense and collocation in the Pali Canon (cf. PTS Concordance vol. 3, p. 102; especially, *kāme paṭisevante*, MN I 504, 34; see also *kāmānaṃ [...]* *ādinavañ ca nissaraṇañ ca yathābhūtaṃ viditvā* in the same passage at MN I 504, 28-30). Cf. also BHSD, s.v. *pratiṣevati*, *te*, which also adds that the verb is ‘sometimes written °ṣev°’.

⁵⁸ There are several sets of five detriments (*pañca ādinavā*) occurring in relation to different concepts in the Pali Canon (see PTS Concordance, vol. 1, p. 318). On the wisdom generated by observing the detriments (*ādinavānupassanāñāṇa*), see Vism 555-558.

⁵⁹ Cf. Vin II 25; 26; MN I 130; AN III 97: *appaṣādā kāmā vuttā Bhagavatā bahudukkhā bahūpāyāsā ādinavo ettha bhiyyo*. This phrase occurs together with the ten similes for pleasures, out of which eight are identical or almost identical to the ones found in our passage. See also note 54 above.

⁶⁰ I read the Sanskrit original as *alamtā vā tṛptitā vā paryāptitā vā* (see Skt. crit. ed.). This appears to be the best way of keeping the number of detriments to five, as announced by the Exalted One at the beginning of this paragraph, and it is also supported by a parallel passage in the *Xianyang lun* (see note 63 below). The lack of ‘sufficiency or satisfaction or satiation’ forms, most likely, one class of *ādinava*. For the counting of the five detriments, see note 63 below.

^{6 1} Skt. has: *anena paryāyeṇa*, but Tib. and Ch. seem to read here: **anekaparyāyeṇa* ‘in a variety of ways’. Literally, Ch. 以無量門 means ‘in an infinite number of ways’.

^{6 2} I take *vadāmi* as part of this sentence and not as referring to the whole statement by the Exalted One in this paragraph. See also Choi 2001, p. 120, n. 358 and pp. 120-1, n. 367.

^{6 3} The parallel passage in the *Xianyang lun* (T31.514b25-29; edited and translated in Choi 2001, 79-80) clearly shows how to count the five detriments: 又薄伽梵言：我說習近諸欲有五過患。一、諸欲少味。二、習近欲者多諸苦惱，多諸過患。三、習近欲者無厭無足、無休、無息。四、習近欲者諸結增長。五、習近欲者無惡不造。 In our ŚrBh passage, this yields the following way of counting:

1. sensual pleasures have little flavour
2. [beget] much suffering, much detriment
3. there is no sufficiency or satisfaction or satiation
4. [lead to] accumulation of fetters
5. there is no evil and unwholesome act whatsoever which one will not commit [for them].

In the Skt. original, there are no formal devices marking each detriment, but the Tib. and Ch. offer good (albeit imperfect) clues regarding their counting. With the exception of the first detriment, the four other *ādīnavas* are connected by *dang* in Tib. and introduced by 又 in Ch. (but it must be noticed that [...] *smad pa dang* in Tib. and 又彼諸欲 [...] 呵責毀咎 in Ch. are misleading in this respect.)

The theme of the insatiable nature of sensual pleasures is very old in Buddhist literature. See, for instance, *Kāmasutta* (Sn 766-771); *Kāmajātaka* (Jā No. 467), especially Bodhisatta’s verses describing the human proclivity for never-ending craving (Ja IV 172-173); etc.

^{6 4} Skt. *bahusādhāraṇa* literally means ‘common to many’ (cf. MW, s.v.). *Sādhāraṇa* placed in *fine compositi* means ‘common to’, ‘similar with’, etc. See, for instance, BoBh 152, 12: *śrāvakasādhāraṇām* [...] *ṛddhim* ‘supernatural power in common with the disciples’; 343, 1-2: *sarvavātavāhasādhāraṇā ca bhavati* ‘and it is common to [similar with] any blow of wind’ (MS: °*sādhāraṇāc ca bhavati*). *Bahusādhāraṇa* in our passage obviously refers to pleasures, but it is hard to determine precisely to which aspect of pleasures it actually alludes. Probably, it refers to the fact that indulgence in pleasures is a common characteristic shared by many (most of the) sentient beings, with the connotation of ‘vulgarity’. Maeda (1991, 89-90) translates it as 多くを共有すること ‘having many in common’. Wayman’s rendering is ‘having many cohorts’ (1984, 365). Both translation do not convey, however, what exactly pleasures have in common. The *Nirdeśa* is not very helpful in this respect. It links this disadvantage with the simile of the chunk of meat: *bahusādhāraṇā māmsapeśyupamatvāt* ‘[pleasures] are common to many because of their being like a chunk of meat’ (Maeda ed. 1991, 89).

^{6 5} Wayman (1984, 365) translates this and the phrase immediately preceding as, ‘They should be avoided by illustrious persons and quickly brought to destruction’. Skt. *kṣīpram vilayaḡāminah* appears to refer to the ephemeral nature of pleasures unable to bring a true-lasting state of satisfaction and happiness. Tib. and Ch. also point in the same direction of understanding.

^{6 6} The compound *bālalāpana* (on the various spellings of the word, see note 53 to Skt. crit. ed.) ‘deceiving fools’ as well as the adjective *ullāpana* (Pali, *ullapana*) ‘deceitful’ is often used in Buddhist literature to describe the nature of the sensual pleasures and worldly existence. For an almost identical passage at MN II 261, which also spells *bālalāpana*, see note 67 below. The term is also used at Thī 357: *ummādanā ullapanā kāmā* ‘maddening, deceitful are pleasures’; LalVis Vaidya ed. 176, 23 (= Lefmann ed. 212, 14): *kāmā* [...] *ullāpanā riktamuṣṭivad asārāḡ* ‘pleasures [...] are deceiving, with no value, like an empty fist’; LalVis Vaidya ed. 140, 25-141, 2 (ver. 98) (= Lefmann ed. 176, 4): *saṃskāra* [...] *mayopama*

cittamohanā / bāla-ullāpana riktamuṣṭivat (Mitra reads the last compound as *ulka muṣṭivat*, Lefmann and Vaidya, on the other hand, have *ukta muṣṭivat*, but both readings are very unlikely; cf. the passage above as well as BHSD, s.v. *ullāpana* and *rikta-muṣṭi*) ‘the conditioned factors [...] are like an illusion deluding the mind, are like an empty fist deceiving the fools’; RāṣṭrPar 39, 13: *bālollāpanam saṃsāraratinirāsvādām rājyasukham* ‘royal happiness [which is] deceiving [only] fools, [containing] worldly delight without any [true] taste’; DaśaBh Kondō ed. 82, 13 (= Rahder ed. 43, 6-7): *sarvasaṃskṛtam [...] bālālāpanam iti yathābhūtam prajānāti* ‘[the bodhisattva] knows all conditioned existence as it really is: [...] deceiving [only] fools.’ (Edgerton, who also refers to this occurrence in Rahder’s edition, suggests that here *bālollāpanam* should be read instead of *bālālāpanam*; see BHSD, s.v. *ullāpana*.)

⁶⁷ There is a parallel passage in verses 44-45 of the *Abhiprāyikāthagāthā*: *aṭṭiptikarakāḥ kāmā bahusādhāraṇās tathā / adharmahetavaś caiva tathā tṛṣṇāvivarddhakāḥ // satām vivarjanīyās ca kṣipram vilayagāmināḥ / pratyayeṣv āśritāḥ kāmāḥ pamādasya ca bhūmayāḥ //* (Maeda 1991, 89; Wayman 1984, 356; Engl. translation of the verses and commentary is found at p. 365); cf. Ch.: 諸欲令無飽 衆多所共有 是非法因緣 能增長貪欲 賢聖所應離 速趣於壞滅 仗託於衆緣 危逸所依地。T30.366c19-22; commentary at T30.369c4-9).

We also find a close parallel of the final part of this passage at MN II 261, 25-26: *aniccā, bhikkhave, kāmā tucchā musā moghadhammā; māyākatam etaṃ, bhikkhave, bālālāpanam* (According to the PTS editors (MN II p. 261, n. 6), the Mandalay MS and King of Siam’s printed edition read: *mosadhammā* instead of *moghadhammā*; cf. also 妄言法 in Ch. parallel below). The corresponding Chinese *Madhyamāgama* text reads: 欲者無常、虛偽、妄言、是妄言法，則是幻化，欺誑愚癡。(T1.542b6-7). Actually, this precedes the passage which appears to be quoted in the next sentence (see note 73 below), This suggests that ŚrBh authors probably cited or at least drew heavily on this canonical text.

⁶⁸ Skt. *nivāpa* (same in Pali) is polysemic. It means ‘seed or sown field; offerings, especially oblations to the departed ones; throwing down, killing’, etc.. In our passage, Buddhist intertextuality strongly suggests the sense of ‘crops or field sown by Māra’. The *locus classicus* is the *Nivāpasutta* (MN I 151-160), where the Exalted One makes use of the simile of four deer herds lured by the fodder found in crops (*nivāpa*) sown (*nivapati*) by a sower (*nevāpika*) (p. 151) (in the Chinese translation of the *sutta*, which is discussed below, the word appears to be understood as ‘hunter’ 獵師). Three herds cannot resist the temptation and end up being caught by the sower. The fourth one, however, manages to escape by making their lairs far from the sower’s fields and not encroaching upon his crop. The Exalted One explains, “‘Crop’, mendicants, is a term for the five strands of pleasure. “Sower”, mendicants, is a term for Māra, the Evil One’ (*nivāpo ti kho bhikkhave pañcann’ etaṃ kāmaguṇānaṃ adhvāpanaṃ. nevāpiko ti kho bhikkhave māraṣṣ’ etaṃ pāpimato adhvāpanaṃ.*) (MN I 155). Then he speaks of four types of recluses and brahmans (*samaṇabrāhmaṇā*). The first three cannot resist the temptations of the ‘worldly things’ (*lokāmisā*) (*āmisā* also meaning ‘food’) and become entrapped by Māra, the evil ‘sower’. The fourth type, however, succeeds in blinding Māra (*andham akāsi māraṃ*) and transcending the attachment to the world (*tiṇṇo loke visattikaṃ*) by staying aloof from sensual pleasures. This is achieved by practising *jhānas* which culminate in the eradication of the contaminants (*āsava*) by wisdom (*paññā*) obtained after the attainment of the cessation of ideation and sensation (*saññāvedayitanirodha*) (p. 160).

The Tibetan translators probably had this sense of *nivāpa* in mind, for which they chose *gzan ma* (Tib. *gzan pa* means ‘food, hay’ or ‘to devour, to consume’). Things seem to be different with the Ch. 住 ‘dwelling’, which suggests *nivāsa* or ‘dwelling’ rather than *nivāpa*. One cannot rule out that the Chinese reading may have been the original reading. It would imply the usage of parallel expressions with cumulative effect: *mārasyaīṣa gocaro, mārasyaīṣa nivāpo* ‘the very

domain [range] of the Evil One, the very dwelling of the Evil One'. The extant MS reading (which seems to be much closer to *nivāpo* than *nivāso*), the parallel passage in the Pali *Majjhima Nikāya* and the Chinese *Madhyamāgama* (see note below), and the Tib. translation, all support, however, *nivāpa* as the most likely reading.

It seems quite probable that Xuanzang's MS read *nivāsa*. (Or did the Chinese master deciphered wrongly *nivāpo* as *nivāso*? The two *akṣaras* are actually rather close in a number of early scripts (see Bühler 1904, Tafel VI). After all, even Homer sometimes nods....) In the 'Scripture on the Hunter' (*Lie shi jing* 獵師經) (T1.718b-720a), the Chinese translation corresponding to the *Nivāpasutta*, we find a quite appropriate rendering of *nivāpa*. The sentence equivalent to the Pali passage quoted above reads: "The food of the hunter" should be understood as referring to the five strands of pleasures. "The hunter" should be understood as referring to the Evil King Māra' 獵師食者，當知五欲功德也。獵師者，當知是惡魔王也。(T1.719a13-14). Here what appears to correspond to *nivāpa* in Pali is rendered as 'food' 食, and *nevāpika* as 'hunter' 獵師. The latter may be problematic if we are to derive it from the verb *ni+vap*, but it fits the context of this *sutta*, where our *nevāpika* is actually engaged in a form of deer hunting which appears as important as the field sowing (cf. *nivāpa* meaning in Skt. also 'killing, slaughter'; cf. MW, s.v.). Let us also note that in the Chinese translation of the *Āṇājasappāyasutta* (see note 73 below), the equivalent of *mārassa nivāpo* is 魔餌 'Māra's food' or 'Māra's bait'.

The ŚrBh dedicates a chapter (3.19) to the four meanings of *māra* and his deeds (*mārakarmāṇi*) (Skt.: MS 94b5L-95a5R; Sh 343, 10-347, 8; W 105; Tib.: D 126a2-127a6; Ch.: T 447c15-448b4), but we do not find any detail which could cast light upon the meaning intended in our passage.

^{6 9} Skt. *abhidhyā* 'covetousness'. AK IV.77c-d defines the term as: 'abhidhyā is improper covetousness for another's property' (*abhidhyā tu parasvaviṣamasprhā*) (AKBh 247,11; see also the explanation following in the next lines); 惡欲他財貪 (Xuanzang's tr., T29.88b2); 貪欲者，他財不平欲 (Paramārtha's tr., T29.243b13-14). Apart from this meaning, AKBh also mentions (but does not agree with) another meaning of the word: 'According to others, *abhidhyā* refers to craving which pertains only to the entire sphere of sensual pleasures' (*sarvaiva kāmāvacarī tṛṣṇābhidhyety apare*) (AKBh 247, 13-14). In our ŚrBh passage, *abhidhyā* is listed together with 'malice, violence, or what[ever] further [factors] which obstruct the practice of the noble disciple'. This seems to suggest that the term is understood as a particular type of greed rather than a generic name for it. If the latter latter had been the case, one would have expected to see it enumerated with *dveṣa* and *moha*. (Even if take *vyāpāda* as an equivalent or an instantiation of *dveṣa*, there is nothing corresponding to *moha*.)

^{7 0} Skt. *vyāpāda* 'malice'. AK IV.78a says: '*vyāpāda* is hatred towards living beings' (*vyāpādaḥ sattvavidveṣaḥ*) (AKBh 247, 18); 憎有情瞋恚 (Xuanzang's tr., T29.88b2); 瞋恚捨眾生 (Paramārtha's tr., 243b21-22). This is further explained as: '*vyāpāda* is hatred towards living beings manifested in the form of harming others' (*sattveṣu vidveṣaḥ vyāpādaḥ parapiḍākārapravṛttaḥ*) (AKBh 247, 19).

^{7 1} Skt. *saṃrambha* is polysemic. In classical Sanskrit, it means 'agitation; ardent desire; fury, wrath; arrogance', etc. The meaning of *saṃrambha* in our ŚrBh passage as well as in other Buddhist sources (see the citation from the AbhSam in note 42 above) seems to imply 'becoming angry and resorting to physical violence'. In Pali, we find both the form *sārambha* and the (Sanskritised?) *saṃrambha* meaning 'impetuosity, rage' (PED, s.v.). The Tib. rendering here is *nyes rtsom* which means 'to undertake [i.e., engage in] evil [acts]' (see note to 80 Tib. ed.). In other passages of the Tibetan translation of the YoBh, *saṃrambha* is rendered as *rtsod pa* (YoBh-D, s.v.), which means 'to dispute, wrangle'. The Ch. equivalent in our passage in the

ŚrBh is 憤諍, literally ‘wrath-dispute’. In a parallel passage in the *Āṇājasappāyasutta* (see note 73 below), *sārambha* is rendered into Chinese as 鬪諍 ‘fight-dispute’. Other Ch. translations for *saṁrambha* in the YoBh include 鬪諍 ‘fight and dispute’, 諍 ‘dispute’, and 發憤 ‘become [/be] enraged’. We also find *asaṁrambha* in the BoBh in a phrase which reads: *asaṁrambhāvihimsākrodhabahulaḥ* (Wogihara ed. 327, 3-4 = Dutt ed. 223, 26) ‘rich in non-wrath, non-violence, and non-anger’, said of the bodhisattva who has firmly joined the Tathāgata’s lineage (*tathāgatavaṁśaniyata*) and has obtained serenity based on faith (*avetyaprasāda*) (for the last term, see BHSD; cf. also CPD s.v. *aveccappasāda*). The phrase is translated into Ch. as: 遠離多分忿害鬪諍 (T30.555a7-8).

⁷² For a discussion on the technical meaning of the obstacles or obstructions (*antarāya*), see ŚrBh-Gr 245-257.

⁷³ There is a parallel passage in the *Āṇājasappāyasutta* at MN II 261-262: *Ye ca diṭṭhadhammikā kāmā, ye ca samparāyikā kāmā, yā ca diṭṭhadhammikā kāmasaññā, yā ca samparāyikā kāmasaññā: ubhayam etaṁ Māradheyyaṁ, Mārass’ essa visayo, Mārass’ essa nivāpo, Mārass’ esa gocaro. etth’ ete pāpakā akusalā mānasā abhijjhā pi vyāpādā pi sārambhā pi saṁvattanti, te ca ariyasāvakaṁsa idha-m-anusikkhato antarāyāya saṁbhavanti*. The Chinese equivalent is found in the *Scripture on the Pure Imperturbability* [or: *Purity and Imperturbability*] 淨不動道經 and reads: 若現世欲及後世欲, 若現世色及後世色, 彼一切是魔境界則是魔餌。因此令心生無量惡不善之法, 增伺瞋恚及鬪諍等。謂: 聖弟子學時爲作障礙。(T1.542b7-11). Though the extant *Nikāya* and *Āgama* texts does not match the ŚrBh passage word for word, the latter is most probably a citation from or, at least, paraphrase of this canonical source. See also note 67 above.

⁷⁴ Skt. *yukti*. In the ŚrBh and the SaṁNirm (see Chapters Five and Six above) as well as the AbhSam, etc. (see Yaita 1989a and Yoshimizu 1996b; cf. also Kimura 2004), the term *yukti* has a precise range of technical meanings arranged under four categories: reasoning with regard to dependence (*apekṣāyukti*), reasoning with regard to [the suitability of] producing [a certain] effect (*kāryakaraṇayukti*), reasoning on the basis of proof by [logical] demonstration (*upapattisāadhanayukti*), and reasoning on the basis of the nature of things (*dharmatāyukti*) (see ŚrBh-Gr 236-240). There seems to be no word in English, German or Japanese which is able to cover the whole semantic range of *yukti*. Sakuma (1990, vol. 2, pp. 99-102) translates *yukti* as *Stimmigkeit* ‘coherence’, but adds: *Es ist fraglich, ob “yukti” in allen vier Fällen die gleiche Bedeutung hat*. He further refers to ŚrBh 141, 11-143, 16, in which one of the meanings of *yukti* is explained as *yoga* or *upāya* ‘method, means’ (cf. also ŚrBh 145, 2, which equates the word with *vinīyoga*) (Sakuma 1990, vo. 2, p. 99, n. 596). Maithrimurthi (1999, 300) as well as Choi (2003, 81) similarly translate *yukti* as *Stimmigkeit* but also note the difficulty of finding a precise rendering of the term (Maithrimurthi 1999, p. 300, n. 22; Choi 2001, p. 123, n. 395).

Yoshimizu (1996a, p. 114, n. 85, and 1996b) offers a detailed discussion of the term and doctrinal history of *yukti*. In her 1996a contribution, Yoshimizu argues that the rendering *Grund* may be a proper rendering for all the four *yukti* categories in the ŚrBh and SaṁNirm. In 1996b, 160-164, Yoshimizu brings some refinements and corrections to her views expressed in the former work. She argues that *yukti* in the SaṁNirm, ŚrBh, and AbhSam ‘is assumed to mean an objective ground or principle which consists of the phenomenal world or facts and based on which one can explain originations and changes of phenomena as well as relations between things including logical relations’ (Yoshimizu 1996b, 160). Yoshimizu (1996b, 124-127) also discusses the various translations of the term in previous studies and adopts for her Japanese translation the term 道理. The latter is actually one of the most frequent traditional Chinese renderings of *yukti* (e.g., Xuanzang’s translation of the SaṁNirm, T16.709b11ff.) and is also a binome used in modern Japanese (as well as Chinese) in the sense of ‘reason, argument’, etc.

The four types of *yukti* are also discussed by Yaita (1989a), who similarly adopts the traditional Chinese translation 道理. The ŚrBh-Gr translation (ŚrBh-Gr pp. 237ff.) also renders the term as 道理.

The main difficulty in rendering the term is that its semantic sphere seems to cover both the objective principles underlying the reality and the human epistemological effort to find and systematise them (cf. Yoshimizu 1996b). Without a term covering both facets (and I can think of none), the solution seems to be a choice between the objective aspect (as the German *Grund*) and the subjective nuance (like *Stimmigkeit* and ‘reasoning’). Probably a more creative manner of rendering *yukti* in this special usage here would be ‘reason(ing)’, i.e., attempting to put together both ‘reason’ (*Grund*) and ‘reasoning’. I am afraid, however, that the reader who is not warned about the semantic complexity behind this ‘reason(ing)’ would become more perplexed than enlightened. Admittedly, *yukti* covers both the objective and subjective sides, but my conjecture is that at least in the ŚrBh, the emphasis is more on the *subjective* facet, i.e., the yogi’s effort to look into the essence of reality. I shall, therefore, adopt in my translation ‘reasoning’, without, however, denying that *yukti* also has an objective facet (after all, ‘looking into the essence of reality’ means discovering its *Grund*). Let us further note that Powers (tr. 1995, 285-289) similarly renders the Tibetan equivalent of *yukti* in the SaṃNirm as ‘reasoning’ or ‘analysis’. Keenan (tr. 2000, 103-104) also translates the Chinese equivalent of the word here as ‘reasoning’. Cox (1995, 14, 15) uses ‘reasoned argument’ for *yukti*, which is an appropriate alternative worth considering. Though my choice has been ‘reasoning’, I heartily agree with Maithrimurthi (1999, p. 300, n. 22) that *das letzte Wort über die angemessene Übersetzung für yukti is aber noch nicht gefallen*.

^{7 5} Skt. *putradāra*. The noun *putra* in dual and plural may refer to ‘children’, both sons and daughters being included (see MW, s.v.). In our compound, too, it is very likely that the intended meaning was plural: ‘sons and daughters’. Whether *-dāra* should similarly be construed as ‘wives’ is not clear. Given the widespread institution of polygamy amongst the wealthy social groups in Ancient India, especially royal and aristocratic families (see Basham 1967, 174-176; Khosla 1986, 253-4; Hara 2003, 28-37; etc.). The character in our ŚrBh passage seems to belong to such a milieu, and the authors of our text may have well intended a plural meaning for *dāra*, too. The institution of marriage in the Gupta Age is discussed in Pandey 1982, 160-166. Pandey argues that ‘monogamy and absolute fidelity was the ideal of a married life. Polygamy, however, was allowed in practice, though it was confined to aristocracy’ (p. 164).

^{7 6} On slavery in the traditional Indian society, see Basham 1967, 153-154. For the legal status of a slave, see *Manusmṛti* ch. 8, ver. 415 (Olivelle ed. p. 743, tr. p. 189; Nene ed., p. 455). For various types of slaves and their legal status in the Gupta Age, see Pandey 1982, 158-159.

^{7 7} Apart from ‘companion’, (Skt.) *amātya*/(Pali) *amacca* also means an ‘inmate of the same house’ or a ‘minister’ (MW, s.v.), the latter sense being frequent in the *Mahābhārata* and the *Manusmṛti*. Linguistically, ‘the adverb *amā-* means “at home”, and in combination with the suffix *-tya-* it acquires the sense of “found at home”; as a substantive it means “home-colleague” or “minister”, who was conceived as a man found at the home of a king” (Hara 1959, 91). The *amātya/amacca* appears to have been a king’s personal aid or confidant rather than and official minister (PED, s.v.).

The traditional interpretations of similar contexts in Buddhist literature seem to prefer the meaning of ‘companion’, though the exact meaning of this term is not easy to determine. In discussing the suffering caused by the separation from the beloved ones, Vibh 100 lists: *mātā vā pitā vā bhātā vā bhaginī vā mittā vā amaccā vā nātisālohitā vā*. Vibh-a 107 explains *amacca* as: *kiccakaraṇīyesu sahabhāvaṭṭhena amā honṭīti amaccā*. ‘Because “they are with me (*amā*) in the sense of association in the execution of functions”, they are **amaccā** (“companions”)’ (Ñānamoli tr., p. 129). The linguistic validity of this gloss, which follows interpretative lines similar to the

Nirukta tradition, should not concern us here; the important aspect is that the Pali commentators understood the term as ‘companion’ associated in the performance of one’s duties. What exactly this association means is, however, not so easy to specify: it could be that of a companion of equal rank or that of a member of one’s retinue or a special adviser.

The character depicted in our passage in the ŚrBh is obviously rich. *Amātya* may refer to an ‘equal companion’, an ‘attendant’, or, if we assume him to be an aristocratic or even royal figure, then ‘privy councillor’ is not excluded. In the end, I have decided to render the word as ‘companion’ in order to accommodate a plurality of nuances. Tib. *blon po* clearly suggests ‘a state-officer, generally of high rank’ (TED, s.v.; cf. BTsh, s.v.; on the early system of *blon* and *zhang*, contemporary to the Tibetan translators of the YoBh, see Yamaguchi 1988, vol. 2, pp. 31-34). For the Chinese rendering, see note 78 below.

⁷⁸ Skt. *jñātisālohita*/Pali *ñātisālohita* is a frequent compound in Buddhist literature (PED, s.v.; BHSD, s.v.). Though not correct from the viewpoint of modern comparative linguistics, traditional Indian grammarians and commentators regarded *jñāti* as referring to paternal relations (see Kazama 1984, 330-2). In our compound, however, no notable difference seems to exist between *jñāti* and *sālohita*. The same passage of the Vibh-a (p. 108) cited in the preceding note continues: *ayam amhākaṃ ajjhattiko ti evaṃ jānanti, ñāyantīti* [PTS reading *nāti* emended to *ñāti*] *vā ñāti. lohiteṇa sambaddhā* [on this reading, see below] *ti sālohita*. ‘Because “they know (*jānanti*) that “this is our own” or because “they are known (*ñāyanti*)”, they are *ñāti* [*ñāti* emended to *ñāti*] (“kin”); because “they are tied by blood”, they are *sālohita* (“blood relatives”’) (Ñānamoli tr., p. 129). (PTS reads *sambandhā* instead of *sambaddhā*. I think that the latter is the correct form, and the PTS reading should be emended accordingly. PED, Mizuno 1988, Kumoi 1997, s.v., list *sambandha* only as noun. It is true that occasionally one also meets with forms like *sambandha-kula* (PED, s.v. *sambandha*) and *asambandha* (CPD, s.v. and PED s.v. *sambandha*), but as suggested by the CPD editors, *asambandha* may be a wrong reading for *asambaddha*.)

The Chinese translation is rather problematic, posing several problems concerning the exact understanding and punctuation of the compound 父母妻子奴婢作使親友眷屬, especially its latter half. My punctuation follows the most natural way of reading the phrase in Chinese (cf. also KIK 235 and KDK 137). This, however, leads to lack of parallelism with the Skt. compound. In order to have a perfectly corresponding translation of the 12-member *dvandva* compound we would need to regard each character as standing for one Sanskrit word. The first six characters raise no special problem in this respect, but construing each of the last six characters as six lexemes is not very natural in Chinese. It is more sensible to suppose that Xuanzang chose to render the compound in an abbreviated manner. The same compound is also seen in the BoBh. The occurrence at T30.509c8-9 (corresponding to BoBh Wogihara ed. 132,15-16; Dutt ed. 92,4-5) offers a perfect example to be compared with our passage. Here *mātāpitrputradārādāsīdāsakarmakarapauruṣeyamitrāmātyajñātisālohiteṣv* is rendered as 父母妻子奴婢作使善友大臣親戚眷屬. The parallelism between the Skt. and the Ch. is evident. But here, too, as in our ŚrBh passage, a term like 作使 is not easy to explain. I could not find the word as a binomic compound in other Chinese sources, Buddhist or not, but the most natural way of construing it is ‘servant 使 who does the work 作’. 作 alone as a noun meaning ‘worker’ (therefore, *karmakara*) is not excluded (though the only its occurrence with the sense of ‘manual worker’, which I could find, is in a text composed in the Song Dynasty, see HDC, s.v.; in this case, the character should be read *zuo* with the second tone and not with its usual fourth tone). However, when referring to persons doing the work, the tendency in Chinese, classical and modern, is to use binomes as 作人 (a lexeme attested as early as the *Book of Odes* 詩經 and also used in Buddhist literature, as for instance, in Kumārajīva’s translation of the

SadPuṇḍ: T9.17a17; 17a24; cf. also Karashima 2001, s.v.). If, however, 作使 is a lexeme, then does it render *karmakara* or *pauruṣeya* or both? I tend to believe that the latter is the most likely answer. Actually, it seems that 作使 regularly translates *karmakarapauruṣeya* in the BoBh. See T30.509c8 (corresponding to BoBh Wogihara ed. 132,15-16; Dutt ed. 92,4), T30.533c16 (BoBh Wogihara ed. 232, 21; Dutt ed. 160, 13, has *pauruṣeya* in square brackets, which shows the fact that the word is missing in the Patna MS and is supplied on the basis of Wogihara's text), and T30.533c19-20 (BoBh Wogihara ed. 232,26-233,1; Dutt 160,17).

Things are even more complicated with 親友眷屬, which likewise could be regarded as representing two bimorphemic words or construed as 'close friends, friends, kinsmen and relatives', corresponding perfectly to the Skt. *mitrāmātyajñātisālohita*. 親友 could stand for two independent words (here rendering 'intimate friends' (*mitra*) and 'friends' (*amātya*)) or could represent a binome meaning 'close friends', the latter being the most frequent usage (also attested in Buddhist texts; see BDJ, s.v.). Taking 親友 as a binome in our ŚrBh passage does, however, raise the following problem: does it stand for *mitra*, or for *amātya*, or for both (taken to refer to basically the same category of persons). Likewise, 眷屬 could mean 'relatives' (the usual meaning of the binome in Chinese, cf. Shinjigen, s.v.; also found in Buddhist sources, cf. BDJ, s.v.), thus standing for *jñātisālohita*, or it could have the sense of 'retinue, attendants' (also seen in Buddhist texts, cf. BDJ, s.v.), rendering *amātya*, but then there is no Ch. equivalent for the Skt. *jñātisālohita*. The latter alternative seems quite unlikely. The compound *mitrāmātyajñātisālohita* is also found in the BoBh (passages referred to above), but its translation is not uniform. At T30.533c16 (BoBh Wogihara ed. 232,21; Dutt ed. 160, 13-14) and T30.533c19-20 (BoBh Wogihara ed. 232,26-233,1; Dutt 160,17-18), Xuanzang renders it as: 朋友僚庶親屬. This compound, too, is not very clear. It should probably be construed as 'friends, officials, and relatives' (the meaning of 僚庶 is defined in HDC, s.v., as 庶僚 'various officials' or 众官 'multitude of officers'; let us also note that 僚, apart from 'official', also means 'colleague'). Both Skt. *jñātisālohita* and Ch. 親屬 are binomic, but as to the latter, it is difficult to know whether Xuanzang construed the compound as 'kinsmen and relatives' or simply as 'relatives' (given the fact that the Skt. components of this *dvandva* do not appear to show any important semantic difference?). At T30.509c8-9 (corresponding to BoBh Wogihara ed. 132,15-16; Dutt ed. 92,4-5), we find the following rendering: 善友大臣親戚眷屬 'good friends, ministers, kinsmen, and relatives' (善友 may evoke the technical *kalyāṇamitra* but its plain sense of 'good friend' is attested in native Chinese writings as well as in translations of Indian texts; for 善友 standing for *mitra*, see BDJ, s.v.).

Though a definitive conclusion is not possible, it seems plausible to assume that here, as in other contexts, too, Xuanzang and his team were aware of the exact meaning of the compound, but they chose an abbreviated form of rendering.

Finally, let us remark that similar compounds which list relatives, attendants, etc. are frequent in Buddhist literature. See, for instance, *mātāpitṛbhrātṛbhaginīputraduhitṛmitrāmātyajñātisālohita*^o (AbhisamĀl 661,28).

^{7 9} *Odana* 'boiled rice' is known since Vedic times. In the *Ṛgveda*, it appears to have referred to a mess 'prepared with rice cooked in water or milk' (Prakash 1961, 10). From the *Atharvaveda* on, it acquires the sense of 'boiled rice' (ibid. 289). Its recipe is described by Prakash (1961, 289) as follows: 'Odana was prepared with clarified butter, meat, fruit, tubers, pulses and milk'. For rice, including *odana*, in Vedic literature, see Gonda's monograph (1987). Patañjali (ca. 150 BCE), too, refers to *odana* as a favourite vegetarian food of his age (Puri 1990, 91). See also note 80 on *kulmāṣa* below.

^{8 0} Skt. *kulmāṣa* is usually translated as 'sour gruel' (MW, s.v.), 'saurer Reisschleim' (PW, s.v.),

酸き粥 ‘sour gruel’ (BWDJ, s.v.), etc. Cf. Pali *kummāsa* ‘junket’ (PED, s.v.), ‘a kind of grain (probably a type of barley or wheat); a porridge or dumpling made of this; a broth or gruel’ (PD, s.v.). Prakash (1961, 287-8) describes *kulmāsa* as follows: ‘Probably the early Dravidians used this preparation. It was coarse gruel prepared by stewing some inferior food grain and mixing it with treacle and oil (Chand. Up. I 10.2.)’. *Kulmāsa* is known from Vedic times, being prepared of inferior cereals in a manner similar to the one quoted above (ibid. 11-12). ‘It seems to have generally been the food of the poor; but the rich ate in time of scarcity.’ (ibid. 12). It continued to be food of the poor and ascetics, being mentioned as such in variety of sources down to the Gupta Age (cf. ibid. 37, 85, 136, 168).

In the Kv (563), we are told that the Exalted One ate boiled rice and coarse gruel (*odanakummāsam bhuñjati*)—the latter quite in keeping with his ascetic life. I surmise that the juxtaposition of *odana* (see preceding note) and *kulmāsa* in our ŚrBh compound is meant to suggest the whole range of staple food from the high quality ‘boiled rice’ to the low dish of ‘coarse gruel’. The context, with its diatribe against the hedonistic attachment to the body and sensual pleasures, makes the meaning even more conspicuous: no matter if you feed upon savoury boiled rice or plain gruel, the body is doomed to destruction and suffering.

The rendering of the word has naturally led the traditional translators to some cultural modifications. Tib. *zan dron* is explained in BTsh, s.v., as *rtsam pa brdzas pa'i zan tsha po* ‘a hot food into which parched barley flour is ground’. It is hard to say whether *rtsam pa* ‘parched barley flour’, which is a staple food in Tibet (cf. TED, s.v.; etc.), was chosen for its culinary similarity to *kulmāsa* (which also appears with the sense of ‘barley flour boiled in warm water, and made into cakes’, Prakash 1961, p. 136, n. 3, referring to Cakrapāṇi on the *Carakasamhitā* Su 27.260) or simply because it was more meaningful to the Tibetan readers, especially as it evoked a basic dish of the masses. The same can be said of the Ch. 糜, which is a type of ‘thick gruel’ known to the Chinese since early times. In his Commentary on the *Li ji* 禮記, the Chinese scholar Kong Yida 孔穎達 (574-648) notes: ‘糜 *mi* is thick [gruel] and 粥 *zhou* is thin [gruel]’ 糜厚而粥薄 (cf. 濃いかゆ ‘thick gruel’, in DKWJ, s.v.; or simply 粥 ‘gruel’, in HDC, s.v., though the editors quote under 糜粥 the above gloss by Kong Yida). MVyut # 5747 gives *zan dron* as the Tibetan equivalent for *kulmāsa* (same as in our text) but 温麵 ‘warm noodles’ as the Chinese translation (under the influence of the Tibetan *zan dron*?).

The phrase *odanakummāsūpacaya* also occurs in the Pali Canon (DN I 76; MN II 17; etc.; cf. CPD, PD, PTS Concordance, s.v.). Buddhaghosa glosses it as: *Odana-kummāsūpacaya ti, odanena c’eva kummāsenā ca upacito vaḍḍhito* (DN-a I 220). We also find *odana-kulmāśopacaya* at Mvastu 2.269,15; 277,18 (cf. BHSD, s.v.).

⁸¹ Like *parimardana* (see below), *utsadana* has a double meaning: ‘anointing’ and ‘destruction’. The usual form is *utsādana* (cf. CarSam *Sūtrasthāna* 14. 24, where the word is rendered by Sharma as ‘anointing’). In the BWDJ, s.v., the form *utsadana* is given as having the meaning of ‘cleaning the body’ 淨身, while *utsādana* is explained as ‘anointing the body with perfumed oil’, both on the basis of the MVyut. In Sakaki’s edition of the MVyut, we find, however, only the form *utsādana* (in spite of its Index which registers both forms under the same entry # 6781 [Sakaki’s edition misprints as # 6881]). Edgerton, referring to the same entry of the MVyut, conjectures that Minayev’s and Mironov’s reading *utsadana* is an error for *utsādana* (BHSD, s.v. *utsadana*). A similar emendation is suggested by Schmidt (PW Nachträge, s.v.). The form *utsadana* is, however, attested at the DhSk 37. Dietz, referring to Edgerton’s conjecture, notes: ‘Die Lesung *utsadana* „Einreiben, Abreiben” ist in allen vier Stellen eindeutig’ (p. 37, n. 87). SWTF, s.v., citing the same locus, adopts the same rendering. MVyut Ishihama and Fukuda ed., entry # 6752 has *utsādana* but also records (*ut*)*sada(na)* as a variant reading.

Ch. 覆蔽 ‘covering’ reflects another reading, most likely, **ācchādana*, which is attested in the MVastu (see below). Choi (p. 125, n. 407) surmises the root *chad* for 覆蔽. As discussed below, the compound *utsadanasnapanaparimardanabhedanacchedanavikiraṇadhvaṃsana-dharman* appears to be a development of the Pali *ucchādana-parimaddana-bhedana-viddhvaṃsana-dhamma* (*ucchādana* is explained in PW, s.v., as a Prakrit form of *utsādana*; for Buddhaghosa’s explanation of *ucchādana*, see note 85 below). The compound is found in the MVastu in forms still close to the Pali version: *ucchādana-parimardana-svapna-bhedana-vikiraṇa-vidhvaṃsana-dharmo* (2.269, 15-16; confirmed by MVastu MS, vol. 1 (palm-leaf) folio 201b4R) and *ācchādana-parimardana-supana-bhedana-vikiraṇa-vidhvaṃsana-dharmo* (2.278, 1; confirmed by MVastu MS, vol. 1 (palm-leaf) folio 205a1R) (*supana* appears to be a BHSD variant for *svapna*, see BHSD, s.v.). It seems that at some stage in the MS (or oral) transmission, *ucchādana* gave birth to two different readings. One is *utsādana*, as reflected by the Skt. original and Tib. translation of the ŚrBh, and another appears to have been **ācchādana*, as suggested by the MVastu and Xuanzang’s rendering of the ŚrBh.

^{8 2} The Pali stock-phrase cited above does not contain *snapana* or ‘bathing’. The MVastu passage quoted above contains *svapna* and *supana* ‘sleep’. It is difficult to say whether this is what the Buddhist compilers actually meant (adding thus a further term representative for the care one has to take of the body) or we have to do with a wrong reading for *snapana*. A similar occurrence in the KaPari 152, 2, reads: *ucchada-parimardana-snapana-bhedana-vikiraṇa-vidhvaṃsana-dharma*. There is no way to ascertain with precision which of the two readings, *snapana* or *svapna*, was the original one, but in view of the context of ‘ointment’ and ‘massage’, it is more likely that *snapana* was the initial reading and *svapna* represents a later corruption or misunderstanding. Let us also note that MVyut Ishihama and Fukuda ed., entry # 6751 registers both forms of *snāpana* and *snapana*. (For both forms *snapaya-ti* and *snāpaya-ti* in Middle Indic, see Sakamoto-Goto 1993, 279). Another closely related word often used in Classical Sanskrit texts for ‘bathing’ is *snāna* (see BudCar 11.34, for which see also below; CarSam *Sūtrasthāna* 5.94, in which *snāna* is recommended as purifying, aphrodisiac, life-promoting, eliminating fatigue, etc.).

^{8 3} Skt. *parimardana* means ‘rubbing down’, ‘rubbing off’, ‘massage’ (cf. Tib. *mnye ba* and Ch. 按摩) and also ‘crushing, wearing out, destroying’. The Pali word *parimaddana* also encompasses both meanings: ‘rubbing, kneading, shampooing, massage’ as well as ‘abrasion’ (PED, s.v.). MVyut # 6779 gives the word as part of the compound *parimardana-saṃvāhana* ‘rubbing’ or ‘massage’ (*saṃvāhana* occurs at CarSam *Vimānasthāna* 6.16, being translated by Sharma as ‘gentle pressing’; *sambāhana* in Pali is also used in conjunction with *parimaddana* in Buddhaghosa’s commentary cited in note 85 below). In the CarSam *Chikitsāsthāna* 21.135, we see *parimardana* mentioned as a form of treatment for glandular erysipelas (*granthi visarpa*), which Sharma renders as ‘compression’. For ‘rubbing over the body’, the CarSam *Sūtrasthāna* 5.93 uses *parimārjana*, which is recommended for the elimination of foul smell, drowsiness, itching, etc. Though derived from a different root (*pari+√mṛd*), *parimardana* appears to be used in a similar sense. Actually, in Buddhaghosa’s gloss quoted below (note 85), the famous commentator uses both *parimaddana* ‘massage’ and *parimajjana* ‘rubbing’ (though the canonical text which he explains contains only *parimaddana*!).

Let us also note that *ucchādana* and *parimaddana* in their concrete senses of ‘ointment’ and ‘massage’ respectively are seen together or alone in contexts describing activities related to the body hygiene (e.g., DN I 7, 19, both words; AN I 132, 16: *ucchādana* only; etc.).

^{8 4} For reasons required by the wording of the English sentence, I render *-dharmaṇa(h)* (*in fine compositi*) twice: ‘always requiring [...]’ and ‘[yet] bound to [...]’.

^{8 5} The compound *nityotsadanasnapanaparimardanabhedanacchedanavikiraṇadhvaṃsana-*

dharman appears to be a development of the Pali *anicc'-ucchādana-parimaddana-bhedana-viddhamsana-dhamma* (see DN I 76, etc.; for other occurrences, see the end of this note). The process appears to have passed through several stages. The earliest one is, most likely, the Pali compound, which Rhys Davids translates as 'its very nature is impermanence, it is subject to erosion, abrasion, dissolution, and disintegration' (*Dialogues of the Buddha*, vol. 1, p. 87). He further explains the expression as follows: 'The words for erosion, abrasion, are cunningly chosen (*ucchādana, parimaddana*). They are also familiar technical terms to the Indian shampooer, and so used above (p. 7, § 16 of the text) [referring to the *Brahmajālasutta*—DN I 7]. The double meaning must have been clear to the Indian hearer, and the words are, therefore, really untranslatable' (ibid., n. 1). Referring to this note, Edgerton remarks: 'the true interpretation was given by Rhys Davids, [...] *shampooing and rubbing down* (so Skt.), but with double entente (not recognised in Pali comm[entarie]s)' (BHSD, s.v. *ucchādana*).

It seems that in a second stage this dual semantic features, which formed the basis of the paranomasia, were felt necessary to be brought from the deep structure to the surface structure. This created compounds like *ucchādana-parimardana-svapna[supana]-bhedana-vikiriṇa-vidhvāmsana-dharma* in the Mvastu and *ucchada-parimardana-snapana-bhedana-vikiriṇa-vidhvāmsana-dharma* in the KaPari (see above). In these, the first part of the compound contains terms explicitly associated with activities meant to keep a hygienic and aesthetic appearance of the body (terms probably no longer construed with their formal double meaning), while its second half consists of words stressing the inherent ephemeral nature of the body in spite of all these efforts.

This understanding is clearly reflected in Buddhaghosa's gloss on the phrase (DN-a I PTS ed., p. 220; I have also collated the PTS text with the Chaṭṭha Saṅgāyana ed., *Silakkhandhavaggaṭṭhakathā*, § 234): *Anicc-uddhāna-parimaddana-bhedana-viddhamsana-dhammo ti. Hutvā abhāvaṭṭhena anicca-dhammo, duggandha-vighātathāya tanu-vilepanena ucchādana-dhammo, aṅga-paccaṅgābādha*[I follow Chaṭṭha Saṅgāyana ed.; PTS ed. reads: °*bādhana*]-*vinodanattāya khuddaka-sambāhanena parimaddana-dhammo, dahara-kāle vā ūrūsu* [I follow Chaṭṭha Saṅgāyana ed.; PTS ed. reads: *dahara-kāle urūsu*] *sayāpetvā gabbhāvāsena dussañḥitānaṃ tesam tesam aṅgānaṃ sañḥāna-sampādanatthaṃ añchana*[I follow Chaṭṭha Saṅgāyana ed.; PTS ed. reads: °*añjana*]-*pīlanādi-vasena parimajjana-dhammo, evaṃ pariharito* [I follow Chaṭṭha Saṅgāyana ed.; PTS ed. reads: °*pariharato*] *pi ca bhedana-viddhamsana-dhammo, bhijjati c'eva vikirati ca evaṃ-sabhāvo ti attho. 'Being of the nature of impermanent, ointment, massage, breaking, and destruction: Because it exists no [more] after having [once] existed, it [is said to have an] impermanent nature. Because of [the usage of] body ointment for the elimination of bad smell, it [is said to] require ointment. Because of soft rubbing for the alleviation of discomfort in the limbs, great and small, it [is said to] require massage. Or it [is said to] require rubbing because during infancy, [one's body] is made to lie on [one's mother's?] thighs [/lap] and is pulled, pressed, and so on in order to bring in [good] shape the various parts [of the body] which have [assumed] a bad shape due the position [of the foetus] in the womb. In spite of being thus taken care of, the nature [of the body] is to break and be destroyed. And indeed it splits and falls to pieces. The meaning [of the phrase] is [to show] that it [i.e., the body] has such an essence.'* (Notes: (1) *khuddaka-sambāhanena* 'moderate rubbing', *khuddaka* usually means 'small' but here it must refer to a 'small' degree of *sambāhana*. (2) If the correct reading is *urūsu* as in the PTS ed. instead of *ūrūsu*, then the meaning is: 'on the soil', not 'thighs [/lap]'. (3) *gabbhāvāsena* 'due to its position in the womb' literally means 'due to its having dwelt in the womb'. (4) I render *añchana* as 'pulled'; it must come from *añchati* 'to pull, to drag'. (5) I translate *pīlana* as 'pressed'; the word usually has the sense of 'oppression', etc., but here it seems to refer to the mechanical act of pressing; cf. Skt. *pīḍana*.)

Our passage in the ŚrBh appears to be the further stage in the history of the compound (with the Ch. reading 覆蔽 = **ācchādana* as a sub-line of development). Its understanding was probably the same as Buddhaghosa, but *anicca/anitya* appears to have been felt as out of place in the first part of the compound being replaced with *nitya*. This was most likely construed as ‘always requiring anointment, etc.’, a meaning which the Chinese rendering 常須 actually makes explicit.

Finally, let us remark most of the whole passage starting with *rūpiṇaḥ* represents a development of a classical description of the body in the Pali Canon: *ayaṃ kho me kāyo rūpī cātu-mahā-bhūṭiko mātā-ṭṭika-sambhavo odana-kummas’-upacayo anicc’-ucchādana-parimaddana-bhedana-viddhamāna-dhammo* (DN I 76; cf. also MN I 144, 500; MN II 17; SN IV 83, 194, 292 [all these occurrences in SN IV do not contain *rūpi*]; SN V 369-370; AN IV 386 [this occurrence in AN IV does not contain *rūpi*]).

^{8 6} Skt. *nānyātra* means ‘rather’ or ‘not other[wise] but’. Cf. SWFT, fascicle 2, p. 89, s.v. *anyatra* # 4: ‘(nach einer Negation:) vielmehr, sondern’.

^{8 7} The doctrinal position underpinning this passage appears to be the denial of pleasure as an independent category. This idea seems to have been expounded by the Dārṣṭāntikas and /or Sautrāntikas and is also found in the BudCar and the SauNan (see Honjō 1987, 392-394; Yamabe 2003, 234-237) as well as in the *Zuochan sanmei jing* 坐禪三昧經, a meditation anthology translated and compiled by Kumārajīva (see Yamabe 2003, 237-238). Our ŚrBh passage does not contain an outright denial of the existence of pleasant feelings (*sukhavedanā*), but it clearly exhorts the ascetic to regard sensual pleasures only as a remedy for suffering (*duḥkhapratikāra*). This view is not developed into a clearly articulated philosophical discussion (like, for instance, at AKBh 330, 9ff.), and we cannot know with accuracy the doctrinal stance of the authors on this issue. However, the underlying conception and many of the images found at BudCar, Canto 11, ver. 36-39, are so similar that we might take the latter stanzas as parallels to our ŚrBh passage. It is hard to determine whether the authors of the ŚrBh were directly inspired from Aśvaghōṣa’s masterpiece or they drew on a common literary and doctrinal heritage, but the similarity of ideas and imagery is undeniable.

Kāmās tu bhogā iti yan matiḥ syād bhogā na kecit pariganyamānāḥ |
Vastrādayo dravyaguṇā hi loke duḥkhapratikāra iti pradhāryāḥ || 36 ||
Iṣṭam hi tarasprasamāya toyam kṣunnāśahetoraśanam tathaiva |
Vātātāpāmbvāvaraṇāya veśma kaupīnaśītāvaraṇāya vāsaḥ || 37 ||
Nidrāvighātāya tathaiva śayyā yānam tathādhvaśramanāśanāya |
Tathāśanam sthānavinodanāya snānam mṛjārogyabalāśrayāya || 38 ||
Duḥkhapratikāranimittabhūtas tasmāt prajānām viṣayā na bhogāḥ |
Aśnāmi bhogān iti ko ‘bhyupeyāt prājñāḥ pratikāraavidhau pravṛtāḥ || 39 ||

(36) ‘If [you] think that the objects of desire are enjoyable, [you should understand that] none of these [objects of desire] is considered to be enjoyable.

For in [this] world, things and qualities, such as clothes [and warmth] should be considered to be the remedy for pain.

(37) For water is desired for allaying thirst; food similarly for destroying hunger,
 A house for protection from wind, sun, and rain, and clothing for covering the
 privy parts or against cold.

(38) Similarly, a bed is for riddance of drowsiness; thus, too, a carriage for avoidance
 of road-fatigue;

So, too, a seat for relief from standing, and bathing as a means of cleanliness,
 health, and strength.

(39) Therefore, people’s [sense-]objects are the means of the remedy for pain and are not

enjoyable things.

What wise man applying the remedy [for pain] would think that he is enjoying something enjoyable?’

(The rendering of stanzas (37) and (38) follows, with slight punctuation modifications, Johnston tr. pp. 157-158; for the translation of stanzas (36) and (39), I rely on Yamabe 2003, 236; cf. also Hara tr., pp. 225-226).

For similar ideas, see also BudCar 11, 40, 11, 42; SauNan 9, 40; 17, 19 (cf. Yamabe 2002, 235-236).

⁸⁸ Skt. *āptāgama* ‘Trustworthy Tradition [of Buddhist scriptures]’. Ch. 至教 ‘supreme teaching’ appears to construe *āptāgama* as a *karmadhāraya*, and this is how I translate the compound here. Tib. *yid ches pa’i lung* is not very clear in this respect: it can be construed as ‘instruction which is [can be] trusted [depended upon]’ and also as ‘instruction of a trustworthy [person]’. The Indian logical tradition, Buddhist and non-Buddhist, tends to understand *āpta* as ‘trustworthy person’ and usually construes the similar compound *āptavacana* as a *tatpuruṣa*, i.e., ‘word(s) of a trustworthy person’ (see Nakamura 1983, s.vv. *āpta* and *āptavacana*) (I am grateful to Prof. Junkichi Imanishi who has kindly drawn my attention to the latter reference.)

⁸⁹ Skt. *jñānadarsana*, translated here ‘intuition’, literally means ‘wisdom and view’. The compound probably represents the nominalisation of the expression *tassa evaṃ jānato evaṃ passato*. This refers to a unique mode of cognition which combines both comprehension and intuition. The word ‘insight’ can cover both these nuances, but I use it as a rendering for *vipaśyanā*. Let us note that at Vin IV 26, 1, *ñānadassana* is identified with the three cognitions (*tisso vijjā*). In the *Sāmaññaphalasutta*, *ñānadassana* arises after the attainment of the four *jhānas* and implies comprehending (*pajānati*) the following truth: *yaṃ kho me kāyo rūpī cātu-mahā-bhūṭiko* [...], the formula which represents the canonical base of our ŚrBh passage here (for the whole stock-phrase, see note 85 above).

In its occurrence here in our passage, the *jñānadarsana* represents the perception (*pratyakṣa*), which is one criterion of determining the truth alongside *āptāgama* and *anumāna*.

⁹⁰ I render rather freely Skt. *ānumāniko* <> *py eṣa vidhiḥ*, which literally means ‘the inferential [type of reasoning] is [of] this [same] sort’.

In its early stages of development, Buddhist logic and epistemology recognised three criteria of validity: scriptural authority, direct perception, and inference. The three criteria in the ŚrBh are discussed in Yaita 1989b; see also Yaita 1989a as well as Yaita 2004 (especially 31-32), the latter analysing the possible influence of these early logical developments upon Dharmakīrti. For a presentation of these logical elements in the history of Indian thought in general and early Buddhist epistemology (SaṃNirm, YoBh, etc.) in particular, see Kajiyama 1984. Yoshimizu 1996b also contains important remarks on the contribution of the four types of *yukti* to the development of Buddhist logic (see especially pp. 143-153). Cf. also SaṃNirm 156-157 (Lamotte’s tr. at pp. 263-264); MadhVibh and MadhVibhṬ (Yamaguchi’s tr. at p. 129).

⁹¹ Skt. *dharmatā*, rendered here as ‘essence’, appears to be used here as, more or less, a synonym of *prakṛti* ‘nature’. The concept seems to refer to the reality as it is, which should be accepted as such without any further questioning. The term also occurs in passage 3.28.2.1.6. below, where, *faute de mieux*, I render as ‘nature’. A few more remarks about its usage in the ŚrBh and early Buddhism are found in note 111 below.

⁹² In the context of Buddhist praxis, such a long diatribe against sensual pleasures is more than an exercise in doctrinal eloquence. According to Buddhaghosa, a mendicant who enters the first absorption without having completely eliminated his attachment by examining the detriment of the sensual pleasures (*kāmādīnava*) is bound to lose (lit., come out of) this absorption soon (*khippam eva nikkhamati*) (Vism 122, § 124).

⁹³ There is a parallel passage in the AbhSamBh (Tatia ed. 80, 4-6; also Griffiths 1983, 429):

yena samāhitabhūmikena manaskāreṇa kāmeṣv ādinavādidarśanenaudārikalakṣaṇaṃ pratisamvedayate, tadabhāvāc ca prathāmadhyāne śāntalakṣaṇaṃ, ayam ucyate lakṣaṇa-pratisamvedī [Tatia: *lakṣaṇaprasamvedīyam*; I follow here Gokhale's reading in his edition of the AbhSam; so Griffiths, too] *manaskārah. sa ca śrutacintāvyavakīrṇo vedītavyaḥ.*

^{9 4} Shukla suggests the emendation of the MS *paryeṣṭa* to *paryeṣya*, which is semantically possible. In this case, one would have to construe *sa evaṃ kāmān pariṅṅāya prathamam dhyānam yathāvat paryeṣyaudārikaśāntalakṣaṇena* as: 'having thus ascertained the sensual pleasures, having properly examined the first absorption by means of the coarse and serene characteristic [respectively]'. I prefer, however, to emend with Choi to *prathamam <ca?> dhyānam* and leave the MS reading *paryeṣṭa* as such. As also argued by Choi (see p. 127-8, n. 453; p. 171, n. 252) on the basis of a parallel passage in the *Xiayang lun* which contains 及 (T31.515a8), *prathamam <ca?> dhyānam* makes a much better reading. Besides, the Ch. rendering of our passage also seems to support such a reading (see below). Another possibility would be to construe *yathāvatparyeṣṭaudārikaśāntalakṣaṇena* with *adhimucyate*, i.e. 'becomes convinced by means of the coarse and serene characteristic properly examined' (as implied by the Tibetan rendering), but this leads to some doctrinal difficulties which are aptly analysed by Choi in the latter part of n. 435 (p. 128).

The Tibetan translation of this passage apparently contains a few corruptions which have been transmitted in all Canons (see notes 129, 131, 134, and 135 to the Tib. ed.). Its original form can only be conjectured, but even this may have been based on a different (corrupt?) MS reading or may have partially mis-construed the Sanskrit text (?). In my emendation, the Tib. sentence reads: 'After having thus ascertained the sensual pleasures, he becomes convinced of the examined characteristic of coarseness and serenity with regard to the first of absorption as it really is, exclusively in the form of meditative cultivation, having transcended the [levels of] of listening and reflection'. If we do not emend the sentence, the rendering is: 'After having thus ascertained the sensual pleasures, he becomes convinced of the examined characteristic of coarse serenity [...]'. Or one might interpret *bsam gtan dang po la yongs su tshol ba dang* | as an independent phrase, in which case the rendering would be: 'After having thus ascertained the sensual pleasures, he examines the first trance and, becomes convinced of [its] characteristic of coarse serenity [...]'. Such a reading would presuppose *paryeṣya* (as in Shukla's emendation) rather than *paryeṣṭa*, but I doubt whether such a reading of *dang* is possible here. No matter how we construe the sentence, two things are clear: (1) *ji lta ba bzhin gyis = yathāvat*, which in our Skt. original precedes *paryeṣṭa*, is construed in Tib. with *adhimucyate*; and (2) *paryeṣṭaudārikaśāntalakṣaṇena* is taken to refer only to the *prathamam dhyānam*. If this reflects the Skt. MS used by the Tibetan translators, then this probably read *prathamam dhyānam*, not *prathamam <ca> dhyānam* (as conjectured by Choi and me). Thus, the Tibetan team was forced to interpret *audārikaśāntalakṣaṇa* as describing the content of the first absorption. This must have led to the rendering *rags pa dang | zhi ba 'i* (as I conjecture) (or the strange: *rags pa 'i zhi ba 'i mtshan nyid*, as in the Tib. original(?)). Once again, if a reading like this goes back to the original text of the Tibetan rendering, then we could surmise that the Tibetan translators may have taken it as referring to the relative serenity of the first *dhyāna* when compared to the higher meditative levels.

The Ch. is much clearer: 彼既如是如理尋思, 了知諸欲是其麤相, 知初靜慮是其靜相。'Having thus already properly examined, he realises that sensual desires represent the coarse aspect and understands that the first absorption represent the serene aspect' (my rendering is slightly different from Choi's interpretation—see n. 435, p. 127). Xuanzang's translation appears to presuppose an original containing *ca* (i.e., *prathamam <ca> dhyānam*). Unlike the Tib., Xuanzang undoubtedly construes *audārikaśāntalakṣaṇena* with the first part of the sentence. He actually renders *yathāvatparyeṣṭa*^o as the first clause of the sentence, which constitutes, to be

sure, the logical sequence of the psychological process described here (first examining and then realising). Xuanzang takes both *kamān* and *prathamam dhyānam* as direct objects of *parijñāya* and correctly matches the *audārika[lakṣaṇa]* with the former and the *sāntalakṣaṇa* with the latter. He expresses this in two separate clauses each with its own verb: 了知 and 知 respectively. This wording does not necessarily presuppose a different Skt. original. Xuanzang probably rendered the same Skt. *parijñāya* with two distinct (albeit semantically similar) verbs for the sake of clarity (as well as elegant variation?). Although showing the trace of some editorial clarifications, the Chinese translation (as well as the parallel passage in the *Xianyang lun*) appears to be the most reliable version.

⁹⁵ The parallel passage in the AbhSamBh (see below) makes it clear to what exactly this characteristic or image which represents the meditative object (*tannimittāmbanām*) refers. AbhSamBh reads: *tadaudārikaśāntalakṣaṇanimittāmbanām* ‘having the image of the coarse [characteristic and the] serene characteristic [of the respective sphere (*dhātu*)] as meditative object’.

Ch. reads 所緣相, which suggests *āmbanimitta* rather than *nimittāmbana* (see note 73 to Ch. ed.). *Āmbanimitta* is a technical term quite frequent in the YoBh (see note 73 to Ch. ed.). In the SrBh, the most detailed discussion is found at Sh 391, 18 – 392, 16.

⁹⁶ Skt. *punaḥ punaḥ* (‘repeatedly’ or ‘again and again’) determining *adhimucyate* clearly indicates the dynamic aspect of the psychological process described by this verb. This contemplation appears to consist in repeated acts of concentration which are associated with and, at the same time, increase the conviction with regard to the meditative object. Although breaking the principle of one-to-one correspondence between the source-language and the target-language, my rendering of *adhimucyate* (as ‘he repeatedly concentrates on and [consequently] becomes convinced’) tries to capture this polysemy.

⁹⁷ One could also construe Skt. *ādhimokṣiko manaskāraḥ* as ‘contemplation characterised by conviction’ or ‘contemplation born of conviction’ (see note 275 to Chapter Six, Part One).

Cf. the parallel passage in the AbhSamBh (Tatia ed. 80, 8-10; Griffiths 1983, 429): *tadūrdhvaṃ śrutam cintām cātikramyaikantena bhāvanākāreṇa tadaudārikaśāntalakṣaṇanimittāmbanām śamathavipaśyanām bhāvayan punaḥ punar yathāparyeṣitām audārikaśāntatām adhimucyate. ity ayam ādhimokṣikaḥ.*

⁹⁸ Cf. the parallel passage in the AbhSamBh (Tatia ed. 80, 10-11; Griffiths 1983, 431): *tadabhyāsāt tatprathamataḥ prahāṇamārgasahagato manaskāraḥ prāvivekyah.* MS spells without interruption: *prāvivekyastena*^o. Tatia has a comma after *prāvivekyah*. This must have been somehow misleading for Griffiths who wrongly regards the following *tenādhimātrakleśaprahāṇāt tatpakṣadauṣṭhulyāpagamāc ca* | as part of this passage (see also his English translation, p. 430). Apart from our SrBh passage, the fact that in almost all cases (the only exception is the first one), the name of the respective *manaskāra* comes last also supports my interpretation.

⁹⁹ A literal rendering of the Skt. *tadūrdhvaṃ prahāṇārāmo bhavati, vivekārāmaḥ* would be ‘beyond this [point], [he] becomes one who rejoices at abandonment, one who rejoices at separation’.

¹⁰⁰ Tib. translation is explicit: *rab tu dben pa las skyes pa'i dga' ba dang | bde ba chung ngu* ‘small [degree of] gladness and happiness born of separation’.

¹⁰¹ In the absence of more details in our text, it is not easy to understand with precision how this sentence connects with the previous one and what exactly the mental states depicted here refer to. I surmise that *ārāma* is finding pleasure in the very act of abandoning defilements and *prītisukha* describes the joy and well-being (still limited, though) resulting from the detachment which the ascetic has reached.

¹⁰² ‘Torpor, drowsiness, and agitation’ are well-known defilements, often appearing as

members of the so-called ‘five hindrances’ (Skt., *pañca nīvaraṇāni* ; Pali, *pañca nīvaraṇā*). The classical list includes: lust [lit., desire for sensual pleasures] (*kāmacchanda*), malice (*vyāpāda*), torpor and drowsiness (*styānamiddha*; *thīnamiddha*) (counted as one member; see below), agitation and remorse [worry] (*auddhatyakaukṛtya*; *uddhaccakukkucca*) (also regarded as forming one member; see below), and doubt (*vicikitsā*; *vicikicchā*). The reason why torpor and drowsiness as well as agitation and remorse are classed together is set forth at AK V 59b-c: *ekavipakṣāhāraḥṛtyataḥ | dvyekatā* (I follow Śāstrī ed., p. 852, 3-4) ‘[These] two [represent] one because of having the same antidote, source, [and] effect’. (I translate Skt. *āhāra* as ‘source’; it literally means ‘food’ and refers to the basis on which these mental defilements depend for their production and growth.)

The five hindrances are well-known from canonical sources, e.g., DN II 300-301 (in the *Mahāsatipaṭṭhānasuttanta*; the *pañca nīvaraṇāni* are here eliminated as part of the application of mindfulness on mental factors (*dharmā*)); AN I 92-93 (the elimination of the five hindrances is a preliminary step to the attainment of the four absorptions; SN V 105-106; AN I 272-273 (both occurrences with formulas of abandonment different from the four applications of mindfulness); AN IV 457-8 (where the antidote of the five hindrances is, once again, the practice of the four applications of mindfulness (*cattāro satipaṭṭhānā*); Vibh 199 (similarly, as part of the application of mindfulness on mental factors (*dharmā*)), etc. For an outstanding analysis of the historical development of the four application of mindfulness, see Schmithausen 1976a. (A different view and criticism of this study is put forward in Bronkhorst 1985, 310-314. Though Bronkhorst’s article makes some valuable contributions on the whole, I do not find his arguments concerning this particular point very convincing. This, however, cannot be entered into detail here.) Definitions and ample discussions of the five hindrances are found at Vibh 253-256, Vibh-a 269-275, **Abhidharmasāṅgītiparyāyapādaśāstra* 阿毘達磨集異門足論 T26.416a29-b-28; AKBh 318-319; etc. For Pali sources, see also Gunaratana 1985, 29-48. In the YoBh, the five hindrances are defined at SamBh 90-95. We also find references to the five hindrances in other parts of the ŚrBh (e.g., ŚrBh-Gr 20, 15-19).

The elimination of the five hindrances is essential for entering and dwelling in the *dhyānas*. The classical description of the first absorption depicts the ascetic as being ‘indeed aloof from sensual pleasures, aloof from unwholesome factors’ *vivicc’eva kāmehi vivicca akusalehi dhammehi* (e.g., DN I 73, MN I 89, 33; Vibh 245; also quoted at Vism 112; etc.). The Vibh (256), after defining the sensual pleasures (see n. 35 above), identifies the ‘unwholesome factors’ with the five hindrances (*kāmacchando vyāpādo thīnamiddham uddhaccakukkuccam vicikicchā: ime vuccanti akusalā dhammā*). We also see the similar expression *viviktaṃ kāmāṃ viviktaṃ pāpakair akusalair dharmāṃ* at ArthVin 17, 3, which is glossed at ArthVinNib 179-180. Here ‘separation’ (*viveka*) is explained as ‘the cessation of the five hindrances’ (*pañcanīvaraṇavyupaśamaḥ*) (ArthVinNib 170, 2). More on the first absorption will be said below.

¹⁰³ On the contemplation conducive to cheering up (*prasadanīyo manaskāraḥ*), see ŚrBh-Gr (18) 10, 17-12, 1. The danger of depression and sluggishness during meditation and the subsequent need to cheer up or encourage the practitioner is a topic known from other sources, too. Buddhaghosa, for example, gives details about how the meditator gladdens his mind (*cittaṃ sampahamseti*) when it becomes dull (*nirassādam cittaṃ hoti*) (Vism 109, § 63).

¹⁰⁴ See also the description of the contemplation comprising delight on the supramundane path (ŚrBh Sh 506, 8-10). Cf. also the phrase *samvejanīyeṣu dharmeṣu samvegaḥ* at ŚrBh-Gr (18) 14, 3-4.

The semantic sphere of *sam-√vij* and its cognates is much broader. The basic sense of the verb is that of ‘to tremble or start with fear’ (MW, s.v.). The noun *samvega* means ‘violent

agitation, excitement, flurry' (ibid.). In his article on *saṃvega*, Coomaraswamy (1977, 182) sums up the meanings of the term as 'a state of shock, agitation, fear, awe, wonder, or delight induced by some physically or mentally poignant experience'. Coomaraswamy is especially interested in the aesthetic connotations which the word has in certain contexts, but his examination of its usage in Pali sources is a very helpful overview of the entire semantic sphere of *saṃvega*. (I am indebted to Dr Hartmut Buescher who has kindly drawn my attention to this article.) In the ŚrBh, the semantic emphasis seems to be mainly on intense fear or dislike towards certain negative mental states.

¹⁰⁵ Skt. *ratisaṃgrāhako manaskāraḥ* could also be construed as the 'contemplation imparting delight'. The overall psychological function of the contemplation comprising [/imparting] delight is to offer a counterbalance to the 'gloomy mood', so to speak, probably generated by continuously loathing the sensual pleasures (which might develop into a depressive state?). It is easy to imagine that, though increasingly convinced of the utterly pernicious nature of *kāma*, the ascetic may become dispirited in the process. This creates the need for cheering him or her up by emphasising the delightful state (still *paritta* 'limited', though!) of the serene detachment, without, however, losing sight of the doctrinally paramount aim of giving up whatever pertains to the realm of sensual desires. More specifically, in terms of Buddhist psychological categories, the 'cheering up contemplation' helps removing *styāna* 'torpor' and *middha* 'drowsiness', while the 'loathing contemplation' eliminates *auddhatya* 'agitation', or, as rendered by Choi, 'euphoria' (2001, p. 130).

The necessity of both 'cheering up' and 'loathing' is quite obvious, but the latter aspect does not fit very well into the name of this spiritual exercise, i.e., 'contemplation comprising *delight*'. Actually, as remarked by Choi (2001, n. 454, pp. 129-130), this appears to be the reason for which the AbhSamBh and the *Xianyang lun* omitted *saṃvejanīyena manaskāreṇa saṃvejayati*. By doing this, they created, however, an imbalance since *auddhatya* is left 'up in the air' (Choi 2001, 130).

¹⁰⁶ Cf. the parallel passage in the AbhSamBh (Tatia ed. 80, 11-14; Griffiths 1983, 431): *tenādhimātrakleśaparakāraprahānāt tatpakṣadauṣṭhulyāpagamāc ca* [Tatia and Griffiths have *daṇḍa* here, but this should be deleted; note that the MS does not contain it either] *sa yogī tadurdhvam pra[hā]ṇārāmo bhavati prahāṇe 'anusāmsadarśī parittapravivekaprītisukhasāmsprṣṭaḥ kālena kālam prasadanīyena manaskāreṇa saṃprahaṛṣayati yāvad eva styāna-middhaudhatyopasaṃāya | ayam ratisaṃgrāhakaḥ |*

¹⁰⁷ Skt. *pariyavasthāna* is aptly rendered by Edgerton as '(state of) possession (by vice or depravity [...])' (BHSD, s.v.) (cf. the similar meaning of Pali *pariyuṭṭhāna* 'state of being possessed (or hindered) by', PED, s.v.). The word can also be rendered as '[state of] being enwrapped [/ensnared]', as actually suggested by its Tibetan and Chinese equivalents. Obviously, *pariyavasthāna* is a noun, but the wording of my English translation above has obliged me to render the word as a verb. For the syntactic structure of the sentence, see note 118 below.

¹⁰⁸ Literally, the sentence runs as follows: 'For one thus delighting in [...], the state of being possessed by defilements [...] does not occur [/fully manifest itself] (*samudācarati*), whether he wanders about or dwells [in some place]'.

¹⁰⁹ Skt. *kāmachanda*, rendered here as 'lust', can be interpreted as a *tatpuruṣa* or a *karmadhāraya* (cf. PD, s.v. *kāmacchanda*, which contains both 'desire that is appetite' and 'appetite for sensual pleasures'). Dhs-a 370, 16-18, suggests a *karmadhāraya* understanding: *kāmacchando ti kāmasaṅkhāto chando na kattukamyatācchando na dhammachando* '*kāmacchanda* is desire [/wish] in the sense of sensual pleasures, not desire [/willingness] to do something, not [wholesome] desire [/aspiration for] Dhamma'.

¹¹⁰ I understand Skt. *kāmeṣu* as 'objects of sensual pleasures', being almost synonymous here with *kāmaguṇa* which in Pali and Buddhist Sanskrit often has the sense of 'the objects of the

five senses' (BHSD, s.v.; cf. also PD, s.v.; PTS Concordance, vol. 2, p. 39; etc). A similar phrase occurs at D II 51, 18-19: *kāmesu kāmmacchandam virājetvā* 'having cast aside the lust for [the objects of] the sensual pleasures'.

¹¹¹ The exact interpretation of the sentence is not easy, being largely determined by how we regard the negation 未 transmitted by the Ch. translation. Together with Choi, I conjecture that the extant Skt. and Tib. are corrupt and, accordingly, adopt the Ch. 未 = *na* as the most natural way of reading the sentence. The problem is discussed by Choi (2001) in a detailed and brilliantly argued note to his edition and translation of the *Xianyang lun* (n. 469, pp. 131-132). In what follows, I shall first summarise his main points and then make a few additional remarks.

Choi shows that the Skt. *saṃskārābhiniḡrhitam me cittam vārivad* echoes the well-attested Pali phrase *sasaṅkhāraniggayhavāritavato* and *vārivad dhṛtam* may be somehow connected with (*sabba*)*vāriḡdhuto*. The Skt. and Tib. versions of the ŚrBh as well as the corresponding passage in the *Xianyang lun* contain no negation of *dharmatābhiniḡrhitā* but, apart from 未 in the Ch. translation of the ŚrBh, a similar passage in the SamBh reads: *na dharmatābhiniḡrhitāḥ*. (For the latter, see also Delhey ed., 166 and 247, with respective notes).

I surmise that *vārivad* represents a wrong Sanskritisation (probably coming from a misunderstanding) of *vāritavata* (or *vārivad dhṛtam* < *vāriḡdhuta*?). *Vāri* in the Pali phrase *vāritavata* has nothing to do with 'water'. The commentarial tradition as well as modern scholarship understands the compound as 'having the habit (*vata*) of restraint (*vārita*)'. This is how Buddhaghosa glosses upon the compound in all its occurrences (DN-a III 1060 *ad* DN III 279; SN-a I 80 *ad* SN I 28; AN-a II 363 *ad* AN I 254; AN-a III 231-232 *ad* AN III 24; AN IV 199 *ad* AN IV 428), and no allusion is made to 'water'. Actually, as pointed out by Norman (1992, 167-169), even *vāri* in *vāriḡdhuta* appears to mean 'restraint', not 'water' (though the latter is the only registered meaning in Pali lexicography, see *Abhidhānappadīpikā*, s.v. p. 94 (rendered into Skt. as *vāri* and into Hindi as *jal* 'water'); PED, s.v.; Mizuno 1989, s.v.; and Kumoi 1997, s.v.).

The Pali phrase *sasaṅkhāraniggayha vāritavata* (for which the MS tradition witnesses many *variae lectiones*) is usually negated (*na* °), and in this negative form, it describes a high meditative attainment in which the ascetic (or, at SN I 28, Gotama Buddha himself) requires no conscious effort to maintain his contemplation (*samādhi*) but has reached the a habitual state of spontaneous restraint. It can be translated as 'not being controlled (*niggayha*) by conscious effort (*sasaṅkhāra*) [but] having the habit of [spontaneous] restraint', which is also how Buddhaghosa explains the compound. (For this meaning of *sasaṅkhāra*, see also Dhs 146 as well as Dhs tr. p. 34 and n. 1.) The meaning is similarly explained at SamBh, 166, 14-15: *praṇiḡdhānasahagatayā cetanayā bahirdhā cittam niḡrhya tasmin samādhou samavadadhāti* 'Having held back his mind from outside [objects] by volition accompanied by exertion, [the ascetic] keeps [his mind] concentrated in this meditation.'

It seems that at a later date (probably in the process of recasting the Canon into various vernaculars, Buddhist Sanskrit or classical Sanskrit), though the general meaning of the phrase was understood, *vāri* was construed as 'water' and, in order to explain its presence, a simile was devised (or borrowed from other sources?): 'as water' (*vārivad*) is contained by a dam, so is mind controlled by a conscious effort. The image of the dam containing the flow of water is a frequent simile in Buddhist literature. It usually stands for the moral precepts or spiritual cultivation which help the mendicant control his or her mind. Here are some occurrences of the simile in the Chinese Canon ('dam' is usually rendered as 堤 or 堤塘): T1.921b15; T4.158c18; T4.159a8; T12.400c19 and 22; T12.641b11 and 14; T12.1111c29; T23.565a3; T24.946b24 and c28; T27.541b21 and c4; T31.5c4; T32.395c25, 396c3; T34.499b15; T37.442b4-5; etc. (the underlined occurrences are the most relevant).

It seems to me almost certain that *vārivad* in our passage in the ŚrBh presupposes a similar image. As for water itself, out of its rich metaphorical imagery in the Canon, we may note here one simile which occurs in Ji's 基 Commentary on the YoBh: 六處如泉, 煩惱如水。 (T43.101a23-24 *ad Śarīrārthagāthā* T30.575b-c) 'The six sense-fields are like a spring, defilements are like water'. It is true that here defilements in general are compared to water, but our ŚrBh passage here may be said to represent a particular case of a more general image: the mind still attached to sensual pleasures is like water which is restrained by spiritual cultivation acting as a dam. The phrase *vārivad dhr̥ta* is also found at SamBh 166, 11 and 17. Here the image is explained: *yathā bahirdhā prasaram̐ na dadāti, evaṃ vārivad dhr̥to bhavati* (166, 16-17) 'It is contained like water in such a way that one does not give it [a chance] to flow out'.

It cannot be completely ruled out that things happened in the reverse historical order: the oldest textual layer made use of the water simile (which survived in the ŚrBh!) and this was later misunderstood by the compilers of the extant Pali *suttas* as well as their subsequent commentators who wrongly emended **vārivad* into *vāritavata*. I believe, however, that the former hypothesis set forth above is more plausible.

As for *na dharmatābhinighr̥taḥ*, it can be interpreted in two ways (which actually do not exclude each other). One is to construe it as 'restrained through [the full realisation of] the nature [of sensual pleasures]'. I have not been able to find parallels to our passage in early scriptural texts, but as already mentioned, the phrase is found at SamBh 166, 17-167, 2, which suggests such an interpretation: *katham̐ dharmatābhinighr̥to bhavati? adhasād audārika-dharmatā dṛṣṭā bhavaty upāriṣṭāc chāntadharmatā. sāntaḥ praṇītaḥ pratiprasabdho labdhamārgas̐* [to be emended to: *pratiprasabdhalabdhamārgaḥ?*—see SamBh, p. 167, n. 548] *cetaso ekotībhāvādhighato yathāryaḥ pañcajñānikaḥ samādhiḥ*. 'How does [the ascetic] become restrained by nature? The coarse nature below is [fully] realised, [and so is] the serene nature above. [This concentration] is serene, excellent, has attained the path of calm [and] has reached the singleness of mind, like the noble concentration equipped with five cognitions.' (On the path of calm, see *pratiprasabdhalabdhamārga* at SamBh 152, 2, as well as Ch. translation here: 得安隱道 (T30.342a20); on the noble concentration equipped with five cognitions, see SamBh 151, 9-152, 7).

The second alternative of construing *na dharmatābhinighr̥taḥ* is to see here the postulation of a state in which spontaneous restraint ('by nature') becomes possible. The ŚrBh actually distinguishes between 'contemplation whose flow [requires] force [or: flowing [only] by force]' (*balavāhano manaskāraḥ*) (ŚrBh-Gr (18), 8) and 'contemplation whose flow [does] not [require] effort [lit., bending] [or: flowing without effort/spontaneously]' (*anābhogavāhano manaskāraḥ*) (ŚrBh-Gr (18), 10) (Cf. also Bhikkhu Bodhi S. Mawatha's interpretation presented in Choi 2001, p. 132, n. 469). Without any further textual testimony, nothing precise can be said about how this state of 'nature' or 'naturalness' (*dharmatā*) was understood by the authors of our text, but I am rather sceptical about seeing here profound metaphysical senses in a full-fledged Mahāyāna vein. As far as I can see, *dharmatā* in the ŚrBh (see also 3.28.2.1.2.7. above) appears to mean 'nature of things', 'the way things are', 'reality of phenomena or mental factors', etc. In this sense, it has canonical precedents; for example, *dhammatā* occurring at DN II 12, ff., appears to mean, as also remarked by T. W. Rhys Davids (DN tr. II p. 8, n. 3), 'nature' or 'order of things'. Cf. also Buddhaghosa who glosses upon this occurrence as *ayaṃ sabhāvo ayaṃ niyamo ti vuttam̐ hoti* (DN-a II 432, 2).

^{1 1 2} Cf. the parallel passage in the AbhSamBh (Tatia ed. 80, 14-17; Griffiths 1983, 431): *tasyaivaṃ samyakprayuktasya kuśalapakṣaprayogopastabdhatvāt kāmāvacarakleśa-paryevasthānāsamudācāre sati tatprahīṇāprahīṇātāvagamārtham̐ tadutpattyanukūlasubhanimittamanaskāreṇa pratyavekṣaṇam̐ mīmāṃsāmanaskāraḥ |*.

¹¹³ At ŚrBh-Gr (18) 12, 2-4, we read that the role of the examining contemplation (*pratyaवेक्षाṇīyo manaskāraḥ*), actually equated with the investigating contemplation (*mīmāṃsāmanaskāra*), is to examine the defilements abandoned and not yet abandoned (*prahīṇāprahīṇatām kleśānām pratyaवेक्षate*). One would expect this parallel phrase to occur in the *mīmāṃsāmanaskāra* passage above (which is actually the case in the description of the investigating contemplation on the supramundane path, ŚrBh Sh 506, 6-7), but I do not think that this raises special problems. After all, in spite of the specific labels and peculiarities of these contemplations, we have to deal with a continuous meditative process, and certain patterns, like the examination of the defilements which have been abandoned and those which have not been abandoned yet, are bound to be seen at different moments and levels along the path.

¹¹⁴ I construe Skt. *samudghāta* as ‘complete eradication’, the nuance of completeness being reinforced by *sam-*. For *samudghāta*, see BHSD, s.v. *samudghāta* as well as *samudghāṭa*. Cf. also Pali *samugghāta*. Let us also note that I render *na* [...] *bhavati* in a rather free manner as ‘does not amount’.

¹¹⁵ The idea that a certain preliminary practice is necessary in order to attain an upper meditative level is, most probably, very old (e.g., the elimination of the sensual pleasures and five hindrances before reaching the first *dhyāna/jhāna*—see above). The codification of the preliminary stage as a preparatory path or path of preparatory training (*prayogamārga*) appears, however, to be an Abhidharmic development. In the *Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣabhāṣya*, we are told: 彼爲離初靜慮染，依初靜慮，起加行道。(T27.83b14) ‘In order to depart from the defilement of the first absorption, he generates the preparatory path [for the second absorption] relying upon the first absorption’. The text apparently refers here to ordinary persons 諸異生 (**prthagjana*) who have attained detachment from sensual pleasures 離欲染 (**kāmebhyo viraktāḥ*) (see (T27.83b13).

¹¹⁶ The word *niṣṭhā* for the ‘culmination’ of spiritual practice is also seen in the Hindu tradition. *Niṣṭhā jñānasya* or the ‘culmination of wisdom’ appears in the *Bhagavadgītā*, Chapter X VIII, stanza 50. On its basis, Śāṅkara coined one of the key-terms of his philosophy: *jñānaniṣṭhā*, which denotes the culmination of *jñānayoga* (see Bader 1990, 62-64). ‘By way of the culmination of wisdom’, says Śāṅkara, ‘he [i.e., the ascetic] attains Brahman, the Supreme Self’ (*jñānaniṣṭhārūpeṇa Brahmaṣaramātmānam āpnoti*) (*Śāṅkarabhāṣya* 279, 19-20). In his gloss on the word, Śāṅkara defines it as: *niṣṭhā paryavasānam parisamāptir ity etat* (*Śāṅkarabhāṣya* 279, 23-24) ‘**culmination** means ‘end’ [or] ‘completion’. (Interesting to note that our passage in the ŚrBh also uses the term *paryavasāna* in *dhyānaprayogamārga-paryavasānagataḥ*.) And ‘wisdom’ is identified with wisdom of Brahman (*brahmajñāna*) (*Śāṅkarabhāṣya* 279, 24). (See also Śāṅkara’s commentary *ad Bhagavadgītā*, Chapter X VIII, stanza 55.) In the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣadbhāṣya* (1.2.12.), Śāṅkara also uses the expression *brahmaniṣṭha* as a *bahuvrīhi* compound for someone who is ‘grounded on [or: has attained completion/perfection in] the absolute non-dual Brahman (*kevale dvaye brahmaṇi niṣṭhā*), where *niṣṭhā* is probably employed in both senses hinted at above or ‘absorbed in’, as construed by Bader (1990, p. 62, n. 42).

¹¹⁷ Cf. the parallel passage in the *AbhSamBh* (Tatia ed. 80, 17-19; Griffiths 1983, 433): *tasyaivam mīmāṃsāpratipakṣam bhāvayataḥ tāvatkālīkayogena sarvakāmāvacarakleśāvisaṃyogāya prathamadhyanaprayogaparyavasānagataḥ pratipakṣamanaskāraḥ prayoganiṣṭhaḥ |*

¹¹⁸ Skt. <*maulam*> *prathamam dhyānam* ‘first absorption proper’ or ‘main first absorption’. Other renderings include: *eigentlichen ersten Vertiefung* (Choi 85); ‘first root-meditation’ (Griffiths 1983, 432), etc. See also de la Vallée Poussin’s translation of *mauladhyaṇa* as *recueillement fondamental* (Poussin vol. 5, p. 144) or *recueillement principal* (Poussin vol. 5, p.

178). As the analysis of the meditative techniques and the psychological states accompanying them (or what we would call today the ‘altered states of consciousness’) became increasingly refined in Buddhist scholastics, a distinction was made between the ‘absorption proper’ or ‘[immaterial] attainment proper’ and the stage preceding it. In the AKBh, we find various references to the concept of ‘absorption proper’ (*mauladhyāna*) and its various aspects, such as ‘concentration pertaining to the absorption proper’ (*maulo dhyānasamādhiḥ*), ‘the triad of immaterial absorptions proper’ (*maulārūpyatraya*), etc. For example, AK stanza VIII.5a-b says: ***iti maulam samāpattidravayam aṣṭavidham*** ‘thus the attainment-entity proper is eightfold’. This is glossed upon as: *ity etāny aṣṭau maulāni samāpattidravayāni yaduta catvāri dhyānāni catvāra ārūpyā iti* (AKBh 436, 12-13) ‘these are the eight attainment-entities proper, to wit, the four absorptions [and] the four immaterial [attainments]’. Later in the same chapter, *kārikā* VIII.22a explains: ***aṣṭau sāmantakāny eṣāṃ*** ‘of these, eight are the liminal [attainments]’. The Commentary further elucidates: *ekaikasyaiekaikam yena tatpraveṣaḥ* (AKBh 447, 17-18) ‘each [of the main attainments] has [a liminal attainment] by which [one] enters it [i.e., the main attainment]’. The first liminal attainment, marking the passage from the plane of sensual pleasures to the serenity of the absorptions, is known as *anāgamyā* ‘not [yet] arrived’ (*ādyam sāmantakam anāgamyam* AKBh 448, 4), which points at its importance for both the ascetic and scholastic. (See also Poussin vol. 5, pp. 179-181, and the illuminating notes on the *anāgamyā* and *dhyānāntara*.) It is actually no coincidence that the ŚrBh deals at such length with the attainment of the first absorption, a process which actually corresponds to the *anāgamyā*.

As far as I know, Theravāda tradition has no particular term to denote the main absorptions, but its Abhidhamma also acknowledges that between *jhānas* there are intermediary states which prepare the passage to the higher attainments. At Kv 565-569, the Theravādins argue (against the Mahimsāsakas and certain Andhakas—see Kv-a 174-175) that when the ascetic passes (*saṅkamati*) from the first absorption to the second one, certain psychological operations, like taking heed (*āvajjānā*) of the coarse nature of the first *jhāna* compared to the second one, wishing (*paṇidhi*) to attain the superior plane of the second *jhāna*, etc. are necessary (Kv 566). The implication is that this mental process cannot be identical either with the first or with the second absorption. The argumentation is more developed, but here it will suffice to cite the conclusion of the Commentary: *vivicc’eva kāmehi ti-ādīhi paṭipāṭiyā jhānānam desitabhāvaṃ dipeti, na anantaruppattiṃ* (Kv-a 175, 16-17) [the scriptural quotation adduced by the opponents] “indeed aloof from sensual pleasures”, etc. casts light on the fact that verily the absorptions have been taught in succession, not that they come forth without an interval’. The Vism analysis concentration into two categories: ‘approach concentration’ (*upacārasamādhi*) and ‘absorption concentration’ or ‘concentration of complete focusing’ (*appanāsamādhi*) (see note 120 below), which also hints at the fact that a preliminary step is recognised as necessary for the attainment of the main meditative state.

¹¹⁹ In the parallel passage at *Xianyang lun*, this is made explicit: ‘having the previous [contemplation] as cause and condition’ 由前因緣故 (T31.515b8-9; Choi 85). The word ‘previous’ 前 may, however, be, as pointed out by Choi, an *explizierender Zusatz des Übersetzers* (p. 133, n. 484).

¹²⁰ The set of seven contemplations are peculiar to the ŚrBh, but on the whole, the psychological process underlying them is delineated in other sources as well.

The Vism (101, § 27) begins its exposition on the way of entering and dwelling in absorptions by stressing the need to see the dangers which lie in sensual pleasures and to aspire at becoming aloof from them as well as to eliminate the five hindrances (see note 102 above). If the ascetic attains the first *jhāna* failing to achieve these requirements, Buddhaghosa adds somewhere else, ‘quite soon, he comes out from the absorption, just like a bee which has entered a soiled hive,

just like a king who has entered an impure park' (*so avisodhitam āsayam paviṭṭhabhamaro viya, avisuddham uyyānam paviṭṭharājā viya, khippam eva nikkhameti*; Vism 122, § 124). Buddhaghosa also distinguishes between two types or levels of concentration: 'approach concentration' (*upacārasamādhi*) and 'absorption concentration' or 'concentration of complete focusing' (*appanāsamādhi*) (Vism 102, §§ 32-33). (For one of the oldest textual evidences as to how *appanā* was understood, see Dhs 10, § 7, which is commented upon at Dhs-a 142 as *ekaggam cittam ārammaṇe appenti ti appanā*; cf. also CPD, s.v.). According to the Vism, the difference between the two types of concentration is the intensity of the constituent factors (*aṅga*) of the absorption. In the approach concentration, they are still weak like an infant (*daharo kumārako*) lifted up and stood on its feet but repeatedly falling back on the ground. In contrast, the absorption concentration has strong factors and, once generated, it can continue for one day and one night. It is compared to a strong man (*balavā puriso*) who, 'after rising from his seat, can stand for a whole day'. The same passage, distinguishes between two levels (*bhūmi*) on which the mind becomes concentrated: the level of approach (*upacārabhūmi*), on which the [five] hindrances (*nīvaraṇa*) are abandoned, and the level of attainment (*paṭilābhabhūmi*) (corresponding to the *appanāsamādhi*), when the *jhāna* constituent factors (*aṅga*) manifest themselves.

¹²¹ Cf. the parallel passage in the AbhSamBh (Tatia ed. 80, 19-20; Griffiths 1983, 433): *tadanantaram maularprthamadyānasahagataḥ prayoganiṣṭhāphala iti* |.

¹²² Skt. *pratiprīṇayati*. Tib. suggests *pariprīṇayati* (see note 187 to Tib. ed.). The verb *pariprīṇayati* appears to be directly borrowed from the extended canonical formula describing the first absorption (see note 126 below).

¹²³ There is a discrepancy between Skt. *pratanukasamṃmukhībhāva*^o and Ch. 微薄現前, on one hand, and Tib. *bde ba'i dngos po chung ngu*^o (which suggests **pratanukasukhībhāva*^o), on the other. Similarly, we have below Skt. *ghanavipulatarasamṃmukhībhāvena* 'in such a way that they profusely [lit., densely] and amply manifest themselves' and Ch. 深重現前, on one hand, and Tib. *bde ba'i dngos po shin tu mang po dang | shin tu rgya chen po'i tshul gyis* (= **ghanavipulatarasukhībhāvayogena*), on the other. I have chosen the Skt. and Ch. reading as the preferable one, but the decision is not so easy. The core of the problem is the lexical suitability of *samṃmukhībhāva*. Skt. *sammukhī-√bhū* means 'be [come to/assume a position] face to face/opposite', quite often used in a concrete sense. In the Pali Canon, we find a variety of occurrences in which *sammukhībhūta* means 'face to face, in the presence of'. At DN II 155, 10-11, *sammukhībhūto no satthā ahoṣi* means 'our Teacher was face to face [with us]'; at DN II 155, 11-12: *na mayam sakkhimha Bhagavantam sammukhā paṭipucchitun* 'we could not ask the Exalted One [when we were] face to face [with him]'; etc. The phrase *satthā sammukhībhūta* is actually a frequent occurrence in the Pali Canon, referring to being in the presence of Gotama Buddha. Later in Mahāyāna literature, in keeping with the diversification of the doctrines and religious experiences, 'face to face' (*sammukha*) came to include being in the presence or having a direct perception (often in a contemplative state of *samādhi*) of a Buddha and Bodhisattva, (see, for instance, the title of the *Pratyutpannabuddhasamṃmukhāvasthitasamādhisūtra*). The compound continues, however, to maintain its concrete meaning. E.g., Aṣṭa 259: *Maitreyo bodhisattvo mahāsatthaḥ sammukhībhūtaḥ* (cf. AbhisamĀl 734). The implication of *sammukha* in mystical experiences is one of unequivocal concreteness: the reality of being 'face to face' with a Buddha in *samādhi* is as concrete as being in his actual presence. (The word 'reality' should be understood in a relative way: in Mahāyāna, especially in Prajñāpāramitā literature, all so-called 'realities' are doubtless empty, as the same *Pratyutpannabuddhasamṃmukhāvasthitasamādhisūtra* clearly points out; see Harrison tr. 1990, 42-44).

The word *sammukha* also has more abstract meanings, such as 'intent upon' (MW, s.v.) or

bedacht auf (PW, vol. 7, p. 764, s.v.; see illustrations, too: *śubhakarmaṇi*, etc.). In Buddhist literature, we also find examples in which ‘being face to face’ is used in connection with mental states. At Kv 482, 7ff. we find *sammukhībhūto saññojanam jahati*, which is translated by Shwe Zan Aung and Mrs. Rhys Davids as ‘a Fetter is cast off by one who is in thrall to’ (Kv tr. 277). Kv-a 144 glosses in the following way: *tattha sammukhībhūto ti saṃyojanānam sammukhībhāvaṃ, tehi samaṅgībhāvaṃ upagato* ‘here **being in thrall to** refers to one having reached the state [in which] the fetters have [actually] become present, the state [in which he] is [actually] possessed of them’ (cf. also preceding passage, similarly worded, which is entitled *nivuto nīvaraṇam jahatīti*, Kv 480-482). Another relevant example is found at BoBh Wogihara ed. 193, 12-14 = Dutt ed. 133, 8-9; Patna MS folio 132b3: *eṣāṃ lokadharmāṇāṃ samastavyastānām āpatanāt* [I follow the Patna MS and Dutt; Wogihara reads *āpatām*] *sammukhībhāvād yad duḥkham utpadyate tal lokadharmādhiṣṭhānam ity ucyate*. (cf. Ch. 如是世法, 若總若別, 會遇現前, 能生衆苦, 此即名爲世法處苦。T30.524a20-21). Here, *sammukhībhāva* and *āpatana* (‘coming, happening, occurrence’) seem to be used as quasi-synonyms (cf. also Tibetan translation at P Zhi 115b1: ‘ong zhing mngon du gyur pa). (The occurrence of worldly factors refers here to suffering-engendering factors such as ‘extinction’ (*kṣaya*), ‘old age’ (*jarā*), etc.). Finally, let us see the following occurrence of *sammukhībhāva* in the AKBh, which is found in the lengthy discussion of the controversy over the existence or non-existence of pleasant feelings (*sukhā vedanā*). To an opponent who holds that pleasure is the mere absence of painful feeling (*duḥkhā vedanā*), Vasubandhu replies that this is absurd because one would feel pleasure (as a sort of continuously underlying feeling) when pain has ended or has not yet occurred. Furthermore, he continues, *evam kāmasukhasammukhībhāve ‘pi vaktavyam* (AKBh 332,8) ‘the same should be declared in the case of experiencing pleasure [occasioned] by sensual pleasures [/pleasant objects—see below]’. That is, the same holds in the case when pleasure does not occur, because the underlying feeling of pleasure should be perceived. Xuanzang translates: 受欲樂時, 徵問亦爾。 (T29.115c6) ‘when pleasure [occasioned] by sensual pleasures is perceived, the clarification of the question is the same’ (KIK, *Bidon-bu*, vol. 22, part 2, p. 208 has 徵聞 but the editors of T as well as Saheki ed. (vol. 3, p. 932) read 徵問, indicating no *var. lec.*; the KIK reading is probably a typographical error). Xuanzang’s rendering is rather free, but it shows that he construed *sammukhībhāva* in the sense of ‘being actually experienced’, which here means ‘to feel’ or ‘to perceive’ (受). Paramārtha’s translation is closer to the original: 欲塵樂現前時, 應說如此。 (T29.268a12-13) ‘when the objects of sensual pleasures (**kāmaguṇa*?) become manifested, the same should be declared’ (on the meaning of *kāmasukha* as well as Paramārtha’s rendering, see Sakurabe and Odani tr. 1999, pp. 46-47, n. 2). Yaśomitra comments: *evam kāmasukhasammukhībhāve ‘pi vaktavyam iti . yathā gandharasaspraṣṭavyaviśeṣajam sukham uktam, evam kāmasukhasammukhībhāve ‘pi vaktavyam*. (AKVy 520, 29-31) “**the same should be declared in the case of experiencing pleasure [occasioned] by [the objects of] sensual pleasures**” means that as the pleasure generated by [such] excellences [as] odours, flavours, and tangible objects is declared, “the same should be declared in the case of experiencing pleasure [occasioned] by sensual pleasures”. *Sammukhībhāva* retains a strong dose of concreteness (‘confronting/being in the presence of’), but the basic sense here is that of ‘becoming actually manifest [/present]’ or ‘being actually experienced’.

In spite of all these, the Tib. reading cannot be discarded outright. A reading like **sukhībhāva*^o also makes sense. Maybe one would like to see in our case **prītisukhībhāva*, but even without *prīti*, the compound may be acceptable. The pleasure (*sukha*) associated with meditative states is common in Buddhist sources (e.g., Lañk 65, 6: *samādhisukhavihāraṃ*; *ibid.* 136, 7: *samādhisukhasamāpattimanomayo*, which, interestingly, reads in a Nepalese MS, called

by the editor manuscript T, *samādhimukha*!).

I think, however, that the original reading in our ŚrBh passage is more likely to have been *sammukhībhāva*. At some stage, probably a careless or tired scribe skipped over *sam* and wrote the easier and frequently occurring *su kha*. This may have been facilitated by the fact that in many varieties of Northern Indian scripts, *su* and *mu* are similar or often virtually identical *akṣaras*. To be sure, one cannot rule out completely that **sukhībhāva*^o may have been the original reading and this became later corrupted into *sammukhībhāva*. However, such a process would seem to me more intricate and less likely. This, the extant Skt. MS reading, the fact that the Ch. translation supports this lection, and the usage of *sammukhībhāva* in connection with mental states—all these have made me decide in favour of the *difficilior lectio: sammukhībhāva*.

^{1 2 4} Skt. *spharati*. The verb appears to be borrowed from the extended canonical formula describing the first absorption, where, however, its usual form is *parispharati* (see note 126 below).

^{1 2 5} Skt. *nāsti kiñcid asphuṭam bhavati spharaṇīyam* seems to be based upon the extended canonical formula describing the first absorption (see note 126 below). Philologically, it poses here several problems. The first one is whether we should read *spharaṇīyam* with the MS or should emend to *aspharaṇīyam*. What appears to be the earliest canonical parallel of the phrase does not give any direct clue concerning this. In Pali, it reads: *nāssa kiñci sabbāvato kāyassa vivekajena pītisukhena apphuṭam hoti* (DN I 73, 27-8; id. 173, 4-5; MN I 276, 21-24 and 30-31; etc.). The surviving Sanskrit parallels of the canonical texteme are more developed and appear to indicate two distinct lineages. The first one reads *aspharaṇīyam* and is met with in such works as the SaṅghBh II: *nāsyā kiñcid sarvataḥ kāyād asphuṭam bhavaty aspharaṇīyam yaduta vivekajena pītisukhena* (SaṅghBh II 243, 6-7 (MS reads: *nāstyā*); in citation above, I follow Gnoli's emended text—but see below; see also the largely similar phrase at *ibid.* 243, 15-17; 244, 1-2; etc. Similar phrases also occur at: *ibid.* 242, 26-243, 1 (MS reads: *nāsty asya*); 244, 4-5; 244, 13-14; 244, 19-21; 245, 1-2; and 245, 5-7, but they are partially or entirely reconstructed; the Tib. rendering of the occurrence at 242, 26 = *bKa' 'gyur*; Peking ed., Ce 254a5ff., also suggests *aspharaṇīya*). ArthVin 26, 2-3, also reads: *tasya nāsti sarvataḥ kāyād asphuṭam bhavaty aspharaṇīyam* [Samtani has: *asphuraṇīyam*—genuine MS reading?; decipherment mistake?; typographical error?] *yaduta adhyātmaṃ vivekajena pītisukhena*. Semantically, reading *aspharaṇīyam* is also possible: there is no part of the body 'which would be unsuffused [or rather: unsuffusable]' (there is no commentary at ArthVinNib, 204; cf. also ArthVin 25, 10-11).

On the other hand, we have another lineage reading *spharaṇīyam*, which also makes sense (see the rendering of the ŚrBh passage here in the main text above). It is attested at, for instance, SaṅghBh III.35(1a), (2a), (3a) (cited in SWFT, fascicle 3, p. 208, s.v. *asphuṭa*): *nāsty eṣāṃ kiñcid sarvataḥ kāyād asphuṭam bhavati spharaṇīyam yaduta vivekajena pītisukhena* (and similarly below: *samādhijena pr^o* and *niṣpītikena sukhena*). At SamBh 152, 13, we also read: *nāsyā kiñcid aparisphuṭam bhavati spharaṇīyam* (with the MS reading: *nāstyā*—see p. 236, n. 257 of diplomatic edition) (see also Tib. equivalent of this passage at *ibid.*, 321, 8-9: *des ci yang khyab par ma gyur pa'am / khyab par bya ba med do*, as well as Ch. rendering at T30.339b19: 此身中無有少分而不充滿).

The Tibetan rendering of our ŚrBh passage here reads: *khyab par bya ba cung zad kyang med do*, which also seems to presuppose something like: **nāsti kiñcid asphuṭam spharaṇīyam*. Ch. 無有間隙 is not very conclusive: 'there are no interstices and fissures [which should be still suffused/which remains unsuffused?]. It seems that the tradition hesitated between *spharaṇīyam* and *aspharaṇīyam* (even in the same text: see above SaṅghBh II and III respectively). Since both make sense, it is preferable to respect the MS readings in each

individual case, especially when they are supported by other collateral witnesses like the Tib. and Ch.—the former certainly corroborating our ŚrBh MS.

Another detail is whether *asti* (in *nasty*) should be not emended to *asya* (or *tasya*) as seen in a few examples above. This, however, is not necessary here. Our ŚrBh original already contains a genitive: *varṭamānasya*, which would make the presence of (*t*)*asya* superfluous. Let us also notice that Tib. contains no equivalent of (*t*)*asya* here. Besides, some of the examples above seem to hesitate between *asti* and (*t*)*asya* or contain both (which is unproblematic if there is no other noun in genitive). And as shown by some other instances above, the sentence can also be construed with (*t*)*asya* (cf. also SWTF, fascicle 3, p. 208, s.v. *asphuṭa*, citing SHT (III) 990 V 5: *nāsti kiñcid asphu(ṭam) //*).

Finally, let us note that the presence of the verb \sqrt{as} before another finite verb (here: *asti* [...] *bhavati*) is not unknown in Sanskrit. It seems to be used to introduce the finite verb (see SWTF, fascicle 3, p. 192, s.v. *as* b; CPD, vol. 1, p. 111, s.v. *atthi*; cf. also ŚrBh Sh 497, 9-10: *aham asmī* [...] *saṃsariṣyāmi*), probably with an emphatic stylistic effect.

^{1 2 6} In some of the variants of the stock-phrase depicting the four absorptions, we find more detailed descriptions of the way joy and pleasure are experienced by the meditator. *So imam eva kāyaṃ vivekajena pītisukhena abhisandeti, parisandeti, paripūreti, parippharati, nāssa kiñci sabbāvato kāyassa vivekajena pītisukhena apphutaṃ* (var. lec. *apphuṭaṃ*) *hoti* (DN I 73, 27-28; id. 173, 4-5; id. 214, 31-215, 2; MN I 276, 21-24 and 30-31; MN III 92, 36-93, 3; etc.) ‘He pervades, fills, permeates, suffuses his very body with joy and pleasure born of separation, there is no place on his entire body which is not suffused with joy and pleasure born of separation’ (cf. Buddhaghosa’s commentary at DN-a I 217, 19-26.). This is also found in Sanskrit sources. E.g., SaṅghBh II 242, 24-243, 1: <*sa imam eva kāyaṃ vivekajena pītisukhenā*>*bhīṣyandayati pariṣyandayati pariprīṇāti parispharati; nāsyā kimcit sarvataḥ kāyād asphuṭaṃ*<*m bhavaty aspharaṇīyaṃ yaduta vivekajena pītisukhena*> (the parts of the sentence between < > are reconstructed; similar phrases occur, however, in the SaṅghBh MS below and guarantee the validity of the reconstruction). ArthVin 25, 8-11, [...] *imam eva kāyamadhīyātmanī vivekajena samādhijena pītisukhenābhīṣyandati paripūrayati pariprīṇayati* [MS omits *pariprīṇayati* here but contains the verb in the next occurrence—see below] *parisphurati | tasya nāsti sarvataḥ kāyād asphuṭaṃ bhavaty aspharaṇīyaṃ* [Samtani has here and in the next occurrence: *asphuraṇīyaṃ*—genuine MS reading?; decipherment mistake?; typographical error?] *yaduta adhyātmaḥ vivekajena samādhijena pītisukhena* | (see also below ArthVin 26, 1-3; etc.). As already remarked in notes 122, 124, and 125 above, parts of the sentence are similar to the wording of our passage, which, on the whole, can be said to be a development and adaptation of this allo-texteme to the ŚrBh scheme of seven contemplations.

In his discussion of joy and pleasure in the first absorption, Buddhaghosa also makes use of some phrases and images similar to our passage. Echoing the definition of Dhs 10, § 9, Buddhaghosa describes joy as *piṇayati ti pīti* (Vism 115, § 94; Dhs-a 115, § 298) ‘it is called joy because it gladdens’ (or, as suggested by Ñānamoli in his translation of Vism, p. 141, ‘gladden’ can be also construed as ‘refresh’; according to PED, s.v., *piṇeti* means ‘to gladden’, ‘to cheer’, ‘to invigorate’, etc.). Buddhaghosa also qualifies *pītisukha* as *pharaṇarasā* ‘[having] the attribute of suffusion’ (ibid.) (cf. *spharati, asphuṭaṃ, spharaṇīyaṃ* in our passage). Furthermore, he speaks of five types (or rather stages) of joy, the last one being called ‘suffusing joy’ (*phāraṇā pīti*). This is defined as: *phāraṇāpītiyā pana uppannāya sakalasarīraṃ* [...] *anuparipphutaṃ hoti* ‘when, furthermore, the suffusing joy arises, the whole body [...] is completely suffused’ (Vism 117, § 98 and Dhs-a 117, § 300). The description resembles the psychological state described in our ŚrBh passage, in which the entire body is filled with joy and pleasure.

¹²⁷ The rest of the sentence is the classical stock-phrase describing the first absorption. In Pali, it runs as follows: *vivecc'eva kāmehi, vivecca akusalehi dhammehi, savitakkaṃ savicāraṃ vivekajaṃ pītisukhaṃ paṭhamam jhānam* [var. lec. *paṭhamajjhānam*] *upasampajja viharati* (DN I 37, 1-3; DN II 313, 12-14; MN I 21, 34-36; etc.). For a discussion of this and the following stock-phrases of the four absorptions, see Griffiths 1983, 71-81; for a more extensive list of occurrences in Pali and Chinese sources, see Lamotte 1944-1980, vol. 2, p. 1023, n. 3. As far as Pali commentarial literature is concerned, Vism is, as expected, the most detailed and systematic exposition of the topic and will be frequently cited below (cf. also *Samantapāsādikā* I 141-157). In referring to Buddhaghosa's glosses and views, I do not imply that there are direct historical links between the authors/editors of the ŚrBh and the Theravāda tradition. A certain common heritage did, however, exist and, more importantly, in dealing with the subtleties of meditation psychology, even explanations coming from other scholastic systems can be helpful (if carefully used!).

In Sanskrit, the description is: *viviktaṃ kāmair viviktaṃ pāpakair akuśalair dharmaiḥ savitarkaṃ savicāraṃ vivekajaṃ pītisukhaṃ prathamam dhyānam upasampadya viharati* (e.g., Pañca 167, 4-5; LalVis 100, 6-7, with *sma* at the end of the sentence; SaṅghBh II 242, 22-24; MVyut # 1478 (Sakaki spells: *kāmāir, pāpākāir* and *dharmāiḥ*); ArthVin 17, 3-4, commentary at ArthVinNib 179-181; etc.).

The canonical sources differ from our ŚrBh passage in only one detail: they lack the compound *pañcāṅgam* 'endowed] with five limbs' (see the end of the sentence). Stuart-Fox (1989, especially 83ff.), argues that the so-called five-limb or five-factor list, which includes rough examination (*vitakka*), subtle investigation (*vicāra*), joy (*pīti*), pleasure (*sukha*), and focussing [of the mind] (*ekaggatā*) (for uniformity's sake, I use my own renderings), is an Abhidhammic development differing from the earlier *sutta* enumerations which mention only the first four factors. The situation is, however, more complex, and we actually do find two *suttas* which speak of the five limbs of the first absorption (see Gunaratana 1985, 66-67). The *Mahāvedallasutta* clearly states that the number of factors of the *pathamajjhāna* is five and enumerates *cittakaggatā* as the last of them (MN I 294, 29-33). The *Anupadasutta* also mentions *cittakaggatā* after the first four 'standard' factors, but its list continues with other minor mental functions which are present in the first absorption. These amount to eleven factors and include contact (*phasso*), feeling (*vedanā*), etc. (MN III 25, 12-18). It is hard to determine whether the author(s)/editor(s) of the latter text considered the focusing of the mind as a major factor characterising the first *jhāna*. Gunaratana (1985, 67) believes this to be the case, but he does not elaborate upon his grounds. It is quite possible that the Sri Lankan author may have tacitly followed the traditional post-canonical view. (Gunaratana's study on *jhānas* in Pali sources is very useful and systematic, but more often than not, the author takes the Abhidhammic and commentarial (mostly, drawn from the *Visuddhimagga*) for granted. (There are very few exceptions to this stance—see, for example, p. 104). This is an approach which 'hard core' (and even moderate) historians doubtless find debatable.) One minor stylistic factor might, however, support Gunaratana's conclusion: *ca* is used after *vitakko, vicāro, pīti, sukho, cittakaggatā* but not after the other eleven mental functions (*phasso*, etc.) It is not, however, certain whether this can be taken as a clear indication of the *sutta*'s view in this respect. To be sure, its author(s) did intend to give a full description of all mental processes involved in the first absorption, including the major limbs as well as the minor and universal factors, but for some reason, he/they did not choose to distinguish clearly between them.

According to Akanuma (1929), there are two Chinese translations corresponding to the *Mahāvedallasutta*: the *Da Gouchiluo jing* 大拘絺羅經 (T1.790b-792b) and the *Gouchiluo* 拘絺羅 (T2.60b-c), the latter being a brief version included in the *Samyuktāgama*. (拘絺羅

*Koṭṭhila appears to be the Chinese transcription of the name of a mendicant known in Pali as Mahākoṭṭhika or Mahākoṭṭhita, and in Sanskrit as Mahākauṣṭhila). Neither of them contains, however, any reference to the first absorption and its constituent factors. *Anupadasutta*, on the other hand, apparently has no equivalent Chinese translation. When comparing the Pali *Nikāyas* with the Chinese *Āgamas*, one should keep in mind three principles concerning the differences between their versions: (1) the scholastic affiliations of the Chinese *Āgamas* is not Theravādin (the precise details of their doctrinal background are intricate and not yet completely resolved); (2) some Chinese translations may reflect a common text in an earlier form of development than the stage displayed by its Pali counterpart; and (3) the stylistic peculiarities and/or historical circumstances behind the masters who translated the scriptures into Chinese as well as the teams assisting them may sometimes have resulted in abridged renderings. Clearly distinguishing between these principles in practice is, however, far from easy (especially as far as (1) and (2) are regarded). Although I have no definitive proofs, I would conjecture that in our case, the *Da Gouchiluo jing* represents an older version and that the Pali version of the *Mahāvedallasutta* shows traces of later (Abhidharmic) additions and modifications.

The content of the *Da Gouchiluo jing* /*Mahāvedallasutta* itself appears to reflect a rather late historical stratum of the *Suttapiṭaka*. It includes discussions and definitions of disparate concepts and doctrines. This structure rather suggests a transitional period from early sermons to a more systematic, proto-Abhidharmic interest in classifications and definitions. The development of the sutra probably passed through several stages, and its very structure made it easy to add and interpolate new concepts. Of course, dating canonical materials is a hugely difficult process, but I would venture to surmise that the five-limbed first absorption is a late development introduced towards the final stages of the *Mahāvedallasutta* formation. This explains why neither of its Chinese counterparts contains any reference to the first absorption. As far as the *Anupadasutta* is concerned, it also shows an Abhidharmic approach. From the standpoint of spiritual cultivation, it is enough to know the *main* factors characterising the first *jhāna*. A list comprising *all* mental factors of a meditative state betrays theoretical interests rather than practical concerns. No matter if the *cittakagattā* was considered a major or minor factor, the very discussion concerning its status probably represents a fairly developed historical stage.

Stuart-Fox's hypothesis can thus be refined. Although the 'five-limb' definition occasionally appears in the *Sūtrapiṭaka*, it is very rare and seems to represent a late interpretation. It is difficult to ascertain with precision when this definition came into existence. It may have been put forward before the formation of the first Abhidharmic treatises. Or, equally possible, it may have been formulated after the compilation of (at least the early) Abhidharma texts and under their influence. (There are no a priori reasons to suppose that the *Sūtrapiṭaka* is in its *entirety* earlier than *all* Abhidharma treatises. Late fragments and interpolations seem to have been incorporated into the sutras at the time of or after the formation of the latter.) Anyway, it appears rather unlikely that the *cittakagattā* was conceived from the beginning as one of the main factors of the first absorption.

The somehow troubling presence of this fifth factor may have also been felt by Vasubandhu. AK VIII.7a-b and its commentary (AKBh 437, 16-19) list five members which characterise the first *dhyāna* and the last one is concentration (*samādhi*) or focusing of the mind (*cittaikāgratā*). Vasubandhu appears to be aware of the somehow peculiar status of the 'concentration' and points out that the *samādhi* is at the same time *dhyāna* itself and also a constituent element of it, while the other factors are only constituent elements. (The ArthVinNib (181, 1-3) also lists five factors, with concentration (*samādhi*) as the last.)

The authors of our passage in the ŚrBh do not mention *samādhi* or *cittaikāgratā* but seem to have in mind the Abhidharmic list which includes this 'limb'. This explains why they added

pañcāṅgam which lacks in the canonical formula. Other Books in the YoBh explicitly mention the names of all the five limbs (see, for example, SamBh 103, 1-2, and the Viniś exegesis of the SamBh at T30.649a29-b1). Although clearly presupposing a five-factor theory, the ŚrBh approach here is somehow different from commentarial works like the Vism (112, § 79) and the ArthVinNib (181). The latter texts first cite the canonical texteme as such, without making any editorial addition, and then in their discussions make clear that the first absorption has five factors. Similarly, Yaśomitra first cites the canonical *locus classicus* and then adds ‘[endowed] with five limbs’: *viviktaṃ kāmair viviktaṃ pāpakair akuśalair dharmaiḥ savitarkaṃ savicāraṃ vivekajaṃ prītisukhaṃ prathamam dhyānam upasāmpadya viharatīti sūtre pañcāṅgam uktam* (AKVy 140, 21-24). Actually, even the ŚrBh does not always add *pañcāṅgam* in its citations of canonical formula which describe the first absorption. E.g., ŚrBh-Gr 20, 23-24; ŚrBh-Gr (17) 8, 6-9: *viviktaṃ kāmair viviktaṃ pāpakair akuśalair dharmaiḥ savitarkaṃ savicāraṃ vivekajaṃ prītisukhaṃ prathamam dhyānam yāvac caturtham dhyānam upasāmpadya viharati*.

¹²⁸ My rendering of the two terms is based on their definition at passage 3.28.2.2.2. below. A similar definition is found at AKBh 60, 22: *cittaūdarikatā vitarkaḥ; cittasūkṣmatā vicāraḥ* ‘*vitarka* represents the coarseness of the mind; *vicāra* represents the subtleness of the mind’. Vasubandhu discusses in detail the two concepts and their functioning (AKBh pp. 60-61), and so does Yaśomitra (AKVy 138-140). The following simile cited by the latter thinker is relevant for the way Buddhist scholastics (at least Vasubandhu and his followers) construed the difference between the two mental functions: *tadyathā bahuṣu ghaṭeṣv avasthiteṣu “ko ‘tra dṛdhaḥ, ko jarjaraḥ “iti muṣṭinābhignato ya ūhaḥ sa vitarkaḥ, “iyanto jarjarā dṛdhā vā” iti yad ante grahaṇam sa vicāraḥ* (AKVy 140, 19-21). ‘*Vitarka* is like the examination of one striking with the clenched hand many jars placed [somewhere] [in order to find out] “which is hard?” [and] “which is fragile?”. *Vicāra* is the final understanding that “so many [of the jars] are fragile or [so many] are hard.’ (See also AKVy 64, 25-28, citing the *Pañcaskandhaka*.) All Abhidharmic sources, Southern and Northern, abound in similes depicting the differences between these two mental processes; for other examples, especially from the Theravādin Abhidhamma, see also Cousins, 1992. The understanding *vitarka* and *vicāra* as coarse and subtle mental activity (or, at least, the emphasis of this aspect) is mainly seen in Sarvāstivādin, Sautrāntika, and other Northern Schools of Abhidharma. E.g., *Jñānaprasthānaśāstra* T26.927b20; AMVibh T27.269b-270a (quoting a scriptural source which says, ‘the coarseness of the mind is named *vitarka*, and the subtleness of the mind is named *vicāra*’ 心麤性名尋。心細性名伺。(T27.269b11-12), then explaining its meaning, and discussing whether this is to be understood as applying to all the three spheres (*dhātu*) of existence or not); AbhHṛ T28.823b23-24; AbhĀv T28.982a24-27; TatSid T32.288b-c; AbhDīp 83, 1-2; AbhSam 10, 10-12; AbhSamBh 8, 26-9, 3 (= T31.669c24-670a2; see also T31.665b22-25); etc.

Though not essentially divergent from the above understanding, the traditional, or at least the early, Abhidharmic definition of *vitakka* and *vicāra* in Theravāda is on somehow different lines. Here the emphasis is rather on the initial application of the mental act of examination (*vitakka*) and the subsequent continuation of the investigation (*vicāra*), which supposedly results in a closer scrutiny into the object of meditation (see Dhs 10, § 7-8; Dhs-a 114-115, § 296; Vism 114, § 88; Mil 62-63; etc). This is also reflected in the modern rendering of the two terms like ‘applied thought’ and ‘sustained thought’ respectively (e.g., Nānamoli 1956) or “‘initial application’ of thought’ and “‘sustained’ thinking about it’ (Stuart-Fox 1989, 97). The Theravādin tradition does not, however, ignore the association of *vitakka* with coarseness and of *vicāra* with subtlety. According to Cousins (1992, 147), ‘this application of the distinction between gross and subtle does not appear before the *Vimuttimaggā* and is therefore probably of Sarvāstivādin origin. Noticeably, whereas the *Vimuttimaggā* probably gave it in the form of “grossness of mind, etc.”, Buddhaghosa refers simply to grossness, etc.’ (Cousins does not

specify the exact reference in Vim, but I assume it must be 羸心受持爲覺。細心受持爲觀 at T32.415c7.)

The whole issue of *vitakka/vitarka* and *vicāra* is very complex and a detailed account of the history and theory of these concepts is beyond the scope of this note. A very useful survey of their usages in the Pali Canon as well as their doctrinal understanding in Theravādin Abhidhamma and Northern Abhidharma in connection with classical Yoga is found in Cousins (1992). To Stuart-Fox (1989) we owe a very insightful discussion of these two terms in early Pali canonical and Abhidhammic sources. Based on the observations in the PED, s.vv., Stuart-Fox argues that in their earliest usage in the *Suttapiṭaka*, *vitakka* and *vicāra* meant the same thing and their collocation in the *paṭhamajjhāna* stock phrase was rather a stylistic emphasis of the same basic concept of ‘thinking’ (pp. 82-83). The dichotomy between initial application of thought and sustained application of thought came as an Abhidhammic development (pp. 86-87), probably resulting from a ‘more refined introspective analysis’ (p. 97). I think that Stuart-Fox’s analysis is in correct in broad lines, though a more detailed historico-philological investigation (‘*vicāra!*’), part of which was actually undertaken by Cousins (1992), into the whole corpus of early Buddhist scriptures (Pali, Sanskrit, Chinese) will undoubtedly reveal more facets and bring further refinements. Important clarifications concerning the definition and different doctrinal explanations concerning *vitarka* and *vicāra* are also found in Jaini’s Introduction to AbhDīp, pp. 83-88. For other relevant remarks and sources, see also Frauwallner 1951a, p. 22, n. 1; Lamotte 1944-1980, vol. 2. p. 1028, n. 2 (also containing the translation of the relevant passage in PPUpad); etc.

Whatever the doctrino-lexical history of these two words may be, most modern scholars will, I believe, agree with a statement made by C.A.F. Rhys Davids more than a century ago: ‘*Vitakko* and *vicāro* is another pair of terms which it is hard to fit with any one pair of English words’ (Dhs tr., p. 10, n. 1, also containing some useful clarifications). Heiler (1918) devotes a long note to these two terms, which he renders as *Überlegung* (‘reflection’) and *Erwägung* (‘consideration’) (p. 13), also listing other translations employed by various scholars up to the publication of his work (note 94, pp. 75-75). See also Frauwallner’s rendering of *vitarka* as *Nachdenken* (which in the English translation (1984, 132) is ‘reflection’) and *vicāra* as *Überlegung* (ibid., ‘deliberation’). To limit our discussion to the English language, the problem stems from the fact that terms like ‘examination’, ‘investigation’, ‘reflection’, ‘consideration’, etc. must be qualified by one or more attributes to express the denotations and connotations which (at least in Abhidhammic definitions) are associated with *vitarka* and *vicāra*. Finding a one-to-one equivalence seems almost impossible. Cousins’s equating *vitakka* with ‘thinking of something’ and *vicāra* with ‘thinking about the same thing’ (1992, 153) is very ingenious and apt, but using these phrases as such in all contexts is stylistically quite difficult.

¹²⁹ Let us add a few further clarifications concerning the concepts of joy and pleasure in the context of meditation (see note 126 above). The difference between them is explained by Buddhaghosa as follows: *pīti* is the feeling of satisfaction which one experiences at the idea that one’s wish can be fulfilled, just like an exhausted man in a desert would hear about or see a pond nearby; *sukha* is the actual experiencing of the pleasure when one’s wish has been fulfilled, just like our man in the desert at the moment when he really drinks water from the pond or stays in the shade of the woods (Vism 110, § 100; Dhs-a 117-118, § 301, more developed than Vism).

Here we should also mention Vasubandhu’s identification of *sukha* in the first two absorptions with *prasarabdhī* ‘tranquillity’ or ‘ease’ (AK VIII.9b) and the long discussion concerning the definition and understanding of the concept by the Vaibhāṣikas and Dārṣāntikas (AKBh 438, 17-440, 8). See also ArthVinBh 180, 4-181, 7. See also below the ŚrBh gloss upon *pṛitisukha* in the first absorption as well as relevant notes.

¹³⁰ Our text classifies defilements (*kleśa*) into strong or excessive (*adhimātra*), of middling

kind (*madhyaprakāra*), and of weak or mild kind (*mṛduprakāra*). Though using different terminology, this taxonomy based on the intensity of defilements has scriptural precedents. At AN I 254, the impurities (*upakkilesa*) are classified into coarse (*oḷārika*), moderately clinging to (lit., ‘accompanying’) [the person] (*majjhimasahagata*), and subtly clinging to the [person] (*sukhumasahagata*). Early Abhidharmic taxonomies do not list this intensity-based scheme (see, for example, Dhs 215 § 1229-220 § 1253; Vibh 385, 16-18; id. 391, 11-14), but later commentarial works contain references to it, though not necessarily associated with defilements. Peṭ 77, 21, using terms similar to our passage in the ŚrBh, states: *so ca paccayo tividho: mudu, majjho adhimatto* ‘and the condition is of three kinds: mild, middling, and excessive’. Nett 99, 16, in its discussion on accumulating karma (*kammasamādāna*), says: *sabbesaṃ mudumajjhādhimattatā*. ‘In everything, there is mild[ness], moderate[ness], and excessiveness’.

The Abhidharma of the Northern Tradition displays a more elaborate pattern of the intensity-based taxonomy. The AbhHṛ divides defilements into nine categories: mild-mild 微微, mild-moderate 微中, mild-excessive 微上, etc., up to excessive-excessive 上上 (T28.819a) (cf. also Frauwallner 1995, 164). This pattern is also adopted by Vasubandhu in the AKBh. In his commentary to AK VI.33c-d, he says: *mṛdumadhyādhimātrā hi trayo mūlaprakārāḥ | teṣāṃ punaḥ pratyekaṃ mṛdumadhyādhimātratvena trividhatvāt nava vyavasthāpyante* | (AKBh 355, 11-12) ‘For weak, middling, and strong are the three basic categories. Because these are furthermore [divided into] three sorts by each [being subdivided into] weak, middling, and strong, [finally] nine [categories] are established’. The statement occurs in the context of the classification of defilements (*kleśa*) (see p. 355, l. 4).

In the Chapter on the Supramundane Path (*lokottaramārga*), the ŚrBh speaks of the cultivation of the [still] weak path (*mṛdumārgabhāvanā*), in which the coarse (*audārika*) or strong (*adhimātra*) defilements are eliminated, the cultivation of the moderate path (*madhyamārgabhāvanā*), in which the middling (*madhya*) defilements are eliminated, and the cultivation of the intense path (*adhimātramārgabhāvanā*), in which all defilements, including the weak (*mṛdu*) ones, are eliminated (ŚrBh, Sh ed. 505, 15-19; Tib. D Dzi 192b6-7; Ch. T 30.476c15-18).

¹³¹ Skt. *nirabhimānatā* ‘freedom from conceit [/vain misapprehension]’. The AKBh (285, 2-3) defines *abhimāna*, one of the seven forms of arrogance (*māna*), as follows: *aprāpte viśeṣādhigame prāpto mayety abhimānaḥ* ‘conceit [/vain misapprehension] is [the case of one who] though having not obtained the mastery of an excellence, thinks “I have obtained [it]”’. Yaśomitra comments: *samādhisaṃniśritāḥ sāsraṇāś cānāsravāś ca dharmā viśeṣāḥ* (both Wogihara and Śastri apply continuous *sandhi*: *viśeṣāś*); *tasyādhigamaḥ sāṅgātkaṇaṃ viśeṣādhigamaḥ* (AKVy 456, 12-13; Śastri ed. 782) ‘excellences are those factors, both contaminated and non-contaminated, based on meditation; its mastery refers to [its] actual realisation [lit., ‘having it before one’s eyes’] — [this is] the mastery of an excellence’. The meaning of *abhimāna* becomes particularly relevant for our passage: it is conceit [/vain misapprehension] related to meditative attainments, a trap our ascetic is prone to fall into, and freedom from it becomes an important step in his or her spiritual progress.

Ji’s Commentary raises the following question concerning the freedom from conceit [/vain misapprehension]: why is it placed after the middling class of defilements and not after the strong defilements or the weak kind of defilements? The Commentary, which adopts a classification into nine types of defilements (similar to the AKBh above), answers in the following way: 前六品惑麤易知道。後三品惑細難了。斷前上中品惑訖，不知下品惑在，乃起增上慢，謂：“九品並盡已”，謂：“證得根本定”。(T43.120c8-10) ‘The first six classes of defilements are coarse and easy to know [whether they have been eliminated or not], the last three classes of defilements are subtle and difficult to realise. After having eliminated the strong

and middling classes of defilements, first [mentioned above], [the ascetic] does not realise that the weak class of defilements [still] exists. Therefore, [he] generates conceit [/vain misapprehension] [under the false impression that he has already obtained the meditative attainment]. [He then] says: “The nine classes [of defilements] have been completely eliminated”, [or] says: “[I] have already attained the absorption proper (*mauladhyāna*)”.

¹³² Cf. the parallel passage in the AbhSamBh (Tatia ed. 80, 20-25; Griffiths 1983, 433): *tatra lakṣaṇapratisamvedinā prahātavyam prāptavyam ca samyakparijñāya prahānāya prāptaye ca cittam prañidhatte | ādhimokṣikena tadartham* (Griffiths emends to *tadūrdhvam*—see below) *samyakprayogam ārabhate | prāvivekyenādhimātrān kleśān jahāti | ratisamgrāhakeṇa madhyam kleśaprakāram jahāti | mīmāṃsakena prāptinirabhimānatāyām cittam avasthāpayati | prayoganiṣṭhena mṛdum kleśaprakāram jahāti | prayoganiṣṭhāphalenaṣām* (I apply regular *sandhi* rules; Tatia and Griffiths read: *prayoganiṣṭhāphalena eṣām*) *manaskārāṇām subhāvitānām bhāvanāphalam pratyānubhavati* |.

Griffiths emendation of *tadartham* to *tadūrdhvam* is based on Tib. *de'i og tu* (P Shi 72b6; D Li 58b2). I think, however, that the MS and Tatia's *tadartham* as well as the Ch. 爲所求義 (T31.736c19) are correct (though the Ch. seems rather too literal). Compared with our passage in the ŚrBh, *tadartham* becomes clear: ‘for this reason’, thus avoiding the repetition of *prahānāya prāptaye ca*.

¹³³ Skt. *vidūṣaṇāpratipakṣa* ‘antidote of reviling’ refers to the becoming aware and loathing or, more precisely, pointing out the detriments of the defilements or their objects. AbhSam 71, 6-7 (fragment based on MS) defines it as: *vidūṣaṇāpratipakṣaḥ katamaḥ | sāsraveṣu saṃskāreṣvādīnavadarśanam* | |. See also note 134 below.

¹³⁴ The definition of this set of four contemplations is found in Yogasthāna II: *tatrānulomiko manaskārah: yenālambanam vidūṣayati samyakprayogam cārabhate, no tu kleśam prajahāti | tatra prātipakṣikah: yena kleśam prajahāti | tatra prasadanīyah: yena līnam cittam pragrāhakair nimittair* (Ch: 淨妙相 = **prasadanīyair nimittair*?—but cf. Tib. *rab tu 'dzin par byed pa'i mtshan dag gis* and the parallel Pali term given below) *abhipramodayati* (MS: *abhipramocayati*; here I emend together with ŚrBh-Gr and Sh) *saṃprahaṣayati pragrhnāti | tatra pratyavekṣaṇīyo manaskārah: tadyathā mīmāṃsāmanaskārah, yam adhipatim kṛtvā prahīṇāprahīnatām kleśānām pratyavekṣate* | (ŚrBh-Gr (18) 10, 14-12, 4; Tib. D 103b6-104a2; Ch. T 438c3-9) ‘The suitable contemplation is that by which [the ascetic] reviles the meditative object [i.e. the defilements] [and] undertakes the correct practice but does not [yet] abandon the defilements. The antidote [contemplation] is that by which [the ascetic] abandons the defilements. The [contemplation which engenders] cheering up is that by which [the ascetic] gladdens, makes joyful, energises [his] depressed mind by making use of energising signs (*pragrāhakair nimittair*) [cf. definition of *paggāhanimitta* at Dhs p. 232, § 1357; also cf. *ibid.* § 13 and § 56]. The examining contemplation, i.e., the investigating contemplation, is that by virtue of which [the ascetic] examines whether the defilements have been abandoned or not [yet] abandoned.’

¹³⁵ This passage seems to be a later addition. The set of four contemplations appears in Yogasthāna II (see note 134 above), which if my analysis is correct, belongs to a later textual stratum in the development of the ŚrBh (see Chapter Five, Part One). Our passage here consists chiefly in lexico-doctrinal matchings, which cast little light on the actual practice of the seven contemplations. The fact that they are additional remarks is not, *per se*, an editorial ‘anomaly’. Passages 3.28.2.1.9.1. and 3.28.2.1.9.2. are also additional remarks, but these two passages come in as natural after-thoughts which clarify some important points concerning the practice of the contemplations. Not the same can be said about the passage here (3.28.2.1.9.3.).

¹³⁶ Skt. *āyatana* ‘station’, ‘base’, or ‘abode’. Buddhaghosa defines the word as follows: *tam ākāsānañcam adhiṭṭhānaṭṭhena āyatanam assa sasampayuttadhammassa jhānassa, devānam*

devāyatanaṃ iva (Vism 275, § 24). ‘The boundlessness [/infinity] of space is “base” (*āyatana*), in the sense of support (*adhīṭṭhāna*), for this absorption together with the factors associated with it, just as the [expression] “abode (*āyatana*) of deities” is [used in the sense of being the support] for the deities.’

¹³⁷ The complete name of the attainment is ‘station of the boundlessness [/infinity] of space’ (Skt. *ākāsānantyāyatana*, cf. AKBh 434, 6; Pali *ākāsānañcāyatana*, cf. Vibh 245, 16; Vism 273, § 12ff).

¹³⁸ The complete name of the attainment is ‘station of the boundlessness [/infinity] of consciousness’ (Skt. *viññānānantyāyatana*, cf. AKBh 434, 6; Pali *viññāṇañcāyatana*, cf. Vibh 245, 18; Vism 275, § 25ff).

¹³⁹ Wayman’s renders: ‘just as there is equipoise of the First Dhyāna by means of the seven orientations, so also there is equipoise of the Second, [...]’ (p. 127). The translation apparently construes *samāpatti* as ‘equipoise’, but the word is clearly used in its technical sense of ‘meditative attainment’. Besides, I cannot see any mental factor amongst the so-called ‘five-limbs’ of the first absorption (see above) which would correspond to ‘equipoise’ (unless we would take ‘focussing [of the mind]’ (*ekaggatā*) as resulting in such a quality, but this would be going too far). Cf. also Choi’s translation (p. 134, n. 487; *samāpatti* is rendered as *Eintritt*).

¹⁴⁰ Cf. the parallel passage in the AbhSamBh (Tatia ed. 80, 25-27; Griffiths 1983, 433): *yathā prathamadhyānasamāpattaye sapta manaskārā evaṃ yāvan naivasamjñānāsamjñāyatana-samāpattaye yathāyogaṃ yojayitavyāḥ |*

¹⁴¹ Here and below, *vitarka* appears in locative plural. I assume that this refers to the plurality of the acts of rough examination (and subtle investigation). Delhey (SamBh p. 352, n. 9), who also notices this occurrence in the ŚrBh, calls this usage ‘a collective term’ (*Sammelbegriff*). Tib. closely follows the Skt. and uses the plural marker *dag*. Ch., which apparently contains some editorial clarifications here, translates as: 有尋有伺 ‘possessed of rough examination and subtle investigation’. In rendering *vitārkeṣv evaṃ audārikatām paśyati* below, the Chinese wording is different: 於諸尋伺觀爲麁性 ‘[he] sees the coarseness in various rough examinations and subtle investigations’ (諸 ‘various’ is often employed for rendering the Skt. plural). It is quite possible that, as implied by the Ch. renderings as well as by the Skt. *vitarkavicārās* occurring later in this passage, we should understand the references here to the acts of *vitarka* as also including *vicāra*.

The plural usage with a collective sense of *vitarka* may also point out, as also remarked by Delhey (ibid.), that to the editors of the YoBh, *vitarka* and *vicāra* did not mean, after all, completely different processes. If we closely examine the definitions in this passage, they seem to represent different steps in a continuous mental process of verbalised scrutiny rather than clearly distinct functions. The compound *tadanubandhānucārī* used in the definition of *vicāra* below seems to indicate that *vitarka* occurs first and *vicāra* follows after it. If this is true, such a view is close to the Sautrāntika interpretation found in the AKBh. According to this, the two factors are different names given to different stages of the speech activators (*saṃskāra*) and cannot operate simultaneously (for this meaning of *saṃskāra*, see AKBh 61, 5; Vetter 2000, 36-37). The view was different from the orthodox Vaibhāṣika doctrine, which considered that *vitarka* and *vicāra* can co-exist in one moment of consciousness (AKBh 61, 7-12; ibid. 439, 19-21; AbhDīp 81-83; cf. also Jaini’s Introduction, pp. 83-88.) See also note 128 above on *vitarka* and *vicāra*.

¹⁴² SamBh 84, 2-3, defines this level as follows: *samāhitā bhūmīṣ caturvidhā tadyathā dhyānaṃ vimokṣaḥ samādhiḥ samāpattiṣ ca* ‘the level of concentrated [thought] is of four types, to wit, absorption, emancipation, contemplation, and attainment’.

¹⁴³ Skt. *vyagrālanbanacārī*. Wayman (p. 128) renders the compound as ‘which ranges on an unsteady meditative object’. In the next sentence, we also have *vyagracāry evālabane* (see

note 161 to Skt. crit. ed.). Furthermore, in passage 3.28.3.2.1. below, we read: *vyagracāriṇa ālambanād vivecyā* and *avyagracāriṇy ālambane* [...] *cittam pravartayati, vyavasthāpayati*. Sakuma (135, § H.2.1.) translates *vyagracāriṇa ālambanād* as *unsteten Gegenstand* and *avyagracāriṇy ālambane* as *stetigen Gegenstand*. As far as I can judge, all these compounds and phrases can be construed as referring either to the unsteady operation of the mind upon the meditative object or the unsteady state of the object on which the ascetic concentrates. The difference between the two interpretations is philological rather than psychological. The effect of this unsteadiness upon the yogi's mind is the same: unsettling and unsatisfactory, especially when compared with the second absorption.

I could not find any close parallel to our passage, but there are clear descriptions of *vitarka* and *vicāra* as imperfect acts of concentration (despite the fact that they pertain to the *samāhītabhūmi*). The word *avyagga* appears in Pali sources with the meaning of 'undisturbed', etc. At SN V 66, 32 and 105, 4, we find the compound *avyagganimittam* '[having the] characteristic [or: 'object of reflection', according to CPD, s.v. *avyagga*] of undisturbed[ness]' (CPD renders 'that evites confusion', but I think that the word refers to the steadiness of the mind rather than to the clarity of cognition). This describes the awakening-factor of concentration (*samādhisambojjhaṅga*). At SN I 96, 11 and 25, *avyaggamanaso* or *avyaggamanaso* describes an 'undisturbed mind'. (For other occurrences, see CPD, s.v. *avyagga*).

Though not using the word *vyagga/vyagra*, we find clear indications that *vitakka* and *vicāra* are considered unsteady mental functions. For example, the Vim says: 近五蓋怨令覺觀動，身成懈怠，心成散亂 (T32.418b1-2) 'being close to the enemy [which is represented by] the five hindrances makes *vitakka* and *vicāra* move [i.e., be unstable], [and this makes] the body become slothful (**kosajja*) and the mind confused (**vikkhitta*)'. (My rendering, especially in the first part, differs from Ehara, Soma, Kheminda tr. 1961, 100). The Vism (127, § 148), describing the concentration of the second absorption, declares *vitakkavicārakkhobhavirahena ativiya acalattā suppasannattā ca* '[it is worthy to be called concentration] because of the extreme immobility and complete confidence due to the absence of the disturbance [brought about by] *vitakka* and *vicāra*'. (The word *pasannattā* also means 'clarity', but in the Theravāda tradition, it is usually understood as 'confidence'; see ŚrBh passage 3.28.3.2.1. and respective notes below.) See also Vism 126, § 144: *adum hi patthamajjhānam vitakkavicārakkhobena, vicitarāṅgasamākulam iva jalām, na suppasannam hoti*. The TatSid explains a similar process: 若心散行，數數起生，是名為覺 (T32.288b28) 'if the mind operates in a distracted way and frequently arises [in this manner], this is called *vitarka*'; 散心小微，則名為觀 (T32.288.c2) '[if] the distracted mind is fine[r] and subtle[r], then [this] is called *vicāra*'. Sastri translates 散行 into English as 'unconcentrated' and renders the term into Sanskrit as *vyagra* (see Sastri I 215 and II 185). We have no guarantee that *vyagra* was the actual word used by Harivarman, but this is a possibility, and more importantly, it shows that *vitarka* and *vicāra* were understood as mental processes not exactly stable (see especially 數數起生 in the description of *vitarka*).

¹⁴⁴ Skt. *manojalpa* is often rendered as 'mind talk' (e.g., Wayman 128) or, more faithfully, 'mind murmuring' (Cousins 1992, 147) (cf. also Delhey's German translation: *Denksprechen*, SamBh p. 352, n. 9). The term refers to the verbalisation of our thoughts and is clearly differentiated from the actual language. In the TatSid (T32.351a16-19), we read about an oponent who, on scriptural basis, points out that for the practioner who enters the first absorption, language ceases to function (語言滅). He questions how it is possible to speak of *vitarka* and *vicāra* in this context since these are processes causing (or activating) language (覺觀是語言因). Harivarman answers that here by 'ceasing', the scriptures mean the actual uttering

of words, not the processes occurring in the mind. In this sense, we can speak of language ‘ceasing’ even in the case of a person in the realm of sensual pleasures (*kāmadhātu*) who stops talking. We can see from this explanation that *manojalpa*, associated with *vitarka* and *vicāra*, represents the flow of mental judgement, implying language, but without any uttering of words, whether loud or murmuring (in spite of the basic meaning of *jalpa*). One could say that *manojalpa* refers here to the linguistic basis of discursive thought.

In the *Śrutimayī bhūmiḥ*, we are told that the focusing of the mind (*cittaikāgrya*) is of three kinds: *samāsatas trividham cittaikāgryam yathābhūta<jñāna>darśanāya samvartate | manojalpagataṃ vicitrabhinnāmbanacārākāram | manojalpasamantaram vicitrabhinnāmbanacārākāram eva | manojalpasamatikrāntam caikāgryam acitrabhinnāmbanacārākāram |* (YoBh MS folio 89a1; Tib., P Dzi 196b3-4; Ch., T30.349c23-26) (I am indebted to Prof Schmithausen for his kindly checking the Sanskrit MS). ‘Briefly stated, three types of focusing of the mind are conducive to (*samvartate*) [for this sense, see BHSD, s.v.] the true wisdom and view, [to wit] [the focusing of the mind] occurring at (*-gata*) [the time of—see Tib. ‘i tshē] mental verbalisation and having the form of operating upon various different objects; [the focusing of the mind] occurring immediately after the [period of] mental verbalisation and just [as the preceding type] having the form of operating upon various different objects; [and focusing of the mind] transcending mental verbalisation and having the form of operating upon an object not various and different [like in the preceding cases].’

Cf. AbhSamBh 8, 26-9, 3 (T31.669c24-670a2; cf. T31.665b22-25, too) which also employs the concept of mental verbalisation (here called *manaso ‘bhījalpanā*) for the definition of *vitarka* and *vicāra*. For other sources on *manojalpa*, see T31.104c19-27; 142c20-24; 199b3-5; etc. See also Ji’s commentary (T43.121a20-27).

¹⁴⁵ For a similar definition of *vitarka* and *vicāra*, see Viniś (T30.623a14-18). See also note 128 above.

¹⁴⁶ Skt. *bāhyāyatana*. This appears to refer to the *dharmāyatana* which comprises all concomitant mental functions (*caita*). The distinction between the six internal bases (*cha ajjhattikāni āyatanāni*) and the six external bases (*cha bāhirāni āyatanāni*) is well-known from canonical sources. E.g., DN III 243, 14-19; MN III 216, 9-18; etc. For this technical sense and the meanings of *āyatana* in general, see CPD, s.v.; PD, s.v.; PED, s.v.; Nyanatiloka 1995, s.v.; etc.

¹⁴⁷ MS, Sh: *ākāyikās*. The word is not attested, and, if this is a lexical invention of the ŚrBh authors, the only meaning I could imagine would be ‘lasting as long as the body’ (cf. *āmaraṇam/-āt* ‘till death’, MW, s.v. *ā*). This, however, is not only semantically problematic, but also lacks an equivalent in Tib. and Ch. (see below). Doctrinally, too, a reference to the ‘body’ is hardly relevant here. Though the ‘body’ is ephemeral, its being used for such an image would be, as far as I can see, an unfelicitous choice in this context. After all, the whole range of mental functions present in absorptions do ‘last as long as the body’, and limiting the expression to *vitarka* and *vicāra* would have little, if any, persuasive power. To my knowledge, the only context related to the first absorption in which *kāyika*, in *fine compositi*, occurs is *Brahmakāyika* ‘belonging to the company of Brahma’ or ‘Brahma’s retinue’. *Brahmakāyikāḥ* or the gods who are Brahma’s retinue represent the first level (*bhūmi*) of the first heaven of the material realm corresponding to the first absorption (see, for instance, AKBh 111, 20; *Brahmakāyikā devā* are also known from canonical sources DN I 222, 1, etc.; see also Vim: 佛所說 “少修初禪得梵天眷屬” (T32.407a29). ‘What the Buddha said [is] “[Those] who practise the first absorption for a little while attain [rebirth in] Brahma’s retinue’”; cf. ŚrBh passage 3.28.6.1. below). But connecting *ākāyika* and *Brahmakāyika* for a plausible emendation here could at best be described as indulging in wild imagination.

Tib. *byung nas 'jig pa* and Ch. 或增或減 as well as parallel phrases in the ŚrBh and other sources suggest a very plausible emendation here: *āyāpāyika* '[characterised by] arising [/coming] and decay [/going]', which has also the advantage of staying close to the MS reading. Let us further mention that *āyāpāyika* also means 'gain and loss', a connotation which may have enhanced the rhetorical effect of the compound. We find the compound attested at ŚrBh MS 110bL-M = Sh 424, 3-4, in a sentence followed by lexemes similar to our passage: *āyāpāyikatām* [Sh: *ā(yā)pāyikatām*] *tāvatkālikatām itvarapratyupasthāyitām*. At ŚrBh MS 122a3L = Sh 480, 9-10, and MS 125b7R = Sh 498, 9-10, we have *āpāyikatām tāvatkālikatām itvarapratyupasthāyitām*. However, the corresponding Tib. passages (P 219a6 and 229a7 respectively) read: *byung nas 'jig pa*, while the equivalent Ch. (472a20 and 475b19-20 respectively) has: 或增或減. This strongly supports the emendation of the above ŚrBh MS readings to *ā<yā>pāyikatām*.

Another possible emendation would be *āpāyika(ta)*. Its meaning is 'decay' or, in BHS and Pali, 'pertaining or leading to an evil fate (such as existence in hell)' (BHSD, s.v. *āpāyika*). Confusion or hesitation between *āyāpāyika* and *āpāyika* appears actually to be attested in other sources, too. This was probably not only because *āpāyika* is phonetically and graphically so close to *āyāpāyika*, but also because semantically the former does not depart from the general purport of the context. We find also the same indecision in, for example, MahSūt 150, 2: *āpāyikās tāvatkālikā itvarapratyupasthāyina*. Here, too, Tib. has *skye zhing 'jig pa* (P Phi 255a8), which suggests *āyāpāyikāḥ*. Ch., however, reads 壞滅 (T31.646b25), which means that the Skt. MS used for the translation read (or was interpreted as?) *āpāyika*. I think, however, that in a phrase like in our ŚrBh passage here, which contains compounds like *tāvatkālikāḥ* and *itvarapratyupasthāyinaḥ*, the reading *āyāpāyikāḥ* 'arsing and decay' fits much better. And of course, the latter is also supported by Tib. and Ch.

Another possible emendation which would keep fairly close to the MS reading would be *ākālika* 'momentary, instantenous' (MW, s.v.), *nur einen Augenblick während, momentan* (PW, s.v.), but this is not supported by Tib. and Ch. as well as by the parallel phrases cited above. See also note 124 to Ch. ed.

¹⁴⁸ Skt. *ārabhya* is used here in the sense of 'referring to, having to do', which, in our sentence can also be rendered (admittedly, rather freely) as 'comparing/compared with'. Tib. renders in a free way, too, but it faithfully captures the original meaning: *ltos pa* 'looking at' or 'considering'. Ch., on the other hand, seems to be presuppose another MS reading or was too free in its choice of 求 'wish', 'seek for', etc. If the latter was the case, then the sentence must have been construed as 'when seeking [to attain] the upper level, [the lower level appears to the ascetic as] accompanied by the state of suffering [...]'.
¹⁴⁹ The yogi's inner monologue describes a reflective pattern whose structure roughly corresponds to the examination of the six aspects (see passages 3.28.2.1.2.1. to 3.28.2.1.2.7.). The order is admittedly different, and the text is not always very clear as to the precise item to which it refers. Here is, however, the approximate correspondence:

- the first part containing the definitions of *vitarka* and *vicāra* seems to correspond to the specific characteristic (*svalakṣaṇa*).
- the sentence starting with *ete punar vitarkavicārās* probably corresponds to the meaning (*artha*).
- the phrase beginning with *evam ete adhyātmam* might be the equivalent of the thing (*vastu*).
- *hetusamutpannāḥ*, etc. appears to refer to the general characteristic (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*).
- *kṛṣṇapakṣyāḥ* is clearly a reference to the category (*pakṣa*).
- *nityam nityakālam dhruvam dhruvakālam* corresponds to the time (*kāla*).

— *tādṛśī prakṛtyā* could be a hint to the reasoning on the basis of the nature of things (*dharmatāyukti*).

¹⁵⁰ Supplied on the basis of Ch. 諸尋伺. See note 141 above.

¹⁵¹ The coarse nature of the first absorption from the perspective of the superior level of the second *jhāna/dhyāna* is depicted in many sources: DN I 37, 10-11; Vim (T32.418a28-b15); Vism 128, §§ 151-152; AKBh 440, 6-7: *sormikeva hi nadī vitarkavicāraḥsobhitā saṃtatir aprasannā vartate* ‘because the [mental] series agitated by *vitarka* and *vicāra* is not calm, just like a river with waves’; *Zuochan sanmei jing* (T15.277c23-278a4: 此覺觀二事亂禪定心，如水澄靜波蕩則濁。行者如是內已一心覺觀所惱，如極得息，如睡得安。是時次第無覺無觀生清淨定。內淨喜樂得入二禪。(the image of the waves is present here, too); PPUpad (T25.185c8-13 (translating verse): 知二法亂心 雖善而應離，如大水澄靜 波蕩亦無見，譬如人大極 安隱睡臥時，若有喚呼聲 其心大惱亂，攝心入禪時，以覺觀為惱 是故除覺觀; note the similarities with the passage in the *Zuochan sanmei jing*, which is not surprising at all since the latter work was compiled from various sources and translated into Chinese by the same Kumārajīva); TatSid (T32.341b10-c3; see especially 341b26-27: 又行者於初禪中定未具足，常為覺觀所亂 ‘furthermore, in the first absorption, the ascetic[s] concentration is not yet complete and is always disturbed by taking notice (*vitarka*) and observation (*vicāra*)’; 覺 used for rendering *vitarka* should be construed in its sense of ‘become aware’ rather than of ‘fully comprehend/realise’); etc.

¹⁵² Most likely, here *duḥkha*^o is construed in the sense of *duḥkhavedanā* ‘unpleasant [uncomfortable] feeling’.

¹⁵³ Skt. *duḥkhataravihāritā* ‘dwelling in more suffering’ and *aprasāntataravihāritā* ‘dwelling in less serenity’ are counted as the first aspect of coarseness; *alpāyuṣkataratā* ‘shortness of the life’ is the second one (cf. Ch. rendering). *Xianyang lun* (Choi 86, § 32.2.) counts each of these as one aspect and declares that the coarse characteristic should be understood as being threefold. The parallel passage in the AbhSamBh quoted below (see note 156) appears to offer the best solution. It explains the first aspect as ‘dwelling in more suffering on account of dwelling in [a state of] non-serenity’ (*duḥkhataravihāritā ‘praśāntavihāritayā*) (cf. also Choi, p. 134, n. 492).

On the lifespan in various heavens and levels corresponding to the absorption, see AKBh III.79-81 (pp. 173-174). At AN I 267-268, the deities abiding in the station of boundless space have a lifespan of 20,000 aeons (*visatim kappasahassāni āyuppamāṇam*), those dwelling in the station of boundless consciousness have a lifespan of 40,000 aeons (*cattārisam kappasahassāni āyuppamāṇam*), and those born in the station of nothing whatsoever have a lifespan of 60,000 aeons (*saṭṭhiṃ kappasahassāni āyuppamāṇam*). No mention is made here of the station of neither ideation nor non-ideation, but according to the Vibh, the lifespan of the deities abiding in this sphere is 80,000 aeons. Actually, the Vibh (422-426) contains a much more detailed list of the lifespans of various deities or heaven-born beings (*devā*) from the Cātumahārājika gods to those dwelling in the sphere of neither ideation nor non-ideation (see also Vibh-a 518-522; Poussin, vol. 2, p. 173, n. 2.).

In the *Āyuhparyantasūtra* (Matsumura ed., in Enomoto, Hartmann, and Matsumura eds. 1989, 69-100), a Śrāvākayāna scripture describing the lifespan in all realms throughout the *sāmsāric* Universe, the life in the Heaven of Brahma’s retinue (the first heavens corresponding to the first absorption) is half an aeon (*brahmakāyikānām bhikṣavo devānām ardhakaḷpa āyuṣaḥ pramāṇa[m...]* p. 86, ll. 1-2; cf. Tib. tr. at ibid. p. 99, ll. 1-2; Ch tr. at T17.603c16) and gradually increases to 80,000 aeons for those born in the station of neither ideation nor non-ideation. The extant Skt. MS of the *Āyuhparyantasūtra* ends with the *Akaṇiṣṭha* Heaven but from its Tibetan version (Matsumura ed., in Enomoto, Hartmann, and Matsumura eds. 1989, 99-100) as well as the parallel passages in the MVyut (# 3107-3113) we can be reasonably confident that this is the

duration (cf. Matsumura's reconstruction on p. 87). See also the Chinese translation at T17.604a2-6 — interesting to note that the Chinese version reads 大劫 'great aeon' (*mahākalpa) for the immaterial spheres but has 劫 'aeon' (*kalpa) for the other heavens and realms.

For the lifespan in the heavenly worlds, see also YoBh 77, 13ff.

¹⁵⁴ Skt. *ṣaḍbhir vastubhir*. The six aspects (*ṣaḍ vastūni*) are the meaning, object, characteristic, category, time, and reasoning, described in detail in passages 3.28.2.1.2.- 3.28.2.1.2.7. Their examination actually represents the contemplation perceiving characteristics. Also supporting this identification is the usage of the verb *paryeṣate*, which is frequently employed with the six aspects (see 3.28.2.1.2. above). Xuanzang's rendering 由前六事 'by means of the six aspects [explained] before' is probably an editorial edition which points at a similar understanding.

¹⁵⁵ Briefly stated, this means that the ascetic will attain each of the four absorptions and four immaterial attainments by means of the seven contemplations. In the station of neither ideation nor non-ideation, the last of the eight meditative stages, the attainment of the fruit of the culmination of the practice coincides with the full realisation of this level and also marks the climax of the mundane path. Cf. also Ch. ed.

¹⁵⁶ Cf. the parallel passage in the AbhSamBh (Tatia ed. 80, 27-29; Griffiths 1983, 433): *audārikalakṣaṇaṃ punaḥ sarvāsv adhobhūmiṣu yāvad ākimcanyāyatanāt samāseṇa dvividhaṃ veditavyam — duḥkhataravihāritā 'prasāntavihāritayā, alpāyuskataratā* [Tatia and Griffiths spell: 'yuska⁹] *ca <|>* [Tatia and Griffiths have no punctuation mark] *tadviparyayeṇordhvabhūmeḥ śāntalakṣaṇaṃ veditavyam ||*.

¹⁵⁷ Tib. contains here an additional passage which cites the entire canonical stock phrase describing the attainment of the first absorption. Neither the extant Skt. MS and nor Ch. the Chinese rendering contains such a citation. An almost identical sentence is found at 3.28.2.1.9. 1. Tib. reads: 'dod pa dag las dben pa'i} sdog pa mi dge ba'i chos rnam la dben pa | rtog pa dang bcas pa | spyod pa dang bcas pa | dben pa las skyes pa'i dga' ba dang bde ba can | bsam gtan dang po'i yan lag lnga bsgrubs te gnas pa dang | . This corresponds to Skt. *vivikta<ṃ> kāmair viviktaṃ pāpakair akuśalair dharmaiḥ savitarkaṃ savicāraṃ vivekajaṃ prītisukhaṃ prathamam dhyānaṃ pañcā<ṅ>gam upasāmpadya viharati* (cf. also ŚrBh-Gr 20, 23-24, but without *pañcā<ṅ>gam*). The only difference in the Tibetan citation before passage 3.28.3.1.1. is the omission of *pañcāṅgam* (omission which actually agrees with the scriptural stock phrase; see note 127 above). If the Tib. reflects a different MS reading (lost in Skt. and Ch.), the original can be restored as: **viviktaṃ kāmair viviktaṃ pāpakair akuśalair dharmaiḥ savitarkaṃ savicāraṃ vivekajaṃ prītisukhaṃ prathamam dhyānaṃ upasāmpadya viharatīty uktah* 'it is said [in the scriptures], "[the ascetic] dwells having attained the first absorption which is separated from sensual pleasures, is separated from bad and unwholesome factors, is possessed of rough examination, is possessed of subtle investigation, [has] joy and pleasure born of separation"'.

It is true the quotation is quite natural in this context, and the following passages represent glosses on each of the words above, but this does not necessarily mean that the extant Skt. MS contains a lacuna here. We have seen that the citation is also missing in Ch. Actually, the Tib. version cites the canonical formulae at the beginning of all the sections dedicated to the absorptions and immaterial attainments (see below). All these quotations similarly lack in Skt. and Ch. The most likely explanation for this is that the citations of the stock-phrases were added by the Tibetan translators as part of an editorial effort to bring more clarity (a reader-friendly reminding of the entire formula?).

For similar glosses on this and all the following absorptions below, see also *Xianyang lun* (T31.486c24ff.).

¹⁵⁸ See passage 3.28.2.1.2.4. and note 38 above.

¹⁵⁹ These two separations obviously correspond to the two aspects of sensual pleasures. The

most natural way of construing *samprayogaviveka* is ‘separation from the union with defilements’. Sakuma renders *samprayogaviveka* as *die Loslösung von der Verbindung [des Geistes mit den Begierden]* (vol. 2, p. 132). This is the basic Abhidharmic understanding and is also attested in the Far Eastern exegetical literature. After glossing *kleśakāma* and *vastukāma* (see note 38 above), To-ryun defines the two separations as follows: 對治起時，與不貪俱，名相應離。厭背五塵，名境界離。(T42.472c7-9) ‘When the antidote arises, it is accompanied by non-greed, [this] is called separation [from] union [with greed]. Abhorring and averting the five dust[y sense-fields i.e., visible objects, sounds, smells, tastes, tangible objects] are called separation from the objects’. Ji’s Commentary has nothing to say on this matter (see T43.121a20-121b18), but we find in Chengguan’s Subcommentary on the *Avatamsakasūtra* the following gloss: 內心不與欲貪相應，名相應離。不染外境，名境界離。(T36.486b23-24) ‘Inwardly, the mind not being united with greed is called separation from union. Not being polluted by the exterior objects is called separation from the [exterior] objects’. In the Commentary on the *Avatamsakasūtra* (T35.783c28-29), Chengguan also mentions these two separations, citing *juan* 33 of the ŚrBh, but does not elaborate upon them.

¹⁶⁰ AKBh 312, 7-8, defines the secondary defilements (*upakleśa*) as follows: ‘the secondary defilements are all those defiled factors different from the principal defilements, [those] mental functions comprised in the aggregate of volition and impulses (*saṃskāraskandha*)’ (*ye ’py anye kleśebhyaḥ klišṭā dharmāḥ saṃskāraskandhasaṃgrhītās caitasikās ta upakleśās*). Cf. also AKBh pp. 10-11 (ch. 1, *kārikā* 15a-b).

¹⁶¹ It is not clear how the subject of the sentence should be analysed (cf. Sakuma, p. 133, n. 745). I think that though stylistically awkward, the most natural way of construing the sentence is understanding ‘bad and unwholesome factors’ (which I supply in square brackets) as its subject. The authors might have thought that *pāpakair akuśalair dharmair iti* in the citation is enough to announce the subject and did not express it again in nominative, as a more careful style would have required. This is also the understanding reflected by the Ch. translation (Ch., however, reads **kleśakāmahetukāḥ* instead of Skt. *upakleśāḥ* and Tib. *nye ba ’i nyon mongs pa*; cf. note 44 to Ch. ed.). Syntactically it is also possible to construe the sentence as: ‘[bad and unwholesome factors] are secondary defilements; [being] caused by sensual pleasures, unwholesome factors, to wit, bodily misdeeds, [...] occur’. The other solution is to take *akuśalā dharmās* as the subject and translate as ‘the unwholesome factors are secondary defilements, which are born of sensual pleasures causes, [they are] to wit, [...]’ (cf. Sakuma 132). The need of a relative pronoun would be felt here, and Tib. *gang dag* actually suggests such a possibility. It is hard to know whether this is the reading of the MS used by the Tibetan translators or is their editorial addition in order to make the sentence clearer. A final pronouncement is certainly difficult, but I believe that (though not a masterpiece of style!) the sentence can be read even without a relative pronoun.

¹⁶² The latter part of the sentence has canonical roots. A similar stock-phrase is found at DN II 59, 1-3 (and below several times); DN III 289, 6-8; MN I 410, 30-31; AN IV 400, 28-401, 2; Vibh 390, 15-17. The phrase usually occurs in the context of explaining the cause and results of craving (*taṇhā*). The description of the pernicious fruition of craving ends with the following sentence: ‘Because of guarding [one’s property], various bad and unwholesome factors [such as] taking up a staff, taking up a [stabbing] weapon, strife, quarrel, dispute, contention, slander, [and] untrue words occur’ (*ārakkhādhikaraṇaṃ daṇḍādāna-satthādāna-kalaha-viggaha-vivāda-tuvaṃtuva-pesuñña-musā-vādā aneke pāpakā akuśalā dhammā sambhavanti*). (There are some differences in the wording of each text mentioned above, the most important ones being at DN III 289, 6-8, which reads: *ārakkhādhikaraṇaṃ paṭicca*, and at MN I 410, 30-31, which does not contain *ārakkhādhikaraṇaṃ*; note also that the latter

occurrence is found in a different doctrinal context.) (For the gloss of some of the terms above, see DN-a II 500, § 10.) The history of some of the words in this stock-phrase can be traced to an even earlier stage. The *Kalahavivādasutta*, included in the *Aṭṭhakavagga* of the *Suttanipāta* (pp. 862-877), contains a brief catechism regarding the cause of strifes (*kalahā*) and disputes (*vivādā*) as well as other negative factors ending in slander (*°pesunā*). The ultimate cause is, we are told, the incorrect ideation (*saññā*) concerning mind and matter (*nāmañ ca rūpañ ca*) (see verses 872-874). (The *Aṭṭhakavagga* section of the *Suttanipāta* belongs probably to one of the earliest strata of Buddhist literature; see Nakamura 1989, 27; von Hinüber 1997, 49.)

The compound *kalahabhaṇḍanavigrahavivādasāṭhyavañcananikṛtimṛṣāvādāḥ* which appears in our ŚrBh passage is partly different from the canonical *kalaha-viggaha-vivāda-tuvaṃtuva-pesuñña-musā-vādā*. Actually, Buddhist literature contains a few more or less similar compounds, the ŚrBh form apparently being a developed version. For instance, in the MVastu (3.48, 13-14), we find: *kalahabhaṇḍanavigrahavivādāṃ*. The same compound appears in quite a few Sarvāstivādin canonical sources (see SWTF, fascicle 9, pp. 35-36, s.v.). Similarly, we see in the SuvParPP (125, 8-9): *kalahabhaṇḍanavigrahavivādā°*. In the SadPuṇḍ (452, 8, verse 23), we see a simpler version: *kalahe ca vivādavigrahe*. The DaśBh (Rahder ed. 26-27, ch. 2, § Q) contains some of the words above, but they do not appear in compounds or even in same sentence. Later Sanskrit Buddhist sources also contain similar phrases. E.g., ŚikSam 149, 8: *kalahabhaṇḍanavivādakṣobhyaś*; PrasPad 52, 8: *kalhavigrahavivādāṃ*; etc. The BoBh contains a form which is even more developed than the ŚrBh counterpart. It reads: *śāstrādāna-daṇḍādāna-kalaha-bhaṇḍana-vigraha-vivāda-sāṭhya-vañcana-nikṛti-mṛṣāvāda-mithyādharma-saṃgrhītāḥ anekavidhāḥ pāpākā akuśalā dharmāḥ* (BoBh 253, 2-4). At BoBh 7, 8-9, we also see: *kalaha-bhaṇḍana-vigraha-vivādeṣv*; and BoBh 179, 26, contains: *kalaha-bhaṇḍana-vigraha-vivādā°*; both closely resembling the first half of the compound in the ŚrBh.

Some lexical remarks on *śāstra* and *daṇḍa* are necessary. Skt. *śāstra* means ‘an instrument for cutting or wounding’, ‘knife’, ‘sword’, ‘dagger’, and (to make matters worse!) ‘any weapon’ (MW, s.v.). In the Pali Canon, the word *sattha* is certainly construed as a generic term. For example, in the *Vinaya*, the rule entailing expulsion [from the Order] (*pārājika*) in the case of killing a human being contains the compound *satthahāraṇam*, the first part of which is explained as: *asim vā sattim vā bhendim vā lagulam vā pāsāṇam vā sattham vā visam vā rajjum vā* (Vin III 73, 26-28). This is translated by Horner as ‘a knife or a dagger or an arrow or a cudgel or a stone or a sword or poison or a rope’ (Vin Engl. tr. I 126) (see also Buddhaghosa’s commentary and Horner, *ibid.*, p. 125, n. 2). It is noteworthy that *sattha* is construed first as a word encompassing all kinds of weapons (including even poison) and then is employed as an individual term meaning, in all likelihood, ‘a sword’. Probably, a rendering like ‘[a weapon like] sword[, etc.]’ is the closest we can get to conveying the entire semantic sphere of *sattha/śāstra*. In the ŚrBh passage here, *śāstra* seems to be contrasted with *daṇḍa*, implying thus a stabbing weapon versus a striking one. Sakuma (vol. 2, p. 132) similarly construes the word as [*Stich-]Waffen* or ‘[stabbing] weapon’, which seems to be the most appropriate translation here. This is also supported by Tib. *miṣhon* and Ch. 刀, both usually meaning ‘sword’ but also having the more generic sense of ‘stabbing or cutting weapon or tool’.

Skt. *daṇḍa* equally poses problems, especially as to the length of the tool/weapon meant here. The word can mean ‘stick, staff, rod, pole, cudgel, club’ (MW, s.v.). No doubt, all these could be used for aggressive purposes. An argument from practicability is, therefore, of no help. We might add here that *daṇḍa* does not appear to have been employed as a regular weapon of the *kṣatriyas* or of the foot-soldiers in the traditional Indian army either (see Pant 1970). The word in our passage has, therefore, no specialised military sense, which could be verified from archeological findings. The only clue we have here is Xuanzang’s rendering. Ch. 杖 refers to a ‘walking

stick' or any staff about the same size which, if need be, can be used for defence or attack. Unfortunately, there is no way we can verify whether Xuanzang and his team rendered the word having in mind a size accurately corresponding to the Indian weapon denoted by *daṇḍa*. Nevertheless, without any other hint, I have decided to rely on Xuanzang's 杖 (!) for my translation of the term.

¹⁶³ The instrumental of the Skt. phrase *svabhūmikair vitarkavicāraiḥ kāmaprātipakṣikāiḥ kuśalaiḥ* can be construed as meaning 'in the form of', as also suggested by Sakuma's in *Gestalt von* (p. 133, § H.1.3.), or in a sociative sense of 'accompanied by' (thus explaining *sa-* in *savitarkam savicāram*), as apparently understood by Tib. I incline to believe that the former alternative is more likely, but my rendering above tries to capture both nuances. I understand the plural of *vitarkavicāraiḥ* as referring to the multiple acts of coarse examination and subtle investigation (see passage 3.28.2.2.2. above).

¹⁶⁴ Our text qualifies the coarse examination and subtle investigation as being wholesome factors. Buddhist thought actually distinguishes between wholesome (*kusala/kuśala*) and unwholesome (*akusala/akuśala*) varieties of *vitakka/vitarka*. For instance, DN III 215, 3-6 states: *Tayo akusala-vitakkā. Kāma-vitakko, vyāpāda-vitakko, vihiṃsā-vitakko. Tayo kusala-vitakkā. Nekkhamma-vitakko, avyāpāda-vitakko, avihimsā-vitakko.* 'Three kinds of unwholesome thoughts: thoughts [directed at/under the sway of] sensual pleasures, thoughts of malice, [and] thoughts of violence. Three kinds of wholesome thoughts: thoughts [directed at] deliverance [from sensual pleasures], thoughts of benevolence [lit., non-malice], [and] thoughts of non-violence.' (see also MN 114-118; Vibh 362-363). AN I 254, 16-25, adds to these three unwholesome thoughts another set of three 'secondary defilements subtly accompanying [the mind]' (*sukhumasahagatā upakkilesā*), i.e., thoughts [of attachment] for one's relatives (*ñātivitakko*; the PTS text reads: *jāti*^o; see, however, AN-a II 362, 19-20, which has: *ñāti*^o; Woodward and Rhys-Davids, AN Engl. tr., vol. 1, p. 232, n. 6, also propose the reading *ñāti-vitakko*, though they do not indicate their source), thoughts [of attachment] for one's [home]land (*janapadavitakko*), and thoughts connected with [the wish] not to be despised (*anavaññatti-paṭisaṃyutto vitakko*) (or, as Woodward and Rhys-Davids suggest, on the basis of the Commentary, caring for one's 'reputation' (AN Engl. tr., vol. 1, p. 232)). After the elimination of these six types of unwholesome thoughts, there still remains, our Pali text continues (AN I 254, 27-255, 2), another kind of *vitakka* called *dharmavitakkā*, which appears to refer to *vitakka* in the first absorption. Buddhaghosa glosses the word as: *dasavipassanūpakkilesavitakkā* (AN-a II 362, 25-26). Woodward and Rhys-Davids (AN Engl. tr., vol. 1, p. 232, n. 8) discuss the word, concluding that the rendering of 'reflections about mind-states' is more appropriate than 'righteous thoughts' (the latter being the equivalent suggested by the PTSD). I think, however, that *dhamma*^o can also be construed here as 'in accordance with the Teaching' (cf. *paṭisaṃyutto* in *anavaññatti-paṭisaṃyutto vitakko* above). The meaning is, I assume, that of thoughts or reflections which agree with the prescriptions for practice of the first *jhāna*. From the viewpoint of the higher absorptions, it is true that this kind of reflections are an obstacle to be abandoned (and therefore *upakkilesa* as categorised by Buddhaghosa), but as far as the first *jhāna* is concerned, they can be called 'righteous thoughts'. (For *vitakka/vitraka* in the Vibh and parallel sources, see Schmithausen 1986, especially p. 225.)

The category of unwholesome thoughts, whether three or six, is also known in the Northern tradition (see TatSid T32.352a29-353a22: 'The Chapter on Unwholesome Thoughts' 惡覺品; *Zuochan sanmei jing* T15.273a26-b5; etc). The unwholesome thoughts are also mentioned in the ŚrBh several times. E.g., *tatra vitarkaḥ kāmavitarkādayaḥ klišṭā vitarkāḥ*. (MS 105a5L-M; Sh 399, 4-5) 'Herein, "thought" [refers to] defiled thoughts, [to wit,] thoughts [directed at] sensual pleasures, etc.' (the enumeration is, most likely, meant to include the thoughts of malevolence

and the thoughts of harming). In the same context, the ŚrBh also mentions other minor forms of unwholesome thoughts, such as thoughts [of attachment] for one's relatives, thoughts [of attachment] for one's [home]land, thoughts [of attachment] for immortality (MS 105b1M, Sh 400, 4: *jñātijanapadāmaravitarkam*, which largely agrees with the Ch.: 於親屬國土不死 [...] 諸惡尋思 (T30.457b27-28); Tib. *nye du'i rnam par rtog pa dang ljongs kyi rnam par rtog pa* (P 177a6; D147a3), however, does not contain the equivalent of *amara* which appears in Skt. and Ch as well as in other parallel passages). We also see *jñātijanapadāmaravitarkaḥ* at ŚrBh-Gr 152, 12, etc. (cf. also Tib D *Dzi* 39a5, this time containing the equivalent of *amaravitarka* = *mi 'chi ba'i rnam par rtog pa*; Ch. T30.412a3-4). At AKBh 319, 2, we find *jñātivitarko janapadavitarko 'maravitarkaḥ*. BoBh 145, 13-16, also lists similar unwholesome thoughts, which compared with the earlier canonical sources, have gradually increased in number: *yathā kāma-vitarkam. evaṃ vyāpāda-vihimsā-jñāti-janapadāmara-vitarkā avamanyanā-pratisamyuktaḥ kulodayatā-pratisamyuktaś ca vitarko veditavyaḥ*. 'It should be understood that just as the thoughts [directed at] sensual pleasures are, even so are the thoughts of malice, of harming, of [attachment] for one's relatives, of [attachment] for one's [home]land, for immortality, [the thoughts] associated with contempt, and thoughts associated with [the arrogance] of success [in life] [high status] of [one's] family.' (cf. also Tib. D *Wi* 78b3-4, also containing the correspondent of *amaravitarka* = *mi 'chi ba'i rtog pa*; Ch. T30.512c18-20) (for the meaning of *kulodayatā-pratisamyukta*, see Tib. rendering; cf. SWFT, fascicle 10, p. 94, s.v.). For *vitarka* in Vinīś, see Ahn 2003, 147-148 (Tibetan edition) and 355-358 (German translation).

The wholesome thoughts (*kusalavitakkā/kuśalavitarkāḥ*) are, obviously, the absence or abandonment of their negative counterparts (see DN III 215, 3-6, cited above; MN 114-118; TatSid T32.353a23-354c2: 'The Chapter on Wholesome Thoughts' 善覺品; *Zuochan sanmei jing* T15.273b6-274c19, with detailed advice on how each of the six unwholesome thoughts can be eliminated; etc.).

¹⁶⁵ It is interesting to note that *vitarka* and *vicāra* also appear associated with meditative states in the Hindu spiritual tradition. Thus *Mahābhārata* 12.188.15 (vol. 3, p. 2245) declares that 'investigation, examination, and discrimination arise in the sage intently concentrating upon the first absorption for the first time' (*vicāraś ca vitarkaś ca vivekaś copajāyate | munēḥ samādadhānasya prathamam dhyānam āditah |*). It is not clear from the text whether *vicāra* and *vitarka* were construed precisely in the same way as in Buddhism. One notices that they appear in the reverse order from the usual sequence in Buddhist sources. More importantly, the *Mahābhārata* contains an extra element: *viveka*, a typically Hindu philosophical term (for its meaning see, e.g., *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* VI.9.2., where *viveka* is the faculty of discerning the real essence; the passage follows almost immediately after the famous phrase *tat tvam asi* which occurs at VI.8.7.; cf. also YS II.26: *vivekakhyāti*, YS III.55: *vivekajam jñānam*; etc.). The association of this factors with *prathamam dhyānam* may suggest a Buddhist influence. What is intriguing is that the *Mahābhārata* does not continue with the second, third, etc. absorptions and thus *prathamam dhyānam* looks somehow unusual. (Or does this refer to 'meditation which is first [acquired by the sage]', a sense reinforced by *āditah?*—less likely!)

YS 1.17 defines the *samādhi* characterised by conscious mental faculties in the following way: *vitarkavicārānandāsmītarūpānugamāt samprajñātaḥ* '[contemplation is] conscious because it is accompanied [by mental factors] in the form of examination, [or] investigation, [or] joy, [or] the sense of existing [as a distinct individuality]'. (Meisig 1988, 49, reads: °*āsmītanugamāt* but records °*āsmītarūpānugamāt* as a *var. lec.* in quite a number of editions (p. 53); cf. also Prasāda ed., p. 32, and Woods tr., p. 40, which also read with °*rūpa*.) Vyāsa's understanding of *vitarka* and *vicāra* in his commentary to this *sūtra* is along the same lines as

the Northern Buddhist Abhidharma: ‘*vitarka* is the coarse orientation of the mind towards the meditative object; *vicāra* is the subtle [orientation of the mind]’ (*vitarka*<*ś*> *cittasyālabhane sthūlābhogaḥ* | *sūkṣmo vicāraḥ* |; Rāma Prasāda, ed., p. 32; Prasāda reads: *vitarkacitta*’; cf. also Vācaspatimīśra’s sub-commentary, *ibid.*, pp. 33-34).

¹⁶⁶ Cf. the Tib. and Ch. translations which are more explicit about the way the phrase should be construed.

¹⁶⁷ Skt. *vipulaprasrabdhicittakāyakarmaṇyatayā*. The word *vipula* literally means ‘extensive’, ‘abundant’, etc. *Cittakāyakarmaṇyatā* ‘malleability [flexibility] of the mind and body’ is identified in the ŚrBh as ‘ease’: *cittakāyakarmaṇyatā, iyam atra kāyacittaprasrabdhīḥ* (Sakuma 26, § G.2.; see also *cittakarmaṇyatā cittaprasrabdhir utpadyate*; *ibid.*, p. 27, § G.2.). AKBh 55, 8-9 also equates the two terms: *prasrabdhīś cittakarmaṇyatā*. (Equally relevant is the subsequent discussion in the AKBh concerning *kāyaprasrabdhī*). At AKBh 438, 18, we read: *iha prasrabdhisukham* ‘here [i.e., in the first two absorptions] there is joy [in the form of] ease’. See also *kāyakammaññatā* and *cittakammaññatā* at Dhs 15, § 46 and § 47, as well as the definition of *prasrabdhī* at SamBh 89 (cited in note 184 below).

¹⁶⁸ The syntax and, closely related to it, the meaning of the sentence raises a few problems. Sakuma (p. 133, n. 746) correctly analyses it as consisting of four phrases: the first two (*īpsitābhilaṣitārthasamprāpteḥ, prītau cādoṣadarśanāt*) refer to *prīti* and the last two (*sarvadauṣṭhulyāpagamāc ca vipulaprasrabdhicittakāyakarmaṇyatayā*) describe *sukha*. In his translation (p. 133), Sakuma, in a manner similar to the Sanskrit tradition of glossing separately upon each component (*pratīka*) of a compound, divides *prītisukham* into its constitutive parts, equating *prīti* with the former two phrases and *sukha* with the latter two. This equation is certainly appropriate, but as far as my translation is concerned, I have preferred to stay as close as possible to the original Skt. wording.

Grammatically, the first three phrases are in ablative and the last one in instrumental. Usually, when both cases are employed to express the reason, the instrumental tends to be subordinate to the ablative. Here, however, it seems that the instrumental functions as a supplementary reason which clarifies why the first *dhyāna* is said to be characterised by ‘joy and pleasure’. *Vipulaprasrabdhicittakāyakarmaṇyatayā* is therefore not to be taken as the reason of *sarvadauṣṭhulyāpagamāc ca* (i.e., ‘due to the disappearance of all noxiousness [disappearance caused] by [...] ease’). On the contrary, we know from canonical sources (see below) that *prasrabdhī* is not the cause but the effect of the disappearance of *dauṣṭhulya* (cf. also Sakuma p. 133, n. 746). (My rendering suggests this relation between the last two phrases by adding ‘resulting’ in square brackets.)

Furthermore, we must also notice that though we find *prītau* in the second phrase, there is no parallel phrase referring directly to *sukha*. In other words, we have no **sukhe cādoṣadarśanāt*, though at the level of the first absorption, the ascetic is equally unaware of the deficiency of both *prīti* and *sukha*! Finally, let us also note that the first half of our passage presumably qualifying *prīti* can hardly be considered a clear definition, i.e., an accurate description of ‘joy’ in terms of the psychological factors which it implies. The phrase *īpsitābhilaṣitārthasamprāpteḥ* would seem to be as relevant for ‘joy’ as much as it is for ‘pleasure’. The achievement of the goal, for which our yogi has so much yearned, is the attainment of the first absorption, which is possessed of *prīti* and *sukha* alike. The second phrase, *prītau cādoṣadarśanāt* directly refers to ‘joy’, but it does not say anything on its psychological content either. Actually, for a more precise definition, we must wait until passage 3.28.3.2.5. below, i.e., the gloss upon ‘joy and pleasure’ in the second absorption.

All in all, these details show that we have to do with a sentence lacking stylistic refinement and commentarial precision. It may reflect a (rather crude) oral style of a master (hastily?) giving a few practical explanations to his disciples.

¹⁶⁹ Our gloss here seems to identify *sukha* with *praśrabdhi*. The latter is frequently depicted in Buddhist sources as a precondition or qualification of *sukha*. At DN I 73, 20-24 (immediately preceding the *paṭhamajjhāna* stock-phrase), we read: *tass' ime pañca nīvarañe pahīne attani samanupassato pāmujjam jāyati, pamuditassa pīti jāyati, pītimanassa kāyo passambhati, passaddhakāyo sukham vedeti, sukhino cittam samādhiyati*. 'Upon perceiving that the five hindrances have been abandoned, gladness is born; in him who is gladdened, joy is born; the body of he whose mind is filled with joy acquires ease; the body having acquired ease feels pleasure; the mind of him who feels pleasure becomes concentrated' (my rendering is fairly free). A similar sequence of *pīti*, *passaddhi*, and *sukha* is also found at DN I 196, 10-12. The post-canonical Nett (29, 21-22), probably echoing these canonical sources, says: *pīti passaddhiyā padaṭṭhānam. passaddhi sukhassa padaṭṭhānam* 'Joy is the base [/proximate cause; see PTSD, s.v.] of ease. Ease is the base of pleasure'. For an early classification of *passaddhi* (in the sense of 'calming'), see SN IV 217-218; also see the definitions of *kāyapassaddhi* and *cittapassaddhi* at Dhs 14-15, § 40 and § 41 respectively.

AK VIII.9b considers that *praśrabdhi* (var. lec. *prasrabdhi*) best describes the content of *sukha* in the context of meditation psychology: *prasrabdhiḥ sukham ādyayoḥ | prathamadvityayos tu dhyānayoḥ prasrabdhi<ḥ> sukham ity uktam* (AKBh 438, 17-18) (Pradhan reads: *prasrabdisukham* but in note 5, p. 438, records the 'G' reading: *prasrabdhiḥ sukham*, which I follow here; I also emend the subsequent occurrence of *prasrabdisukham* to *prasrabdhi<ḥ> sukham*; Tib. consistently presupposes *prasrabdhiḥ sukham*, and so does Ch. seem to do). 'In the first [two absorptions] pleasure is ease. It has been stated that in the first and second absorptions, in contrast (*tu*) [to the third absorption], pleasure is ease'. The subsequent discussion in the AKBh (438, 18 - 440, 8) makes it clear that important differences between the Vaibhāṣikas and the Dārṣṭāntikas existed on how *sukha* and *praśrabdhi* should actually be construed in this context (see note below).

The phrase *sarvadauṣṭhulyāpagamāc* also seems to be closely related to *praśrabdhi*, and thus indirectly to refer to *sukha*. The elimination of the noxiousness [/badness] (*dauṣṭhulya*) is a condition determining the obtaining of the ease. In the *Bhāvanamayi bhūmiḥ*, for example, we read: 麤重已遠離故，獲得輕安。輕安故，生心身清涼。 (T30.394c29-395a1). 'Because noxiousness has disappeared, [the ascetic] obtains ease. Because of ease, he produces in his body and mind [a sensation of] coolness'. My translation follows the Chinese version. The Tibetan rendering (which is part of a larger sentence) has a slightly different wording: *gnas ngan len dang bral bas kyang de'i shin tu sbyangs pa dang | shin tu sbyangs pas bskyed pa'i lus dang sems kyi phan pa bsil bar gyur pa bsgom pa yongs su rdzogs par 'gyur ba* (ZT 72.1328, 18-20) (Tib. *gnas ngan len dang bral pas* strongly suggests *dauṣṭhulyāpagamāt*, similar to our passage in the ŚrBh). On *dauṣṭhulya*, see Schmithausen 1969a, n. 145, pp. 156-158.

See also note 184 below on joy and pleasure in the second absorption.

¹⁷⁰ As pointed out in the preceding note, the AKBh identifies ease (*praśrabdhi*) with pleasure (*sukha*) in the first two absorptions. By using *praśrabdhi* to gloss upon *sukha*, the ŚrBh seems to share a similar view. This actually sheds some light upon the doctrinal stance of the ŚrBh authors. Vasubandhu discusses in detail the differences between the Ābhidhārmikas (the orthodox Sarvāstivādin Vaibhāṣikas) and 'others' (identified by Yaśomitra as the Dārṣṭāntikas and/or Sautrāntikas) concerning the precise understanding of *sukha* (AKBh 438, 18 - 440, 8; see also AKVy 673 - 676, for details and the identification of the opponents.) The debate is full of doctrinal intricacies, but the relevant points for our discussion can be summed up as follows. The Ābhidhārmikas deny the fact that the *sukha* experienced in *dhyānas* can be bodily 'because one who is in meditative attainments does not have the complex of [sensible] cognitions [i.e., visual perception, etc.]' (*samāpannasya vijñānakāyābhāvāt | AKBh 438, 21*) (cf. also AMVibh

T27.412b2ff; T28.308c17ff.). The Dārṣṭāntikas, on the other hand, consider that in the first three absorptions there is no faculty of mental pleasure (*cāitasikam sukhendriyam*) and that in all these three *dhyānas*, pleasure refers only to corporal pleasure (*kāyikam eva sukham aṅgam*) (AKBh 439, 1-2; see also AKBh 41, 12-18; cf. AMVibh, T27.412b3-4, referring to a similar opinion of other proponents 有說者, who are not, however, identified). From the viewpoint of the Dārṣṭāntikas, *praśrabdhi* is present in all the four absorptions but is different from *sukha* (see *praśrabdhisukheyoḥ pṛthagvacanān na praśrabdhir eva sukham* | AKBh 439, 9; cf. AKVy 674, 5-9; cf. also AKBh 439, 6, for fourth absorption). In this meditative context, *praśrabdhi* is described as a wind which pervades the body and is born of a special concentration. This wind leads to a pleasant bodily feeling or sensation (AKBh 439, 10ff; AKVy 674, 27), which is the object of a tactile perception associated with pleasure (AKVy 674, 17ff.). The fact that unlike the Ābhīdhārmikas, the Dārṣṭāntikas/Sautrāntikas seem to accept the existence of both *cittapraśrabdhi* and *kāyapraśrabdhi* is also attested in other parts of the *Kośa* (see AKBh 55, 8-16; AKVy 128-129; for the identification of this view as being connected with the Sautrāntikas, see Saheki 1978, vol. 1, p. 158, and Poussin, vol. 1, 157).

Our passage in the ŚrBh, though not as explicit as the AKBh, makes, however, some hints at its doctrinal background. Judging from *vipulapraśrabdhicittakāyakarmaṇyatayā* (as well as from *tatpṛātipakṣikapraśrabdhicittakāyakarmaṇyatāsukhānugatvāt* in passage 3.28.3.2.5.), the authors of our text, unlike the Ābhīdhārmikas, seem to accept both *cittapraśrabdhi* and *kāyapraśrabdhi*. It thus seems that in this respect, the ŚrBh stance is similar or identical with that of the Dārṣṭāntikas/Sautrāntikas. Furthermore, if this qualification refers to *sukha* (as it most likely does), then the ŚrBh is again different from the Ābhīdhārmikas, for whom *sukha* in the first two absorptions would be *cittapraśrabdhi* only. In this respect, however, it seems that the ŚrBh standpoint is also distinct from the Dārṣṭāntikas/Sautrāntikas since the latter do not identify the *sukha* in absorptions with *praśrabdhi*.

See also passages 3.28.3.2.5., 3.28.3.3.5. and respective notes below.

¹⁷¹ Skt. *upanidhyāna* ‘reflection’. In Pali, *upanijjhāna* and *upanijjhāyana* mean ‘reflection, meditation’ as well as ‘looking at’, and *upanijjhāyati* is ‘to contemplate, hence, 1. to look at regard intently or covetously; 2. to meditate upon (acc.)’ (CPD, s.v.). We thus find *upajjhāna* used in the sense of ‘meditation’ in, for example, the Jātaka Commentary: *jhāyatīti lakkhaṇūpanijjhāna-ārammaṇūpanijjhānasamkhātehi jhānehi jhāyati* (Ja V 251, 18-19) ‘**meditates** means that [the *paccekabuddha* Sonaka, one of the characters of the tale] meditates by means of the so-called meditations of ‘reflection upon characteristics [and] reflection upon meditative objects’. The latter reflection, i.e., *ārammaṇūpanijjhāna*, is actually identical with *āmbanopanidhyāna* in our passage. We have no further details, however, on the way the authors of the Jātaka Commentary defined the term. On the other hand, *upanijjhāna*, *upanijjhāyati*, etc. often appear in collocations related to desire, i.e., looking with a covetous eye at something (e.g., Mil 124, 21; Vism 353, § 51; cf. also Vin I 193, 6, etc.: *upanijjhāyati*).

We also find the word in the BoBh (8, 22; 17, 2-3; and 209, 10-11; in the last two occurrences together with *samyag*^o), and though there is no detailed definition, *upanidhyāna* as a technical term seems to stress the reflective or contemplative aspect of meditation. The Tibetan and Chinese renderings of the term in our ŚrBh passage also support such a conclusion (see text and footnotes to the respective editions). It is noteworthy that though the ŚrBh deals here with *dhyāna* in the strict sense of absorption, it, nonetheless, stresses the observational (as opposed to estatic) nature of these meditative states (cf. also *smṛti*^o ‘mindfulness’ in the next phrase).

Let us also note that the ŚrBh passage here contains some parallels with the definition of *dhyāna* at AKBh 433, 7-13.

¹⁷² Skt. *ekāgrasmṛtyupanibandhād* can be interpreted in two ways. The word *upanibandha* literally means ‘being linked/bound to’. One way of construing this is to take this as referring to

being linked to the meditative object by means of the one-pointed mindfulness, as I render above. Sakuma (1990, vol. 2, p. 134) translates more freely as *da man seine Achtsamskeit in konzentrierter ("einspitziger") Form [auf den Gegenstand] richtet (upanibandha)*, but this obviously points to a similar understanding. Another possibility is to construe *ekāgrasmṛtyupanibandha* in the sense of 'relying on one-pointed mindfulness', therefore taking the 'linkage' to refer to the yogi's mental process 'being bond to', i.e., relying upon *ekāgrasmṛti*. Edgerton actually registers the word *upanibandha* as 'connexion, dependence (of effect on cause)' (see BHSD, s.v.). See also the use of the verb *upanibadhnāti* in passage 3.28.3.2.1. below. I think that this interpretation also makes sense, but I prefer the former alternative.

Both Tib. and Ch. show differences with regard to the way in which they construe this passage. See Tib. ed. and Ch. ed. as well as respective notes.

¹⁷³ Or, literally, 'through', 'by'. The value of the Sanskrit instrumental here is what Speijer ([1886] 1988, 48 and 50-51) calls 'accompanying circumstances and qualities'. See Sakuma's interpretation which suggests that *samāpattiyā* should be construed in the sense of *-samāpānatayā*, "als ein Eingetretener" (p. 135, n. 749). Cf. also Skilling's remarks with regard to the rendering 'dwell in emptiness' (1997, 347).

¹⁷⁴ Ji comments on the duration of the attainment as follows: 何故不言多時，唯言七日等者？[To-ryun's citation of Ji's Commentary contains 謂 here] 彼欲界中段食絕 [Ji's text reads 經 instead of 絕; I follow here the reading in To-ryun's citation of Ji's Commentary; one of the versions of To-ryun's text (甲本), however, also reads 經; see T vol. 42, p. 472, n. 9] 七日故。若過七日出定已，其身即壞故。(T43.121b8-10) 'Why doesn't [the *Śrāvaka*hūmi] say a longer [period of] time [and] only says "seven days"? Because [the nutritional value of] food [necessary for sustaining life] in the realm of sensual pleasures is exhausted in seven days [or, if adopt the 經 reading, '[can] last [only] seven days' (?)]. [And] because his body will be immediately destroyed if [the ascetic] comes out from the meditative attainment [after a period] longer than seven days.' (See also To-ryun citation at T42.472c20-21).

As far as the meaning of *viharati* is concerned, let us note that this is not the only way of construing it. Vibh (252, 26-27), for instance, explains *viharati* in physical terms, i.e., 'to dwell' means that the meditator sits cross-legged, walks, etc.

¹⁷⁵ Here, too, Tib. (see also Tib. ed. 3.28.3.1.0. above and 3.28.3.3.0., 3.28.3.4.0., etc. below), contains the citation of the whole canonical formula on the second absorption (which lacks in Skt. and Ch.): *de rtog pa dang dpyod pa dang bral zhing nang yongs su dang ste | sems kyi rgyud gcig tu gyur pas | rtog pa med pa dang | dpyod pa med pa | ting nge 'dzin las skyes pa 'i dga' ba dang bde ba can bsam gtan gnyis pa bsgrubs te gnas so = Skt. *sa vitarkavicārāṇām vyupaśamād adhyātmasamprasādāc cetasa ekotībhāvād avitarkam avicāram samādhijam prītisukham dvitīyam dhyānam upasāmpadya viharati.* 'Due to the stilling of the rough examination and subtle investigation, due to inner clarity, due to singleness of mind, he [i.e., the ascetic] dwells having attained the second absorption which is without rough examination, without subtle investigation, born of concentration, [and is characterised by] joy and pleasure'. The Sanskrit is reconstructed according to ŚrBh-Gr 22, 1-2 (see also MVastu 1.228, 4-6; id. 2.131, 18 - 132, 1 (reading *ekotībhāvā*, which is an ablative singular form occurring mostly and frequently in MVastu; see BHSD vol. 1, pp. 52-53); id. 283, 7-9 (having, this time, °*samprasādā*); Pañca 167, 5-7 (omitting initial *sa* and reading *adhyātman*); LalVis 100, 7-9 (spelling °*ekoti*° with *sma* at the end); SaṅghBh II 243, 12-14 (reading *adhyātman* and spelling *ekoṭi*°); DaśBh Kondō ed. 55, 16-56, 1 (spelling *eko*[°]° but Kyoto Univ. MS reading *ekoti*° and Tokyo Univ. MS *ekoṭi*°) = Rahder ed. 34, 1-3; ArthVin 17, 5-6 and commentary at ArthVinNib 182-183; MVyut # 1479 (reading *adhyātman*); etc. (cf. also note 127 above). In the ŚrBh glosses which follow below, there is no mention of the personal pronoun *sa* (but see the

var. lec. in Tib. (D-C-ZT stemma): *de'i phyir de*). Furthermore, *dhyānam upasampadya viharati* is no longer glossed upon, but no doubt, this is to be understood as in the explanation for the first absorption (see 3.28.3.2.6.: *evam sarvaṃ pūrvavad veditavyam*).

The parallel Pali stock-phrase is: *vitakkavicārānaṃ vūpasamā ajjhataṃ sampasādanam cetaso ekodibhāvaṃ avitakkaṃ avicāraṃ samādhijaṃ pītisukhaṃ dutiyajjhānaṃ upasampajja viharati* (DN I 74, 13-16; see also DN I 173; MN I 21-22; id. 41; id. 276; MN III 4; id. 14; id. 25-26; id. 36; SN III 236; SN V 10; id. 214; AN III 11; etc.). Unlike the Sanskrit version, the Pali formula has only the first phrase in ablative while *ajjhataṃ sampasādanam cetaso ekodibhāvaṃ* qualifies *dutiyajjhānaṃ*. I cannot figure out a decisive reason as to why the Sanskrit equivalent put the first three phrases in ablative. To be sure, from a psychological viewpoint, the change is not of major importance, but it can offer a clue for the scholastic who counts the basic factors (*aṅga*) of the absorption. A wording like that of the Sanskrit formula would make it much easier to conclude that the basic factors are three in number. It is, however, the Southern Abhidhamma which defines the second *jhāna* as consisting of three basic components: joy (*pīti*), pleasure (*sukha*), and focusing of the mind (*cittassa ekaggatā*) (see Vibh 263; Vism 126, § 139; id. 128, ch. 4, § 150). The Northern Abhidharma tradition, on the other hand, considers that the second absorption consists of four fundamental factors: the three mentioned above plus the inner peace (*adhyātmasaṃprasāda*) (see AKBh 438, 2; ArthVinNib 183, 3-4).

¹⁷⁶ For the Tib. way of construing the phrase, see note 332 to Tib. ed. Cf. also passage 3.28.2.2.2. and note 143 above.

¹⁷⁷ Skt. *ekarasatā* is an abstract noun formed from *ekarasa* which usually means 'having only one pleasure [or: one object of affection]; having always the same object of affection; unchangeable' (see MW, s.v.). The word occurs in Pali, too, with a wide range of connotations, from the concrete meaning of '(having) the same/a single taste' to the figurative usage (like in the compound *vimuttirasa* 'taste of liberation') and to technical sense of 'having the same character/nature; having the same/single function/accomplishment' (CPD, s.v. *ekarasatā*). The latter is, obviously, a later philosophical development characteristic of the commentarial literature, but we can see a transitional stage in the history of the word already in the Paṭiṣ (see A.K. Warder, in 'Introduction by PTS Editor' to the *Path of Discrimination* translated by Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli, p. XVIII and p. XXXV).

Though retaining a figurative shade ('taste', in the sense of spiritual experience), the term *ekarasatā* in our ŚrBh passage is closer to the meaning of 'state' or 'function'. It seems to refer to a mental state completely turned inwards, unmixed with other emotional or cognitive processes, and most notably, unobstructed by the discursive thinking implied by *vitarka* and *vicāra*. A more 'poetic' rendering would be 'singly flavoured state'. In the SamBh (143, 10-13), in a similar context, we find a relevant description, which makes the sense of *ekarasa* even more evident: *katham avitarko 'vicāraḥ samādhir bhavati? vitarkavicārebhyaś cittam adhyupekṣya saced ekaraseṇādhyātmam ālambanam adhimucya[ta] ekaraseṇa ca saṃprakhyāyate* 'How does the concentration without rough examination and subtle investigation arise? [It arises] when [the ascetic] becomes convinced of the inner meditative object in a homogeneous way, after having rendered [his] mind indifferent towards rough examination and subtle investigation, and when it fully appears [manifests itself] in a homogenous [way]'. In the Chinese translation of the ŚrBh, we also see 一味 describing the perfectly unified and concentrated state of *śamata*. 諸心相續、諸心流注前後一味、無相、無分別、寂靜而轉。(T30.460c12-13) 'The mental continua, the mental currents roll on homogeneously [lit., '[with] a single flavour'] before and after, with no characteristic, no conceptualisation, tranquil'. The extant Skt. corresponding to this sentence does not, however, contain *ekarasa*: *sarvā cittasantatiś cittadhārā paurvaparyeṇa*

nirnimittā pravarteta, nirvikalpā upasāntā (MS 109a5M-R; Sh 416, 22-417, 1). The sentence, with a few additions and a slightly different wording, is repeated at T30.461a22-24, which corresponds to MS 109b5L-M; Sh 419,8-10. As usual, it is difficult to decide whether this is an editorial addition by Xuanzang or a different reading witnessed by the Skt. MS in his hand, but here I would rather incline to favour the latter alternative. In BoBh (260, 18-20), we come across a passage, which partially resembles the wording of the above citation from the ŚrBh and describes *śamatha* as follows: *tasmimś ca nirabhilāpye vastumātre nirnimittayā ca nirvikalpacittasāmyā sarvadharmasamataikarasagamī*. This time, the Skt. contains the word *ekarasa*. The sentence is rendered into Chinese as: 即於如是，離言唯事，由無有相、無所分別，其心寂靜趣向一切法平等性、一味實性。(T30.539c29-540a2).

¹⁷⁸ Skt. *samprasāda* means ‘perfect quiet’ (which, according to MW, s.v., especially refers to ‘repose during deep sleep’), ‘serenity’, and also ‘trust, confidence’. The Tib. equivalent *yong su dang ba* ‘wholly pure/purity’ as well as the Ch. one 等淨 ‘uniformly pure/purity’ stresses the idea of ‘purity’. *Prasāda*, which is prefixed here with *-sam*, actually, means ‘brightness, clearness, purity’ as well as ‘calmness, tranquillity’, etc. In the context of spiritual praxis, one would expect that either of the meanings (or both!) would be unquestionably sanctioned by the Abhidharma exegets, but rather surprisingly, they seem to favour the sense of ‘confidence’. This is seen in both the Northern and Southern exegetical traditions. The Vibh (258, 7-8) defines the term as: *sampasādanan ti: yā saddhā saddahanā, okappanā, abhippasādo ‘sampasādana* means faith, believing, confidence, trust’. The same line of interpretation is inherited by the Vism (126, § 142: *sampasādanam vuccati saddhā*; etc.). The AKBh (440, 9-11) similarly says: *śraddhā prasādah: tasya hi dvitīyadhyanālabhāt samāhitabhūminiḥsaraṇe sampratayaya utpadyate | sā ‘trādhyātmāsāmprasāda iti | ‘Prasāda is faith: because due to the obtainment of the second absorption, complete trust in [the possibility of] riddance of [this] concentration level arises in the [ascetic]. This [faith refers] here [to] inner confidence (adhyātmāsāmprasāda)’. (As suggested by Xuanzang’s rendering 於定地亦可離 (T29.147b23), *samāhitabhūminiḥsaraṇe* probably refers here to the fact that the ascetic is able to abandon the meditative level without becoming attached to it; cf. also T29.762a11ff.) In the ArthVinNib (182, 4-5), we find the same equation stated in almost identical wording: *śraddhāsāmprasādah | yasmāt tasya yogino dvitīyadhyanālabhāt samāhitabhūminiḥsaraṇam sampratayaya utpadyate. ‘Sāmprasāda is faith through which, due to the obtainment of the second absorption, complete trust in [the possibility of] riddance of the concentration level [of the first attainment] arises in the yogi’.**

The ŚrBh contains only one other occurrence of *sāmprasāda*. The word appears in the stock-phrase describing the second absorption (ŚrBh-Gr 22, 1; see note 175 above). No definitions of the technical terms in the formula are, however, provided. In the SamBh (103, 8-9), some further details are given: *dvitīye dhyāne ‘dhyātmāsāmprasāda ālambana-grahaṇārthena, samādhir adhyā[tmasa]mprasādasamniśrayārthena* ‘in the second absorption, the inner clarity has the purpose [or: is used in the sense] of grasping the object, the concentration has the purpose [or: [is mentioned] in the sense of] [providing] a support for the inner clarity’. Construing here *sāmprasāda* as ‘confidence’ (concerning to the object) is not impossible, but the sense of ‘clarity’ of view (which helps ‘grasping’ the meditative object) is an equally plausible alternative. At SamBh 153, 8, *adhyātmāsāmprasāda* is compared to ‘a lake’ (*hrada*; Ch. (T30.339c1) renders 泉 ‘spring’), which might also point to the clearness of water (=view?), but without any further details it is difficult to draw definite conclusions (*hrada*, to be sure, can also suggest the abundance of water, etc.). The Vinīś ad SamBh contains some relevant clarifications. It says: 問：內等淨何法爲自性？答：念正知捨爲自性。(T30.649b4) ‘Question: What is the nature of *adhyātmāsāmprasāda*? Answer: Mindfulness (*smṛti*), discernment (*samprajāna*), and equanimity (*upekṣā*) are [its] nature’ (cf. Tib. P Zi 185a1). A few lines below,

the text explains that in the first *dhyāna*, the mindfulness, discernment, and equanimity are also present, but because they are activated by means of *vitarka* and *vicāra*, they cannot operate properly and are not, therefore, declared to be basic factors (*aṅga*) of this absorption. The Vinīś further adds: 第二靜慮由彼自性能有作業，又由踊躍心隨煩惱之所纏縛，是故顯示內等淨名。(T30.649b10-12) (cf. P Zi 185a4) ‘[In the case of] the second absorption, [they] function on account of [their] nature [i.e., spontaneously] but are [still] enwrapped by the defilement [Ch. 隨煩惱: secondary defilement] of excitement (Tib. *sems dga’ ba* = * *cittaudbilya*?) [exuberant mind, Ch. 踊躍心]. Therefore, [the canonical formula] uses [i.e., reveals/makes clear] the name of *adhyātmāsāmprasāda*’. Mindfulness and discernment, two of the psychological functions representing the nature of *adhyātmāsāmprasāda*, would seem to hint at clarity in the process of concentrating upon the meditative object. Though I have no definitive proof that the latter was the sense intended by the ŚrBh authors, I have opted for rendering here *sāmprasāda* as ‘clarity’.

Finally, let us add that *sāmprasāda* is counted as one of the fundamental factors of the second absorption (see AKBh 438, 1-2).

¹⁷⁹ Skt. *vitarkavicārasa* <c> *chidrasāntarām avasthām*. *Sacchidra* means ‘having holes’ or ‘faulty’ (*chidra* being ‘a hole, opening; a gap; a defect, imperfection’, etc.). Likewise, *sāntarām* has the sense of ‘having an interval or interstices’, ‘not close or compact, open in texture’, etc. as well as of ‘different’ and ‘mixed or mingled with others’ (MW, s.v.). Sakuma’s (p. 136) aptly renders as *unterbrochen und lückenhaft* and *frei vom Unterbrechungen und Lücken* respectively. Perfect concentration, at least in *jhāna/dhyāna*, is supposed to be a completely non-verbal focusing of the mind on the meditative object. The discursive thinking implied by the rough examination and subtle investigation, though having already transcended the sphere of sensual pleasures, is regarded as full of ‘holes’ and ‘interruptions’ in the mental flow. The achievement of the singleness of mind marks the cessation of all ratiocinative process, cessation which is described below as *ni*<*ś*> *chidranirantarām avasthām*. It would appear that in the beginning, the attainment of the second absorption is not stable, being liable to interruptions. During such unstable intervals, the mind seems to fall back to the level of the first *dhyāna*.

¹⁸⁰ Skt. *cetasa ekotībhāva* ‘singleness of mind’ (Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit, also °*ekoti*°, though the spelling °*ekoti*° appears more common; see BHSD, s.v.); Pali, *cetaso ekodibhāva*. The etymology and early meaning of the word have been subject to much debate (cf. CPD; BHSD, s.v.), but in the context of meditative psychology (at least, as depicted in the Abhidhamma/Abhidharma tradition), the term is equated with *ekaggatā/ekāgratā* ‘one-pointedness’. Vibh 258, 10-11, describes *cetaso ekodibhāva* as *sammāsamādhi* ‘correct concentration’. Vism, after a (Nirukta-like) analysis of the word (126, § 143), explains that in the first absorption, *samādhi* is not fully manifest because of the lack of *sampasāda* (which in Theravādin understanding means ‘confidence’). In the second *jhāna*, due to the absence of the obstructing activity of *vitakka* and *vicāra*, *sampasāda* gains full power, and ‘by the very obtainment of strong confidence as [its] companion’ (*balavasaddhāsahāyapaṭilābhen’eva*), ‘singleness of mind’ becomes fully established (126-127, § 144). At SamBh 152, 2-3, we read: ***cetasa ekotībhāvādhigata ity avitarkavicārabhūmilābhāt ‘Attainment of the singleness of mind — [this] is [achieved] because of the obtainment of the level without rough examination and subtle investigation [i.e., the second dhyāna].’***

¹⁸¹ See the almost identically worded gloss upon *vivekajam* ‘born of separation’ in passage 3.28.3.1.4. above.

The Vism (127, § 148) stresses that although concentration is also present in the first absorption, it is only the second *jhāna* that deserves the qualification *samādhijam* because of the extreme steadiness and confidence (*atīviya acalattā suppasannattā ca*) resulting from the elimination of the disturbing activity of *vitakka* and *vicāra*.

¹⁸² Tib. suggests: “noxiousness [corresponding] to rough examination, subtle investigation and the category of defilements of the first absorption”. See also note 353 to Tib. ed.

¹⁸³ Tib. seems to subordinate the phrase *vitarkavicāraprathamadhyānakleśapakṣasarva-dauṣṭhulyāpagamāt* to *tatprātipakṣikaprasrabdhicittakāyakarmaṇyatāsukhānugatvāt* ‘because it is accompanied by pleasure [...] due to the elimination of all noxiousness [...]’. This is a possibility, but I have preferred to follow the Skt. syntax faithfully.

¹⁸⁴ The gloss is more detailed than the parallel passage explaining ‘joy and pleasure’ in the first absorption (see 3.28.3.1.5. above and respective notes). Some of its phrases and parts of its compounds, i.e., *īpsitā<bhilaṣit>ārthaprāpteḥ prītau cādoṣadarśanāt*, *°sarvadauṣṭhulyāpagamāt*, and *°prasrabdhicittakāyakarmaṇyatā°* are actually identical. Furthermore, like 3.28.3.1.5., the first part of our passage here seems to be a gloss upon *prīti* while its latter half constitutes a description of *sukha*. (In his translation, Sakuma again divides the compound into *pratīkas*, assigning to each the respective phrases which gloss upon them. Here, too, I prefer to follow the original as closely as possible and leave the compound undivided like in the original Skt. as well as in Tib. and Ch.)

The following passage from the SamBh clearly shows that *prīti* is equated with *saumanasya* and *sukha* is linked to *prasrabdhi*. The beginning of this fragment is also cited by Sakuma (p. 136, n. 753) directly from the YoBh MS. The whole passage has meanwhile been edited by Delhey (SamBh 89, 1-6), whose text I follow here: *prītiḥ katamā? yaḥ samyakprayogapūrvako harṣaḥ prītiḥ(?) saumanasyaṁ cittakalyatā. prasrabdhiḥ katamā? dauṣṭhulyāpagamāt kāyacittakarmaṇyatā. sukhaṁ katamat? tathā(?) karmaṇyacittasya(?) yat kāyikacaitasikam avyāvadyasukhaṁ vimuktisukham; yatpakṣyaṁ hi tad dauṣṭhulyam apagatam, tebhya upakleśebhyo vimuktiḥ*. ‘What is **joy**? It is rejoicing preceded by [i.e., resulting from] correct practice, joy, [mental] satisfaction, mental well-being. What is **ease**? It is mental and bodily malleability [attained] due to the elimination of the noxiousness. What is **pleasure**? It is the impregnable bodily and mental pleasure, the pleasure of liberation [experienced by the ascetic] who has thus [attained] a malleable mind; liberation [refers here to] [being free] from the secondary defilements to which the eliminated noxiousness belongs’.

AK VIII.9cd also equates the two terms: *prītiḥ tu saumanasyaṁ dvidhāgamāt*. ‘But [it can be asserted that] *prīti* is mental satisfaction because of [being stated so in] two scriptures’. The *Bhāṣya* cites the canonical sources which prove this statement (AKBh 440, 16-21; for the identification of the scriptures, see Poussin vol. 5, p. 160, n. 1 and 2; Honjō 1984, pp. 112-113; Pāsādika 1989a, pp. 121-122, # 494). Vasubandhu also adds that below the level of the third absorption, the faculty of satisfaction is the feeling of mental delight (*caitasikī śātā vedanā saumanasyendriyam*, AKBh 41, 16-17), and this [mental] satisfaction is identified as ‘joy’ (*prītiḥ hi saumanasyam*, AKBh 41, 18). In the third *dhyāna*, however, bodily sensations are no longer possible because the complex of five sensible cognitions no longer functions. Instead of it, the feeling of mental delight becomes the faculty of perceiving pleasure (*śātā vedanā caitasī sukhendriyam | na hi tatra kāyikī vedanā ‘sti | pañcaviññānakāyābhāvāt* | AKBh 41, 13-14).

¹⁸⁵ Here, too, Tib. (see also Tib. ed. 3.28.3.1.0., 3.28.3.2.0, etc.) contains the whole citation of the stock-phrase describing the third absorption (for which there is no equivalent in Skt. and Ch.): *de dga’ ba’i ‘dod chags dang bral bas | btang snyoms la gnas shing dran pa dang shes bzhin can yin te | bde ba lus kyi myong la | ‘phags pa rnam kyis gang de dran pa dang ldan pa bde ba la gnas pa | btang snyoms pa’o zhes brjod pa ste | dga’ ba med pa bsam gtan gsum pa bsgrubs te gnas so = Skt. *sa prīter virāgād upekṣako viharati smṛtaḥ samprajāna<ḥ>* [MS: *samprajāna*; ŚrBh-Gr 22, 4: *samprajānan*; I emend on the basis of the reading in passage 3.28.3.3.3. below] *sukhaṁ ca kāyena pratisamvedayati; yat tad āryā ācakṣate “upekṣakāḥ smṛtimān sukhavihāri”ti niṣprītikāṁ tṛtīyaṁ dhyānam upasampadya viharati*. ‘Due to detachment from joy, he [i.e., the ascetic] dwells equanimous, mindful, discerning, and

experiences pleasure with [his] body; he dwells having attained the third absorption free from joy, which the Noble Ones describe [with the words] “[he is] equanimous, mindful, dwelling in [/enjoying] pleasure”. The Skt. reconstruction here follows MVyut # 1480 (with my punctuation).

There is also a variant of the canonical formula which does not contain *niṣpṛītikam* after “*upekṣakah smṛtimān sukhavihārī*”^{ti} and spells *pratisamvedayate* instead of *pratisamvedayati* (e.g., ŚrBh-Gr 22, 4-6; AKVy 673, 15-17; etc.). The corresponding Pali phrase has a slightly different wording: *pīṭiyā ca virāgā ca upekhako ca viharati sato ca sampajāno, sukhañ ca kāyena paṭisamvedeti yan tañ ariyā ācikkhanti* : “*upekhako satimā sukha-vihārī*” *ti tatiyajjhānaṃ upasampajja viharati* (DN I 75, 6-10; for other Sanskrit and Pali sources, see note 175 above). The standard Pali formula does not contain *nippītika*, but in its more detailed version, the description continues: *so imam eva kāyaṃ nippītikena sukkena abhisandeti parisandeti paripūreti parippharati, nāssa kiñci sabbāvato kāyassa nippītikēba sukkena apphutaṃ hoti* (DN I 75, 10-14; MN I 277, 17-20; etc.).

¹⁸⁶ It is difficult to ascertain with precision whether *nimitta* refers here to characteristics or to the mental image based on or refined from them (see note 17 above). Sakuma’s tentative rendering *Erscheinungs-und-Vorstellungsbildern* (p. 137; cf. n. 757, too) seems to imply the latter. Ji and To-ryun do not gloss the term 喜相 which occurs in this passage. We find in To-ryun’s Commentary (*ad* scrolls IV to VI of the YoBh) the following remark: 已見第二靜慮喜相過失而厭離之 (T42.338c22) ‘[The ascetic] having seen the deficiency in the characteristic of joy in the second absorption, averts [lit., ‘abhors and leaves’] it’. But this remark, too, offers no precise answer as to how *nimitta* should be construed. Neither is *prītinimitta* found amongst the 32 types of *nimitta* discussed in the SamBh (pp. 122-128).

¹⁸⁷ Skt. *virāga* means ‘indifference’, ‘dislike’, ‘dispassion’, etc. To-ryun’s Commentary (see note 186 above) implies ‘aversion’. Vism (128, § 154) accepts both meanings: *virāgo nāma vuttappakārāya pīṭiyā jigucchanaṃ vā samatikkamo vā* ‘the so-called *virāga* means disgust for or the transcending of joy as described [above]’.

¹⁸⁸ Skt. *upekṣā*/Pali *upekkhā* ‘equanimity’. Buddhaghosa analyses *upekkhā* into ten types (Vism 129, § 156-131, § 171). As remarked by Maithrimurthi in his outstanding study on the four *apramāṇas* (1999, 139-142; see also 428), this appears to be a later commentarial development, though early canonical sources also show *upekkhā* used in various contexts (ibid., 143). According to Buddhaghosa’s exegesis, *upekkhā* in the phrase ‘dwells equanimous’ is called ‘absorption-equanimity’ (*jhānupekkhā*) and is described as *aggasukhe pi tasmim apakkhapātajanāni upekkhā* (Vism 130, § 165) ‘the equanimity engendering impartiality [lit., ‘non-falling into one-sidedness’] towards even the highest [form of] pleasure [of the third absorption] [or: towards even this state [i.e., third absorption] possessed of the highest [form of] pleasure]’. The same ten kinds of equanimity are found in the Dhs-a (172-173), and the *jhānupekkhā* is defined in a similar way (the only difference is: *accanta-aggasukhe*). In the Northern tradition, the AKBh appears to distinguish between three types of *upekṣā*: (1) the intermediate (*madhya*) feeling of neither suffering nor pleasure (*aduḥkhāsukhā vedanā*) (AKBh 41, 20); (2) the cognitive indifference defined as *upekṣā cittasamatā cittānābhogatā* (AKBH 55, 16-17) ‘*upekṣā* is mental equality, lack of mental orientation [towards a specific object]’ (this is actually the opposite of *manaskāra* and the possibility of their coexistence in one mental act gives rise to different interpretations between the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas, ibid. 55, 17-21); and (3) equanimity as a one of the four boundless states (*apramāṇa*) (AKBh 452-454, *kārikās* VIII 29-31). These are termed by the AKVy as feeling equanimity, volitional equanimity, and equanimity as a boundless state (*trividhā hi upekṣā: vedanopekṣā, saṃskāropekṣā, apramāṇopekṣā ceti*. AKVy 129, 23-24). The ArthVinNib, which actually follows the same

threefold classification, identifies *upekṣā* in the third absorption as *samskāropekṣā* (183, 7-184, 1; cf. also Maithrimurthi 1999, p. 140, n. 5).

The Tibetan translation of the *Yogācārabhūmivyākhyā* enumerates 10 types of equanimity, but it concludes that they can be reduced to three basic categories (see Maithrimurthi 1999, 140), which seems to echo the AKBh and AKVy. On *upekṣā* in Yogācāra literature, see Gadjin Nagao's study 'Tranquil Flow of Mind: An Interpretation of *Upekṣā*' (1991, 91-102).

¹⁸⁹ Skt. *smṛti* also means 'recollection', 'memory', etc., but the primary sense in Buddhist texts in general is that of 'mindfulness' (see Cox 1992; Griffiths 1992). A collection of studies dedicated to mindfulness and remembrance in Indian and Tibetan Buddhism was edited by Janet Gyatso (1992). The most important contributions to the understanding of the concept of *smṛti* in the Buddhist tradition are Cox 1992 (an excellent study of the history of the concept from Early Buddhism to Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma), Griffiths 1992, and Jaini 1992.

¹⁹⁰ Skt. *cittam adhyupekṣate*. Sakuma renders: *hält den Geist frei [von ihnen] (?)*. I render the phrase as 'makes his mind indifferent [to them, i.e., those ideations and acts of attention accompanying joy]'. This does not contradict Sakuma's understanding since the implication is that by making the mind indifferent to these disturbing factors, the ascetic become free from them. (Cf., for instance, MN II 223, 13ff., where by becoming indifferent (*ajjhupakkhato*) to the source of suffering (*dukkhanidānassa*), the mendicant becomes detached (*virāgo*) from it.) The basic meaning of the verb *adhyupekṣate* (*adhi+upekṣate*) is 'ignores, disregards, is indifferent to' (BHSD, s.v.) or 'to look with indifference' (無關心に見る, in BWDJ s.v.) (the primary sense of *adhi-* here most probably is '[directed] towards'). The Pali equivalent is *ajjhupakkhati*, which is rendered in CPD (s.v.) as 'to look on without interfering, to tolerate, to be indifferent'. The phrase *cittam ajjhupakkhati* occurs in a number of sources and appears to have two main usages. One seems to be causative (like in our ŚrBh passage): 'to make the mind indifferent to [something]', 'to turn away the mind from [something]', or, simply, 'to make the mind free from [something]'. E.g., AN III 435, 22-23: *yasmim samaye cittam ajjhupakkhitam, tasmim samaye cittam ajjhupakkhati* 'when the mind should be made indifferent, he then makes his mind indifferent'. The other usage seems to take *citta* as the direct object of the verb *ajjhupakkhati* in the sense of 'to look at the mind with indifference'. Thus, at Nidd I 508, 10-12 (in verse), we see the collocation *cittam [...] ajjhupakkhati*, most probably meaning 'look upon the mind with equanimity' (cf. *Nanden daizōkyō*, vol. 43, p. 404: 心を [...] 捨置す). At Paṭis 168, 6-10, in a passage describing the cultivation or frequent training of equanimity (*upekkhanubrūhanā*) for the first *jhāna* (and below, for the other absorptions and immaterial attainments, too), we read: *visuddham cittam ajjhupakkhati, samathapaṭipannaṃ ajjhupakkhati, ekattupaṭṭhānaṃ ajjhupakkhati* [...] '[the meditator] looks at the purified mind with equanimity, looks at [the mind which] has practised tranquillity [or, as Ñānamoli construes at Paṭis tr. 170: 'as having made way for serenity'] with equanimity, looks at [the mind which] has established [mental] unity with equanimity [...]'. A similar meaning can be seen at MN III 86, 16-17 (and below): *so tathāsamāhitam cittam sādhuḥkam ajjhupakkhitā hoti*.

The collocation is also attested in Sanskrit sources. As Sakuma also points out (p. 138, n. 761), the AKBh (339, 20), too, employs the phrase in the following context: *kāyāṃ cittam cādhyupekṣya*. Sakuma translates this as *Körper und Geist unbeachtet lassend* and also refers to Poussin's rendering (vol. 4, 154): *laisser le corps et la pensée tels quels* (or, in note 6, *sans se préoccuper du corps et de la pensée*). The phrase, which occurs in the context describing the first stage of the mindfulness of breathing, means that no particular attention should be given to bodily and mental processes other than counting. Yaśomitra glosses upon it as: *anāsajyeti arthaḥ* (AKVy 528, 5) 'the meaning is without clinging [being attached to them]'. The verb *adhyupekṣate* (in various grammatical forms) also appears in the BoBh. E.g., *sacet samsāram*

yathābhūtaṃ na pariṇāyān, na śaknuyād rāgadveṣamohādikāt sarvasaṃkleśāc cittam adhyupekṣitum. anadhyupekṣamānaś ca samkṣiptacittaḥ samsāre saṃsaram naiva buddhadharmān paripācayet (BoBh 40, 9-12) ‘If [the bodhisattva] does not comprehend thoroughly the cycle of rebirths as it is, he cannot turn [his] mind away from [or: make his mind indifferent to] all defilements, [to wit] passion, hatred, misguidedness, etc. And since he does not turn away [his mind from them], [with] his mind defiled [and] wandering in the cycle of rebirths, [the bodhisattva] surely cannot mature the factors [necessary to become] a Buddha’. See also *tathā tathā bhūyasyā mātrayā paropārambhavivādaprakīrṇalapitākṣepakṣebhyaś ca vṛttaskhalitasamudācārebhyaḥ pariñāya pariñāya cittam adhyupekṣate* (BoBh 42, 7-9), where the phrase means ‘make the mind indifferent [to criticism, etc.]’ (cf. Ui’s translation: 心を無關心にする, at BoBh Index, p. 40.)

Finally, a few words about the Tib. and Ch. translations of *cittam adhyupekṣate* in the ŚrBh. The former renders the phrase as *sems btang snyoms su byed* ‘make the mind equanimous’. Ch. translates it as 心住上捨 ‘[his] mind dwells in superior equanimity’ (thus construing *citta* in nominative). 上捨 seems to be a literal rendering of *adhy* (=上) + *upekṣate* (=捨). (Some Tibetan equivalents of *adhyupekṣate*, etc. in the YoBh also construe the verb similarly: *lhag par btang nyoms su byed pa* or *lhag par btang snyoms su ’jog pa*; see YoBh-D, s.v. *adhi-upa-√īkṣ*.) The term 上捨 actually appears a few times in Xuanzang’s translation of the YoBh: 心得平等便修上捨. (T30.676c22); 若復於彼深觀過患, 於上捨中不生愛味. (T30.858a9-10); etc. In Xuanzang’s translation of the BoBh, we also see: [...] 安住上捨, 故名不愛. (T30.489b6-7) ‘because of dwelling in superior equanimity, [this] is called non-craving’. In the extant Skt. text, there is, however, no *adhyupekṣate* (or any form derived from it) but simply *upekṣaka*. The text runs as: [...] *upekṣakaś ca viharati. evaṃ kāntim na karoti* (BoBh 49, 14-15). Without a Sanskrit original for the other occurrences above (and, more importantly, without being able to ascertain Xuanzang’s Skt. MS used for the rendering), it is difficult to determine whether 上捨 consistently stands for *adhi-upa-√īkṣ*.

¹⁹¹ Skt. *smṛta* ‘mindful’ and *saṃprajāna* ‘discerning’, together with ‘equanimity’ (*upekṣā*), are fundamental factors (*aṅga*) of the third *dhyāna* (see AKBh 438, 3-5). The gloss here (as in many other places in the ŚrBh) seems to be more concerned with the spiritual process the yogi experiences rather than with Abhidharmic definitions and systematisation. For the sake of more terminological precision (a vice which I share with the Ābhidhārmikas!...), I shall quote here definitions from other sources. Buddhaghosa comments upon *sato ca sampajāno* in the corresponding Pali stock-phrase as follows: *sarati ti sato, sampajānāti ti sampajāno [...] tattha saraṇalakkhaṇā sati, asammussanarasā, ārakkhapaccupaṭṭhānā. asammohalakkhaṇaṃ sampajāññaṃ, tīraṇarasam, pavicayapaccuṭṭhānaṃ* (Vism 131, § 172) ‘[Because] he remembers, he is called “mindful”, [because] he discerns, he is called “discerning”. [...] Here, mindfulness has the characteristic of remembering, the function of not forgetting [for this meaning of *rasa*, see note 177 above], [and] the manifestation of guarding. Discernment has the characteristic of non-bewildernment, the function of judgement [/recognition], [and] the manifestation of investigation’. See also Dhs 11, § 14 and 16, § 53 for the definition of *sati* and *sampajāñña* respectively, and Dhs-a 121-122, § 306, and 131, § 325, for detailed glosses on these definitions. Yaśomitra, commenting upon AKBh VIII.8a-b, says: *saṃskāropekṣā ’tra grhyate. yā prūter* [Wogihara reads: *prūter*; my emendation is based on Tib. P Chu 350a5: *dga’ ba la*] *anābhogalakṣaṇā. smṛtir upekṣānimittasyāsaṃpramoṣaḥ. smṛtyasaṃpramoṣe saṃprajñānatā saṃprajñānam* (AKVy 672, 7-8; Wogihara spells: *saṃprajñānam*) ‘Here, [equanimity] [should be] taken as [meaning] volitional equanimity [see note 184 above]. It has the characteristic of not being directed towards joy. **Mindfulness** [means] non-losing [this] characteristic of equanimity. **Discerning** [means] discernment as to not losing this mindfulness’.

¹⁹² The gloss here has a rather irregular form. All the other glosses end in *tenāha* or the canonical word/phrase is preceded by nouns in ablative (occasionally, in instrumental) explaining how the state in question arises. Formally, the gloss here appears to continue into the next two sentences, the last one containing the typical *tenāha*. Doctrinally, however, this has nothing to do with them, as the latter represent an explanation of *sukham ca kāyena pratisamvedayate*. The passage here (3.28.3.3.4.), on the other hand, deals with *niṣprītikam*, a word which actually occurs in the gloss itself. In Tib., which has a different order from Skt. and Ch. (see note 407 to Tib. ed.), the explanation of *dga' ba med pa = niṣprītikam* is clearly structured as a gloss apart.

It must also be noted that in the canonical formula (see note 185 above), *niṣprītikam* appears later in the sentence, after the phrases which are glossed upon in passage 3.28.3.3.5. and 3.28.3.3.6.

¹⁹³ Skt. *rūpakāya* 'material body'. This refers to the physical body. I render to *rūpa* as 'matter' or, in its attributive usage, as 'material' (cf. 'immaterial' for its negative forms). In spite of its wide-spread employment, I do not think that 'form' is the most felicitous rendering of the term. Seyfort Ruegg's apt remarks (1998, 137) concerning the unsuitability of 'form' for *rūpa* are definitely worth mentioning in this context.

¹⁹⁴ Skt. *manaḥkāya* 'mental body'. The canonical stock-phrase, which is the object of this gloss, seems to construe *sukha* in the third absorption simply as a bodily experience of pleasure or ease. Early sources usually conceive of *sukha* in general as an agreeable body sensation (e.g., SN V 209, 7-9: *katamañ ca bhikkhave sukhindriyam? yañ kho bhikkhave kāyikaṃ sukhaṃ kāyikaṃ sātāṃ kāyasamphassaṃ sukhaṃ sātāṃ vediyatāṃ*; actually, the whole chapter here (SN V 207-216) is dedicated to *sukhindriya*).

The problem becomes, however, much more complicated with the development of the Abhidharmic analysis. Bodily sensations in the third *dhyāna* are declared to be no longer possible due to the absence of the five sensible cognitions. The *Kośa* says that the faculty of pleasure is the feeling of mental delight (*śātā vedanā caitasī sukhendriyam | na hi tatra kāyikī vedanā 'sti | pañcaviññānakāyābhāvāt |* AKBh 41, 13-14) (see note 184 above). Vasubandhu discusses the problem in detail at AKBh 438, 18 - 440, 8 (cf. also AKVy 673-676). Here, he seems to present a Dārṣṭāntika position (see AKVy 673, 6-7), though he directs some criticism at it (see AKBh 440, 4-5). Basically, Vasubandhu describes a polemical dialogue between an opponent (apparently a Vaibhāṣika) and the others (*apare*) (probably the Dārṣṭāntikas). To the oponent who adduces scriptural proof that *sukhendriya* is mental as well as bodily sensation ([...] *kāyikaṃ caitasikaṃ sātāṃ veditaṃ* [...] AKBh 439, 2-4, which actually is the Skt. parallel of SN V 209, 7-9, quoted above; the latter, however, contains no equivalent of *cetasika*), it is replied that this is a wrong extrapolation (*adhyaeropita eṣa pāṭhaḥ*, AKBh 439, 4) and that the canonical formula of the third absorption expressly states that pleasure is experienced by the body ("*sukhaṃ ca kāyena pratisamvedayata*" *iti svaśabdena vacanāc ca*, AKBh 439, 5). But how is this to be solved if we accept that at this level there are no more corporal perceptions? The Dārṣṭāntika answer is that *kāyena* must be understood here as a 'mental body' (*manaskāyenetī cet* AKBh 439, 5). The term is explained by Yaśomitra as *manaḥsamudāyena* (AKVy 673, 18) 'mental complex' (cf. also *trīṣṭhā dhyāne yat sukham, tan mana evāśritam, na caḥsurindriyādyāśritam itī* AKVy 310, 34-311, 1).

In the Southern Abhidhamma tradition, the Vibh (259, 20-28) was more outright and argued that *sukha* in the third *jhāna* is to be understood as mental (*cetasika*) and that the *kāya* experienced in it refers to the aggregate of ideation (*saññākhandha*), the aggregate of impulses and volition (*sañkhārakkhandha*), and the aggregate of consciousness (*viññānakkhandha*).

Our ŚrBh passage here appears to represent a position different from the Dārṣṭāntikas and the Theravādins. Though no appeal to scriptural authority is made here, the ŚrBh standpoint seems

to come closer to the opponent (Vaibhāṣika?) against whom the Dārṣṭāntikas argue. It must, however, be stressed that the ŚrBh gloss is too succinct to allow us clear conclusions concerning the details of how the authors regarded this matter.

¹⁹⁵ The Skt. original (as well as the Ch.) merely cites this last part of the canonical formula, without glossing upon it. Tib. contains, however, a separate gloss (see note 439 to Tib. ed.) which tells that the rest of the sentence should be understood as above, i.e., in the case of the first absorption.

¹⁹⁶ Here, too, Tib. (see also Tib. ed. 3.28.3.1.0., 3.28.3.2.0, 3.28.3.3.0., etc.) gives the whole citation of the stock-phrase describing the fourth absorption (for which we have no equivalent in Skt. and Ch.): *de bde ba yang spangs te | snga nas sdug bsngal yang spangs shing yid bde ba dang | yid mi bde ba yang nub pas bde ba yang ma yin | sdug bsngal yang ma yin | btang snyoms dang | dran pa yongs su dag pa bsam gtan bzhi pa bsgrubs te gnas so* = Skt. **sa sukhasya ca prahāṇād duḥkhasya ca prahāṇāt pūrvam eva ca saumanasyadaurmanasyayor astagamād aduḥkhāsukham upekṣāsmṛtipariśuddham caturtham dhyānam upasampadya viharati* (reconstructed according to ŚrBh-Gr 22, 7-9; note that the ŚrBh-Gr editors spell *astagamād* while MS 3a8L reads as above (for the choice of this spelling, see note 263 to Skt. crit. ed.); *prahāṇād duḥkhasya ca* is omitted in MS, but MVyut # 1481 as well as other sources (see note 175 above) contain it). ‘Due to the abandonment of pleasure and due to the abandonment of [bodily] pain as well as due to the fact that [mental] satisfaction and dissatisfaction have already disappeared before, he [i.e., the ascetic] dwells having attained the fourth absorption which is neither painful nor pleasant [and] is pure with regard to equanimity and mindfulness’ (on the interpretation of the compound *upekṣāsmṛtipariśuddham*, see note 207 below). The equivalent Pali canonical formula is: *sukhassa ca pahāṇā dukkhassa ca pahāṇā pubb’eva somanassadomanassānaṃ atthagamā adukkham asukham upekkāsati pārisuddhim catutthajjhānaṃ upasampajja viharati* (DN I 75, 28-31; for other Pali sources, see note 175 above; *atthagamā* is also spelled *atthaṅgamā*, e.g. Vibh 245, 15, but with *var. lec.*: *atthagamā*—cf. also note 263 to Skt. crit. ed.).

¹⁹⁷ Ji comments upon this passage in the following way: 此中捨念正知名能對治，第三禪樂名所對治。經中唯說所斷之樂，不言能斷捨念正知者以第三禪已明捨念等能對治法與此第四禪能對治法相似故。(T43.121c1-4; I differ from the Taishō punctuation) ‘Here, equanimity, mindfulness, and discernment are called “[factors] capable of being antidote”. Pleasure [in] the third absorption is called “[factor upon which the] antidote is effected [or: subject to the antidote]”. The fact that the scriptures speak only of the pleasure which is abandoned and do not mention equanimity, mindfulness, and discernment[, which are the factors] capable of being antidote, is because the factors capable of being antidote, [i.e.,] equanimity, mindfulness, etc., which have been explained for the third absorption, as well as the factors capable of being antidote in the fourth absorption are similar.’

¹⁹⁸ It seems that (at least according to the Ābhīdharmikas) in the context of the fourth absorption, both pleasure (*sukha*) and pain (*duḥkha*) should be conceived of in a narrow sense. The Vibh (260, 19-31) defines both of them as ‘bodily’ (*kāyika*) sensations. Buddhaghosa (Vism 134, § 187) says that pain (*dukkha*) may re-appear during the access phase the first absorption (*paṭhamajjhānūpacāre*) in the form of contact with gadflies, mosquitos, etc. or the discomfort of an uneven seat (*daṃsamakakasādisamphassena vā visamāsanupatāpena vā*). This understanding of *dukkha* and *sukha* as bodily sensations of discomfort and comfort respectively has canonical roots (e.g., the definitions of *sukhinidriya* and *dukkhindriya* at SN V 209 ff.). In the Northern tradition, the ArthVinNib (186, 2-3), the gloss upon *sukhasya ca prahāṇād* in the canonical formula of the fourth absorption, says: *sukhasya kāyikasya, duḥkhasya ca kāyikasyaiva* ‘verily [it is abandonment] of bodily pleasure and of bodily pain’.

Our passage in the ŚrBh, too, appears to construe *sukha* and *duḥkha* here as ‘bodily’ since they are contrasted with *saumanasya* and *daurmanasya*. But this leads to the problem of the exact interpretation of *sukhaduḥkhavyatikramam*: if *sukha* and *duḥkha* are understood in a narrow sense (as the passage on the whole seems to do), then why are not *saumanasya* and *daurmanasya* (which are also transcended) mentioned? One possible answer is that in this compound here, *sukhaduḥkha*^o should be construed in a broader sense as including *saumanasya* and *daurmanasya* (cf. also Sakuma p. 140, n. 772). See also note 204 below.

¹⁹⁹ A more literal translation of the Skt. *yac ca pūrvaprahīṇaṃ yac caitarhi prahiyate, tasya saṃkalanāṃ kurvann* would be ‘putting this together, [i.e.,] both what has been previously abandoned and what is abandoned now’.

²⁰⁰ [Mental] satisfaction (*saumanasya*) is equivalent to joy (*prīti*) (see passages 3.28.3.1.5. and 3.28.3.2.5. above as well as respective notes).

²⁰¹ [Mental] dissatisfaction (*daurmanasya*) is the antonym of *saumanasya*. At SN V 209, 22-24, the faculty of dissatisfaction (*domanassindriya*) is described as ‘an unpleasant mental [feeling], an uncomfortable mental [feeling], an unpleasant, uncomfortable feeling arising from mental contact’ (*yaṃ [...] cetasikaṃ dukkhaṃ cetasikaṃ asātaṃ manosamphassaṃ dukkham asātaṃ vedayitaṃ*). AK II 8b-c defines it as: *asātaṃ caitasī punaḥ | daurmanasyam* (AKBh 41, 20-21) ‘**furthermore, daurmanasya is unpleasant mental [feeling]**’. To this Yaśomitra adds: *upaghātikā caitasikī vedanā daurmanasyam* (AKVy 100, 32) ‘*daurmanasyam* is an afflicting mental feeling’.

²⁰² The same pattern of abandonment as in the ŚrBh is also suggested at SamBh (107, 18-108, 10). See also Ji’s Commentary (T43.121c13-122a4). Vism (134, § 185), which also glosses upon the disappearance of the same four factors for the ascetic who attains this *jhāna*, assigns the levels in a different manner: [mental] satisfaction (*somanassa*) is abandoned at the moment of the access to the fourth absorption (*catunnaṃ jhānānaṃ upacārakhaṇe*), [bodily] pain (*dukkha*) at the moment of the access to the first absorption, [mental] dissatisfaction (*domanassa*) at the moment of the access to the second absorption, and pleasure (*sukha*) at the moment of the access to the third absorption.

According to the ArthVinNib (186, 3-5), bodily pain (*duḥkha*) and mental dissatisfaction (*daurmanasya*) disappear with the obtainment of the first absorption, bodily pleasure (*sukha*) with the second absorption, and mental satisfaction (*saumanasya*) with the third absorption.

²⁰³ The verb *asti* at the beginning of the sentence clearly expresses emphasis. This grammatical pattern is discussed by Sakuma (p. 141, n. 776).

²⁰⁴ Here, too, *aduḥkhāsukha* seems to be used in the sense of lack of both corporal and mental pain and pleasure (on the definition of *sukhā vedanā*, *duḥkhā vedanā*, and *aduḥkhāsukhā vedanā*, see ŚrBh-Gr (18) 38, 10-16). Vism (135, § 193) identifies *adukkham-asukham* with equanimity (*upekkhā*) and says that it has the ‘characteristic of experiencing the opposite of the desired and non-desired’ (*iṭṭhāniṭṭhaviparītānubvavanalakkhaṇā*), without describing these either as mental or bodily. The ArthVinNib (186, 7-8), commenting upon the *aduḥkhāsukha* in a similar context, says: *aduḥkhāsukhalakṣaṇā vedanoktā, caturthadhyānasamāpatau hi sukhādīnāṃ asambhavāt* ‘the characteristic of neither-pain-nor-pleasure is stated because of the non-existence of the pleasure, etc. at the attainment of the fourth absorption’. Here, too, *ādi* seems to imply that *duḥkha* as well as *saumanasya* and *daurmanasya* are also referred to.

²⁰⁵ The precise limits of this gloss with regard to the former one are not easy to determine. There is no doubt that they are closely related, but it is not clear where one ends and the other starts. Sakuma (pp. 35-36, § H.4.2.) takes them as forming one single textual unit and divides them into two paragraphs: the first from *tasmin samaye sa dhyāyī sukhaduḥkhavyatikramam* to *prathamadhyānasamāpattikāle daurmanasyasya*, and the second one from *asti tāvat* to *tenāha aduḥkhāsukham*. This is a possibility which has its own advantages (such as avoiding to include

in the same sentence the apparently repetitive *sukhaduḥkhasya prahāṇād*. I believe, however, that my tentative solution suggested above has some merits, too. First, it ends the first gloss with the citation from the canonical formula, which appears to be the formal tendency of most glosses in this subchapter (the only exceptions being passages 3.28.3.5.5. and 3.28.3.8.1.). It also explains better the presence of *tatra*, which often introduces a new textual unit. Furthermore, unless linked to the sentence starting with *asti*, the phrase introduced by *tatra* has no verb. The only way of construing it is to take it as adding further information to the preceding citation and supply a verb like ‘herein, [it is thus said]’—no doubt, a possibility, but connecting it with the sentence beginning with *asti* seems more natural syntactically.

My tentative solution is not, however, completely satisfactory. First, we have the repetitive usage of *sukhaduḥkhasya prahāṇād*. This might be explained as (emphatically?) summing up the abandonment of the four kinds of feelings, abandonment which results in *aduḥkhāsukham*. If this interpretation is correct, we would have to conclude that the style of the gloss is rather clumsy. Another stylistic irregularity is that we only have *ca* after *sukhasya* but not after *duḥkhasya*, *saumanasyasya* and *daurmanasyasya*. (This, however, is difficult to explain no matter how we divide the gloss here!) It could be argued that *ca* is a sentence connector, but taking it with *tatra* and assuming an ellipsis of the main verb would be quite odd. I surmise that though stylistically crude (careless?), our sentence used *ca* after *sukhasya* (as in the canonical formula) and then abbreviated it after *duḥkhasya*, *saumanasyasya* and *daurmanasyasya*.

Let us also briefly look at how Ch. and Tib. construe this passage. They would rather seem to favour an interpretation closer to Sakuma’s understanding, but, I believe, not in a decisive way. Ch. is not perfectly clear, but it appears to take this phrase with the previous gloss. The most natural way to read the Chinese is to see 謂 as explaining the preceding canonical phrase 樂斷苦斷先喜憂沒. Ch. 謂 most probably renders here *tatra* (cf. BCSD, s.v.). But this is not a definitive proof. After all, even in my division and understanding of the passage, *tatra* seems to imply a nuance like ‘herein, [this] being the case’ (**tatraivam sati?*), thus closely connecting the gloss which it introduces with the previous one. Tib. is even less clear. Glosses in Tib. usually start and end with the same lexical or textual unit commented upon, but the equivalent of the problematic phrase *tatra caturthadhyānasamāpattikāle sukhasya [...] prathamadhyāna-samāpattikāle daurmanasyasya* occurs in between the citation at the end of the previous gloss and that at the beginning of the next one and contains only independent sentences (connecting neither with the preceding passage nor with the following one). From a purely formal viewpoint, it creates an irregularity no matter if we include it in the previous gloss (which would not end with the citation) or in this one (which thus does not begin with the quotation of the canonical item).

²⁰⁶ As Edgerton shows in his illuminating entry (BHSD, s.v.), Skt. *āśvāsapraśvāsa* as a compound means ‘breath’ and is used as a synonym of *ānāpāna*. Though the tradition is not always clear and different interpretations exist (see the Vism discussed by Edgerton), *āśvāsa* appears to be ‘breathing out’ and *praśvāsa* ‘breathing in’. Both Tib. *dbug rngub pa dang dbug* ‘*byung ba* and Ch. 入息出息 suggest the same, and this is the interpretation which I adopt in my translation. Vasubandhu also construes the words in this way. In his gloss upon *ānāpāna*, he says: *ānanam āna āśvāso yo vāyuh praviśati | āpānanām apānaḥ praśvāso yo vāyuh niṣkrāmati* | (AKBh 339, 7-8) ‘*āna* is inhalation, breathing in, the wind [i.e., air] which enters [the body]. *āpāna* is exhalation, breathing out, the wind which exits [the body]’. Cf. also Vyāsa’s similar gloss on *śvāsa-praśvāsa* ‘inhalation and exhalation’ in YS 1.31. (YS, 54).

The idea that respiration is an obstruction to perfect concentration appears to be very old. At AN V 135, 3, we are told that *catutthassa jhānassa assāpassāsā kaṇṭako* ‘breathing in and out is a thorn to the fourth absorption’. Actually, we know from other canonical sources that

breathing vanishes altogether at this meditative level. *Catutthajjhānam samāpannassa assāsapassāsā nīruddhā honti* (DN III 266, 9-10; cf. AN IV 409, 11-12, with slightly different wording) ‘for one attaining the fourth absorption, breathing in and out ceases’. Nāgasena explains to the doubtful King Milinda that for the ascetic who reaches the fourth *jhāna* and has his body, virtue, mind, and wisdom cultivated (*bhāvita*), it is possible indeed to stop respiration just as someone stops snoring when his or her body is bent. And this explanation is, of course, sufficient to make the King exclaim the usual *kallo si bhante Nāgasena* ‘how clever you are, Venerable Nāgasena!’ (Mil 85, 18-30). Vasubandhu, too, recognises that respiration does not exist at the level of the fourth *dhyāna* (AKBh 340, 17).

Breathing is also considered an obstacle to concentration in classical Yoga. At YS I.31., we read: *duḥkhadaurmanasyāṅgamejayatvaśvāsprasvāsā vikṣepasahabhuvah* ‘pain, dissatisfaction, moving of the [body] limbs, breathing in and out are accompanying factors to the distractions [listed in the preceding *sūtra*].’ (cf. Woods tr., p. 65). Vācaspati’s gloss seems to imply that *śvāsprasvāsa* refers here to non-controlled respiration (see Prasāda ed., p. 55; see also Woods tr. 65), which makes sense and also explains why breathing in and out is associated with distractions.

I have strong doubts as to the complete cessation of the respiratory process on the higher meditative levels (though Nāgasena and Vasubandhu do mean that it actually stops!). Recent medical research on altered states of consciousness and yogic practices has accumulated sufficient data to prove that various meditative attainments lead to a substantial decrease in the pulmonary activity, which is actually quite in tune with the sharp reduction of all metabolic functions accompanying such states. To the outside observer as well as to the meditator himself, respiration may become hardly perceptible, and this may have led Buddhist and Hindu scholars to postulate the possibility of stopping the breathing process.

²⁰⁷ The interpretation of the compound *upekṣāsmṛtipariśuddha* differs in the Theravāda Abhidhammic tradition. Vibh 261, 15-16, says: *ayam sati imāya upekkhāya vivaṭā hoti parisuddhā pariyoḍatā. tena vuccati “upekkhāsatiṭṭhā” ti*. ‘This mindfulness, because of this equanimity, is unobstructed, entirely pure, completely purified. Therefore, it is said “**purity of mindfulness [brought about by] equanimity**”.’ (for the meaning of *vivaṭa*, see PTS, s.v. *vuṇāti*). Vism (136, § 194) adopts the same view (actually citing the Vibh in support of its interpretation), and adds: *na kevalañ c’ettha tāya sati yeva parisuddhā, api kho sabbe pi sampayuttadhammā. sātisena pana desanā vuttā* ‘And not only is mindfulness purified by this [equanimity] here, but also [are] all the factors associated with it [purified]’.

²⁰⁸ Here, too, Tib. (see also Tib. ed. 3.28.3.1.0., 3.28.3.2.0., 3.28.3.3.0., 3.28.3.4.0., etc.), cites the canonical formula depicting the first immaterial attainment (which lacks in Skt. and Ch.): *de rnam pa thams cad du gzugs kyi ‘du shes rnam las yang dag par ‘das te | thogs pa’i ‘du shes rnam nub par gyur cing | sna tshogs kyi ‘du shes rnam yid la mi byed pas | nam mkha’ mtha’ yas so snyam nas | nam mkha’ mtha’ yas skye mched bsgrubs te gnas so* = Skt. * *sa sarvaśo rūpasamjñānām samatikramāt pratighasamjñānām astaṅgamān nānātvasamjñānām amanasikārād “anantam ākāśam” ity ākāśānāntyāyatanam upasampadya viharati*. (The Skt. reconstruction follows here MVyut # 1492, with my punctuation). ‘Due to the complete surmounting of the ideation of matter, due to the disappearance of the ideation of resistance, due to not paying attention to the ideation of variety, [thinking] “space is infinite”, he [i.e., the ascetic] dwells having attained the station of the infinity of space’. See also DaśBh Kondō ed. 56, 5-7 = Rahder ed. 34, 9-11; Pañca 168, 11-12; ArthVin18, 2-4, with the commentary at ArthVinNib 189, 1-190, 6; etc. The Pali counterpart runs as follows: *sabbaso rūpasamjñānām samatikamā paṭighasamjñānām atthagamā nānattasamjñānām amanasikārā “ananto ākāso” ti ākāśānañcāyatanam upasampajja viharati* (AN IV 410, 13-15; see also MN I 41, 19-22; MN III 27, 7-9; SN III 237, 13-16; AN I 41, 3-5; ibid. 267, 3-6; Vibh 245, 17-19; etc.). A

similar formula is used to describe the fourth liberation (*catuttho vimokho*), a spiritual exercise virtually identical with the attainment of infinite space (see, e.g., Vibh. 342, 35-38).

²⁰⁹ In this and a few other occurrences below, I render *adhimokṣa* as ‘concentration’. I think that here this dynamic connotation is much stronger. It should not be forgotten, however, that the semantic sphere of the word also covers the result of this intense and repeated process, which is gaining ‘conviction’ with regard to the objects meditated upon. See note 15 above.

²¹⁰ Skt. *nīlapītalohitāvadātādi*. Actually, *nīla* could also mean ‘dark colour’ in general or ‘dark-green’ (MW, s.v.). In contrast to this, *pīta* may refer to white (or light) colours (PED, s.v.). In our passage here, the presence of *avadāta* makes it, however, more likely that *pīta* simply means ‘yellow’. In Buddhism, *nīlapītalohitāvadāta* ‘dark-blue, yellow, red, and white’ are the four basic colours from which all other colours are derived (see AKBh p. 6, line 8 and lines 11-12 and AKVy p. 25, ll.8-9 and ll. 14-15; YoBh 4, 14-15; etc.).

²¹¹ This appears to be the meaning of the instrumental in *anābhasagatayā* here and *nirvidvirāgatayā* below. See also notes 278 and 279 in Skt. crit. ed.

²¹² Hongjing, quoted by To-ryun, explains the order of transcending the material sphere as consisting of three steps. 景師解云：“以於虛空起勝解故：初、過青黃等眼識相應想。次、過耳識身識及[I follow the Jin Canon; T has: 反; see Taishō, p. 473, n. 8.]緣五根意識等有對想。三、過第四靜慮下緣欲界飲食瓶衣等種種想[T reads: 相, with no *var. lec.*, but it is clear from the context as well as the parallel sentences above that this must be scribal error for: 想]。” (T42.473c16-19). ‘Master [Hong]jing elucidates [as follows]: “**Due to the concentration upon the [infinity of] space:** First, [the ascetic] surmounts the ideations associated with the visual cognition, such as dark-blue, yellow, etc. Next, [the ascetic] surmounts the ideations of resistant [things] (**sapratiṅgha*) [associated with] the auditive cognition, tactile cognition and the mental cognition which have the five sense faculties as its object [/support], etc. Third, [the ascetic] surmounts the various ideations which have as their object [/support] [things belonging to] the realm of pleasure [such as] drink, food, bowls, clothes, etc. which are below [the level of] the fourth absorption.’ The last sentence could also be construed as: ‘Third, [the ascetic] surmounts the various ideations [occurring in] the fourth absorption having their object [/support] downwards in [things belonging to] the realm of pleasure [such as] drink, food, bowls, clothes, etc.’ The passage from the AMVibh quoted in note 215 below would rather seem to support the latter reading.

²¹³ It is noteworthy that the ŚrBh authors/redactors do not mention and gloss upon *sarvaśo* ‘completely’, which appears in the canonical formula of this attainment (see note 208 above). It is not excluded that they did not consider it important or that they used an allotexteme without *sarvaśo* (though the Tib. citation of the stock-phrase does contain *rnam pa thams cad du*). In the ArthVinNib (189, 2-190, 2), Vīryaśrīdatta is, however, definitely interested in glossing upon *sarvaśo* because of an important doctrinal problem underlying it. This refers to whether there is any matter (*rūpa*) in the immaterial spheres or not? The author concludes that not even the subtlest form of matter exists there (*sūkṣmam api rūpaṃ tatra nāsti* | ArthVinNib 190, 1), siding thus with the Vaibhāṣikas (see note 5, p. 189, in the modern edition; cf. also AKBh 431, 17-22). This, however, was not the only view. According to the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, the Vibhajyavādins held that there was some form of matter in the the *ārūpyas* (T27.431b6ff; see also Poussin vol. 5, p. 141, n. 2). The authors/editors of the ŚrBh may have found it more convenient to skip over the word and the difficult problems which it implied and focus instead on the practically relevant aspects of the canonical formula.

²¹⁴ In a similar context, ArthVinNib (190, 2-3) comments as follows: *pratighasamjñā pra<ti>ghātasvabhāvā* [Samtani reads: *praghātasvabhāvā*] | *sā rūpaṇām anyonyāvaraṇā sambhavati* |. ‘The ideation of resistance has the nature of opposition [/prevention of free

movement]. It arises due to the mutual obstruction of the material objects.’ See also Vibh 261, 31-37 and Vism 274, §§ 16-19.

²¹⁵ Skt. *avaśiṣṭeṣu* is quite problematic. It is supported neither by the Tibetan translation nor by the Chinese rendering. Tib. *thogs pa khyad par can rnam pa sna tshogs pa de dag nyid la* suggests something like: **teṣv eva vicitreṣu viśiṣṭeṣu* [/*nānāprakāreṣu/nānāvidheṣu*] *pratighāteṣu*. Ch. reads: 所有於彼種種聚中差別想轉 = **yāh* [...] *teṣu nānāvidheṣu* [/*vicitreṣu*] *saṃghāteṣu viśiṣṭāḥ* [/*viśiṣṭa-*] *saṃjñāḥ pravṛttāḥ* (see also respective notes to Tib. ed. and Ch. ed.). The word **pratighāteṣu* suggested by Tib. is not excluded, but there are no compelling reasons to prefer it to *saṃghāteṣu* in the extant the extant Skt. (which is also supported by Ch.). On the other hand, whatever the original may have been, the ‘diversity’ suggested by both Tib. *rnam pa sna tshogs pa* and Ch. 種種 makes a much better reading than extant Skt. *avaśiṣṭeṣu*. The only way I can construe it is to explain ‘remaining’ as referring to the ideations not associated with sensual pleasure and aversion. According to Vibh (369, 32-33), *kāmasaññā vyāpādasaññā vihiṃsāsaññā*: *ayaṃ vuccati nānattasaññā* ‘ideation [associated with] sensual pleasures, ideation [associated with] malice, ideation [associated with] violence: this is called the ideation of diversity.’ In our ŚrBh passage, however, the diversity of ideation refers to the conceptualisation of the sense-data into diverse ‘things’, i.e., conventional objects (or, to follow the Tib. version, into the fictitious ‘wholes’ of everyday usage). No suggestion is made that such ideations as ‘food, ...mountain, etc.’ are directly connected with sensual pleasures and desires. After all, *kāma* as such has already been abandoned at the stage of the first absorption. Buddhaghosa (Vism 273, § 15) clearly points out that the surmounting of ideation cannot occur for one who is not detached from the ideation object (*ārammaṇe avirattassa saññāsamatikkamo na hoti*). However, up to the level of the fourth absorption, the mind still preserves its cognitive capacity of conceiving images and ideas in general, which involve the epistemic operation of treating things as being differentiated (*viśiṣṭa*). This, however, represents a source of distraction which can threaten the yogi’s meditative calm even at the level of the fourth absorption. Buddhavarman’s translation of the AMVibh (T No 1546) explains this as follows: 云何種種想思惟? 謂: 第四禪中諸散想。問曰: 何故名種種想。答曰: 此想緣種種入故。染汚者緣十入。不染汚者緣十二入。問曰: 何故說無種種想思惟? 答曰: 種種想, 離第四禪欲時, 極作留難, 令離欲法不相續。如守門人不令他入。彼亦如是。是故佛作是說: “不應思惟種種相, 應離第四禪欲。” (T28.362b2-9) ‘What is the thought [here apparently rendering **manaskāra*] [directed] at the ideation of diversity? Answer: “[It represents] the various distracted ideations [or: ideations [directed] here and there] during the fourth absorption.” Question: “Why is it called ideation of diversity?” Answer: “Because these ideations have diverse sense-fields (**āyatana*) as their object. The defiled ones are based on ten sense-fields [which exclude mind and mental objects from the usual list of the *ṣaḍāyatana*]. The non-defiled ones are based on the twelve sense-fields.” Question: “Why is it said that **there is no thought [directed] at the ideation of diversity?**” Answer: “At the time when [one is about to] abandon the desire for the fourth absorption, [this] ideation of diversity strongly operates [as] an impediment and makes the factor [facilitating the] abandonment [of this meditative level] un[able to] continue [its functioning]. It is like a doorman who does not allow others to enter. This is the same [with the ideation of diversity]. Therefore, the Buddha said this: “[One] should not think of the ideation of diversity. [One] should leave the desire for the fourth absorption.”’ It thus appears that the mere habit of forming ideation of diversity is considered a major obstacle to achieving the immaterial attainments. And it may be precisely this aspect which is hinted at by the word ‘remaining’ in our ŚrBh passage here.

²¹⁶ A more literal rendering is: ‘absolutely no orientation [of mind] to these operates for him’. The so-called ‘[mental] orientation’ (*ābhoga*) often appears used as a (quasi-)synonym of

'attention' (*manaskāra*). In Pali canonical sources, it collocates with attention (*manasikāra*) and concentration (*samannāhara*) (Vibh 321, 6-7; DN-a I 122, 6-8 glossing upon *cetaso ābhoga* at DN I 37, 32-33; Mil 97, 10-11, only with *manasikāra*; etc.) (see CPD, s.v.; cf. also BHSD, s.v.) As we have seen in note 6 above, the AKBh and the Trim use the term *ābhoga* to define *manaskāra*. In our ŚrBh passage, too, *ābhoga* < > *py asya na pravartate* is clearly employed as a synonymic explanation of *amanasikārāt*.

²¹⁷ On liminal attainments and absorptions/attainments proper, see note 118 above.

²¹⁸ According to AKBh 447, 8-10, *maulānām kuśalārūpyāṇām adhobhūmikam sāsraṇam vastu nālambanam svordhvabhūmyālambanatvāt | [...] sāmantakānanantaryamārgāṇām tv adharā bhūmir ālambanam |* 'A contaminated thing pertaining to the lower levels is not the [meditative] object of the wholesome, immaterial [attainments] proper because [the latter] have [as their meditative] object only what pertains to their own [level or] the level(s) above. [...] But the paths of non-obstruction [on the level of the] liminal [attainments] have the lower level as [their meditative] object'. (On the definition of the *ānantaryamārga* as well as the closely related *prayogamārga*, *vimuktimārga*, and *viśeṣamārga*, see AKBh 382, 1-3).

Ji devotes a whole paragraph to the discussion of our ŚrBh gloss. In doing so, he largely relies on the concept of the 'ninth [stage] of the path of liberation' 第九解脫道. Ji frequently makes use of this Abhidharmic category, and actually both the path of non-obstruction (*ānantaryamārga*) and the path of liberation (*vimuktimārga*) are key-terms in his explanation of the seven contemplations 七作意 in the ŚrBh. He considers that the first six contemplations coincide with the first nine stages of the path of non-obstruction and the first eight stages of the path of liberation 前九無間道八解脫道 and that they take place at the level of the liminal attainment 皆在近分定中 (T43.120a26). The fruit of the culmination of the practice coincides with the ninth stage of the path of liberation and the attainment of the absorption proper 第九解脫道居根本靜慮 (T43.120a25-26). The ninth [stage of the] path of liberation (*navamo vimuktimārgaḥ*) is also met with in Indian Abhidharmic texts. It refers to the complete emancipation from a certain level, whether the realm of sensual pleasures or a meditative absorption (see AKBh 409, 15-410, 2). It also marks the detachment from the summit of existence (*bhavāgra*) in the case of an Arhat (see *ibid.* 409, 8). To return to Ji's Commentary, this is how the Chinese master elucidates the relation between various meditative levels and their object or support 緣 (*ālambana*): the ninth stage of the path of liberation coincides with the seventh contemplation and the attainment proper. In the first moment 剎那 (*kṣaṇa*) of obtaining the path of liberation, its meditative object comprises only the aggregates 諸蘊 of its own level 自地. In the second moment, the mind of the yogi obtains the aggregates of the levels above and below 上下地 as its meditative objects. However, the Chinese master adds, the ŚrBh summarises the process and speaks only of the first moment. In the liminal attainment, the first nine stages of the path of non-obstruction contain aversion towards the lower level as their meditative object, while the first eight stages of the path of liberation contain the aggregates of the lower as well as upper levels as their object [cf. here AKBh 368, 6-14 and also AKVy 576, 16-577, 8, but not exactly in the same sense as here]. But the ŚrBh again simplifies the process and speaks only of the effect of the path of non-obstruction. (第四禪以上, 其第九解脫道第七作意唯在根本定中。其初得解脫道, 此一剎那時, 唯緣自地諸蘊。第二剎那心者得緣上下地蘊。今約最初一剎那解脫道說故, 言亦緣自地諸蘊。若近分定前九無間道但緣下地生厭故, 故言亦緣下地所有諸蘊。其前八解脫道亦緣上下地諸蘊。今約無間道說故, 言亦緣下地諸蘊, 而唯不遮近分根本, 但緣上下及自地諸蘊。於近分定八解脫道不說論九無間故, 言緣下蘊。於根本定, 說初一剎那隱立第二剎那以去故, 言亦緣自地蘊。故論文中不言唯緣自地蘊等, 而言亦緣。此無間解脫道如前初禪中解。若與顯揚對法第二卷相違。如彼有

太師解。T 43.122a13-27; my punctuation) (cf. T42.473c29-474a13 for a similar passage, which contains, however, some variants).

²¹⁹ Here, too, Tib. (see also Tib. ed. 3.28.3.1.0., 3.28.3.2.0., 3.28.3.3.0., 3.28.3.4.0., 3.28.3.5.0., etc.) contains the whole citation of the canonical formula describing the second immaterial attainment (for which there is no equivalent in Skt. and Ch.): *de rnam pa thams cad du nam mkha' mtha' yas skyed mched las yang dag par 'das te | rnam par shes pa mtha' yas so snyam nas | rnam shes mtha' yas skye mched bsgrubs te gnas so* = Skt. **sa sarvaśa ākāśānantyāyatanam samatikramya "anantaṃ vijñānam" iti vijñānānantyāyatanam upasampadaya viharati*. (Skt. reconstruction follows MVyut # 1493, with my punctuation.) 'Having completely surmounted the station of the infinity of space, [thinking] "consciousness is infinite", he [i.e., the ascetic] dwells having attained the station of infinite consciousness'. (DaśBh Rahder ed. 34, 12-13, reads: *sa sarvaśa ākāśānantyāyatanam samatikramād*; Kondō ed. 56, 7, reads the same with the exception of *sarvaśo* instead of *sarvaśa*). The Pali parallel reads: *sabbaso ākāśānañcāyatanam samatikkamma "anantaṃ viññānaṃ" ti viññānañcāyatanam upasampajja viharati* (AN IV 410, 15-17; etc.). For other sources, see note 208 above.

²²⁰ The wording of the sentence is admittedly difficult and rather confusing. The *Xianyang lun* explains the process more concisely: 無邊識者謂：緣無邊虛空之識；今緣此爲境界。(T31.487c13-14) 'Infinite conscious is the consciousness which has infinite space as its object; now, [the ascetic] makes this [consciousness] [his] object'. The gist of the psychological process appears to be the following: in the act of contemplating the infinity of the space, the consciousness assumes the attribute of boundlessness which characterises its very object. Space is no longer necessary as a meditative support and can therefore be transcended. By surmounting space, the ascetic attains the sphere of infinite consciousness, i.e., a state consciousness contemplating itself as an infinite object.

²²¹ Roughly speaking, the psychological process presented here is not different from the one described in the *Vism*. In tune with the Theravāda Abhidhamma, Buddhaghosa does not use the concepts of liminal attainment and attainment proper. Instead, 'approach concentration' (*upacārasamādhi*) and 'absorption concentration' or 'concentration of complete focusing [of the mind]' (*appanāsamādhi*) (*Vism* 102, §§ 32-33), which approximate the same functions, are employed. Speaking of the way to attain the station of infinite consciousness, Buddhaghosa explains: *tass'evaṃ tasmim nimitte punappunam cittam cārentassa nivarāṇāni vikkhambhanti, sati santiṭṭhati, upacārena cittam samādhīyati* (*Vism* 276, § 26) 'For him who thus repeatedly directs [his] mind to this characteristic [/image], the hindrances are surpressed [/blocked], [his] mindfulness is firmly established, and [his] mind is concentrated by means of the approach [concentration].'

²²² The PPUpad explains the whole process of this attainment with more clarity. While contemplating the space, the ascetic takes the feelings (*vedanā*), ideations (*samjñā*), impulses and volition (*saṃskāra*), and consciousness (*vijñāna*) associated with this contemplation as a disease, etc. 'Having formulated such thoughts, [he] abandons space [as] an object and [makes] consciousness [his] sole object' (如是念已，捨虛空緣，但緣識。T25.186c6-7). 'This consciousness is boundless and infinite just as space is boundless and infinite (是識無量無邊，如虛空無量無邊。T25.186c8-9).

²²³ Unlike the other glosses above, the Skt. MS of the ŚrBh (as well as Ch.) cites here the canonical formula almost entirely (omitting only the pronoun *sa*). Of course, Tib., too, contains the complete stock-phrase as it does above (see Tib. 3.28.3.1.0., 3.28.3.2.0., 3.28.3.3.0., 3.28.3.4.0., 3.28.3.5.0., and 3.28.3.6.0.). Let us note that the citation in our passage here is identical with MVyut # 1494 but slightly different from DaśBh Kondō ed. 56, 8, which reads *sa sarvaśo vijñānānantyāyatanasamatikramāt* (= Rahder ed. 34, 13-14, but reading *samatikramān*

due to *sandhi*). The Pali parallel reads: *sabbaso viññāṇāñcāyatanam samatikkamma "n'atthi kiñci" ti ākiñcaññāyatanam upasampajja viharati* (AN IV 410, 17-19; etc.). For other sources, see note 208 above.

^{2 2 4} Skt. past participle *uccalito* does not mean that the yogi has actually proceeded upwards. It rather seems to imply that the ascetic is 'driven to proceed upwards/advance' or that he 'has set out for moving up' or, more concretely, 'has jumped up [in order to attain the upper level]'. Ch. 求上進 'seeking to proceed upwards [advance]' aptly conveys the meaning here. See also passage 3.28.3.8.1. below.

^{2 2 5} Skt. *ālambana* 'object'. So far, I have translated the word as 'meditative object'. Here its sense is, however, more general: not only that the meditative support cannot be perceived but there is no perceivable *cognitive object* whatsoever. I think that in this context, it is, therefore, preferable not to limit the meaning of *ālambana* to 'meditative object'. The Ch. translation of this passage is quite relevant in that it uses 境, 境性, and 境界 for *ālambana*, though so far in our chapter (and many other passages in the ŚrBh), the term has been translated as 緣.

^{2 2 6} I construe *kiñcanapratisamyuktam rūpi vā arūpi vā* as a post-verbal additional phrase qualifying *ālambanam* in this sentence. Though often separated by a few words from the noun which they modify (like in our passage), such constructions occur frequently in Pali and Buddhist Sanskrit texts.

^{2 2 7} Buddhaghosa (Vism 277, § 35) gives an illuminating simile as to what precisely meditating on (or rather, in!) the station of nothing whatsoever means. Suppose, he says, a man witnesses the scene of monks gathering in a place like the monastery hall, etc. (*maṇḍalamālādisu*). With the completion of their ecclesiastical meeting, the *bhikkhus* will all leave, and then after a while the man comes back alone to the hall. 'Standing in the doorway, looking again at that place, he sees it just empty, just deserted. It does not occur to him: "So many of the monks [once gathered here] have passed away, or [so many of the monks] have left the region", but [only] "this [place] is empty, deserted"; he [thus] sees only the absence [lit., the state of no[one] being [there]].' (*dvāre thatvā puna tam thānam olovento suññam eva passati, vivittam eva passati, nāssa evam hoti: "ettakā nāma bhikkhū kālañkatā vā, disāpakkantā vā" ti, atha kho: "suññam idaṃ, vivittan" ti natthibhāvam eva passati*; with my punctuation). In brief, the state seems to be an awareness of the absence of cognitions and perceptions, with no disturbing ratiocinative inference as to what this absence is.

^{2 2 8} Tib. contains the whole citation of the canonical formula describing the fourth immaterial attainment as a passage apart at the beginning of the section (see also Tib. ed. 3.28.3.1.0., 3.28.3.2.0, 3.28.3.3.0., 3.28.3.4.0., 3.28.3.5.0., and 3.28.3.6.0. above). For this passage there is no direct parallel in Skt. and Ch. However, at the end of passage 3.28.3.8.3. below, Tib. repeats the citation: *de rnam pa tham cad du ci yang med pa'i skye mched las yang dag par 'das nas | 'du shes med 'du shes med min skye mched bsgrubs te gnas so*, which corresponds to Skt.: *sarvaśa ākimcanyāyatana<ṃ> samatikramya naivasamjñānāsamjñāyatanam upasampadya viharati* (only *sa* is omitted; cf. MVyut # 1495, in Sakaki's spelling: *sarvaśo* and *nāiva*^o; see also DaśBh Rahder Kondō ed. 56, 9-10, which reads: °*samatikramāt | naivasamjñānāsamjñēti* [...]; DaśBh Rahder ed. 34, 15-16, has, however, °*samatikramān naivasamjñānāsamjñāyatanam* [...], omitting *naivasamjñānāsamjñēti*). 'Having completely surmounted the station of nothing whatsoever, [the ascetic] dwells having attained the station of neither ideation nor non-ideation'. The Pali parallel reads: *sabbaso ākiñcaññāyatanam samatikkamma nevasaññānāsaññāyatanam upasampajja viharati* (AN IV 410, 19-20; etc.). For other sources, see note 208 above.

^{2 2 9} Skt. *animittālbane*. The compound could also be construed as 'an object of [which] no characteristic [/image] [is perceived]'. See also the gloss found in To-ryun's Commentary (T42.474b2-4). Cf. the various doctrinal and psychological explanations concerning this state in

the AMVibh (T27.433c1-21).

^{2 3 0} Vism (280, § 50) explains: *sā paṭusaññā-kiccaṃ kātuṃ asamatthatāya n'eva saññā, sañkhārāvesasasukhumabhāvena vijjānattā nāsaññā* 'this is neither ideation because it is incapable to perform [its usual] function of sharp ideation, nor [is it] non-ideation because it [still] exists in a subtle form [in so far as only] a latent impulse [of it] remains'. Cf. also ArthVinNibh 191, 3-5.

^{2 3 1} Actually, as made clear by Tib., this is rather a gloss on the final part of the formula.

^{2 3 2} Buddhaghosa gives two similes which illustrate this state. In the first one (Vism 281, § 51), a novice (*sāmaṇera*) lays aside a bowl (*patta*) after having smeared (*makkhetvā*) it with oil (*telena*). Later, when the elder (*thera*) asks him to bring that bowl, the novice tells him that there is oil in it. Hearing this, the elder requires the novice to bring the oil in order to fill the tube (*nāli*) used as a storage container. But this time the novice replies, 'Venerable, there is no oil' (*n'atthi, bhante, telam*), meaning, of course, not enough to be poured into the tube. In the second simile (Vism 281, § 54), a novice who walks ahead of an elder sees some water (*thokam udakam*) on the road and warns the *thera* to remove his sandals (*upāhanā*). The elder, not knowing how much water is there, wishes to bathe. This makes the novice tell the elder that there is no (*n'atthi*) water, this time in the sense that its quantity is not sufficient to bathe in. The similes are quite illustrative. (I wonder whether apart from their illustrative function, the similes were also intended to contain a touch of ecclesiastical humour.) Both attempt to account for the seemingly illogical expression 'neither X nor non-X' by showing that seen from different angles, the same reality can be described, with equal validity, as existing and not existing.

^{2 3 3} Sh (see note 329 to Skt. crit. ed.) and the editors of ZT (see note 598 to Tib. ed.) seem to take this passage as belonging to the next section which expounds the two attainments without mental activity. From the viewpoint of its content, the passage is, however, related to the absorptions (see *dhyānasamāpattikāle* in the text) and immaterial attainments (see *ārūpyasamāpattikāle*). Actually, the scribe of the ŚrBh MS uses || © || before and after this passage, which clearly marks that he (and/or the scribal tradition behind him?) understood this as a section in its own (but, admittedly, the punctuation of our MS is far from being a model of consistency). The Chinese, Korean, and Japanese traditions, as reflected by the editorial and exegetical literature, also understand this as a passage connected with the preceding section. In the traditional Canons which adopt the convention of opening paragraphs at the beginning of new sections, this passage is included in the preceding section (on immaterial attainments) and the start of the new paragraph coincides with the section on the two attainments without mental activity (see ZT (Jin) 668c10; Koryō 742a10; Qisha 343a13). The same is the situation is reflected in modern editions (*Shukusatu daizōkyō* 156a12; *Manji daizōkyō*, Taiwan ed., 0119a12; T 469a4) as well as in KDK, p. 149 and KIK, p. 244.

^{2 3 4} The precise meaning of the passage is not easy to understand. This is largely due to *rasātala*, a word quite intriguing, especially for a Buddhist text dedicated to meditation. The main lexicographical sources render it as *Unterwelt, Hölle; N. einer der 7 Unterwelten* (PW, s.v.) or 'one of the seven hells or regions under the earth', 'the lower world or hell in general' (MW, s.v.). This does not fully reflect the complex imagery associated with the term. The seven subterranean worlds are a major feature of the Hindu cosmology (see Kirfel [1920] 1967, 143-147). They were adopted in the Vedānta philosophy (see Dasgupta [1922] 1991, vol. 2, p. 76; see also *Vedāntasāra* 78, § 163: *bhūrādicaturdaśabhuvanāni*) and also mentioned by Vyāsa in his Commentary ad *Yogasūtra* III.25 (Prasāda ed., pp. 225-226). These netherworlds are not to be confused with the hells proper (*naraka*), though they are populated by demonic beings, snakes, etc. and occasionally are described as places whose denizens suffer some form of punishment (see Hopkins 1915, 111).

To limit our discussion to Rasātala, the term does not appear in all variants of the seven

worlds (see Kirfel [1920] 1967, 144), but when it does, it is the sixth or the seventh level of these subterranean spheres. In the *Rāmāyaṇa* (I .39.21) and the *Mahābhārata* (V .3602), it is the lowest of the netherworlds (Kirfel [1920] 1967, 145). One possibility to interpret the ŚrBh passage here is that the term ‘Rasātala’, in the sense of the bottom level of the subterranean realm, was used as a metonymy for all the worlds under the earth. (If this is true, the random choice of any other level would have certainly been less meaningful as a stylistic device.)

According to the *Purāṇas*, the inhabitants of Rasātala are the Dānavas who are powerful enemies of the gods but have been subdued by Lord Hari and now live in fear of Indra (Kirfel [1920] 1967, 147; see also the translation of the *Bhāgavatapurāṇa* in Dimmitt and van Buitenen 1978, 349-350). In this sense, Rasātala may appear like a hell (and inasmuch as the Dānavas had to submit to and fear the gods, it may be considered so), but the overall image of these netherworlds is not always that of a gloomy place of ordeal and agony. According to the *Bhāgavatapurāṇa* (Dimmitt and van Buitenen 1978, 348), the Dānavas as well as the denizens of other subterranean worlds lead household lives with families, friends, and servants. The cities of these netherworlds are sumptuously adorned and the ‘floors are teeming with loving couples of Snakes and Asuras, doves, parrots and mynah birds. Their gardens outshine the beauty of the world of the Immortals [...]’ (ibid.). The lack of sunlight is compensated, ‘for the jewels in the hoods of the great Snakes dispel all darkness’ (ibid.). One verse in the *Rāmāyaṇa* (V .102.11) actually goes as far as to declare that ‘no heaven is so blessed a place’ (Hopkins 1915, 61) as Rasātala.

It is very difficult to say which was the precise image which the authors/editors of the ŚrBh had in mind. Admittedly, many of the *Purāṇas* are later than the ŚrBh (though they may be based on earlier materials), but as much as one can be certain in the quicksands of Indian chronology, at least large parts (if not most of) the *Mahābhārata* and the *Rāmāyaṇa* must have been in circulation when our work was being forged into a whole (ca. 3rd century C.E.; see Chapter Five above). With quite a few Buddhist scholar-monks coming from Brahman families, their familiarity with Hindu literature and mythology would come as no surprise at all. What is intriguing is that the term *rasātala* does not seem to occur in any Buddhist source (as far as I know) and its introduction from the Hindu tradition does not appear to be doctrinally or stylistically imperative for our text. (The underworlds in general are not a feature of the Buddhist cosmology as set forth in the YoBh; see also Kajiyama 2000.) The only related term which I could locate in Buddhist literature is *pātāla*, another netherworld of Hindu cosmology, whose place varies (the first, second, third, and, quite often, the seventh level; see Kirfel [1920] 1967, 144-145). Again, it is risky to establish a forced semantic linkage between the two words in the absence of positive textual evidence in Buddhist literature, but their lexical association in classical Sanskrit suggests that such a relation is not totally impossible. Actually, some passages in the *Rāmāyaṇa* seem to make no difference between Rasātala and Pātāla (Hopkins 1915, 61).

The word *pātāla* occurs in the Pali Canon a few times (SN I 32, 25; ibid. 127, 16; ibid. 197, 17; Th 1104; Jā III 530, 21; Mil 286, 27-28; etc.). SN IV 206 contains a *sutta* actually called *Pātāla*, in which the word is employed as a simile for the feeling of bodily pains (*sāriṅkānaṃ [...] dukkhānaṃ vedanānaṃ adhivacanāṃ*). The meaning in all of the above texts appears to be that of ‘abyss’ or ‘bottomless pit’, though some occurrences may also denote or connote ‘hell’. For instance, *pātālarajo* at SN I 197, 17, may suggest ‘hell’ (*raja* means ‘dust’ or ‘dirt’ and here may also have the connotation of *rajas* in Classical Sanskrit, i.e., ‘gloom’ or ‘darkness’; the compound could, therefore, be construed as ‘the gloom of the abyss’). In many other occurrences, we could say with sufficient certainty that *pātāla* appears to be a bottomless pit, mainly associated with the ocean (cf. also Mrs Rhys Davids’s note to verse 1104 of Th, in Engl. tr., p. 418). It is interesting that at SN IV 206, 7-10, the existence of a *pātāla* in the great ocean

(*mahāsamudde*) is denied and such a belief is attributed to ignorant ordinary people (*assutavā putthujano*). The far-from-ignorant Nāgasena, however, seems to find no problem with this 'geography' and takes it as a matter of fact (see Mīl 286, 27-28). The word *pātāla* is also found in Buddhist Sanskrit sources (e.g., BhikVin 149, 2, in a stanza similar to Th 1104 (see above); Lañk 98, 7), and as far as I can see, it is used in a sense similar to the Pali texts examined above.

Now, what are we to make of the term *rasātala* in our ŚrBh passage after this excursus in mythical geography? Our text is too elliptic, and unfortunately, no definitive conclusion can be reached. Roughly speaking, however, it can be reasonably assumed that Rasātala is used here as a metonymy for the netherworld. Which connotations are associated with it remains, nonetheless, unclear. It does not seem very likely that Rasātala was meant to be an image of paradisiac splendour in this context. Was it used as a more general symbol of a silent, self-contained (albeit dark!) realm far away from the maddening world of the sensual pleasures? This, too, could be a possibility. Or did the authors of the ŚrBh intend Rasātala to evoke the gloomy, uncomfortable, and confined world under the earth? If so, it would serve as a metaphor of the limited freedom which the yogi possesses in the material sphere (as narrow as a subterranean world!). Compared to this, the *ārūpyasamāpattis* allow the the yogi to transcend all bonds of matter and make him feel as if flying up in the sky. It is true that much of the Buddhist literature relegates the immaterial attainments to the position of an appendix to the *dhyānas*, themselves usually regarded as an ancillary or optional practice on the path to Awakening. We find, however, some canonical passages which seem to grant the immaterial attainments a more important role. At MĀN I 410, 28-30, for instance, the meditator wishing to attain the immaterial stations thinks: *dissante kho pana rūpādhikaraṇaṃ daṇḍādāna-satthādāna-kalaha-viggaha-vivāda-tvaṃtuva-pesuñña-musāvādā, n'atthi kho pan' etam sabbaso āruppe* [I follow the reading of the quotation in Vism (see below); PTS ed. has: *arūpe*] *ti*. 'Because of matter (*rūpa*) do taking up a staff, taking up a [stabbing] weapon, strife, quarrel, dispute, contention, slander, [and] untrue words occur, but nothing of this whatsoever is in the immaterial [states].' In the Vism, Buddhaghosa cites this passage at the beginning of his chapter on immaterial states, adding that the meditator sees detriment in matter in the form of eye-disease, ear-disease, etc. (*c'eva cakkhu-sotarogādīnaṃ ca ābāhasahassānaṃ vasena karajarūpe ādinavaṃ disvā* [...] Vism 271, § 1) (in Pali literature, the list of diseases often begins with the eye, ear, etc. (e.g., Nidd I 13, 2) and in their most developed forms include (or should include) 98 afflictions; see PED, s.v. *roga*). The ŚrBh passage may have echoed such ideas and compared the absorptions to the uncomfortable world of Rasātala and the immaterial attainments to the freedom of flying up in the sky. Though not the only possibility, I think that this is the most probable line of interpretation.

Finally, we should also consider the possibility that *rasātala* may be a corrupt reading. I cannot, however, think of any suitable emendation, and neither the Tib. nor the Ch. suggest a better lection. Tib. *sa'i 'og tu* 'under the earth' or 'underground' clearly refers to a subterranean world. The Ch. has a reading which I find even more obscure: 處室 'staying in a room'. This reflects, in all likelihood, a different MS. The fact that in Ch. there is no equivalent for Skt. *adho* further corroborates my hypothesis that Xuanzang's MS must have been worded differently here. The phrase 處室 is found in several places throughout the Chinese canon (e.g., T1.309a28; T13.812b6; T15.31a20 (actually 處室宇); and T35.785a24, in what appears to be a close paraphrase of our ŚrBh passage). Though all these occur in a related context ('sitting in a room' for the purpose of meditation), none of them provides us with a clue for our ŚrBh passage. (One also recalls *suññāgara* 'empty room' (e.g., DN II 291, 3, etc.), as a standard recommendation for meditation practitioners, but this, too, has no particular relevance here.) No matter whether Xuanzang's MS read 'room' instead of Rasātala or, less likely, whether the Chinese master

choose to render Rasatāla (quite!?) freely as ‘room’, 處室 ‘staying in a room’ can serve as an image of being in a self-contained world or as a contrast to the infinity of the sky. This actually appears, I believe, to be the way how Xuanzang and Chengguan (T35.785a24) construed the phrase. See also notes 255 and 256 to Ch. ed.

We must add that the image of Rasatāla and the sky in our passage, whatever their precise meaning(s) may have been, are not used for their poetical value only. The main interest of the ŚrBh authors seems to focus here on two points intimately linked to the spiritual praxis: (1) there are some physical signs or changes in the bodily appearance of the yogi who reaches the *dhyānas* and immaterial *samāpattis*, signs which he (as well as probably the master guiding him) can and should know; and (2) though these are good signs indicating the mastery of these meditative states, the ascetic should not become infatuated with them and lose his tranquillity. Unfortunately, we have no detailed description of the actual signs, but to an ‘initiated’ reader and listener in the traditional yogic circles, the images must have struck a familiar note.

²³⁵ The idea that the attainment of non-ideation is cultivated and reached only by ordinary people while the attainment of cessation is the exclusive ‘province’ of the Noble Ones is also expressed at Kv-a 157, 10; AKBh 69, 14-16; 70, 15-26, 72, 13; BoBh 90, 10-11; etc. See also notes below.

²³⁶ Skt. *naivasamjñānāsamjñoccalitenālambanasamniruddhena ca manaskāreṇa*. The exact interpretation of the compound is not easy. My rendering above is based on understanding it as an (absolute) *tatpuruṣa*. Tib. construes it as ‘*du shes med ‘du shes med min skyed mched las bskyod cing dmigs pa yang dag par ‘gags pa ‘i yid la byed pas* ‘contemplation [characterised by] the meditative object having ceased [/stopped]’. Ch., on the other hand, translates as: 由從非想非非想處欲求上進，暫時止息所緣作意以爲上首 ‘due to [/by means of] seeking to proceed upwards from the station of neither ideation nor non-ideation [and due to/by means of] taking the contemplation of temporarily suppressing the meditative object [/support] as the main factor’. This is obviously more developed than the extant Skt. and Tib. (see note 263 to Ch. ed.), but apart from this, the main difference appears in taking *samniruddhena* in an active sense. This is not impossible in BHS, and if this was meaning intended by our authors, then the rendering of *naivasamjñānāsamjñoccalitenālambanasamniruddhena ca manaskāreṇa* should be ‘contemplation which has proceeded upwards from [the station of] neither ideation nor non-ideation and has suppressed the meditative object’ or ‘contemplation which has suppressed the meditative object [by] having proceeded upwards from [the station of] neither ideation nor non-ideation’. I think, however, that reading *samniruddhena* in an active sense in our compound here is less likely.

²³⁷ The idea that the attainment of cessation is obtained by proceeding upwards from the station of neither ideation nor non-ideation is also found at AKBh 70, 7-8; 72, 12; AbhSam, 10, 12; etc. Our passage does not refer directly to the level (*bhūmi*) on the basis of which the attainment of non-ideation is achieved, but its mentioning of becoming ‘detached from [the Heaven of] the Splendid Perfection [but] not detached from [the Heaven of] the Great Reward’ (see passage 3.28.4.2. below) hints at the fourth absorption (*caturthadhyaṇa*). The doctrine that the attainment of non-ideation relies upon the fourth absorption is actually set forth at AKBh 69, 5; 72, 12; AbhSamBh 9, 15-16; AbhAv (Matsuda ed.) 37, 29-38, 1; etc.

²³⁸ Skt. and Pali *gaṇḍa* as a pathological condition means ‘*Kropf und andere Halsanschwellungen*’ (PW, s.v.), ‘goitre or any other excrescence on the neck’ (MW, s.v.), ‘a swelling, esp. as a disease, an abscess, a boil’ (PED, s.v.). The term is also used in canonical sources as a simile for the body (*kāya*) or sensual pleasures (*kāma*) (cf. PED, s.v.). A very concrete (and quite graphic!) description of *gaṇḍa* is found at AN IV 386, 16-21, which clearly points at a boil (though its anatomical location is not specified) said to have nine wound openings (*nava vaṇamukhāni*) and suppurating puss (*asuci yeva pagghareyya*). This boil is

declared to be ‘a metaphor [/designation] of this body made up from the four elements [...]’ (*gaṇḍo ti kho bhikkvave imass’ etaṃ cātumahābhūtikassa kāyassa adhivacanaṃ* [...]; see also p. 386, ll. 22-23). The same metaphor is found in the *Uddakasutta* (SN IV 83, 24-25). Here, however, we have no details about *gaṇḍa* as a pathological condition, and the main image employed in the text, i.e., *gaṇḍamūla*, appears to have the more general sense of ‘root of illness’ (cf. SN-a II 386, 20, which equates *gaṇḍamūla* with *dukkhamūla*). (For *gaṇḍa* as metaphor for sensual pleasures, see note 239 below.) Vism (301, § 71) mentions *gaṇḍa* as one of the places where pus (*pubba*) is produced.

As might be expected, medical literature offers more precise and detailed descriptions. CarSam (*Cikitsāsthāna*, 12.79ab) makes the following distinction: *galasya pārśve galagaṇḍa ekaḥ syād gaṇḍamālā bahubhis tu gaṇḍaiḥ*. ‘On the side of the throat [/pharynx] would *galagaṇḍa* be [found] [and] one [in number], but *gaṇḍamālā* is made up of many swellings’. Sharma (CarSam, vol. 2, p. 199) renders the former term as ‘goitre’ and the latter as ‘cervical adenites’ (incidentally, his translation of *gala* is ‘pharynx’). The latter half of the stanza goes on to say that these ‘swellings’ can be cured, but if accompanied by coryza, pain in sides, cough, fever, and vomiting, they may turn into incurable diseases (I follow Sharma’s translation of the terms). *Galagaṇḍa* (‘goitre’) also appears in the chapter on swellings, whose generic name in the CarSam is *śoṭha*, as a disturbance of *kapha* within the throat (*Sūtrasthāna*, 18.21). *Gaṇḍa* also appears with a similar sense in the Pali medical tradition. Bhes uses it several times (ch. 1, ver. 96, ch. 2, ver. 26, ch. 11, 130, etc.), and according to Liyanaratne (Bhes Engl. tr., p. 15, n. 7), the term encompasses *galagaṇḍa* ‘goitre’ and *gaṇḍamālā*, which the translator renders as ‘glandular tumescence round the neck’.

It is difficult to know whether our ŚrBh authors had in mind the general sense of boil (or, even more generically, illness?) or a particular meaning of one or the whole group of cervical tumescences. In view of the canonical antecedents, I would rather favour the first alternative, though I do not rule out a more technical usage, which appears to be hinted at by the Tib. and Ch. renderings. According to BTsh, s.v., Tib. *’bras* seems to refer to a solid lump about the size of a grape formed from coagulation of infected blood (caused, in its turn, by fatigue or [improper] diet) and containig pus. The Chinese equivalents given in BTsh are 瘰癧 ‘scrofula’ and 腫核 ‘tumoural lump (?)’, in which case, if the renderings are medically accurate, the former would point at the cervical region as *gaṇḍa* does in its Indian medical usage. Xuanzang’s rendering 癰 *yong* appears even more closely associated with the latter meaning. The character is usually defined as a ‘malignant swelling or tumour’ mainly appearing on the face, neck, or back (DKWJ, s.v.). HDC, s.v., which renders it as ‘abscess’ 腫瘍, describes the condition as a cutaneous or subcutaneous inflammation, mainly occurring on the neck and back and accompanied by chillness and fever. In severe cases, the HDC says, the disease can evolve into septicemia. The examples given here by HDC are from the *Zhuangzi* 莊子, *Records of the Historian* 史記, etc. (these classical occurrences do not, however, elaborate upon the details of the disease). Chinese medical literature suggests, however, other usages as well. In the *Huangdi nei jing su wen* (actually not mentioned in either DKWJ or HDC), 癰 is used to describe a stomach tumour (or ulcer?) resulting from an abnormal movement of the stomach energy 氣 upwards and the ensuing accumulation of heat in the upper region of the stomach (vol. 2, pp. 195-196). It is not perfectly clear how Xuanzang construed the term, but in the light of the more general usage of 癰 as well as the sense of *gaṇḍa* in Indian sources, the meaning of pathological swelling round the neck seems more likely. (Did Xuanzang receive first-hand information in India about such technical terms?)

^{2 3 9} The function of *iti* here seems to be that of explaining the content of the contemplation which turns away from ideation (*saṃjñāvimukhaṃ manaskāraṃ*) as consisting in *saṃjñā rogaḥ*

[...] *yadutāsamjñikam*. The content of the contemplation is based upon the following canonical formula: *saññā rogo saññā gaṇḍo saññā sallam, etaṃ santam paññitam yadidam asaññan ti* (MN II 230, 17-19). ‘Ideation is [like] illness, ideation is [like] a boil, ideation is [like] an arrow; serene is this [and] exquisite, to wit, [the state of] non-ideation.’ The sentence is actually quoted as representing the stance of some recluses and brahmins (*samaṇabrāhmaṇā*) who criticise others postulating that the self has ideation and is unimpaired after death (*saññim attānaṃ paññāpentī arogaṃ paraṃ maraṇā*, p. 230, l. 16). The theme of the *sutta* is the exposition and refutation of various philosophical speculations as to the nature of the self. We also find a similar statement about ideation in the Chinese translation of the *Madhyamāgama*: 優陀羅羅摩子如是見, 如是說: “有<想>[T and KIK, *Agon*, vol. 5, p. 143 read 有 only, without any *variae lectiones*; the content of the scripture as well as 無想者 below makes the addition of 想 preferable]者是病, 是癰, 是刺, 設無想者是愚癡也。若有所覺是止息是最妙, 謂乃至非有想非無想處。(T1.603a10-12) (愚癡 is probably a rendering of *sammoha*—see AKBh below). This is a *sutta* presenting the views of Udraka Rāmaputta (the text partially corresponds to SN IV 83-84, but the latter does not contain the whole citation above). Actually, such canonical formulae appear to be the source of Vasubandhu’s citations at AKBh (436, 9-10) (see Pāsādika 1989a, p. 120, # 486). This is a passage which describes the way in which the ascetic prepares himself to reach the fourth immaterial attainment: [...] *prayujyate samjñā rogaḥ, samjñā gaṇḍaḥ, samjñā śalyaḥ; āsamjñikam sammohaḥ, etaṃ chāntam, etaṃ prañītam, yaduta naivasamjñānāsamjñāyatanam* (Pradhan reads: *prayujyante*; but see Yaśomitra’s quotation at AKVy 671, 18; cf. also Pāsādika 1989a, p. 120, # 486) (Pradhan reads: *āsamjñika*^o, while MS has: *āsamjñaikam* (see AKBh p. 436, n. 3) and AKVy 671, 19, reads: *āsamjñikaḥ*; I think that *āsamjñikam* makes the best reading). [The following] is practised—“ideation is [like] illness, ideation is [like] a boil, ideation is [like] an arrow; [the state of] non-ideation is complete unconsciousness; serene is this, exquisite is this, to wit, the station of neither ideation nor non-ideation” (for *sammohaḥ* as ‘unconsciousness’, see AKVy 671, 19-20: *āsamjñikam sammoha* [Wogihara reads: *āsamjñikaḥ sammoham*; see my remark above] *iti: samjñāyā abhāvo hi sammoha-kāraṇam* ‘[the state of] non-ideation is complete unconsciousness: for non-existence of ideation is the cause of complete unconsciousness’).

The similes of illness, boil, and arrow appear in the Pali Canon frequently employed in connection with sensual pleasures. Probably, one of the oldest occurrences is Sn 51, which urges the ascetic to see *kāma* in the following way: ‘calamity, boil, misfortune, disease, arrow, and danger is this for me’ (*itī ca gaṇḍo ca upaddavo ca | rogo ca sallaṇ ca bhayaṇ ca m’etaṃ*). AN IV 289, 20-23; 290, 3-4, declares: ‘illness is a metaphor [/designation] for sensual pleasures, boil is a metaphor [/designation] for sensual pleasures, arrow is a metaphor [/designation] for sensual pleasures’ (*rogo ti bhikkhave kāmānam etaṃ adhivacanāṃ, gaṇḍo ti bhikkhave kāmānam etaṃ adhivacanāṃ, sallan ti bhikkhave kāmānam etaṃ adhivacanāṃ, [...]*) (similar phrases at AN III 310, 29-311, 1, but without *sallan* [...]). See also Thī 491, SN IV 64, 33 (as metaphors for *ejā* ‘agitation’), etc. Sometimes, we also find these metaphors as methods of contemplating the five aggregates (MN I 435, 34; AN IV 25: *rogato gaṇḍato sallato*). In the AMVibh, they are similes for the five aggregates to which one clings (*pañcopādāna-skandhāḥ*): 脅尊者言: “修觀行者知五取蘊如病, 如癰, 如箭等已, 次求其因, 知是集諦。” (T27.404c24-26) ‘Venerable Pārśva says: “Having realized that the five aggregates [to which one] clings are like an illness, like a boil, like an arrow, etc., the yogi next seeks for their cause, [and] realises that this is the Truth of Origination”’. (Venerable Pārśva was one of the Sarvāstivādin Patriarchs and editors of the *Mahāvibhāṣā*.) 五取蘊 are the *pañcopādāna-skandhāḥ*. My rendering of the term as the ‘five aggregates to which one clings’ is based on Schmithausen 1987a, vol. 1, p. 24. Another possibility of construing the compound is the ‘five

items as inviting appropriation (*upādāniya*), which is suggested by Vetter (2000, 80). Vetter also suggests ‘branch of appropriation’ for *upādānakkhandha* (ibid., p. 81); his analysis of the concept in early Pali sources is found in ibid., pp. 73-82.

^{2 4 0} The person formulating such a thought is an ordinary person (*prthagjana*). Ch., most likely as part of its editorial clarifications, clearly expresses this: 諸異生作如是念. Doctrinally speaking, the person engaged in this praxis may be a meditator below the level of a Stream-Enterer, a lay practitioner, or a non-Buddhist yogi.

^{2 4 1} Skt. *sacittikāvasthā*. SABh (Schmithausen ed.) 222, 8-19 defines the concept as follows: *ṣaḍ avasthāḥ sthāpayitvā sacittikā bhūmir vedītavyā* ‘the level with mental activity should be understood [as referring to all states] with the exception of the six states’. The latter include sleep without thought, i.e., dreamless sleep (*acittikamiddhāvasthā*), attainment of non-ideation (*asaññāsamāpatti*), attainment of cessation (*nirodhasamāpatti*), etc. and represent the level without mental activity (*acittikā bhūmiḥ*).

^{2 4 2} The Heavenly World [Abode] of Splendid Perfection (*Śubhakṛtsna*) is one of the planes of the third absorption, while the Heavenly World of the Great Reward [or: Abundant/Full-Grown Fruit] (*Bṛhatphala*) is one of the spheres of the fourth absorption. They are both part of the Buddhist cosmography and can be traced to early canonical sources. (For a general survey of the Heavenly Worlds in both Pali and Northern Buddhist literature, see Kirfel [1920] 1967, 190-198.) In the Pali Canon, they are known as *Subhakiṇṇa* (var. lec.: *Subhakiṇha*) (e.g. DN II 69, 8-10; MN I 2, 19-22; MN III 102, 31-32; etc.) and *Vehapphala* (e.g. MN I 2, 22-26; MN III 103, 1; etc.) respectively.

Later Abhidharmic and commentarial sources give more systematic presentations of these cosmic planes arranged and attained according to the meditative levels. E.g. MN-a I 35, 19-21 and 25-26 (explaining the meaning of the abodes names); Abhidh-s Ṭikā 126, 4-6 and 8-9 (also explaining the meaning of the abode names); AKBh 111, 23-24; AKVy 255, 14-16 and 19-21 (also explaining the meaning of the abodes names); YoBh 76, 1-2; ŚrBh 468, 16 and 18 (see passages 3.28.6.3. and 3.28.6.4. respectively below); BoBh 62, 4-5; etc.

AKBh 68, 19, gives more details: *Bṛhatphalā nāma devā yeṣaṃ kecid asaṃjñikāḥ pradese bhavanti*. ‘Gods named *Bṛhatphalā*, some of whom, in a [certain] region [of this Heaven], are beings with no ideation’ (Xuanzang apparently renders *pradese* as 高騰處 (T29.24b19) ‘a high [elevated] place’). YoBh 76, 3, also says: *Asaṃjñikāṃ* [which probably it should be emended to *Āsaṃjñikāṃ*] *Bṛhatphalaparyāpannatvān na sthānāntaram*. ‘Because of being included in the *Bṛhatphala*, [the Abode of] Non-Ideation is not a different place [from *Bṛhatphala*]’ (Ch. (T30.295a9) renders *Āsaṃjñikāṃ* as 無想天 ‘Heaven of Non-Ideation’). In the Southern tradition, a similar statement is found at MN-a I 35, 31-32: *Asaññasattā devā Vehapphalehi saddhim ekatalā eva* ‘The gods who are beings with no ideation are indeed at the same level with the [gods in] *Vehapphala*’ (*Vehapphala* being the Pali equivalent of *Bṛhatphala*).

The idea expressed in our ŚrBh passage as well as in the similar fragment in the AbhSam (see note 244 below) is that the *prthagjana* yogi has abandoned his attachment to the third absorption level (whose highest plane is *Śubhakṛtsna*) but has not yet become detached from the fourth *dhyaṇa*. (Cf. the similar explanation is also found in the *Cheng weishi lun* 成唯識論 (T31.37b25-26: 有異生伏遍淨貪, 未伏上染。) Actually, the latter is the level which serves as the basis for achieving the attainment of non-ideation. Quite naturally, the karmic retribution for these yogis is rebirth in the Heavenly Spheres of the fourth absorption, and since they represent a separate category, they have an special abode which is part of the *Bṛhatphala/ Vehapphala*. Cf. also the concept of *asaññābhava* in the Pali tradition.

For a full list in the ŚrBh of the Heavens corresponding to meditative attainments, see passages 3.28.6.1. to 3.28.6.6. below.

^{2 4 3} Skt. °*pūrvaka* also means ‘accompanied by’. See PW, s.v., rendered as *begleitet von, verbunden mit*. See also a similar usage in the following passage as well as in the AKBh and AbhSam cited in the note 244 below. It is difficult to make a definitive pronouncement on whether *pūrvaka* is here construed as ‘accompanied by’ or ‘preceded by’. The main reason is the specific nature of this contemplation, which is presumably accompanied by a certain type of ideation in its initial stages, but once fully attained, it can (or rather should) be depicted as being *preceded* by this ideation.

^{2 4 4} Similar doctrines concerning the attainment of the *asaññīsamāpatti* are also seen in other Buddhist sources. According to the AKBh, the attainment of non-ideation is preceded/accompanied by the ideation of riddance (*niḥsaraṇasaññīpūrvakeṇa*) (AKBh 70, 5; see also AKBh 69, 16-17) or obtained by the method of the contemplation preceded/accompanied by the ideation of dwelling in riddance (*niḥsaraṇavihārasaññīpūrvakamanasikāraprayogāt* AKBh 72, 12). The AKBh 69, 5ff., explains that some people cultivate the *asaññīsamāpatti* because they want to attain *niḥsaraṇa* or escape from the cycle of re-births (*saṃsāra*) and falsely believe that merely suppressing the ideation (without practising the supramundane path) constitutes the means for attaining complete liberation (*mokṣa*) (see also AKVy 160, 35-161, 1).

AbhSam (10, 19-21) contains a passage whose wording is almost identical with the ŚrBh: *asaññīsamāpattiḥ katamā | śubhakṛtsnavītarāgasyoparyavītarāgasya niḥsaraṇasaññīpūrvakeṇa manasikāreṇāsthāvarāṇām cittacaitasikāṇām dharmāṇām nirodho asaññīsamāpattir iti prajñaptiḥ |*. (This is a passage based on the extant Skt. MS fragments of the AbhSam (see Schmithausen 1976b, p. 112, n. 1), not on Pradhan’s Sanskrit retranslation from Chinese and Tibetan) (see also AbhSamBh 9, 8-9). It is very likely that our ŚrBh passage is the source of the AbhSam definition of the *asaññīsamāpatti*, but similar descriptions are also found in earlier sources (see *Abhidharmaprakaraṇapādaśāstra* T26.628c13ff. = T26.694a19ff; AMVibh T27.772c28ff; cf. also YoBh T30.592c13ff.).

A similar but more developed passage on the attainment of non-ideation (containing quite a few identical phrases and sentences) is found at SamBh 158, 17-159, 7. This, too, appears to be based on the ŚrBh. See also notes 246 and 249 on *nirodhasamāpatti* below.

For the attainment of non-ideation in the *Cheng weishi lun* 成唯識論, with relevant fragments rendered into English, see Lusthaus 2002, 143-149.

^{2 4 5} I render this sentence freely. Literally, Skt. *evaṃ ca punar asyāḥ prāptir bhavati* translates as ‘and, furthermore, thus its obtainment occurs’. Cf. also the same sentence at the end of passage 3.28.4.3. below.

The attainment of non-ideation (*asaññīsamāpatti*) is well-documented in the Northern Abhidharmic sources. We do not find, however, the term *asaññīsamāpatti* in Pali canonical sources. Certainly, words like *asañña*, *asaññasatta*, *asaññabhava*, etc., which are attested in numerous Pali texts, show that the mental state of non-ideation and the beings who experience it (and also enjoy its karmic fruition) were well-known. However, the only references to the attainment itself, i.e., *asaññīsamāpatti*, which I could locate in Pali texts are three occurrences in paracanonical and commentarial sources. (No lexicographical work, including the CPD and PTS Concordance, record them or the word *asaññīsamāpatti*). Two of them occur at Nett 76, 23 and 100, 8, in passages which list *asaññīsamāpatti* together with *saññīsamāpatti*, *nevasaññānāsañña-samāpatti*, *vibhūtasaññīsamāpatti*, and *nirodhasamāpatti* under the heading of ‘attainment’ (*samāpatti*). We are still faced with many questions concerning the formation of the *Nettipakaraṇa*, but there are quite a few aspects hinting at the continental (Northern?) origin of the entire text or, at least, parts of it (see Hinüber [1996] 1997, 77-80). The third occurrence is found at Kv-a 157, 7, where *asaññīsamāpatti* is said to be a term synonymous with the attainment of cessation (*nirodhasamāpatti*), also called attainment of the cessation of ideation and feeling (*saññāvedayitanirodhasamāpatti*). The text goes on to say that there are two

types of attainment of the cessation of ideation and feeling: one is mundane (*lokiyā*), practised by ordinary people (*puthujjanassa*) and leading to rebirth in the realm of non-ideation (*asaññasattupikā*), and the other is supramundane (*lokuttarā*), cultivated by the Noble Ones (*ariyānaṃ*) and non-conducive to rebirth in the realm of non-ideation (*nāsaññasattupikā*). This is the Theravāda doctrinal stance asserted against the Hetuvādins. The Kv passage (pp. 518-519) upon which the *Aṭṭhakathā* comments uses only the word *saññāvedayitanirodhasamāpatti*. Kv-a mentions *asaññasamāpatti* as a synonym of this term and does not treat it as a separate type of attainment, though the dichotomy between the two types of *saññāvedayitanirodhasamāpatti* closely parallels the distinction between *asaññīsamāpatti* and *nirodhasamāpatti* in the Northern tradition (see above). It would thus appear that the latter distinction (in its full-fledged form, at least) and the developments concerning *asaññīsamāpatti* as a separate type of meditative practice probably originated in a period following the separation of the Sarvāstivāda School from the Sthaviravādins. The usage of the term *asaññasamāpatti* in the Kv-a may represent an inner Theravāda evolution (compound coined from the already widely used *asañña* and *samāpatti*) or a faint echo of the Northern vocabulary (quite faint indeed since the term is not treated as a separate practice). As for the dichotomy mundane - supramundane, the concept of *lokuttara* meditative practices already appears in Dhs (pp. 72-75) (for a discussion of their place and importance, see Frauwallner 1995, 68-70), and the Kv-a doctrinal viewpoint may constitute the result of an internal development. See also note 30 above.

^{2 4 6} The idea that the attainment of cessation can be obtained only by the most advanced practitioners (often referred to as 'Noble Ones') can be seen in a number of texts belonging to both the Southern and Northern traditions. The *Vism* (604-605, § 18) gives a detailed list of persons able and unable to achieve it. Non-returners and destroyers of the contaminations (= Arahants) who have mastered and can obtain the eight meditative attainments (*aṭṭhasamāpattilābhino* [...] *anāgāmino khīṇāsavā ca*) represent the former class, while ordinary people (*puthujjanā*), stream-enterers (*srotāpannā*), once-returners (*sakadāgāmino*), non-returners and Arahants who have reached their stages by bare insight without practising tranquillity (*sukkhavipassakā ca anāgāmi-arahanto*) belong to the latter category (See also *Vism* 312, § 124).

According to the *Kośa*, ordinary persons cannot generate this attainment (*na hi pṛthagjanā nirodhasamāpattim utpādayitum saknuvanti*; AKBh 70, 16). Vasubandhu continues, 'and because it is generated by the power of the Noble Path, [only] one who [has reached] Nirvana in the present life [can] attain it' (*āryamārgabalena cotpādanād dṛṣṭadharmanirvāṇasya tadadhimuktitaḥ*; AKBh 70, 16-17). (I render here *adhimukti* freely as 'attained'; the concrete sense is that the ascetic becomes 'convinced of it' as a result of zealous application; see note 15 on *adhimokṣa* above.) Yaśomitra's interprets this sentence in two ways. He first explains that the Noble One becomes convinced that what is called 'Nirvana in the present life' is just that (*tad iti*), i.e., *nirodha* 'cessation'. The second way of construing the sentence is: *dṛṣṭanirvāṇasya*, which Yaśomitra explains that only a person who has seen Nirvana in the sense of *nirodhasatya* 'the truth of cessation' on the *darśanamārga* 'path of vision', therefore a Noble One, can attain [become convinced of] this, i.e., *nirodha* 'cessation' (AKVy 161, 15-25).

On the station of neither ideation nor non-ideation as a basis for the attainment of cessation, see DN II 71, 15-17 (for other canonical sources, see note 249 below); *Vism* 92, § 120; etc. AKBh also says that *nirodhasamāpatti* is produced by proceeding from the station of neither ideation nor non-ideation which is also known as the summit of the [conditioned] existence (*bhavāgra*) (AKBh 70, 7-8). See also AbhSam and SamBh (note 248 below).

^{2 4 7} My addition is based on the idea expressed in the first sentence of this passage as well as on AKBh 70, 5, and AbhSam (see note 243 below) in which the name of the contemplation is 'contemplation preceded by the ideation of dwelling in serenity' (*śāntavihārasamjñāpūrvakeṇa*

manasikāreṇa). SamBh 159, 9 (see note 243 below), has, however, the same *vihārasamjñā-pūrvakeṇa manasikāreṇa*, without any qualification of the ‘dwelling’. The Chinese translation of our ŚrBh passage offers an original rendering, different from all other versions: 求暫住想作意爲先 ‘preceded by the contemplation of the ideation of seeking to dwell temporarily [in this state]’. See also note 280 to Ch. ed.

^{2 4 8} AbhSam (10, 21-11,2) contains a definition whose wording is very close to our ŚrBh passage: *nirodhasamāpattiḥ katamā | ākimcanyāyatanavītarāgasya bhavāgrād uccalitasya śāntavihārasamjñāpūrvakeṇa manasikāreṇāsthāvarāṇām <tadekatyānām ca sthāvarāṇām>* [adeed on the basis of Tib. and Ch. and confirmed by the *pratīka* glossed upon at AbhSamBh 9, 20] *cittacaitasikāṇām dharmāṇām nirodhe nirodhasamāpattir iti prajñaptiḥ |* (This belongs to a passage based on the extant Skt. MS fragments).

A similar passage on the attainment of cessation (with quite a few identical phrases and sentences) is found at SamBh 159, 8-14. The passage continues with a discussion (see note 249 below) on the nature of the *nirodhasamāpatti* (SamBh 159, 15-161, 9).

For similar definitions, see also *Abhidharmaprakaraṇapādaśāstra* (T26.628c15-17 = T26.694a20-22); AMVibh (T27.774a22ff.); etc. Cf. YoBh (T30.593a1-3).

^{2 4 9} Unlike the *asamjñāsamāpatti*, the attainment of cessation is well-attested in canonical texts. In the Pali scriptures, it usually appears by the name of ‘cessation of ideation and feeling’ (*saññāvedayitanirodha*). E.g., DN II 71, 15-17 (as part of eight liberations (*aṭṭha vimokkhā*)); MN I 160, 7-9; MN I 301, 30-302, 27 (here called *saññāvedayitanirodhasamāpatti* and discussed in detail); MN III 1-3; SN II 212, 13-17; AN I 41, 12-13; etc. It seems that the appellation *nirodhasamāpatti* (most likely an abbreviation of the former name) becomes frequent in later texts belonging to the *Abhidhammapīṭaka* and commentarial literature. E.g., Paṭis 97, 28; 100, 24; Vism 606 § 16ff; etc. The term *saññāvedayitanirodha* continues, however, to be used in later sources as well (see Paṭis 99, 11; Kv 202, 22; etc.).

Its place and role in the spiritual praxis of Early Buddhism remains a matter of debate. No matter what later Abhidharmic and commentarial literature (as well as a part of modern scholarship following in the footsteps of the Buddhist exegetic tradition) tells us, it seems that certain passages in the early scriptures regard *saññāvedayitanirodha* as the base upon which or the state in which Liberation is attained (see, for instance, MN I 160, 7-10). Furthermore, there is no doubt that a quite a few canonical sources regard the attainment of cessation as a prelude to or rehearsal of Nirvana in this very life. A detailed discussion is beyond the scope of this note, and the problem requires a meticulous examination of the way entstatic meditation praxis (*śamatha/samatha*) interacts with the reflective practices (*vipaśyanā/vipassanā*). This issue has received considerable attention (though it deserves even more) in modern Buddhist studies from la Vallé Poussin’s (1937) ‘classic’ article to recent contributions such as Schmithausen 1981, Griffiths 1983, and Vetter 1988 (to name only some of the most remarkable ones).

Although Abhidharma theory in general regards *nirodhasamāpatti* as an optional practice, the attainment continued to capture the interest of the later commentators and philosophers mainly for two reasons: (1) the necessity to explain (away!) those passages apparently giving this meditation a predominant role on the path to Awakening; and (2) the unique nature of the experience which it entails, i.e., a complete cessation of all mental functions and the possibility of restarting the psycho-biological continuum when emerging from it. The AKBh devotes quite a few passages to it (mostly in Kośasthāna II, pp. 70, 1-73, 12). So does the Vism, which in its main treatment (604, § 16-611, § 52) deals with the attainment of cessation not as a practice necessary for Awakening but as a benefit of the wisdom cultivation (*paññābhāvanānisamsa*). Our ŚrBh passage is brief but sufficient to show that it shares a similar view that

nirodhasamāpatti is a meditative attainment reserved to the Noble Ones but not absolutely necessary for obtaining Liberation. The attainment of cessation is discussed in more detail and using more developed concepts in the SamBh (159, 15-161, 9). This suggests that the SamBh represents a later historical layer in the YoBh, which probably made use of the ŚrBh material (see also note 248 above) but reinterpreted it in a more elaborate manner. This SamBh passage actually contains a reference (p. 160, ll. 6-9) to the the *ālayavijñāna* which is employed to explain the possibility of resuming the mental continuum after the psychic lacuna brought about by *nirodhasamāpatti*. This is what Schmithausen (1987a, 18ff) considers to be the origin of the *ālayavijñāna* doctrine. The attainment also appears in other later Yogācāra sources which are discussed in Schmithausen's magnum opus on the early history of *ālayavijñāna* (cf. also the partial citation of our ŚrBh passage in *ibid.*, Part II, p. 282, n. 156).

Finally, some recent contributions on the subject must be mentioned in this context. The first one belongs to Paul Griffiths who in his excellent monograph dedicated to the *nirodhasamāpatti* ([1986] 1999) lucidly discusses the doctrinal history of the praxis in the Theravāda, Vaibhāṣika, and Yogācāra traditions and also analyses their philosophical presuppositions. The second is one is the Chapter on 'Asamjñi-samāpatti and nirodhasamāpatti' (actually dealing mostly with the latter) in Dan Lusthaus's study (2002, 123-159). Leaving aside his (rather controversial) view that Yogācāra Buddhism is a type of phenomenological approach, the examination of the historical aspects of this meditative attainment is an important contribution (see also the translation of the relevant fragment on the *nirodhasamāpatti* in the *Cheng weishi lun*, pp. 149-151). Finally, in Japanese Buddhist studies, Hakamaya's contribution (2001, 521-540) on the historical significance of the attainment of cessation in the Vijñānavāda tradition is noteworthy.

²⁵⁰ In spite of their frequent presence in Buddhist literature, the supernatural faculties have not received sufficient scholarly attention. Certainly, important studies and remarks concerning their role do exist, but we still have no detailed historico-philological monograph(s), which the *abhijñās/abhiññās* doubtless deserve. One reason for this is, I suppose, the wide-spread impression that the five supernatural faculties are more or less an optional appendix in the edifice of spiritual cultivation—to be sure, a view with deep Abhidharmic roots, though the latter has been much more generous with its usage of ink and palm-leaves for the discussion of the subject. To this, more often than not, we can add the persistence of a rather uncritical view that Buddhism, especially in its early period, strictly prohibited the display of supernatural faculties in public. It certainly did upon some occasions, but we equally find situations when their usage is permitted and even encouraged. Modern Buddhist scholastics and apologetics manage to find various arguments for the latter (see, e.g., Gunaratana 1985, 128-129—not surprising for a traditional Theravāda scholar; Bucknell and Stuart-Fox 1983, whose main ideas are developed in Bucknell and Stuart-Fox 1986, 78-94—both contributions concerned not so much with the historico-philological problems but rather with formulating a hermeneutico-apologetic re-interpretation of the three knowledges in a modern framework which does not require the traditional view of *samsāra* as actual rebirth; etc.). But what we need is a critical study of the complex fabric of the permission and prohibition of the *abhijñās/abhiññās*.

This is not the place to embark upon a full discussion of the problem which would require more than one bulky volume, and for the time being, it will suffice to mention some basic bibliographical data. The only monograph dedicated to the subject is Lindquist (1935), which discusses the Buddhist *abhiññās* in relation to the *siddhis* in classical Yoga. The book can, however, at most be described as a general introduction. Lindquist refers only to a very limited number of canonical sources, draws heavily upon the Vism, his mention of the Northern tradition is scarce and often restricted to de la Vallée Poussin's French translation of the AKBh. Furthermore, its discussion of the topic in classical Yoga and Brahmanism is not always

satisfactory. (The supernatural faculties are the main theme of Chapter III *Vibhūtipāda* in Patañjali's *Yogasūtra*, especially III.16-49; many of these attainments bear close resemblance to the Buddhist *abhijñās/abhiññās*, but lack of space and time do not allow me to go into details.) Lindquist is frequently preoccupied with explaining the supernatural faculties in terms of hypnotism and self-suggestion—an enterprise worth undertaking but not before a general historical picture has emerged and not without a sound knowledge in the latest scientific research in the field (which, by the way, has hugely developed meanwhile).

Definitely much more valuable from a historico-philological perspective are Dayal [1932] 1978, 106-134 (presenting the six *abhijñās* in Pali and Sanskrit Buddhist literature, with special emphasis on the latter), Démieville 1927 (discussing the three cognitions (*vidyā* 明) in Chinese and Pali canonical sources as well as in some Abhidharmic texts), de la Vallée Poussin 1931 (an article which is not philologically rich but meaningful in reminding Buddhist scholars of his (as well as our!) age that the Buddha was not a pure rationalist fighting against superstitions but was equally portrayed as having achieved supernatural faculties), and Bareau 1963, 75-91 (analysing the various versions of the Buddha's awakening in which the three cognitions play a crucial role). More recently, Gregory Schopen's excellent article (1983) on the development of the concept of *jāṭismara* (memory of former births) in mediaeval Mahāyāna *sūtra* literature is definitely worth mentioning. The author clearly shows how this yogic attainment, which initially was conceived of as the exclusive province of the 'religious virtuoso', becomes a practice or faculty within the reach of all Buddhist believers and can be brought about even by external agents 'undertaking specific ritual or merit-making activity' (p. 132) on behalf of other individuals. Another important contribution is Donald S. Lopez's paper dedicated to the Buddha's memory of former lives (1992), mostly notable for bringing welcome corrections to Mircea Eliade's interpretation of the concept. Last but not least, one should not forget Enomoto's excellent article (1982) dedicated to the early history of 'three cogintions' (*tisso vijjā* 三明) and the six supernatural faculties.

In addition to these contributions, one can also mention Lamotte's introduction to the six supernatural faculties (or '*supersavoirs*', as the Belgian scholar rendered them) in the PPUpad (Lamotte tr. 1944-1980, vol. 4, pp. 1810-1816). Vallée Poussin's notes to the AKBh (especially, Poussin vol. 5, p. 98, n. 1) as well as the CPD entry on *abhiññā* are also very useful. As most of the relevant primary sources are listed in these works (especially Lamotte tr. 1944-1980), in what follows I shall concentrate only upon particular aspects relevant to our ŚrBh passages.

²⁵¹ According to the ABKh 422, 2, 'the five supernatural faculties depend on the level of the fourth *dhyāna*' (*pañcābhijñāḥ caturthadhyānabhūmikāḥ*) (see also note 33 above). The AKBh 422, 2-12, explains why their basis cannot be the immaterial attainments. The Vism also hints at the fact that the achievement of the supernatural faculties is preceded by the attainment of the fourth absorption. Glossing upon the subject of the canonical formula describing the practice of the *abhiññās*, Buddhaghosa says: *tattha so ti so adhigatacattujjhāno yogī* (Vism 317, § 13) 'herein, "he" is the yogi who has attained the fourth absorption'. See also Vism 317, § 19; 323-4, § 49; 347, § 22; etc. In the PPUpad, we told: 四禪諸通皆易得 (T25.265b15) 'in the fourth absorption, all supernatural faculties are easy to obtain' (compared to the preceding *dhyānas*, which are suitable for the attainment of only particular *abhijñās*; this view is presented as the opinion of 'some people' 有人言 **ity apare* but is not rejected by the author(s) of the PPUpad). Cf. also ŚrBh passage 3.28.1.2. above.

²⁵² What exactly this 'pure absorption' (*parisuddham dhyānam*) means is not defined here, but some similar terms and concepts are found in other sources. In the *Sāmaññaphallasutta*, after the description of the four absorptions and the contemplation of the impermanence of the body, the Exalted One explains in detail the supernatural powers. Each is introduced by the phrase

evam samāhite citte parisuddhe [...] (DN I 77, 6; etc.) ‘with [his] mind thus concentrated, purified [...]’. Vism 317, § 14, explains that here *parisuddhe* refers to purification by means of the ‘cultivation of the purity of mindfulness [brought about by] equanimity’ (*upekkhāsatiṭṭhāna*) (on the interpretation of this term, see note 207 above). See also Skt. parallel at SaṅghBh II 246, 13: *evam samāhite citte parisuddhe* [...].

I could not find, however, any Pali or Sanskrit source mentioning or describing **parisuddham jhānam/parisuddham dhyānam* as such. The closest term to this notion appears to be *śuddhakam dhyānam*, which we find, for instance, in the SamBh and the AkBh. (Let us, however, note that *śuddhakam dhyānam* itself does not occur in the ŚrBh.) At SamBh 132, 3-7, the term is explained as a meditative state of not savouring the pleasant feelings which one can derive from the attainment of absorptions: *sa parataḥ prathamadhyānasamāpatter āsvādam ādīnavam ca śṛṇoty uttare ca nihsaraṇam*. [...] *samāpadya tam evādīnavam manasikurvann uttari ca nihsaraṇam prajānan nāsvādayati*. ‘He [i.e., the ascetic] hears from other[s] [i.e., his master and/or fellow-meditators] of the relish of the first absorption and of [its] detriment as well as of the [necessity to achieve] riddance [from it by proceeding] to the upper [levels]. Having attained [the absorption], fixing [his] attention on the fact that it is such a detriment and knowing the [necessity of] riddance [from it by proceeding] upwards, [he] does not relish [it].’ At AkBh 427, 4, we read: *nirmāṇacittād api śuddhakam dhyānam nirmāṇacittam cōpadyate nānyat* ‘from [after] a [magical] creation, in its turn, there arise a pure absorption and [another magical] creation thought, nothing else’. The concept of pure attainment is defined at AkBh 437, 7: *laukikam kuśalam samāpattidravayam śuddhakam ucyate* ‘*lobhādisuddhadharmayogāt*’ ‘the entity of the mundane wholesome attainment is called ‘pure’ since it is associated with pure factors [like] non-greed, etc.’.

In a Mahāyānika context, we also find a similar concept in, for example, BoBh (210, 18-211, 4; for a French translation, see Demiéville tr. [1957] 1973, 317-319). Here, it is called *bodhisattvasya viśuddham dhyānam* ‘pure absorption of the bodhisattva’ and classified into ten types. The first one, reminding of the SamBh, runs as follows: *laukikyā śuddhyā viśuddham anāsvāditam dhyānam* (BoBh 210, 19-20) ‘non-relished absorption pure as far as mundane purity is concerned’ (Demiéville (p. 317) renders: *Le Dhyāna en tant que non savouré, qui est pur d’une pureté mondaine* (see also n. 2, p. 318); I construe the instrumental as a *instrumentalis partis* (see Speijer [1886] 1988, 53-54); cf. Tib. ‘*jig rten pa’i dag pas rnam pa dag pa ro myang ba med pa’i bsam gtan* (D Wi 112b7-113a1); Ch. seems to understand it as an instrumental expressing cause: 由世間淨離諸愛味清淨靜慮, T30.528b14).

²⁵³ I read here: *yo < > nenābhijñādhīpateyo dharma<h>*. Shukla also suggests a more or less similar emendation (see note 355 to Skt. crit. ed.). MS *nenābhijñādhīpataye* and Wayman’s reading ‘*nenābhijñādhīpataye*’ represent a possibility which though remote, is, however, worth considering. The way to construe such a reading would be to see °*adhīpataye* either as a dative singular of *adhīpati*, a word which means ‘controller, dominant influence or factor’ (BHSD, s.v.; cf. Pali *adhīpati* ‘ruler, master, owner; controller, dominant factor’ in CPD, s.v.; ‘ruler, master; ruling over, governing; predominant; ruled or governed by’ in PED, s.v.; see also PE, s.v.), but none of these sense would fit in here. Wayman’s translation (p. 129) reads: ‘that [doctrine] in order to master the supernormal faculties’, but *adhīpati* in the sense of mastery of a certain skill or knowledge is, to the best of my knowledge, unattested. The same can be said of *ādhipateya* which also means ‘control, influence, mastery, overlordship’ (see BHSD, etc.; none of the occurrences would point, however, at a ‘mastery’ of a skill; the meaning seems to be that of political control).

The word *ādhipateya*, which appears to me the best editorial choice, is an abstract semantic development from ‘overlordship’ but in a rather different direction. It means ‘having something as the chief/main [topic/interest]’. The term is actually employed similarly in a few other

passages in the ŚrBh. At MS 101a1L, Sh 377, 11, Maithrimurthi 1999, 278, § II [1.], we read: *maitryadhipateyam dharmam adhipatiṃ kṛtvā*, correctly rendered by Maithrimurthi (1999, 296) as *Anhand eines Lehrtextes, welcher das Wohlwollen zum Thema (genauer Hauptthema?) hat* ('main topic', suggested by Maithrimurthi within brackets, is more appropriate). Similarly, MS 101b4L-M, Sh 381, 2-3, reads: *tadadhipateyam dharmam adhipatiṃ kṛtvā*, with a similar sense, 'this' (*tad*) referring here to the 'dependent origination' (*pratītyasamutpāda*). See also MS 6b2R, ŚrBh-Gr 108, 9, Sh 69, 9: *yadadhipateyam*; MS 6b3L, ŚrBh-Gr 108, 10, Sh 69, 11: *na tadadhipateyam* (Sh wrongly reads here: *ca tadadhipateyam*); ŚrBh MS 107b4L, Sh 411, 11-12; etc. The term also occurs at SamBh 107, 15-16.

Let us finally note the Tib. rendering, which in our passage is *dbang du byas pa*, lit., 'made the chief [topic/point]' suggests a similar understanding. (Note, however, the alternative (but less precise) translation at D 27b6 and b 7: *dbang des* and *dbang de med pas* corresponding to the last two Skt. occurrences in the ŚrBh quoted above.) Xuanzang's 增上, lit., 'increase-above', (T30.453b1, 454a17, 407b2, and 407b4 corresponding to the ŚrBh citations above), usually meaning 'additional' or 'superior', is too literal. I think that to the average Chinese reader, such a rendering fails to convey the sense of the Skt. word.

^{2 5 4} Skt. *ṛddhiviśaya* 'range of miraculous powers'. I must confess that am not completely happy with my rendering of *ṛddhi* as 'miraculous powers' for three reasons. (1) The word 'miraculous' may carry a (here unwished for) connotation of 'divine intervention'. Needless to say that in a Buddhist treatise on meditation, especially a Śrāvakayānika one, such a nuance is not present. (2) A miracle is usually understood as an inexplicable break in the known laws of Nature, but from a Buddhist viewpoint, the attainment of the *abhijñāsa* is a 'natural' result of one's spiritual cultivation. I must stress in this respect that I write and translate from the viewpoint of *prthagjana* who in his deluded belief in natural laws as defined by modern physics would describe *ṛddhi* (if proven to be a reality at all!) as a miracle. (3) From a strictly lexical viewpoint, the exact meaning of the Pali *iddhi* and Sanskrit *ṛddhi* is not that of 'power' (miraculous or not). A semantically closer rendering would be 'accomplishment' or 'success'. AKBh 425, 5, glosses *ṛddhi* as *ṛdhyati* 'succeeds' (or 'prosper', etc.), which AKVy 658, 21, further explains as *sampadyata ity arthaḥ* '[its] sense is "succeeds [is fulfilled/accomplished]"'. Buddhaghosa, in much more detailed in gloss (Vism 318, §§ 20-23), explains *iddhi* as *ijjhana* 'succeeding', *nipphati* 'accomplishment', *paṭilābha* 'obtainment' (318, § 20). In spite of these strictly semantical considerations, a rendering like 'accomplishment' would hardly evoke in English the idea of passing through walls and stroking the Sun and the Moon (see below).

The compound *ṛddhiviśaya* used here in the ŚrBh is attested in other sources as well. More often than not, Pali texts employ *iddhividhā* 'type(s) of miraculous powers' (Vism 323, § 47, glosses upon *vidha* as *koṭṭhāsa* 'division, part'), but occasionally we also see *iddhiviśaya* (e.g., Vin III 67, 17). Sanskrit sources are divided between the usage of *ṛddhividhi* (Pañca 83, 8; DaśBh Kondō ed. 56, 16; MVyut # 208; etc.) and *ṛddhiviśaya* (AKBh 421, 8; AKVy 654, 3; BoBh 58, 13; etc.).

^{2 5 5} Skt. *cyutyupapādajñāna* 'knowledge of the deaths and births [of all sentient beings]' is also known as the 'divine eye' (Skt. *divyaṃ caḥṣuḥ*; Tib. *lha'i mig*; Ch. 天眼; see MVyut # 202; etc.). Ji also says: 論解五通中死生智通亦得是天眼相應慧。 (T43.122b22) 'Amongst the five supernatural faculties explained in the [*Yogācārabhūmi*] Śāstra, the supernatural faculty of the knowledge of the deaths and births [of all sentient beings] also [refers to] obtaining a [type of] wisdom associated with the divine eye'.

^{2 5 6} Skt. *cetaḥparyāyajñāna* 'knowledge of the ways of thought [of other sentient beings]'. I rely on Edgerton's understanding of the term (BHSD, s.vv. *cetaḥparyāya* and *paryāya*). Tib. *sems kyi rnam grangs shes pa* uses (rather mechanically) *rnam grangs*, lit. 'part-number', for

pariyāya (probably in the latter's sense of 'arrangement' or 'method'), which points at a similar understanding. Ch. 心差別通 'comprehension of the mind distinctions [/differences]' is a rather free rendering (差別 for *pariyāya*!) but basically shows the same understanding. The Theravāda commentarial tradition, on the other hand, construes *pariya* as 'penetration'. Thus, the Vism 344, § 8, links the word with verbs like *pariyāti* 'goes round' and *paricchindati* 'determines'. PED translates the word as 'penetration' s.v. *pariya*, but construes it as a syncope of *pariyāya* s.v. *cetopariyāya*, whose equivalent is given as 'the ways of the heart (= *paricca*)'. PTS Concordance, vol. 3, p. 190, s.v., renders *pariya* as 'encompassing'.

Let us add here that the canonical order of describing or listing the supernatural faculties is miraculous powers (*ṛddhi*), divine ear (*divyaśrotra*), knowledge of the ways of thought [of other sentient beings] (*cetaḥpariyāyajñāna*), recollection of [one's own] previous lives (*pūrvanivāsānusmṛti*, also spelled *pūrvanivāsānusmṛti*; see *pūrvanivāsa*^o in our passage; cf. BoBh 66, 22; ibid., 389, 15) knowledge of the death and birth [of all living beings] (*cyutyutpādajñāna*), and, when the sixth *abhiññā* (attainable only by Buddhist adepts) is added, knowledge of the destruction of the contaminations [/cankers] (Skt. *āśravakṣayajñāna*; Pali *āsavakkhyañāna*). This order seems to be 'scrupulously followed by the Pali Nikāya and Abhidhamma and a considerable part of the Sanskrit Āgama' (Lamotte 1944-1980, vol. 4, p. 1819, n. 1). This is also the order adopted by SaṅghBh II 246, 13-251, 16; DaśBh Kondō ed. 56, 16-59, 8 = Rahder ed. pp. 34-36; Pañca 83, 7-88, 6; AKBh 421, 6-9; AKVy 23; BoBh 58, 13-15; etc. The order in the ŚrBh is, however, different from this as well from the order of the 'meditation scripture [or: scriptures?]' 禪經 (T25.464c25-465a13) and that followed by the Buddha during the night before his Awakening (T25.465a13-b16), both of which are discussed in the PPUpad (see Lamotte 1944-1980, 1822-1827). It is difficult to decide whether the ŚrBh passage here reflects a different scriptural tradition or is just an arrangement peculiar to our text and does not constitute a historically significant variation. The MVyut (Sakaki ed. § XIV) confronts us with yet another order: *divyaṃ cakṣuḥ*, *divyaṃ śrotram*, *paracittajñāna/ cetaḥ(citta)pariyāyajñāna*, *pūrvanivāsānusmṛtijñāna*, *ṛddhividhijñāna*, and *āśravakṣayajñāna*. (Sakaki ed. contains an extra *parasya cetaḥpariyāyajñāna* after *divyaṃ śrotram*, which appears to be Sakaki's own addition since it has no Tib. and Ch. equivalents and is not found in either Csoma de Körös ed. § C L X XIX (11) or Ishihama and Fukuda ed., p. 12, §§ 199-206, of the MVyut.)

^{2 5 7} Skt. *arthapratisamvedinaḥ* 'thoroughly knowledgeable about meaning' and Skt. *dharmapratisamvedinaḥ* 'thoroughly knowledgeable about [the wording of the respective] teaching' seem to be related to the first two of the four kinds of thorough knowledge (Skt. *pratisamvid*; Pali, *paṭisambhidā*), i.e., *arthapratisamvid*, *dharmapratisamvid*, *nirukti-pratisamvid*, and *pratibhānapratisamvid*. Various renderings of *pratisamvid* into European languages as used by Buddhist scholars up until the early 1930s are gathered by Dayal ([1932] 1978, 259-260). Dayal proposes 'detailed and thorough knowledge' (ibid. 261), which is very apt but rather long. I think that 'thorough' also implies that the knowledge is 'detailed'. Let us note that other ways of construing the term are also possible (see Vasubandhu's understanding and Oltramare, in ibid., 262). Equally pertinent is Dayal's brief description of the *raison d'être* of this set: 'They simply imply thorough knowledge of something for purposes of propaganda' (ibid. 261).

The *paṭisambhidās* are known from early canonical sources (e.g. AN II 160, 19-37; etc.) and have received extensive treatment in the *sāstra* literature (e.g., Paṭis I 88-91; Vism 372, § 21-374, § 27; AKBh 419, 7-420, 5; BoBh 258, 4-24; etc.). In Mahāyāna Buddhism, developed and re-seasoned in the spirit of the new movement, they become cardinal virtues of the bodhisattva (for further sources and discussion, see Dayal [1932] 1978, 259-267, and Lamotte 1944-1980, vol. 3, 1614-1615).

The *Kośa* identifies *dharmapratisamvid* with the knowledge concerning the complexes (*kāya*)

of names, phrases, and syllables, and *arthapratisamvid* with the knowledge concerning the meaning of those complexes of names, phrases, and syllables (AKBh 418, 13: *nāmapadavyaṅjanakāyeṣv artha*^o). To use modern terms, we could roughly say, that the former represents the signifier and the latter the signified. The sense of *dharmā*^o in *dharmapratisamvid* is explained as ‘Buddhist teachings’ (AKVy 652, 14: *dharmapratisamvid iti: iha deśanā dharmah*; see also Vism 373, §§ 23-24).

BoBh 258, 5-10, defines the terms as follows: *yat sarva-dharmāṅām sarva-paryāyeṣu yāvadbhāvikatayā yathāyadbhāvikatayā ca bhāvanāmayam asaktam avivartyaṁ jñānam, iyaṁ eṣāṁ dharmapratisamvit. yat punaḥ sarva-dharmāṅām eva sarva-lakṣaṇeṣu yāvadbhāvikatayā yathāyadbhāvikatayā ca bhāvanāmayam asaktam avivartyaṁ jñānam, iyaṁ eṣāṁ arthapratisamvit*. ‘That which is unhindered (*asakta*; cf. Tib. *thogs pa med cing*, D 137a1; Ch. 無所滯礙, T30.539b6 and 8-9), unshakable knowledge produced by meditative cultivation, with regard to every single type [of expression/teaching] of all *dharma*s covering the entire reality and in conformity with reality, that is their [i.e., the bodhisattvas]; cf. Ch. 是名菩薩法無礙解, T30.539b6-7] complete knowledge with regard to [the teachings concerning] phenomena. Furthermore, that which is unhindered, unshakable knowledge produced by meditative cultivation concerning every single characteristic of the same all *dharma*s covering the entire reality and in conformity with reality, that is their complete knowledge concerning the meaning [of phenomena]’. The sense of *dharma*s in the first sentence is usually construed as ‘teachings’. In the second sentence, however, *dharma*s appear more likely to be used in the sense ‘phenomena’ (*lakṣaṇa* does not fit well with ‘teachings’). If this is true, then *sarva-dharmāṅām eva* ‘the same all *dharma*s’ suggests that in the first sentence, too, the meaning is also ‘phenomena’. In his commentary on BoBh, Sāgaramegha explains *dharmā* here as referring to ‘*dus byes rnam*’ ‘conditioned things’ and *sarva-lakṣaṇeṣu* as *svalakṣaṇa*, etc. (*rNal ’byor spyod pa’i sa la byang chub sems dpa’i sa’i rnam par bshad pa*, 506).

In many of the Northern Abhidharma texts as well as Mahāyāna sources, the four kinds of thorough knowledge are listed with *dharmapratisamvid* as the first member followed by *arthapratisamvid*. In the Pali tradition as well as in a few Mahāyāna scriptures, we find, however, the reverse order (Dayal [1932] 1978, 263). The latter is also seen in our ŚrBh passage here.

We should also notice that although the four kinds of thorough knowledge usually appear together, sometimes only the pair *arthapratisamvid* and *dharmapratisamvid* is mentioned. (This pair may have historically preceded the four-*pratisamvid* formula.) In the Pali Canon, we find the following expression: *tathā tathā so tasmim dhamme atthapaṭisaṁvedī ca hoti dhammapaṭisaṁvedī* (DN III 241, 6-8; AN III 21, 17-19; etc.). Closely related to this seems to be the collocation of *athaveda* with *dhammaveda* (e.g., MN I 37, 30-31; etc.). Dayal ([1932] 1978, 263) also refers to the occurrence of only two knowledges and points out the pair *arthavādī dharmavādī* in the DaśBh (Rahder ed. 24, 22 = Kondō ed. 39, 7). Furthermore, Dayal draws the attention to what he takes as a set of three kinds of thorough knowledge in the BoBh (which exclude *nirukti-pratisamvidā*). This, however, appears to be a mere scribal omission. Dayal worked before the publication of any edition of the text and had to rely only on one Skt. MS. Wogihara’s ed. (89, 25) actually has *nirukti-pratisamvidā* and notes that the MS omission is emended on the basis of Tib. (see p. 89, n. 4). Dutt’s ed. (63, 14) contains the word (reading: *nirukti-pratisamvidapratibhānapratisamvidā ca*—this is probably a typographical error to be emended to *nirukti-pratisamvidā pratibhānapratisamvidā ca*), without any note, which means that the MS discovered by Sāṅkṛtyāyāna does not omit it.

The order of listing the four kinds of thorough knowledges is discussed in the AMVibh (T 27.905b7-25). According to it, in the *sūtras* 契經, the *arthapratisamvid* is listed first, followed

by the *dharmapratisaṃvid* (like in our ŚrBh passage), while in Abhidharma 阿毘達磨, the order is reversed. It is interesting that the AMVibh explains both enumeration orders by making appeal to the experience of the meditation adepts 瑜伽師 (**yogācāra*) (cf. also Nishi 1975, 252). A definitive conclusion is not possible, but if we regard the order adopted by the ŚrBh as symptomatic for its doctrinal affinities, we could speculate that our authors deliberately chose a pattern different from the Abhidharmic tradition. Were they trying to distance themselves from the Vaibhāṣikas and stress their reliance upon canonical sources (and a related Dārṣāntika/Sautrāntika tradition)?

See also passage 3.28.5.2.11. below and respective notes.

²⁵⁸ AKBh 430, 5-14, admits that certain individuals can also have innate (*upapattyāpta*, *upapattilambhika*, *upapattipratilabdha*, or *upapattipratilabhya*) miraculous powers similar to the *abhijñās*. Technically, however, they should not be called *abhijñās* and do not have the same ‘high quality’ of the latter. For example, the divine eye of a person with innate miraculous powers cannot see beings in their intermediate states (*anatarābhava*). In contrast to these, the supernatural faculties developed by the ascetic represent the fruit of spiritual cultivation (*bhāvanāphala*), which actually is the same term used in our ŚrBh passage.

²⁵⁹ Or: ‘ideation of agreement [/conformity] between body and mind’. Let us also note that in passage 3.28.5.2.5. the compound appears in the reverse order: *cittakāyasamavadhānasamjñā* ‘ideation of the mind-body fusion’. For its definition, see passage 3.28.5.2.5. below.

²⁶⁰ Here the ideation is called *adhimuktisamjñā*, but in passage 3.28.5.2.6.1. below, which is dedicated to its definition, the term employed is *adhimokṣasamjñā*. Tib. (*mos pa’i ‘du shes*) and Ch. (勝解想) use the same renderings for both Skt. readings. If *adhimuktisamjñā* (here) and *adhimokṣasamjñā* (below) are the exact wording of the ŚrBh authors, then there is no doubt that, at least in this context, the two compounds were regarded as freely interchangeable synonyms.

²⁶¹ Although many of these ideations have canonical and Abhidharmic parallels, the *dvadaśa samjñāḥ* listed here seem to represent a set unique to the ŚrBh. More details will follow in the text and notes below. Here it will suffice to quote a general remark in Ji’s Commentary: 論解十二想中前五想是修神境通法，餘四次第修一一通法。(T43.122b26-27) ‘Amongst the **twelve ideations** explained in the [*Yogācārabhūmi*] *Śāstra*, the first five ideations represent the cultivation of the miraculous powers, the remaining four [ones represent] in the order [of their enumeration] the cultivation of each of [the rest of] the supernatural faculties’. This means that the recollection of the previous lives is attained through the sixth ideation, the divine ear through the seventh one, the knowledge of the deaths and births of all sentient beings through the eighth one, and the knowledge of the ways of thought of other sentient beings through the ninth one. The remaining three ideations constitute well-known meditative practices but are not directly linked to the achievement any particular faculty. As argued below, passage 3.28.5.2.11., where the last three ideations are discussed, may represent a later addition to the ŚrBh. It is very likely that the original text of the ŚrBh contained only the first nine ideations, and the the ideation of the eight liberations, the ideation of the eight bases of mastery, and ideation of the ten totalities were added later (just in order to complete the yogi’s repertoire?). Their somehow irregular presence in this context is also supported by the fact that they perform no specific role in the attainment of the supernatural faculties. For more details, see note 304 below.

²⁶² Skt. *ātman* appears to be used here in the sense of ‘one’s own body’ (a sense recorded in PW, s.v. and MW, s.v.). Tib. makes this quite clear: *bdag nyid kyi lus*. In the next passage, Skt. reads *kāyam*, which Tib. similarly renders as *bdag nyid kyi lus*. The meaning of ‘body’ for this word generally thought to be the paramount denotation of the Soul may be quite surprising. However, such a usage is seen even in the most orthodox Hindu texts. For example, Śaṅkara, in his Commentary upon the *Bhagavadgīta*, clearly construes some occurrences of *ātman* as *deha*

‘body’ (two occurrences) or *indriya* ‘sense faculties’ (one occurrence) (see Hara 1999, 71; cf. also p. 77, p. 84). A careful look at the *Bhagavadgīta* passages so glossed upon by the great philosopher prove that he did not miss his ‘semantic’ mark (though such interpretations surprised a modern Indologist like Zaehner—see Hara 1999, p. 67, n. 2). One of the usages of *ātman*, which goes back to the *Ṛgveda*, is that reflexive pronoun or ‘oneself’. It is, after all, not so surprising to see ‘oneself’ construed as including or simply referring to the body. And such an understanding appears to be even older than the *Bhagavadgīta*. At *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 8.8.4., *ātman* is employed in a sense which seems to refer to the ‘body’ (Radhakrishnan [1953] 1989, 504, renders this occurrence as ‘one’s (bodily) self’). In Buddhist literature, too, this usage is rare, but not absent. At Thī 28, we read: *sele khambhesim attānam* ‘I propped my body [/myself] against the rock’, where *attānam* is best understood as referring to ‘oneself’ in a physical sense, i.e., ‘body’. Thī-a, 33 construes *attānam* as *attabhāvam*. One of main meanings of *attabhāvam* is ‘body’ (see CPD, PED, PD, s.v.). For *attabhāva* as one of the terms in the semantic group denoting ‘body’, cf. also *Abhidhānappadīpikā*, p. 25, ver. 151.

²⁶³ Skt. *tūlapicur vā karpāsapicur vā vāyumaṇḍalake*. The pair *tūlapicur vā karpāsapicur vā* appears in a series of scriptural sources. In a context similar to our ŚrBh passage, the *Ayogūlasutta* describes how the Tathāgata can reach Brahma’s Realm with his mentally-constructed body (*manomayena kāyena*) as well as his physical body made up of the four elements (*cātumahābhūmikenā kāyena*). As a result of his exquisite meditative and miraculous powers, the Tathāgata can rise up from the ground ‘light as a tuft of *tūla*-cotton or a tuft of *kappāsa*-cotton wafting through the air’ (*seyyathāpi [...] tūlapicu vā kappāsapicu vā lahuko vātupādāno* SN V 284, 1-2) (for other occurrence of *vātupādāna*, see also SN IV 399, 27). Though not connected with supernatural faculties, the same expression is also employed as a simile for lightness at SN V 443, 27-28 (Ch. equivalent at T2.107b29-3 reads: 如小綿丸、小劫貝華丸置四衢道頭，四方風吹，則隨風去向於一方。). The *tūla*-cotton and *kappāsa*-cotton are found as similes for the soft touch of the treasure-woman’s (*itthiratana*) skin at DN II 175, 27-28 and MN III 175, 4. In Sanskrit sources, we find *tūlapicur vā karpāsapicur vā* at Divy 210, 14-15, 388, 14-15. *Tūlapicu* alone is also employed in the *Vism* 341, § 131 (explaining the ideation of lightness (see note 265 below) by means of which the ascetic reaches Brahma’s Realm ‘as a tuft of cotton blown by the wind’ *vātukkhittatūlapicunā*); Aṣṭa 286, 4-5 (as a simile for the wavering intellect (*buddhi*) of a bodhisattva not cultivating the perfection of wisdom; cf. *Abhisamāli* 584, 3-4); *AKBh* 167, 25 (as a comparison for the softness of the soil of Indra’s royal residence on the top of Mount Meru); etc. For Sanskrit sources from Central Asia, see SWTF, s.v. *tūla-picu*.

The main difference from the Pali parallel phrases (SN V 284, 1-2 and 443, 27-28) is *vāyumaṇḍalaka*. I assume that the reference here is not the ‘wind-sphere’ (though both Tib. and Ch. render as such) as a cosmic region but rather to a strong ‘whirlwind’ (see MW, s.v.; BHSD, s.v. *vāyumaṇḍalavat*). We see the expression *vāyumaṇḍalavat* at *Avad* 114, 1, where five hundred hungry-ghosts (*pañca pretaśātāni*) are whirled round in the air as a whirlwind (*vāyumaṇḍalavat ākāṣe paribhramanti*). *Vāyumaṇḍalaka* in our ŚrBh passage here may be a stylistic change (the force of the whirlwind emphasising the image of lightness) or a corruption (oral or scribal) of the old Pali compound *vātupādāno*.

The most difficult part is the exact identification of the materials which *karpāsa* and *tūla* denote. All lexicographical sources I have consulted basically render both of them as ‘cotton’. In the case of the former, we appear to know more. Monier-Williams (s.v.) identifies *karpāsa* as the ‘cotton-tree’ or, simply, ‘cotton’ and gives the scientific term of *Gossypium Herbaceum*. Similarly, the Japanese scholar Maku (1977, 129-131) translates *karpāsa* as ワタ ‘cotton’ or キワタ ‘cotton-tree’ (with a photo on p. 129, and the same Latin name *Gossypium Herbaceum*

in the Index, p. 10). No such a precise identification seems possible for *tūla* (even in modern Indo-Aryan languages and dialects, the derivatives which can be traced to *tūla* merely point to ‘cotton’; see Turner 1966 [1999], s.v.).

The Tib. and Ch. renderings raise the additional problem of determining to what precisely they refer. Even if the translators had a clear idea about what these plants and materials meant, they had to grapple with languages reflecting quite different ecosystems. Tib. *shing bal gyi 'dab* (= *tūla*) literally means ‘tree’(shing)-‘wool’ (bal)-‘leaf’ (‘dab). As a compound, BTsh, s.v., records *shing bal gyi 'dab ma* and renders it into Chinese as 綿絮 ‘floss silk’. It is difficult to know, however, whether this applies to old sources such as the ŚrBh translation. In the case of *karpāsapicu*, its equivalent is *ras bal gyi 'dab*, literally, ‘leaf of cotton-wool’, but, once again, its precise identification is not easy. (Note that the modern English word ‘cotton wool’ refers to ‘raw cotton’ and probably has nothing to do with the Tibetan rendering above.)

Ch. translates *tūla* with the help of a phonetic transcription: 妬羅綿 ‘*duluo*-cotton’ (for the reconstruction of the mediaeval pronunciation of 妬 and 羅, see Pulleyblank 1991, 83 and 203 respectively) and *karpāsa* as 疊絮 ‘white (?) cotton’ (疊 usually means ‘to fold up’ but can also have the sense of ‘white cotton’ or, simply, ‘cotton’; see DKWJ, s.v., and Mathews 1943, s.v. 疊 = ‘a kind of white cotton cloth’). The word *tūla* transcribed in this or various other ways (for which, see T54. 510b13; 1172a23-27) is well-attested in Chinese sources and has attracted the attention of a number of exegetes. Of direct concern is Ji’s Commentary who glosses upon the term as follows: 論云妬羅綿者謂：野蠶虫繭，名妬羅綿。(T43.122b5) ‘The *tūla*-silk mentioned in the [Yogācārabhūmi] Śāstra is [obtained from] the cocoon of wild silkworms and called *tūla*-silk’ (in this case, 綿 should be construed as ‘silk’ not ‘cotton’). The word is similarly defined by To-ryun (T42.474c23-24). However, Puguang 普光, who as Ji was also one of Xuanzang’s chief disciples, shows a different understanding: 妬羅綿：妬羅是樹名，綿從樹葉 [var. lec. 果] 中出，名妬羅綿；如言柳絮。(T41.189b10-11) ‘*Tūla*-cotton: *tūla* is the name of a tree, [and] the cotton comes from the fruit of the tree, [therefore] it is named *tūla*-cotton; it is like the expression “willow-catkins” (i.e., the latter word is coined in the same way the term *tūla*-cotton). (Puguang’s gloss is *ad* AKBh Ch. T29.59c26 = Skt. 167, 25.) A similar and more detailed definition is found at T54.1172a23-27. It is hard to decide which of the glosses is the correct one, but even if we could attain a decision, the exact material or species from which it comes would remain obscure. See also MVyut # 5874.

A more comprehensive study accompanied by a sound knowledge of Indian plants and textiles may reveal more in the future, but to all intents and purposes, I have decided that here we have to deal with two types of cotton and the safest way to distinguish them is to make use of the original Sanskrit. It can be briefly mentioned here that Indian flora abounds in species of cotton. A very brief browsing through the vast botanic literature has led me to the ‘discovery’ of two types of so-called silk cotton trees: red and yellow. Their scientific names are *Bombax malabaricum* and *Cochlospermum religiosum* respectively (see Saldanha and Dhawan 1984, plates 47-50).

Finally, let us add that the phrase occurs one more time in the ŚrBh (MS A*b4L; this is part of a folio omitted by Sh). The context is the exposition of the mindfulness of breathing, a practice in which the yogi becomes aware of all types of wind or air (*vāyu*) circulation in and around his body. One type of wind is described as follows: *evam sarvaṃ kāyaṃ [...] tadyathā tūlapicur vā karpāsapicur vā laghukam adhimucyate* ‘[the ascetic] thus concentrates upon [his] whole body as [being] light like a tuft of *tūla*-cotton or a tuft of *karpāsa*-cotton’ (= Tib. P 195b4-5 and D 162a1-2 (which I follow here): *dper na | shing bal gyi 'da' ba dang | ras bal gyi 'da' ba ltar yang ba nyid du mos par yang byed do | |*; Ch. 464b20-22: 如妬羅綿或如疊絮等諸輕飄物於是諸相而起勝解。).

²⁶⁴ We can reconstruct with a certain degree of confidence the monastic furniture which serves for our yogi's 'trans-gravitational' itinerary. The Pali *Vinaya* lists four types of beds (*mañca*) and four types of chairs (*piṭha*) (Vin IV 40, 5-8). The former are also described by Krishna Murthy (1982, p. 78 and figures XVIII and XIX; for *piṭha* in the sense of 'stool', see p. 8 and for 'chairs' in general, see pp. 37-42 and figure IX). The third piece mentioned in our text is *ṭṭṇasamstaraka* which Edgerton renders as 'mat or bed (of grass)' (BHSD, s.v. *samstaraka*; cf. also SWFT, s.v.). The Pali equivalent *ṭṭṇasanthāra* also suggests a grass mat (cf. also Krishna Murthy 1982, p. 79) but not necessarily serving as a bed. At Vin I 286, 24, it is used to put a robe on it, at Vin II 113, 36, to protect a bowl from being broken, and at Vin II 116, 15-16, to protect a *kaṭhina*-frame from dust. In our ŚrBh passage, it, too, seems to be a grass mat but not used for the bed (the yogi flies from the latter to the *ṭṭṇasamstaraka* and then back). As suggested by the Ch. 草座, it seems to be a rather grass mat used as a seat (for meditation?) set as a separate piece of furniture.

Concerning the Tib. and Ch. equivalents, some unavoidable slight differences exist, but roughly speaking, they seem to match the Skt. original. The only slightly problematic term might be Ch. 几. In Classical Chinese, the word is basically used in the sense of 'a small table' used to place things or support one's elbow on it (see DKWJ, s.v.; HDC, s.v.) (Its shape can easily be figured out from the form of the character, which is a pictogram.) The sense of 'bench' is, however, also attested (see Mathews 1943, s.v.). As far I can see, this seems to be a secondary meaning, but in the light of the Skt. original, it is more likely that Xuanzang used the word in the sense of 'bench' or 'stool'.

Let us also remark that the yogi's flight is described here with a certain reticence, and this seems to have been the general tone for the Abhidharmic 'accounts' of the initial steps in such experiences. In the AMVibh, we are told that the **yogācāra* 瑜伽師 cultivating the range of miraculous powers 神境通, first rises above ground as high as half a sesame-seed 半苜蓿 (T27.414c26) and then slowly increases his 'flight abilities' to a full sesame-seed, etc. It is only in the final stages of his training that he can reach the realm of the gods at summit of the conditioned world (**akaniṣṭhā devāḥ*) 色究竟天 (T27.414c29).

²⁶⁵ Skt. *laghusamjñā*. The ideation of lightness as a method facilitating the attainment of the the ability to raise from the ground can already be seen at SN V 283, 9-10; 17-19; 23-24: *sukhasaññā ca lahusaññā ca kāye* [var. lec. *kāyena*] *okkamitvā viharati* '[The Tathāgata] dwells having attained (*okkamati*) [for this verb, see CPD, s.v.] the ideation of pleasure and ideation of lightness in [his] body [var. lec.: by means of [his] body]'. SN-a III 261, 9, explains the term as follows: *kilesa-dandhāyitattassa ca abhāvā lahu-saññā nāma* 'and because of the absence of slowness [caused by] defilements, it is named "ideation of lightness"'. This points at an understanding not only as physical lightness which allows flying but also, more abstractly, as getting rid of the 'weight' of the cankers. The Vism (340, § 131) contains a more detailed explanation, which similarly makes a point in saying that the lightness comes from having become freed from hindrances (*nīvaraṇehi*). There is no doubt, however, that this lightness allows the yogi to fly with astonishing speed to Brahma's Realm in his physical body (*kāyena Brahmālokaṃ gacchati*). Though the term *laghusamjñā* is not found in the AKBh, the treatise refers, however, to a similar praxis: *ṛddhyādīnām tu laghutvaśabdālokamanasikaraṇam prayogaḥ* (AKBh 422, 11-12) 'but the preparatory practice for [the attainment of] the miraculous powers, etc. is the contemplation of lightness, sound, and light'. AKVy 656, 22-24, explains that the contemplation of lightness prepares for the miraculous powers, the contemplation of sound for the divine ear, and the contemplation of light for the divine eye.

²⁶⁶ Skt. *kauseyam vā kacam vā paṭṭam vā*. The identification of the materials is again a task far from easy. Furthermore, the Tib. and Ch. translations face us with lexical items which

complicate the picture. *Kauṣeya* is rendered by Monier-Williams (MW, s.v.) as ‘silk cloth’ or, simply, ‘silk’ (which I have adopted for my translation here). This, however, does not agree with Tib. rendering which is *shing bal* or ‘cotton’. It is rather intriguing that the same Tib. word is employed to translate *kauṣeya* here and *tūla* in the preceding passage. I do not know whether this should be seen as a proof of their synonymy or simply as a symptom of a ‘loss of words’ (quite literal!) on the part of the Tibetan team.

Ch. 綿囊 ‘silk [cotton] sack’ (a binome otherwise not attested in any lexicographical source) adds further problems. 綿 means both ‘floss silk’ and ‘cotton’ (see Mathews 1943, s.v.; DKWJ, s.v.; HDC, s.v.), and it is difficult to ascertain which of the two materials Xuanzang had in mind. Furthermore, 囊 ‘sack’, ‘bag’, etc. looks rather odd here. A remote possibility would be to construe it the sense of ‘sack material’ (i.e., ‘cloth?’), but I am not sure whether 囊 could be used in such way. (For ‘cloth’, 布 would have been a much better choice.) Another (equally remote!) possibility would be to take 囊 as a metaphor for the body, i.e., ‘[like a soft] sack [filled with] floss silk/cotton’. It is true that occasionally Buddhist scriptures compare the body with a ‘bag’, but not in a context similar to ours and usually with pejorative connotations. For instance, at MN I 57, 21, the ascetic engaged in the practice of *satipaṭṭhāna* views his body as a ‘double-mouthed bag’ (*ubbhato mukkā mutoḷī*). This is definitely a negative image, which has nothing to do with the semantic spectrum one would expect in our ŚrBh passage. It is quite possible that Xuanzang had another lection in his MS. If this was the case, I would rather suspect that whatever stood for 囊 was probably a corrupt reading.

For the next word, *kaca*, I have followed Edgerton’s ‘cotton or raw silk’ (BHSD, s.v.). This agrees with (at least one of the meanings of) Tib. *srin bal*. Das (TED, s.v.) equates the compound with *ras bal* and renders it as ‘cotton, flock silk, raw silk’. I am not sure whether *srin bal* covers all these materials. Judging from its component words, i.e., *srin* < *srin bu* ‘worm’ (here, ‘silkworm’) and *bal* ‘wool’, it rather appears that (at least the primary) meaning of the compound is ‘silk’. Actually, BTsh s.v. defines the compound as *srin bu las byung ba’i bal* ‘wool produced from [silk-]worms’, and gives 丝绵 ‘silk floss’ as its Chinese equivalent. (See also MVyut # 5870.)

On the other hand, Xuanzang’s translation of *kaca* is 毛毳 which usually means ‘down’, ‘very soft feathers’ (DKWJ, s.v.). This sense is certainly stressed by the second character, an ideogram in which the repetition of 毛 ‘hair’ or ‘fur’ graphically represents the minuteness of the feathers. Actually, we also find 毛毳 in as a synonym or, more likely, an explanation of the *tūla*: ‘it is [as soft as] down’ (T54.1172a26) (see also note 263 above). It is somehow surprising that the binomic lexeme 毛毳 is not always employed in connection with soft cloth or garment. We actually find it in the same ŚrBh (ŚrBh-Gr 278, 9 = Ch. T30.422b4), where 毛毳 stands for *aurṇika* ‘woolen’, and 毳衣 (ŚrBh-Gr 278, 8 and 10 = Ch. T30.422b3 and 5) translates *nāmatika* ‘wearing garments of felt’. The latter binome can hardly refer here to soft wool since *nāmatika* is one of the austerities (*dhūtagaṇa*) which by their very nature rule out any degree of comfort. Actually, a similar rendering can be seen in the Chinese *Ekottarikāgama* 增壹阿含經 translated by Gautama Saṅghadeva sometime in the latter half of the fourth century C.E. In a *sūtra* parallel to the second half of the Pali *Mahāsīhanādasutta* (MN No. 12), wearing 毛毳 (T2.671b23) is one of the extreme forms of ascetic practices which Gautama had undertaken before his Awakening. It is not clear what 毛毳 precisely means here since the Pali counterpart is more developed and contains more types of cloths which Gotama wore (compare T2.671b22-23 with MN I 78, 10-15). One possibility is that it refers to black antelope skin (*ajina*) (typical of Brahmanical ascetics), but this is a mere conjecture. Whatever it is, the material could, however, hardly convey the idea of ‘softness’. Now to return to our ŚrBh

passage, in spite of the conflicting usages of 毳, our binomic lexeme 毛毳 should be taken here as a soft material. As to exactly what material it refers, I am afraid that a certain answer is not easy to give. Roughly speaking, however, ‘down’ or ‘soft wool’ are the most likely meanings. On the other hand, ‘silk’ is, I think, quite improbable.

According to MW, s.v., *paṭṭa*, the third of our similes, refers to ‘cloth, fine or coloured cloth, woven silk’ (see also *paṭa* ‘woven cloth’, ‘cloth’, etc.; for the meaning of the latter in Buddhist literature, cf. BHSD, s.v.). Tib. *dar* simply means ‘silk’, but Ch. 熟練 seems to be used here in the sense of ‘dressed silk’ (see 練熟絲 in Mathews 1943, s.v. 練 (b) ‘to soften raw silk by boiling’; DKWJ, s.v. 熟練 = ねりぎぬの衣服; HDC, s.v. 熟練 = 煮炼丝、麻、棉组织使之洁白柔软). ‘Fine cloth’ for *paṭṭa* is a possible rendering, but it is more likely that the authors of the ŚrBh wanted to enumerate different kinds of silk and contrasted *paṭṭa* in the sense of silk processed and already woven in a cloth or garment to *kaca* ‘raw silk’. Of course, both of them are very soft and primarily meant here to be similes for the ascetic’s ‘body being soft’ (*mṛdukam kāyam*), but stylistically it sounds better to list quasi-synonyms each with a different nuance (one cannot, however, exclude the possibility that our authors were not so good at or did not care so much about literary effects!).

Let us also add that there is another possible reading here: *pr̥ṅga* (see note 115 to Skt. dipl. ed. and note 379 to Skt. crit. ed.), which also makes good sense, but in my opinion, not so good as *paṭṭa*. Edgerton (BHSD, s.v.) renders *pr̥ṅga* as ‘figured silk’ (see also BWDJ, s.v.). Actually, both dictionaries cite Mvyut # 5866 (*var. lec.: br̥ṅga*), whose Tib. equivalent is *dar ri mo can* and Ch. rendering is 綵絹. It seems that the stress is on the ‘figures’ (Tib. *ri mo*; Ch. 綵) of the silk, which would appear to me less relevant in our passage. Admittedly, one of the meanings of *paṭṭa* given by Monier-Williams above is ‘coloured silk’, but this does not appear to be of primary importance in our passage. Let us also note the fact that when Tib. uses *ri mo*, it probably must have a substantial semantic weight. The term *dar ri mo can* also renders *citrapaṭṭaka* (TSD, s.v.) where *dar* renders *paṭṭa* which is qualified by *ri mo can* = *citra*, probably in the sense of ‘spotted, speckled’ (or ‘bright-coloured’?). Though *pr̥ṅga* remains a ‘candidate’ lection in our passage, I think that *paṭṭa*, with its nuance of ‘woven/dressed’ as opposed to ‘raw’, seems better. Besides, though the MS decipherment here is not easy, the word most probably reads *paṭṭa*, which requires no emendation. The other possible decipherment is *paṅga*, which would have to be emended in order to read *pr̥ṅga*.

²⁶⁷ The meaning of Skt. *rūpagatam* seems to be ‘any [kind of] matter’ or ‘consisting in matter’. The Tib. rendering *gzugs kyi rnam pa* should probably be construed as ‘type of matter’. Ch. 色聚 literally means ‘collection of matter’, here 聚 most likely standing for ‘collection’ in the sense of ‘variety of [types of] matter’ (see below). *Rūpagata* is also found in Pali. We see the compound at, for instance, AN IV 422, 24, alongside *vedanāgatam*, *saññāgatam*, *saṅkharagatam*, *viññāgatam*. The basic meaning does not appear to be different from *rūpa*, etc. used alone. The text says that whatever ‘belongs to [/consists in/is associated with] matter’, etc., all these factors (*te dhamme*) are seen by the meditator who dwells in the first absorption as being impermanent and causing suffering (*aniccato dukkhato*), etc. See also AN-a IV 195, 15-16: [...] *yaṃ rūpaṃ nāma pavattati; vedanāgatādini sampayuttavedanādīnaṃ* [...]. This canonical passage seems to be the basis of a reference at AKBh 435, 14-16: *yat tatra bhavati rūpagatam vā yāvad vijñānagatam veti* [...] *rūpagatam veti nāvakṣyat* (cf. Honjō 1984, pp. 110-111; Pāsādika 1989a, p. 120, # 485). The Tib. translation here is also *gzugs kyi rnam par* (P Ngu 78a5) and *gzugs kyi rnam pa* (P Ngu 78a7). Both Paramārtha (T29.297b26 and 28) and Xuanzang (T29.146a26 and 29) have 色類 ‘type of matter’. It is noteworthy that both translators render *rūpajāti* occurring in the same passage also as 色類. Cf. also *rnam pa* used for *-gata* in the DaśBh (cf. TSD, s.v.) as well as in the Mvyut # 4651 *dr̥ṣṭigatam* = *Ita ba’i rnam*

pa 'am lta bar gyur ba.

²⁶⁸ The idea that the perfect unity or interpenetration of mind and body leads to supernatural faculties is very old. SN V 283, 8-12, describes it using terms and images clearly similar to our ŚrBh passage: *yasmim Ānanda samaye Tathāgato kāyam pi cite samādhati cittam pi ca kāye samādhati || sukhasaññaṅca lahusaññaṅca kāye okkamitvā viharati || tasmim Ānanda samaye Tathāgatassa kāyo lahutarō ceva hoti mudutarō ca kammaniyatarō ca pabhassaratarō ca ||* (see also commentary at SN-a III 261). The ŚrBh passage here is more developed and uses its own concept of *cittakāyasamavadhānasamjñā*, but there is little doubt that its authors (or the tradition to which they belonged) must have drawn their inspiration from this canonical source. The theoretical refinement of the idea that the body-mind unison serves as the basis for the attainment of supernatural faculties also appears to have continued in the Theravāda School, as reflected in, for instance, the Paṭis I 111 (cf. Paṭis-a I 345).

²⁶⁹ Skt. *karaṇīyam vistareṇa* can be construed as an instruction for the ascetic, i.e., '[the exercise] should be done in full'. The Tib. and Ch. renderings clearly point in this direction (see below). An alternative, not necessarily contradicting the first interpretation, is to take the phrase as a direction for the preacher/reader/listener of the text, in the sense of '[the rest of the elements] are to be supplied [understood] in full'. A similar phrase is found at Divy 377, 1: *vistareṇa kāryam*, which Edgerton translates as 'the text is to be done (i.e. recited in full)' (BHSD, s.v. *vistara*). Cf. also the Index to the Divy, s.v., where Cowell and Neil explain the word *vistara* as 'direction to the narrator ('expand here')' (p. 690). Pali *vitthārena* is also used in the sense of 'in detail'. E.g., DN III 241, 15: *dhammam vitthārena paresam deseti* 'teaches other the doctrine in detail' (a phrase seen in other texts as well: AN III 178, 4, and below; also with negation at *ibid.*, p. 177, l. 12, and below; etc.). In Sanskrit sources, *vistareṇa* is also frequently employed with the same meaning: BoBh 90, 21; AKBh 327, 5 (*vistareṇākhyātam*); 394, 11 (*vistareṇoktam śāstre*), etc.; AbhisamĀl 36, 8 (*vistareṇoktaḥ*), 43, 9-10 (*vistareṇa nirḍiṣṭāḥ*), etc.

Tib. seems to take the sentence as an instruction for the yogi and translates in a rather free way: *de bzhin du 'byung ba chen po re re zhing gcig la gcig 'khrul bar rgya cher mos par byed pa dang* | 'Thus, [he] intensely envisages (*mos par byed pa*) in full [/detail] each of the elements in such a way that one transforms ('*khrul bar*) into the other'. It appears that the content of *karaṇīyam* (for which, one would usually expect *bya ba*) is concretely explained by supplying '*khrul*, which is a synonym of '*phrul* (meaning 'magical feat [/transformation]'), TED, s.v.; cf. BTsh, s.v., rendering it into Ch. as 變幻、幻化).

Ch. also seems to construe the phrase as an explanation of the yogi's praxis and freely renders *karaṇīyam* as an active sentence: 如是一一差別大種展轉相作 'in this way, the elements, one by one separately, transform one into another [lit., create each other]' or 'in this way, [the ascetic] mutually creates [i.e., transforms] [with regard to] each separate element' (the latter reading is suggested by the *kundoku* reading at KDK 152 and KIK 246). What is peculiar to Ch. is that it (wrongly) takes *vistareṇa* 廣 with the next sentence: 廣如變化所作勝解, 或色變化, 或聲變化. This sentence can be interpreted in two ways. (1) 'Broadly, [he] intensely envisages in accordance with the magical creations, be they magical creations of visible [things] or magical creations of sounds'. This is the most natural reading in Chinese, but we would have to assume that Xuanzang's MS read: **yathā nirmitam adhimucyate*. (變化所作 is a rendering for *nirmita*; see BCSD, s.v.; cf. also 變化所作 in Paramārtha's translation of the *Mahāyānasamgraha* which in Tib. corresponds to *sprul pa*—see Nagao 1994, Part 2, s.v. *nirmita*.) (2) 'Broadly, [he] thus (?) intensely envisages the magical creations, be they magical creations of visible [things] or magical creations of sounds'. This reading takes 如 as rendering *tathā* (which occurs as such in our Skt. MS), which is a lexical possibility (see BCSD, s.v.), but

from the view point of Chinese syntax, it is far less natural.

²⁷⁰ I render here *adhimucyate* as ‘intensely envisages’. As explained above (see notes 15, 209, and 246), *adhimokṣa* and the related forms have a wide semantic sphere, which cannot be covered by one single word in English.

²⁷¹ The BoBh devotes a whole passage (p. 60, l. 5 - p. 61, l. 9) to the bodhisattva’s powers to transform the elements (*mahābhūta*) from one into another by deliberately cultivating the firm conviction (*adhimucyate*) that they are (or will become) as he decides. Its underlying ideas as well as some phrases (e.g., *sacet prithvīm apo dhimucyate tat tathaive bhavati*, 60, 5-6; *dūram c’āsannam adhimucya*, 61, 8; etc.) bear a close resemblance to our ŚrBh passage.

²⁷² It seems that although all the five ideations mentioned so far must be perfected in order to achieve the miraculous powers detailed in this passage, the ideation of conviction plays a central role. This is clearly expressed in the phrase *laghumṛdvākāśadhātucittakāyasamavadhāna-samjñāpariḡhītayādhimuktisamjñayā* at the end of the first paragraph of this passage.

²⁷³ Skt. *ātmanam* ‘oneself’, or, as we have seen in passage 3.28.5.2.2. above, one’s ‘own body’. Tib. renders the Skt. word here as *bdag nyid* (unlike *bdag nyid kyi lus* in passage 3.28.5.2.2.). In this passage as well as in 3.28.5.2.2., Ch. translates as 身.

²⁷⁴ Skt. <> *bhidyamānena srotasā* literally means ‘by means of a stream which is not broken’ or ‘without the stream being broken’. Cf. SaṅghBh 2.246, 20: *abhinnasroto*.

²⁷⁵ This list of miraculous powers is based on a stock-phrase frequently employed in Pali and Sanskrit sources. Let us first see the canonical formula in Pali: *so anekavihitam iddhividham paccanubhoti—eko pi hutvā bahudhā hoti, bahudhā pi hutvā eko hoti, āvibhāvaṃ tirobhāvaṃ tirokuḍḍam tiropākāraṃ tiro-pabbataṃ asajjamāno gacchati seyyathā pi ākāse, paṭhaviyā pi ummuḷlanimujjam karoti seyyathā pi udake, udake pi abhijjamano gacchati seyyathā pi paṭhaviyaṃ, ākāse pi pallānkena kamati seyyathā pi pakkhī sakuṇo, ime pi candimasuriye evaṃ mahiddhike evaṃ mahānubhāve pāṇinā parimassati parimajjati, yāva Brahmālokaṃ pi kāyena vasaṃ vatteti* (DN I 78, 1-10, which, however, misprints: [...] *kāyena va samvatteti*) (= MN I 34, 10-20; 494, 24-35; SN II 212, 18-27; AN I 255, 3-13; etc.; for a detailed explanation see Vism, 314-342). For Skt. parallels, see SaṅghBh 2.246, 15-23, and below; Pañca 83, 7-84, 2; DaśBh Kondō ed. 56, 16-57, 7; BoBh 61, 2-4 (abbreviated formula); AKVy 602, 11-17 (*bhūyo* on line 15 is to be emended to *sūrya*); MVyut # 215- # 228; etc. Our ŚrBh passage describes the same stock of miraculous powers linking it with the five ideations described above and also adding two new ideations.

²⁷⁶ Skt. *pariḡhīta*, which I have translated rather freely as ‘assisted (by)’, seems to be used here in the sense of ‘followed (by)’.

The ‘due order’ refers here to the fact that the last four miraculous acts described above correspond to each of the four ideations in the order of their enumeration.

²⁷⁷ Skt. *upādāyarūpa* ‘derived matter’. More literally, it means ‘matter [arisen] in dependence upon [the four elements, i.e., earth, water, fire, and wind]’. The concept is seen, for instance, at Dhs 124, 33-34: *cattāro ca mahābhūtā cattunnañ ca mahābhūtānām upādāya rūpam—idaṃ vuccati sabbaṃ rūpam* ‘the four elements [lit., great elements] and the matter depending on the four elements—this is what is called all [kinds of] matter’. The Vism (375, § 33 - 382, § 80), which treats the topic in detail, calls the matter based upon the four elements *bhūtarūpa* (aptly rendered by Nānamoli (tr. [1956] 1991, 443) as ‘primary materiality’) and distinguishes it from *upādāyarūpa* ‘derived matter’, classified into twenty-four types (eye, ear, nose, etc.). The same distinction is seen in the Northern Tradition. The *Kośa* mentions *upādāyarūpa* quite frequently (AKBh 8, 12; 53, 24; 84, 12; 85, 2; 103, 4; 199, 12-14; 340, 8; 413, 16). Vasubandhu does not give a detailed definition of the term, but from his usage, it is obvious that he basically has in mind a dichotomy similar to the one set forth in the Southern Abhidhamma (see especially AKBh 199, 12-14). YoBh 52, 10-53, 8, discusses in detail the relation between the four elements

and the derived matter as well as the complex mechanism of the dependence of the latter's seeds (*bīja*) on the former. For our purpose here, it suffices to cite the following: *katham tannisritam upādāyarūpaṃ bhavati | tathā hi | utpannam upādāyarūpaṃ bhūtadeśāvinirbhāgeṇa pravartate* | (YoBh 53, 2-3) (= Tib. D Tshi 26b3-4: *rgyur byas pa'i gzugs ji ltar de ltar de la brten ce na | 'di ltar rgyur byas pa'i gzugs skyes pa de 'byung ba'i phyogs dang tha dad pa med par gnas pa'i phyr* | ; Ch. T30.290a9-11: 云何造色依於彼耶？由造色生已不離大種處而轉故。) 'Why is it [said] that derived matter depends upon the [elements]? It is because derived matter exists [functions] having arisen [from them] [and] not being separated from the locus (Skt. *deśa*; Tib. *phyogs*; Ch. 處) of the elements'. Cf. also YoBh 207, 5ff., which classifies derived matter into ten material bases (*daśa rūpiṇy āyatanāni*) and matter included in the base-entities [not perceptible by external senses] (*dharmāyanaparyāpannam ca rūpaṃ*) (YoBh 207, 6-7).

²⁷⁸ This paragraph constitutes an additional gloss upon *vaśe vartayati*. It explains the 'wielding of power' (*vaśe vartanā*) as (1) exercising bodily mastery in a spatial sense, i.e., moving at will to Brahma's World; and (2) exercising physical power on material entities up to Brahma's World, most likely in the sense of being able to move or alter them. The Eastern exegetical tradition shows a similar understanding. Ji, who offers two interpretations, says: 一分造色謂色聲二種，故言一分。不迴轉觸及五根等故，唯外境故言一分。(T43.122c6-7) '**One part of the derived matter** refers to matter and sound, therefore it is said **one part**. Because [the ascetic] does not act upon the touch and the five sense organs [but only upon] the external objects, it is said **one part**'. Shentai 神泰, an early Tang exegete whose work has survived only in To-ryun's quotations (cf. Yūki 257-258), explains as follows: 二種迴轉者：一、神通人身往來自在；二、能轉變梵世一分造色，或青或黃自在迴轉，非轉一切，言一分。(T42.475a11-14) '**Two types of vartanā** [mean]: (1) by means of the miraculous powers, [the ascetic] goes to and returns from [Brahma's World] at will; (2) [the ascetic] can modify a part of the derived matter in Brahma's World, [for example,] [colours like] blue or yellow are acted upon at will; [however, this] is not [the ability] to act upon the entire [World of Brahma], [and therefore] it is said **one part**'. (This view actually agrees with Ji's second interpretation, see T43.122c7-9.) The ŚrBh passage is, admittedly, far from easy, and this lead to erroneous explanations even among traditional commentators (e.g., Fuhui 福慧 (T85.944c3-5) who is completely off the mark).

Though not exactly the same, a similar miraculous power is described by the Vism in a different context. Glossing upon *dūre pi santike adhiṭṭhāti* '[the ascetic] concentrates [sets his mind] [upon something as if being] close in spite of [its being] far' (Vism 339-340, §§ 120 - 128), Buddhaghosa gives examples of miraculous feats performed by the Exalted One and his advanced disciples. One of these is travelling by making far destinations come physically close to them and sometimes even by taking other monks with them. We are also told here of the ability to make what is much (*bahukam*) become little (*thokam*) and vice versa, or what is sweet (*madhuram*) become non-sweet (*amadhuram*) and the other way round. It is interesting that Buddhaghosa also describes the yogi's ability to travel to Brahma's World in this body, whether a visible (*dissamānena kāyena*) or an invisible one (*adissamānena kāyena*) (Vism 338-339, § 119), but nothing similar to our ŚrBh passage is said here.

Northern Abhidharma literature, though hinting at developments and refinements of the concept of magical travel, does not, however, show clear similarities with the ŚrBh description. At AKBh 425, 9, we are told: *śarīravāhinī ādhimokṣikī manojavā ca tatra gatiḥ* 'there are three [types] of going, [to wit] that carrying the body, that [based on] conviction [zealous meditative application], and that [moving] with the speed of mind'. The *Kośa* continues by explaining that the last of these three kinds of supernatural movement is reserved only to the Buddha, but *śarīravāhinī* and *ādhimokṣikī* can also be achieved by *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas*. They are defined as follows: [...] *śarīravāhinī ca gatiḥ | pakṣivat krameṇa śarīravāhanāt | ādhimokṣikī*

ca *dūrasyaśannādhimokṣeṇāsugamanāt* (AKBh 425, 15-16) ‘and the going which carries the body is [called so] because of carrying the body by means of [gradually] moving like a bird [i.e. flying]. And [going based upon] conviction [zealous meditative application] is [called so] because of rapid going by means of the conviction that what is remote is near’. These two kinds of movement, especially the last one, is probably similar to the first of type of *vaśe vartanā* in the ŚrBh, i.e., ‘[actually] going’ (*gamana*).

It is hard to determine whether the ŚrBh gloss here is part of the original early version of the text or is a later interpolation coming from the hands of a compiler who felt that some further clarifications were needed. Whichever textual layer it may belong to, the explanation of *vaśe vartanā* seems, however, to be unique to the ŚrBh. The BoBh (61, 2-9) also contains a passage on the bodhisattva’s ability to travel not only to Brahma’s World but to wherever he wishes in the whole Trichiliomegachiliocosm [lit., Universe consisting of a triple thousand great thousand worlds] (*trisāhasramahāsaḥsrām lokadhātūm gacchaty āgacchati ca*). Here, however, no mention is made of the bodhisattva’s ability to alter material phenomena in these worlds.

²⁷⁹ Skt. *audārikaudārikatayā* ‘clearly [manifested]’ (cf. *oḍārika* ‘manifest, clear’, CPD, vol. 2, p. 768, s.v.). This seems to be a natural semantic development of *audārika*. From its basic sense of ‘coarse’, ‘not-subtle’, etc., the adjective was probably construed as expressing the ‘completely manifested’ or ‘clear’ (i.e., ‘not faint’, ‘not slight’) quality of the noun which it qualifies, or, if used adverbially, of the verb it modifies.

²⁸⁰ Skt. *avyutkramaṇikayā* literally means ‘in the manner of not skipping [passing over] [each act]’. See note 417 to Skt. crit. ed.

²⁸¹ In analogy with passage 3.28.5.2.9. below, it also is possible to construe *bhāvanāphalam* as the direct object of an elliptical verb like *pratīlabhate* and render as ‘[obtains] the fruit of the cultivation’. Or the elliptical verb could be *utpadyate* as in *bhāvanāphalam cetaḥparyāyajñānam utpadyate* (passage 3.28.5.2.10. below). However, the sentence can be understood even without presupposing such an ellipsis.

²⁸² The primary function of Skt. *vistareṇa* here is to mark a direction for the listener/reader/preacher to supply the exact wording of the stock-phrase which describes how past experiences are recalled. This function is clearly stressed by *yāvat*. A similar usage of *vistareṇa yāvat* is seen in passage 3.28.5.2.9. below. As pointed out in note 269 above, *vistareṇa* might also be taken as a direction for the yogi: the act of recollection should cover all details as in the canonical formula. Basically, this is not contradictory to the interpretation suggested above. Since the yogi must recollect his past lives following the exact pattern of the canonical formula, this ends up meaning pretty much the same thing: the ascetic (who is at the same time a listener or reader of the text) must supply the wording of the entire stock-phrase. The difference with the plain listener/reader (if such recipients were ever envisaged by the ŚrBh authors), is that the ascetic would have been also expected to practice and actually attain what the canonical formula describes.

The ŚrBh passage here refers to the canonical formula which starts with the recollection of one life (*ekam pi jātim*) and ends with many aeons of formation and disintegration (*aneke pi samvaṭṭa-vivaṭṭa-kappe*). The canonical passage can be found at DN I 81, 9-82, 18. In a shorter version, it is also seen at MN I 35, 5-18; 495, 23-36; SN II 213, 16-32; AN I 255, 30-256, 7; etc. This texteme is glossed upon and discussed in detail at Vism 346, § 13-357, § 71. For Skt. parallels, see SaṅghBh 2.249, 3-34; Pañca 86, 1-87, 2; DaśBh Kondō ed. 58, 1-11; MVyut # 229- # 230 (partial citation); etc.

²⁸³ Skt. *sākāram soddeśam* ‘with [all] aspects and particulars/details’ (*soddeśam* comes from *sa+uddeśa* ‘with+explanation, exposition, setting forth’). Vism (357, § 71), commenting upon the canonical formula which contains this phrase, says: *nāmagottavasena sa-uddesaṃ, vaṇṇādivāsena sākāram* ‘due to [including the recollection of] the name and the clan, [it is

called] **with [all] particulars**; due to [including the recollection of] the appearance [/colour], etc., [it is called] **with [all] its aspects**'. In the stock-phrase, it is stated that the ascetic recollects his name, clan, appearance, the food which he has eaten, his pleasant as well as painful experiences, and his death.

²⁸⁴ The basic structure of this long and intricate sentence is the typical syntactic construction employed in definitions: '*tatra X, yaḥ (/yad/yā) Y*'. In our case, this is: *tatra nānāprakāraśabdasannipātānirghośasamjñā* [...] *yā samjñābhāvanā*. In our passage here, the sentence continues after *samjñābhāvanā* with a relative clause introduced by *yayā*, but I am afraid that the English style would not bear any attempt of further expanding the sentence. I have, therefore, rendered this relative clause as an independent sentence: 'by means of this [ideation] [...]' (see below).

²⁸⁵ Skt. *tatra nimittam udgrhya* literally means 'having grasped the characteristic regarding this'. Here, *tatra* appears to be used in the sense of 'in this regard', referring to the sounds and noises which in the Sanskrit sentence are enumerated before.

²⁸⁶ Skt. *āryānāryeṣu* refers, most likely, to the Noble Realm (*āryāyatana*), where the Noble Law prospers, and to its counterpart, the 'border regions' (*pratyanta*), populated by barbarians. Tib. *dbus dang | mtha' 'khob pa* 'central and border [areas]' clearly construes the compound in this way. Of course, *Āryāyatana* implies the Sanskrit language, and 'the noble sounds' may refer (only or mainly?) to sounds uttered in Sanskrit. I think it is, however, more likely that the usage of *ārya* here is wider, and though it certainly includes the language, it should be probably construed as 'the sounds uttered by the people living in the Noble Realm'.

The ŚrBh (ŚrBh-Gr 10, 9-10) describes a person belonging to the Noble Realm as *madhyeṣu janapadeṣu pratyājāto bhavati* '[someone] born in the middle regions'. This is one of the propitious conditions regarding oneself (*ātmasampad*) which is a requisite (*sambhāra*) for the practice of the Noble Path. The reverse is being born in a border region (*mtha' 'khob*—Skt. unavailable; for Tib. text, see ŚrBh-Gr 6, 1-5).

The Noble Land (*āryāvarta*) is also a central concept in the cultural and spiritual geography of Brahmanism and Hinduism. The *Manusmṛti*, chapter 2, ver. 22, defines it as follows: *ā samudrāt tu vai pūrvād ā samudrāt tu paścimāt | tayor evāntaram giryor āryāvartam vidur budhāḥ ||* (Olivelle ed., pp. 406-407). 'The land between the same mountain ranges extending from the eastern to the western sea is what the wise call "Āryavarta"—the region of the Āryas' (Olivelle tr., p. 95) (the same mountains refer here to the Himalaya and Vindhya ranges which are mentioned in the preceding verse). This is 'the natural range of the black buck' (*kṛṣṇasāras tu carati mṛgo yatra svabhāvataḥ |* (*Manusmṛti* 2.23a-b, Olivelle ed. p. 407; tr. p. 95) (a rendering closer to the original is found at Doniger with Smith tr., 1992, p. 19: 'where the black antelope ranges by nature'). The concept had important practical consequences because the twice-born were expected do all efforts to settle in this regions, beyond which lie the lands of the barbarians (*mlecchadeśa*) (*Manusmṛti* 2.24; *ibid.*). Even travelling outside the prescribed boundaries should be avoided, and when a journey to barbarian lands becomes absolutely necessary, strict rites of purification await the twice-born upon return to *Āryāvarta*.

²⁸⁷ The canonical passage describing the divine ear can be found at DN I 79, 6-22 (in its most developed form); MN I 34, 21-24; 494, 36-495, 3; SN II 212, 31-35; AN I 255, 14-17; etc.). DN I 79, 6-22, is the basis of the discussion at Vism 343-344, §§ 1-7. For Skt. parallels, see SaṅghBh 2.248, 1-12; Pañca 84, 9-16; DaśBh Kondō ed. 57, 7-9; etc.

²⁸⁸ See ŚrBh Sh 416, 2-4. Cf. also ŚrBh Sh 421, 18ff.

²⁸⁹ Once again, we have a direct reference to and partial quotation from a canonical formula, this time the texteme describing the divine eye. Let us first see the Pali stock-phrase. It starts with: *So dibbena cakkhunā visuddhena atikkanta-mānusakena satte passati cavamāne upapajjamāne, hīne paṇite suvaṇṇe dubbaṇṇe sugate duggate yathākammūpage sate pajānāti*

(DN I 82, 26-29). 'By means of the pure divine eye, surpassing the human [one], he sees sentient beings passing away [and] being [re-]born, he fully knows sentient beings, [whether] mean [or] lofty, pleasant [or] unpleasant, happy [or] unhappy, [each being] born [lit., reaching a state] according to [their] acts'. (A similar idea is hinted at by *kuśalākuśalakarmakriyādibhedena* in our ŚrBh passage). The ascetic sees then how those having committed wrong bodily, verbal, and mental deeds are reborn in a bad form of existence and those with a good karma and correct views (*sammāditthikā*) 'after the destruction of the body after [their] death are born in a good destination, a heavenly world' (*kāyassa bhedaṃ paraṃ maraṇā sugatiṃ saggam lokam upapannā*) (DN I 37-39). This last part is actually cited in our ŚrBh passage. The only difference is that in Pali we find no equivalent for 'amongst deities'. The latter appears, however, in the Sanskrit parallel: *kāyasya bhedaṃ sugatau svargaloke deveṣūpapadyante* (SaṅghBh 2.250, 16). The beginning of the citation, 'by means of the divine pure eye', is also found in both Pali (see above) and Skt. (*divyena cakṣuṣā viśuddhena*; SaṅghBh 2.250, 5-6).

For the canonical formula in Pali sources, see DN I 82, 22-83, 34 (in its most developed form); MN I 35, 18-36; 496, 1-17; SN II 213, 33-214, 18; AN I 256, 8-24; etc. Vism discusses and glosses upon the canonical formula at pp. 357-368, §§ 72-129. For Skt. parallels, see SaṅghBh 2.250, 3-19; Pañca 87, 3-88, 6; DaśBh Kondō ed. 58, 11-59, 5; etc.

²⁹⁰ Skt. *klesakṛtarūpavikārasamjñā* 'ideation of the specific changes in physical appearance determined by defilements'. *Vikāra* and *vikṛti* (used below in *rūpavikṛti*) mean 'alteration, transformation, modification', etc. The sense of the term here seems to be that of a 'change' in the physical appearance of a person in accordance with the type of defilement dominant in him or her. Let us also note that one of the senses of *vikāra* is 'contortion of the face, grimace' (see MW, s.v.).

²⁹¹ Skt. *paridāha* 'ardent desire'. The word can also be rendered as 'feverish longing' or 'fever' in a purely pathological sense (see BHSD, s.v.). *Paridāha* does not appear to be a standard Abhidharmic category, at least, not in the doctrinal system expounded in the AKBh. Actually, passage 3.28.2.1.2.4. of the ŚrBh (see above) lists *pradāśa* 'stubborn adherence [to one's views]' after *mraṅka* in a similar enumeration of defilements. It is not excluded that *paridāha* here is a scribal error or later editorial change of *pradāśa*, but the former is not out of place here. Actually, *paridāha* appears in other Buddhist sources, too, sometimes occurring in similar lists of defilements. Pali *pariḷāha* or 'fever' is frequently employed in a figurative sense of 'feverish passion' and in collocation with *kāma* or other 'burning' defilements (e.g. MN I 101, 30; SN II 143, 28; 151, 19: *kāmapariḷāho*; 151, 25: *vyāpādapariḷāho*; 151, 30-31: *vihiṃsāpariḷāho*; AN I 68, 5; 137, 18-19; etc.).

The word *paridāha* occurs in Sanskrit sources with apparently the same meaning. I could not find a scholastic definition of the term, but its often being enumerated together with defilements leaves no doubt that it was considered one of them. At LalVis 42, 21-22, we find it alongside *rāga*, *dveṣa*, *moha*, *irṣya*, *mātsarya*, *māna*, *mraṅka*, and *mada*. See also LalVis 206, 3, *kāmeṣu paridāha* 'burning longing for sensual pleasures', in a passage containing several parallel expressions: *kāmeṣu nandiḥ*, *kāmeṣu rāgaḥ*, [...]. DaśBh Kondō ed. 39, 14-15, includes it in the following list: *krodhopanāhakhilamalavyāpādaparidāhasamdhukṣitapratighātyāni* (var. *lec.*: *ādyaṇi*) (my underlining). At ŚikSam 109, 26-27, in a quotation from the *Ugradattaparipṛcchā*, the term *paridāha* appears with *rāga*, *dveṣa*, *moha*, *mana*, *mada*, *mraṅka*, *lobha*, *irṣya*, and *mātsarya* as one of the mental states which the bodhisattva must fear and abandon.

It can easily be seen that these enumerations partly overlap with our ŚrBh passage. Such a textual tradition may have determined the ŚrBh authors to deliberately include *paridāha* here in spite of the similar enumeration at 3.28.2.1.2.4. which has *pradāśa*. It is unclear to me, however, whether this is a change motivated by doctrinal reasons (I cannot see any impelling ones

requiring it!) or is just a pure stylistic preference.

^{2 9 2} Ch. contains extra items in its list of defilements (see note 332 to Ch. ed.). Furthermore, it is not clear whether Ch. 惱 renders *pradāśa* or *paridāha* (see note 331 to Ch. ed.).

With the exception of *paridāha* (see preceding note), all the other defilements enumerated in Skt. also appear in passage 3.28.2.1.2.4. above. For their meanings and doctrinal background, see respective notes to the Engl. tr. of the passage.

^{2 9 3} Skt. *sagadgadasvaratā*. The word *gadgada* usually means ‘stammering, stuttering’, but Monier-Williams also records the sense of ‘indistinct or convulsive utterance (as sobbing, etc.)’ (MW, s.v.), which I think is more relevant for our passage. A person dominated by hatred is more likely to be depicted as having wrathful ‘convulsive utterances’ than as ‘stuttering’ (though admittedly wrathful ‘convulsive utterances’ may sound or culminate in hysteric ‘stuttering’ or ‘indistinctness’ of sound).

^{2 9 4} A detailed description of the persons ‘whose [habitual] behaviour [is governed/dominated by] passion’ (*rāgacarita*), ‘whose [habitual] behaviour [is governed/dominated by] hatred’ (*dveṣacarita*), and ‘whose [habitual] behaviour [is governed/dominated by] bewilderment’ (*mohacarita*) is found at the beginning of Yogasthāna II (ŚrBh-Gr (13) 106-112, in Chapter 3.5. (see my Synoptic Presentation above), which contains the classification of persons (*pudgala*) into 28 types.)

^{2 9 5} Skt. *vitarkitaṃ vicāritaṃ mano manasā*. In the Pali canonical formula, the parallel sentence runs as follow: *so parasattānaṃ parapuggalaṃ cetasā ceto paricca pajānāti* (DN I 80, 22-24). This corresponds to Skt.: *sa parasattvānāṃ parapudgalānāṃ vitarkitaṃ vicāritaṃ mano manasā yathābhūtaṃ prajānāti* (SaṅghBh 2. 248, 18-20) (for other sources, see note 296 below). In Skt. sources, as in our ŚrBh passage, we see *cetasā ceto paricca* replaced by *mano manasā* and *vitarkitaṃ vicāritaṃ* added to the sentence. In Pali, the latter is not only absent in this sentence but also lacks in the enumeration of the various mental frameworks known by the yogi. This list starts in Pali sources with *sarāgaṃ vā cittaṃ* and ends with *avimuttaṃ vā cittaṃ* (e.g. DN I 79, 35-80, 14) while in Sanskrit texts, it begins with *sarāgaṃ cittaṃ* and finishes with *<su>vimuktaṃ vā cittaṃ* (e.g. SaṅghBh 2. 248, 20-26). *Vitarkitaṃ vicāritaṃ* appear to be construed here as action nouns which clarify the content of *manas* (grammatically, they are appositions to the latter). Rendered more freely, *vitarkitaṃ vicāritaṃ mano [...] prajānāti* is: ‘[the ascetic] fully knows the mind [of the sentient beings], [i.e.,] their thinking, be it coarse or subtle’.

^{2 9 6} The canonical description of the knowledge of the ways of thought of other sentient beings is found at DN I 79, 26-81, 8 (in its most developed form); MN I 34, 24-35, 4; 495, 4-22; SN II 213, 1-15; AN I 255, 18-29; etc. Vism discusses the canonical formula at pp. 344-345, §§ 8-12. For Skt. parallels, see SaṅghBh 2.248, 16-249, 2; Pañca 85, 1-14; DaśBh Kondō ed. 57, 9-58, 1; etc.

In our ŚrBh passage, we see three characteristics in the treatment of this supernatural faculty. (1) Like with other *abhijñās*, its obtainment is based on a particular type of ideation. (2) The mental states described in the stock-phrase are modified to accommodate the personality taxonomy peculiar to the ŚrBh and brought in line with the much more precise Abhidharmic typology of defilements. (3) In the canonical description of the supernatural faculty, the knowledge of other people’s minds is a psychological process (albeit a supernormal one), but in our ŚrBh passage, the yogi starts from observation of the physiognomy and only later achieves actual penetration into the thoughts of other beings. It must, however, be added that such a development is not confined to the ŚrBh alone. Though implying a different procedure, the idea of beginning with the observation of a material phenomenon is also met with in the Vism (344-345, §§ 9-10). Here the meditator who has already obtained the divine eye makes use of

this supernatural faculty and looks at the colour of blood (*lohitaṣṣa vaṇṇam*) in another being's heart (*hadaya*^a). He thus comes to understand that a mental state of satisfaction (*somanassacittam*) is accompanied by red (*ratta*) blood, dissatisfaction by dark or black (*kāḷa*) blood, etc. When his practice has gained firmness (*thāmagate*), the meditator does not need to look at the blood colour and can penetrate directly the minds of other beings. Non-dependence on material signs also allows him to know the minds of the beings in the immaterial (*ārūpa*) spheres of existence.

²⁹⁷ For a presentation and discussion of these sets of spiritual exercises in canonical and Abhidharmic sources, see Lamotte tr. 1944-1980, vol. 3, pp. 1281-1290 as well as their treatment in the PPUpad, *ibid.*, pp. 1291-1307. See also AKBh 456, 8-458, 9.

²⁹⁸ This refers to SamBh pp. 136-140, which discusses all these sets of meditative exercises.

²⁹⁹ To-ryun comments upon this as follows: 變是通體，化是通果，亦名神通。勝解通者：遠作近解，屈伸臂項 (*var. lec.* 頃) 至色究竟，及想地爲水等，名爲勝解。(T42.475b14-16). 'Transformation is the essence of [this] faculty, creation is the fruit of [this] faculty, [which] is also called miraculous power [lit, divine penetrating faculty]. The faculty of conviction: [the ascetic] "becomes convinced that what is remote is near" [and thus becomes convinced that by] bending and stretching his arm [or] neck, [he can] reach the Summit of the Material Realm (i.e., *Akaṇiṣṭha*), and formulates the ideation that "earth is water", etc.—[this faculty] is called conviction'. To-ryun's citations seem to be based on the passage 3.28.5.2.6.1. above.

For a detailed treatment of *pāriṇāmikī ṛddhiḥ* and *nairamāṇikī ṛddhiḥ*, see BoBh Wogihara ed. 58, 19ff. (Dutt ed. 40, 16ff.).

³⁰⁰ Skt. *tadyathā* seems to be used here in a rather irregular way. Usually, the word clarifies the immediately preceding lexical element or brings illustrations to it, but here neither sense seems to fit in this context. The words following *tadyathā* appear to be listed as further accomplishments obtained through the cultivation of the *vimokṣābhībhvāyatanakṛtsnāyatana-samjñā*. Tib. contains the equivalent of *tadyathā* = 'di lta ste but continues juxtaposing (with *dang*) the rest of the nouns in a sequence similar to the former part of the sentence. Ch. clearly construes the lexical elements after *tadyathā* as an addition to the preceding terms: 及能引 'and [he] can [also] generate [...]'.
The nouns following *tadyathā* also seem to show a grammatical irregularity. Unlike the preceding nouns which are in accusative, *araṇā*, *praṇidhijñānam*, *catasrah pratisamvidāḥ tadyathā dharmapratisamvit*, *arthapratisamvit*, *niruktipratisamvit*, *pratibhānapratisamvit* are in nominative. I think that all nouns in accusative would sound (at least, stylistically) better, but I must confess that I have not checked all usages of *tadyathā* in the ŚrBh and related texts. This change of case may have been an admissible change. If this was not, emendation becomes necessary. The irregularity could then be explained as a corrupt transmission or a less careful (oral?) style. Or it may reflect a later accretion which was included in the text without carefully linking it to the rest of the sentence, i.e., without making the grammatical case uniform.

³⁰¹ Skt. *araṇā* 'freedom from impurity'. In Pali, *a-raṇa* means 'free from passion (beyond strife)' (CPD, s.v.) and is often contrasted to *sa-raṇa* (see MN III 235, 17-237, 17; Dhs 7, 3; Vibh 19, 9; etc.) (cf. also the compounds *araṇavihāra* and *araṇavihārin*). The semantic duality of *raṇa*, which means both 'fight, battle' and 'intoxication, desire, sin, fault' (PED, s.v.; cf. also CPD, s.v., which explains that *raṇa* is identified in the Pali tradition with *kilesa*), seems to have survived in later usages and definitions of *araṇā* in Buddhist literature. The word is translated by Edgerton (BHSD, s.v.) as 'free(dom) from depravity, passion; impurity' (BHSD, s.v.). I render the word here as 'freedom from impurity', but I think that the nuance of 'beyond strife' may have also remained in the word as a (latent?) connotation.

I shall discuss here two occurrences. The first one comes from Subhūti's story in the Avad

(231-233). Before becoming an Arhat, Subhūti had a very irascible character and this was related to his previous 500 rebirths as a serpent (*nāga*). Having realised this, Subhūti feels pity not only for himself but also for all sentient beings harbouring hatred against others. During his alms-round, he thus starts to inspect the ground in order not to harm living beings and formulates the wish that no one, not even an ant (*pipilaka*), should have reasons to bear grudge against him (232, 14-16). In the end, he is declared by the Exalted One to be ‘the foremost amongst the dwellers in passionlessness/peace (*araṇāvihāriṇām agraḥ*, p. 233, l. 11). The story ends with an explanation of the ultimate cause of Subhūti’s 500 births amongst serpents: this is his ‘not having abandoned the defilements’ (*aprahīṇātvāt kleśānām*, 233, 13), which would appear to underlie the basic sense of the word *a-araṇā*. But even with this specification, the nuance of ‘conflict’ is present since among the details concerning the nature of these defilements, an important one is Subhūti’s former attitude of hatred towards mendicants and his scolding them ‘with words [harsh as] a venomous serpent’ (*āśviṣavādena*, 233, 14).

The definition in the AKBh (417, 2-5) also witnesses the semantic complexity of the term: *tatrāraṇā nāma kaścīd evārhan kleśaprabhavaṃ sattvānām duḥkham viditvātmānam ca dakṣiṇyaviśeṣaṃ pareṣāṃ tadālambanaṃ kleśotpādaṃ parihartukāmas tād dṛṣaṃ jñānam utpādayati yena pareṣāṃ sarvathāpi raṇaṃ notpādayati | na kasyacit tadālambano rāga upadyate dveṣo māno vā | naiṣā pratipat kiṃcid eva raṇayatīty araṇā |*. ‘Herein [i.e. in the compound occurring in the preceding sentence], the so-called *araṇā* is [as follows]: indeed, some Arhat, realising that the suffering of the living beings has its source in defilements and that he himself is especially worthy of reversion for others, wishing to avoid that a defilement having him as its support may arise in others, produces such a knowledge [that] by its means he does not arouse others’ passion [/conflict] (*raṇa*) at all [in such a way that] no passion, hatred, or arrogance having him as its support arises in anyone. Because this practice does not become the cause of anybody’s becoming contaminated (*raṇayati*), [it is called] *araṇā*’ (*raṇayati* is equated with *kleśa* by Yaśomitra—*raṇayatīti kleśayatīty arthaḥ* (AKVy 651, 21); cf. also BHSD, s.v. *raṇati*). (AKBh 417, 5-16, continues with the discussion of various doctrinal facets of the concept.) It is true that one of the defilements the Arhat may produce in others is ‘passion’ (*rāga*), but another is ‘hatred’ (*dveṣa*), which implies a nuance of conflict. Furthermore, according to Sthiramati’s explanation in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣyaṭīkā* (P Tho 495a8), the most obvious defilement which might be generated by the sight of a Worthy One is envy (cf. also AKBh 128, 3).

³⁰² Skt. *prañidhijñāna* ‘cognition [arising from] the wish [to know an object as it is in reality]’. After discussing several theoretical aspects of the concept (most of which are similar with *araṇā*), the AKBh (418, 5-6) describes how *prañidhijñāna* is attained: *prañidhipūrvakam jñānam prañidhijñānam | yad dhi prañidhāya prāntakoṭīkam caturtham dhyānam samapadyate “idaṃ jānīyām” iti, tad yathābhūtaṃ jānāti, yāvāms* [MS, Pradhan read: *sarvas*; I follow AKVy 652, 11] *tatsamādhiviṣayaḥ |* (my punctuation). ‘*Prañidhijñāna* is a [form of] knowledge preceded by a wish. For having resolved upon what [is to be known], [the meditator] enters into the fourth absorption [which represents] the culmination [of the *dhyāna* levels] [or: into the highest [form] of the fourth absorption], [thinking] “I’d like to know this”, [and] that he [comes to] know in conformity with reality as much as the domain of his meditation [extends].’ According to the AKVy 652, 11-13, the last part of the sentence appears to refer to the fact if the meditator is a disciple (*śrāvaka*), he can know only as much as the domain of knowledge of his *śrāvaka* level allows, which is different from that of *pratyekabuddha*, etc.

For the definition *araṇā* and *prañidhijñāna*, see also AbhSamBh 127, 26ff. (§§ 156-157).

³⁰³ For a discussion of the set of the four kinds of thorough knowledge and its first two members, see note 257 above. Here, I shall briefly present the last two members. According to the AKBh 418, 13, *nirukti* is the thorough knowledge concerning speech. Edgerton (BHSD, s.v.)

is, I think, correct in remarking that *nirukti* is ‘explanation, not necessarily etymological, of the meaning of a word or text’. See also AbhSamBh 128, 8ff.

The last of these knowledges is defined by the the *Kośa* as follows: *yuktamuktābhilāpitāyām samādhivaśisamprakhyaṇe cāvivartyam jñānam pratibhānapratīsamvit* (AKBh Śāstrī ed. 1103, 1-2 = Pradhan ed. 418, 15-16) [I follow Śāstrī; Pradhan reads the last word as: *pratibhānasavit*; cf., however, Tib. P Ngu 68b1: *spobs pa so so yang dag par rig pa* and AKVy 652, 26: *pratibhānapratīsamvit*; see also AKBh Index (vol. 1, p. 436), Corrigenda, which emends to: *pratibhānasamvit*]. ‘*Pratibhānapratīsamvit* is the unobstructed knowledge concerning the clarity [obtained] by one who has mastered meditation, [clarity] which is expressed appropriately [and] unimpededly’. (My rendering relies on Yaśomitra’s understanding; see AKVy 652, 22-26). For a discussion of the *nirukti* *pratīsamvit* and *pratibhānapratīsamvit*, see also Dayal [1932] 1978, 265-267.

³⁰⁴ The passage bears the mark of an editorial adjustment and probably represents a later addition. The explicit reference to the SamBh shows that it must have assumed its present form after the latter Book had been compiled. We cannot be certain whether the *ur-Śrāvakabhūmi* gave full information concerning the practices listed in this passage or even whether it contained this passage at all. I think that the hypothesis of its complete absence cannot be ruled out. The so-called ‘ideation of the [eight] liberations, [eight] bases of mastery [and] [ten] totalities’ does not seem to be a form of cultivation in its own, and the passage as such does not offer any clue on how it or the meditative techniques it is supposed to trigger should be practised. This contrasts with the other ideations which describe or present concrete forms of praxis. Besides, all the other ideations are related to the obtainment of supernatural faculties. This last passage, on the other hand, first announces three names of ideations about which no details are given and which have no direct relevance to the *abhijñās*. It then continues with the enumeration of other unrelated forms of spiritual cultivation and knowledge derived from it.

The passage, especially the cognitions appearing in its last part, reminds of the AKBh fragment which starts with *kārikā* VII.35 (AKBh 416, 17ff.). Vasubandhu states that the Buddha shares some qualities (*guṇa*) with the disciples (*śrāvaka*) and some *guṇas* even with the ordinary people (*prthagjana*) (presumably referring here to ‘ordinary people’ engaged in spiritual cultivation). The qualities listed by Vasubandhu include: *araṇāpraṇiddhijñānapratīsamvit-abhijñādhyānārūpyāpramāṇavimokṣābhibhāvātanakṛtsnāyatanādayaḥ* (AKBh 417, 1) (AKVy 651, 12-14, explains that the qualities shared with the disciples are *araṇā*, *praṇiddhijñāna*, and so on, and those common with ordinary people are *abhijñā*, *dhyāna*, *ārūpyā*, etc.). Vasubandhu first treats the first three categories in detail and then deals with the six *abhijñās* (AKBh 421, 5ff.). Though not expounded in detail, we also see a similar list of spiritual practices and cognitions in the BoBh, which this time are presented as being shared by bodhisattvas with the Śrāvakayānikas: *bodhisattvavimokṣābhibhāvātanakṛtsnāyatanānām pratīsamvidaraṇā-praṇiddhijñānādinām guṇānām śrāvakasādhāraṇānām* (Wogihara ed. 207, 21-23). It thus appears that these practices and cognitions, which are anyway ancillary or optional in the great edifice of the spiritual path (at least, in Abhidharma literature), were perceived as forming a sort of a common set or section in the overall treatment of meditation and ensuing cognitions.

I surmise that the editors of a late or final version of the ŚrBh looked for a place to fit in this appendix, and due to an Abhidharmic tradition which discusses it in the vicinity of the *abhijñās* (as, for instance, the AKBh does), the subchapter on the ideations linked to the supernatural faculties appeared as appropriate. This must have been felt quite suitable also because they occur in the *Laukikamārga* Chapter, and some of these techniques were considered as attainable even by ordinary people and non-Buddhists (see the AKBh and AKVy above). Such a conjecture would also mean that the ideations must have originally been nine, not twelve. As for the reference to the SamBh, I think that it could be even later (see Subsection 2, Section II,

Chapter Five, Part One above). See also note 261 above.

³⁰⁵ Like other Buddhist texts (see AK VII.35: *śiṣyasādhāraṇā anye dharmāḥ kecit prthagjanaiḥ | araṇāpraṇiddhijñānapratīsamvidguṇādayaḥ* || and AKBh 417, 1 (quoted with AKVy explanation in previous note above); cf. also AKBh 421, 9-10, about the first five supernatural faculties: *āsām pañca prthagjanaiḥ sādharmaṇāḥ*), our text admits of the possibility that the ordinary people can attain miraculous powers, but the quality of the latter is decidedly poor, apparently not surpassing the level of magic. It is, however, important to note that though expounding the mundane path, to which even non-Buddhists have access (see passage 3.28.1.1. above), the authors of the ŚrBh are very keen to stress the ‘noble supernatural faculties’ (or: ‘supernatural faculties [cultivated] by the Noble Ones’) (see also *āryānām* [...] *guṇānām* in the paragraph below and *āryām ṛddhim abhinirharati* in passage 3.28.5.2.11. above).

Ji does not say anything about this in his Commentary on the YoBh (see T43.122c), but the whole of this ŚrBh passage is cited in another major work of his, the *Dacheng fa yuan yi lin zhang* 大乘法苑義林章 (T45.336c3-7). The citation appears in a section dealing with differences in meditative attainment and derived faculties between the Noble Ones and ordinary people.

³⁰⁶ Tb. *'phags pa rnam s kyī yon tan* suggests: ‘qualities of the Noble Ones’. Ch. 諸聖功德 is not clear: 諸 could refer to 聖 ‘the Noble Ones’ or to 功德 ‘qualities’.

³⁰⁷ My rendering above is a compromise between the attempt, on one hand, to keep as close to the original as possible and, on the other, to make the sentence sound reasonably natural and clear in English. The Skt. original does not contain any active verb, and a more literal rendering would be: ‘the generation of [...] should be known’. The number of lexical elements modifying *abhinirhāra* has, however, made me desist from any attempt to stay close to the original. Though I do not deny that a more experienced translator could find a better solution, it must be noted that the Skt. sentence itself is rather clumsily constructed. Actually, both Tib. and Ch. appear to have experienced similar difficulties and probably tried to bring more clarity by splitting the sentence into two phrases (see Tib. ed. and Ch. ed. as well as respective notes). The place of the two adverbs *yathāyogaṃ* seems particularly problematic. It is not excluded that the original sentence contained just the *yathāyogaṃ* before *pañcānām abhijñānām*, but this may have been felt as being limited to the supernatural faculties only. Probably later in the editorial process, a second *yathāyogaṃ* was added after the phrase *āryānām ca guṇānām aprthagjana-sādhāraṇānām* in order to stress that these qualities, too, are generated ‘in accordance with what is suitable in each case’. It goes without saying that this is a merely conjectural scenario, and other alternatives (from a rather careless style to a corrupt transmission) are also conceivable.

³⁰⁸ With the exception of the Heavenly Worlds corresponding to the attainment of non-ideation, all these cosmic planes, similarly structured, are also listed and discussed at AKBh 111, 16-114, 4. See also YoBh 75, 14-76, 9; MVyut # 3084 - # 3113; etc. (for other sources, see note 242 above).

³⁰⁹ Skt. *yathāyogaṃ* ‘in due order’, indicating here that the lowest Heavenly World on the respective cosmic plane is obtained if the ascetic has a low level of meditative proficiency, the second one if his proficiency is intermediate, and the third one if his practice has been intense and fully mastered the respective *dhyāna*.

³¹⁰ Skt. *upasampadyate*. Usually, the verb means ‘to come to, to reach, to arrive; to obtain’ and is often used in the context of spiritual cultivation. In its absolute form, Skt. *upasampadya* (Pali, *upasampajja*) (preceding *viharati*) appears in all canonical formulae describing the eight meditative attainments (see above, especially passage 3.28.3.1.7. which glosses it). We also find it employed in the description of other meditative states. E.g., AKBh 197, 24: *samādhiṃ kāyena sākṣātkṛtvopasampadya* (scriptural citation); AKBh 439, 9: *prītiṃ kāyena sākṣātkṛtvopasampadya* (scriptural citation); AKBh 455, 2: *śubhaṃ vimokṣaṃ kāyena*

sākṣātḥvopasāmpadya vihartīti tṛtītaḥ [i.e. the third of the eight liberations]; etc. In the present context of the ŚrBh, which presupposes being '[re-]born' in Heavenly Worlds, one would expect *upapadyate*. A corrupt transmission cannot be ruled out, but our text is consistent all throughout this passage. Tib. and Ch. simply read 'is born' in all occurrences. If *upasāmpadyate* was indeed the original word employed by the ŚrBh authors and was intended to be more than just a quasi-synonym of *upapadyate* (though, admittedly, the two words are not usually construed in a relation of synonymity), it must have been meant to stress that one attains a meditative level and as its result is reborn in the cosmic plane corresponding to it. Unfortunately, there is no English (and, as a matter of fact, no Tibetan or Chinese) word able to convey both nuances, and 'is [re-]born' appears to be the best solution.

³¹¹ More precisely, Skt. *sabhāgatā* means 'likeness, community'. Cf. also Tib. *skal ba* [/pa] *mnyam pa* (see note 870 to Tib. ed.). BHS, s.v., also gives the sense of 'being one of a category or group'. AK II.42a defines it as 'similarity [shared by] living beings' (*sattva-sāmyam*) (AKBh 67, 12; see also AKBh 67, 13: *sabhāgatā nāma dravyam | sattvānām sādṛśyam* [...]). AKVy 157, 4-5 glosses upon this as: *samāno bhāgo bhajanam eṣām iti sa-bhāgāḥ. tad-bhāvaḥ sabhāgatā*. '[They are called] "with [the same] share [/lot]" because they have the same share [or] possession. This state is *sabhāgatā*'. The term also refers to the 'similarity' in general physical appearance of the beings sharing the same cosmic sphere.

³¹² My renderings of the Heaven names in this sub-chapter cannot convey their entire semantic wealth. A detailed description of their meanings and traditional interpretations represents a very complex issue which cannot be tackled here. In what follows, I shall limit myself to those Heavens which are terminologically more problematic.

³¹³ The exact sense of the word *avṛha* or *abrha* (see also note 473 to Skt. crit. ed.), which serves as the name of this Heaven, is not clear (cf. also PED, s.v. *Aviha* 'of uncertain origin'; CPD, s.v., PD, s.v., and SWFT, s.v., do not mention anything concerning its etymology). I think that Edgerton is probably right in suggesting that 'as the lowest of the five Śū. [i.e. Śuddhāvāsa] classes these gods may have been called [relatively] *not great*' (BHS, s.v.). This is what Tib. *Mi-che-ba* clearly suggests (cf. also MVyut # 3102). At least one of Yaśomitra's scholastic etymologies points in the same direction: *Śuddhāvāsāntarebhyo 'nutkṣṣatvād abṛmhitā ity Abṛhāḥ*. (AKVy 255, 22). '[These deities are called] **Abṛha** because [they] are not [fully] developed [/prosperous] on account of lack of excellence [when compared] to the other Pure-Abode[-Gods].' The other, more fanciful, etymology would suggest a translation as 'Heaven which is not [easily] thrown away'. Yaśomitra's gloss runs as follows: *nālpena vā kālen' ātmanaḥ sthānam bṛhanti* [both Wogihara and Śāstrī read: *bṛmhanti*, but this is to be emended; see below] *jahatīty Abṛhāḥ* (AKVy Wogihara ed. 255, 22-23; Śāstrī ed. 382, 23). 'Or [they are called] **Abṛha** because they do not throw away [lit., root up], abandon their own place in a short while.' I think the sentence makes sense only with the emendation suggested above. There are actually two verbs with the same root $\sqrt{bṛh}$: one (spelled $\sqrt{bṛh}$ or $\sqrt{vṛh}$) means 'to tear, pluck, root up'; the other (spelled $\sqrt{bṛh}$ or $\sqrt{bṛmh}$) has the sense of 'to grow great or strong' (MW, s.vv., p. 735). It is very likely that the name of the Heaven discussed here is etymologically linked with the latter verb, which is actually Yaśomitra's first line of interpretation. The second etymology, however, seems to exploit the other root. The sentence would actually make little sense if we read it as '[...] they do not prosper [and] abandon [...] in a short while'. The present form of the first root is *bṛhati*, while the latter $\sqrt{bṛ(m)h}$ has both *bṛhati* and *bṛmhati* (see MW s.v.). Actually, this similarity can also explain the scribal mistake which must be at the basis of both modern editions cited above. The gloss links *v/brha* with the verbal root $\sqrt{bṛh}$ which is semantically similar to $\sqrt{hā}$ 'to abandon'. The same etymology is also seen in the Abhidh-s Ṭikā (126, 17-18): *imesu pana paṭhamatalavāsino appakena kālena*

attano ṭhānam na vijahantī ti Avihā. (This seems to be a hermeneutical or *nirukta* etymology; the term ‘hermeneutical or *nirukta* etymology’ was proposed by Seyfort Ruegg in his excellent contribution published in 1998, pp. 118-119, especially note 9. One could also define this type of exegesis as ‘scholastic etymology’ since such semantical exercises were done by scholars trying to find the ‘original’ meaning of words which, more often than not, were (made to be) in conformity with their own philosophical paradigms.) The modern translators of the Abhidh-s also seem to reflect this understanding in their renderings of the Heaven’s name: ‘immobile gods’ (Aung and Mrs Rhys Davids, *Compendium of Philosophy*, p. 142) or ‘the Enduring’ (Wijeratne and Gethin, *Exposition of the Topics of Abhidhamma*, p. 165).

The Chinese translation of the ŚrBh, on the other hand, renders the name of the Heaven or of its celestial denizens as 無煩 ‘Without-Affliction’. This is probably based on a different (folk or hermeneutical) etymology which must have linked *br̥ha* with $\sqrt{\text{barh/varh}}$, a verb meaning, among others, *ein Leid zufügen* (PW, s.v.) or ‘to hurt’ (MW, s.v.). Xuanzang employs this rendering here and in other translations as well (e.g., AKBh T29.41a20-21 = Skt. p. 111, l. 24). The term was not, however, devised by him. We already see it in several earlier Chinese translations. E.g., the Chinese version of the **Madhyamāgama* 中阿含經 (see T1.478b1) rendered by Saṅghadeva between 397-398; the so-called *Different Translation of the *Samyuktāgama* 別譯雜阿含經 (see T2.442b29 and c14), whose translator’s name is lost but whose date can be placed between 350-431 (see Akanuma Chizen, in Ono Genmyō ed. 1968, vol. 7, p. 62, s.v. 雜阿含經); the **Samyuktāgama* 雜阿含經 (see T2.159b8 and b22) translated by Guṇabhadra sometime between 435-443; etc.

³¹⁴ The AKBh (362, 9 - 366, 5) gives ample details about this meditative practice. Some Arhats and Non-Returners (*anāgāmin*) mix moments (*kṣaṇa*) of non-contaminated (*anāsrava*) and contaminated (*āsrva*) fourth absorptions. The culmination of the exercise is fusing the non-contaminated and the contaminated *dhyāna* in the same moment. This is actually a Sautrāntika view which is supported by Vasubandhu. The Kashmiri Vaibhāṣikas, on the other hand, did not agree with this and held that only the Buddhas can mingle the two in the same moment. Vasubandhu tells us that there are three reasons for undertaking such a practice: (1) Non-Returners with keen faculties (*tikṣhendriya*) may cultivate it in order to be re-born in the Pure Abodes (AKBh 363, 2) (this is also the category hinted at in our ŚrBh passage); (2) the same class of persons may cultivate it in order to dwell in a comfortable state (*sukhavihāra*^o) in this very life (*dṛṣṭadharmā*^o) (AKBh 363, 2-3); and (3) Non-Returners with weak faculties (*mṛdvendriya*) may practise it ‘by excluding the meditation associated with delectation because they are afraid of [the re-activation of] the defilements, [or to be more precise] in order to avoid falling back [to a lower level]’ (*kleśabhīrūtayā cāsvādanāsamprayuktasamādhidūrikaraṇāḍ aparihāṇyartham*, AKBh 363, 3-4; Pradhan reads: [...] *aparihāṇārtham*; I follow the reading of AKVy 566, 3-4). In the case of Arhats, there are two classes who engage in this form of exercise: (1) those with keen faculties practise it in order to dwell in a comfortable state in this very life; and (2) those with weak faculties cultivate it in order to avoid falling back (AKBh 363, 4-5) (see also AKVy 565, 25-566, 4). AKBh 363, 7-11, continues with a brief discussion of the five Pure Abodes.

The AKBh discusses in detail (436, 17-437, 13; 447, 1-15; etc.) the differences between non-contaminated meditative attainments, which are conducive to the abandonment of the defilements, and their counterpart, i.e., contaminated meditation. The latter is further analysed into two aspects: (1) the meditative state itself which being dissociated (albeit temporarily) from the realm of sensual pleasures, is called pure (*śuddha*); and (2) its enjoyment or delectation (*āsvādana*), described as being associated with craving (*saṭṭṣṇa*), i.e., developing attachment to such blissful (yet, alas, impermanent) states. Of course, the non-contaminated attainments are

never associated with such enjoyment and are practised only with the aim of Liberation.

³¹⁵ The *Kośa* similarly divides the first three absorptions into three planes each and the fourth *dhyāna* into eight levels: *dhyānaṃ tribhūmikam tatra caturtham tv aṣṭabhūmikam* (AK III.2c-d). Yaśomitra makes clear that this division depends on the intensity of the meditative practice. Using expressions similar to our ŚrBh passage, he says the following about the first three absorptions: *tatra rūpadhātau sarveṣāṃ api dhyānānāṃ mṛdumadhyādhimātrabhedena pratyekaṃ tribhūmikam* (AKVy 254, 34-35). Then, the fourth *dhyāna* is commented upon as: *tasya tv adhimātrasyaivānāsravadhyānavyavakiraṇena mṛdumadhyādhimātrādhimātra- tarādhimātratamabhedabhinnena punaḥ pañca sthānāntarāṇi* (AKVy 255, 3-5).

³¹⁶ The same idea is expressed at AKBh 112, 1-8. AK III.3a says: *ārūpyadhātur asthānaḥ* ‘The immaterial realm contains no [physical] place’. The *Bhāṣya* comments upon this as: *na hy arūpiṇāṃ dharmānāṃ sthānam asti* (AKBh, 112, 2) ‘because there is no [physical] place [necessary for] the immaterial factors’. The lack of matter obviously accounts for the absence of the different physical landscapes which exist in the Heavens of the material realm (*rūpadhātu*). The only difference in the immaterial spheres becomes the mental state itself (*vihāra*) experienced by the ascetic as long as his karmic ‘fuel’ lasts.

³¹⁷ For the attainment of non-ideation, see passage 3.28.4.2. above and note 242 (which deals with the abodes of the beings without ideation).

³¹⁸ Skt. *na cāsyeryāpatha āśu paryādiyate* ‘his posture does not quickly come to an end [or: is not exhausted]’. I am not aware of any other context in Sanskrit or Pali literature in which *paryādiyate/pariyādiyati* is found in collocation with *īryāpatha/iriyāpatha* (see BHSD, s.v.; CPD, s.v.; etc.). The verb means ‘masters, overcomes; exhausts’ (BHSD, s.v.). In Pali (see PED, s.v. and PTS Concordance, s.v. *pariādāti*) as well as in Buddhist Sanskrit (see BHSD, s.v.), it is frequently employed for (usually bad) mental states and sometimes for physical elements (e.g., *udakam [...] siḅham pariyādiyati*, JA V 186, 27-28, ‘the water swiftly goes out [is exhausted]’). Its usage in the ŚrBh passage here is not, however, impossible to understand. It seems to refer to the fact that the person detached from sensual pleasure does not restlessly change his (or her) posture but keeps it for a long time with no agitation. The sight of such a person is, no doubt, bound to impress anyone as a mark of dignified deportment. This characteristic is actually detailed in the next sentence, too.

Tib. *de'i spyod lam myur du mi 'jig pa* faithfully translates the Skt. (see especially *'jig pa* ‘to destroy; to be lost, to decay’). Ch., on the other hand, seems to be a rather free rendering which, furthermore, contains an extra phrase. From the viewpoint of the syntactical order, the phrase corresponding to Skt. *na cāsyeryāpatha āśu paryādiyate* should be 威儀進止無有躁擾 ‘in [his] postures there is no agitation’. 威儀進止 is a four-morpheme compound synonymous with 威儀, the usual Ch. rendering for *īryāpatha*, which is actually employed below in the same sentence. Literally, 威儀進止 means ‘postures, advancing, [and] stopping’; the original and ‘orthodox’ sense of 威儀 is ‘dignified [/decorous] demeanour’; in a Buddhist context, the main semantic value is that of ‘postures’, but the nuance of ‘dignified deportment’ (which a monk is expected to show at all times) is also present (see DKWJ, s.v.). The compound 威儀進止 is frequently seen in the Chinese Canon: e.g., T22.412c5; 412c7; 412c9; T23.649b10-11; 876c24; 909a18; T24.462a21; 682b2; 806a12; 1018b8 (all the above occurrences are from Vinaya texts); T54.1284c24 (in a passage dealing with morality); etc. (cf. also BCSD, s.v. 威儀進止 = *īryāpatha*; but as usual, BCSD does not indicate its sources). In the YoBh, our passage here is the only place which uses 威儀進止 (incidentally, the compound is not recorded in the YoBh Index.)

As for 躁擾 ‘(be) agitated, troubled, disturbed, etc.’, this is a binome which in the ŚrBh (quite aptly) translates words like: *utplāvitatva* (ŚrBh-Gr (17) 20, 1 = T 30.436c25), *samkṣobha*

(ŚrBh Sh ed. 418, 21-22 = T30.461a15), or (apparently both) *druta* and *pluta* (ŚrBh-Gr 132, 2: *drutamānasaḥ, plutamānasaḥ* = T30.409c1: 令意躁擾; alternatively, one may take 躁 as rendering *druta* and 擾 as standing for *pluta*, with both words condensed in the same phrase for the sake of brevity). To return to our ŚrBh passage here, 無有躁擾 can hardly be a translation of *na paryādiyate*. In order to find the Ch. equivalent of the latter, we actually must go two phrases below. Here is how the whole Chinese sentence reads: 威儀進止無有躁擾, 於一威儀能經時久, 不多驚懼, 終不數數易脫威儀 . ‘In [his] postures there is no agitation, the time [he] can spend in one posture is long, [he] is not surprised and frightened, [he] does not repeatedly change [and] leave [his] posture [for another] as long as necessary (終不)’. It seems that Ch. 不 [...] 易脫 stands for *na paryādiyate*. But this leaves us with two Ch. phrases (無有躁擾 and 不多驚懼) for the Skt. present participle *aparitasyamānaḥ*. The BHS verb *paritasyati* means ‘is wearied, exhausted, troubled, disturbed’ (BHSD, s.v.). Semantically, both Ch. phrases are not far from the Sanskrit word, though the latter would seem rather too strong (see also the presence of 多 which has no direct Skt. equivalent). A different reading in Xuanzang’s MS is not excluded, but it is also possible that the Chinese master decided that *aparitasyamāna* has two main semantic values, both of which had to be translated. Thus, 無有躁擾 ‘there is no agitation’, i.e., the postures are ‘not troubled/disturbed’, translated the typical BHS sense of *paritasyati*, which is actually the most appropriate in this context. On the other hand, the verb *paritasyati* is equivalent with *paritrasyati* (see BHSD, s.v.), the latter being based on the root \sqrt{tr} as ‘to tremble, to be afraid’. This sense of the root may have been rendered as 驚懼 (modified by 多 for rhythmic reasons, i.e., four-character phrase, as well as for enhancing the stylistic effect (?)). Actually, we find instances in the YoBh where (a)*paritasanā* is rendered as (無)怯弱 (see Choi 2001, 245 and 344), which semantically is not so far from (不)驚懼.

³¹⁹ Skt. *bhavati* ‘is’. It is difficult to convey all the shades of the Sanskrit verb. Here, it implies that the qualities are not inborn but obtained through practice. One could render as ‘he has become’ or ‘he has acquired’ [as a result of spiritual cultivation]. This would, however, disturb the style of the English sentence, and I have, therefore, chosen the less ‘dynamic’ dimension of the verb rendering it as a simple copula.

³²⁰ Skt. *na saṅgaṇikārāmaḥ, na saṃsargārāmaḥ*. Both terms are known from Pali canonical sources. E.g., *saṅgaṇikārāma(tā)* at DN II 78, 11-12; MN III 110, 16-17; etc.; at AN III 293, 11ff.-295, 2, it appears together with *saṃsaggārāma(tā)* and similarly has the pejorative connotation of associating with the ‘madding crowds’, which can hamper spiritual cultivation. AN-a III 348, 16-19 (*ad* AN III 293, 11ff.-295, 2) glosses the words as follows: *saṃgaṇikā ti gaṇasaṃgaṇikā; sā ekassa dutiyo hoti dvinnam pi tatiyo ti ādinā nayena veditabbā. saṃsaggo ti savanadassanasamullāpasambhogakāyasamsaggavasena pavatto saṃsaṭṭhabhāvo*. ‘*Saṃgaṇikā* means association with a crowd; it should be understood [in the following way:] one [person] has [with him or her] a second [person], the two [persons] have in their turn (*pi*) a third [person with them], and so one similarly [until it makes up a multitude]. *Saṃsagga* means the state of living in association [with others] which happens for the sake of hearing, seeing, conversing, eating [/living] together, [and] having bodily contact.’ If we are to follow strictly this explanation, it would appear that *saṃgaṇikā* is a gathering of people without any strong bonds, while *saṃsagga* would rather point at a stable human group sharing a common mode of living. It is hard to know whether all Buddhist authors and compilers, including those of our text, shared a similar understanding, but we continue to see the two terms used side by side in Sanskrit Buddhist literature, usually with the same negative nuances. E.g., Lañk 49, 7-8: *saṃgaṇikāsaṃsargamiddhanivaraṇa^o*, which should be abandoned by the bodhisattva who wishes to fully realise (*bodhisattvena* [...] *parijñātukāmena*) the unreal nature of the dichotomy

between the grasped (*grāhya*) and the grasper (*grāhaka*); ŚikSam 111, 24 (as a citation from the *Ratnarāsisūtra*): *samsargasamgaṇikābhirataih sattvaiḥ* (Bendall reads: °*samgaṇikābhir etaiḥ*; emended on the basis of Tib.), i.e., worldly beings who pursue thoughts directed at sensual pleasures (*kāmavitarka*), malice (*vyāpāda*) and thoughts of violence (*vihiṃsāvitarka*)—these being precisely the thoughts which the ascetic in our ŚrBh passage had to eliminate; see note 164 above as well as note 323 below).

It is interesting to note here that both Tib. *bre mo gtam* ‘foolish talk’ and Ch. 誼雜 ‘boisterous mixing’ seem to construe *saṅgaṇika* as the frivolousness or the noise associated with a crowd rather than as the group itself.

^{3 2 1} Skt. *no tu* seems to be emphatic here. In Vedic Sanskrit, *no* means ‘and not’, but from Epical Sanskrit onwards, the negative adverb becomes used mostly as a substitute for *na* due to metrical reasons (PW, s.v.). It is possible that *no* might also carry a nuance of emphasis. This, however, is not registered in the main lexicographical sources. The authors of the PW (s.v.) say: *Die lexicographen (AK.3,55,11. H.1539) führen ॐ mit anderen Negationen auf ohne Angabe der Bedeutungsverschiedenheit.* (AK. is an abbreviation for the *Amarakośa*; H. stands for *Hemacandra’s Abhidhānacintāmaṇi*.) As far as I could check, later commentators on the *Amarakośa* do not add anything conclusive and only limit themselves to giving examples (see *Amarakośa with Unpublished South Indian Commentaries*, vol. 2, p. 625). On the other hand, the Japanese Indologist Naoshiro Tsuji (1987, 256) holds that *no* is an emphatic form of negation. In Pali, too, *no* appears to be stronger than *na* (PED, s.v.; see also Warder 2001, 400). Whether reflecting a usage in Classical Sanskrit or in BHS, the adverb in our ŚrBh passage, occurring in collocation with the adversative conjunction *tu*, seems to have an emphatic nuance: the ascetic perceives sound, etc., but experiences *absolutely no* passion for it (Let us remember that our yogi has already attained detachment from sensual pleasures and his detachment is, presumably, complete!).

^{3 2 2} Skt. *upagūḍha* means ‘hidden, concealed, covered’. This is faithfully rendered by Tib. *nye bar bskor ba* and Ch. 隱密. See also Pali *upagūḍha* ‘embraced’, derived from *upaguhāti* ‘to embrace, to clasp’ (CPD, s.v.). Here, however, the sense of the word appears to be more general: ‘containing’ or ‘possessed of’. Cf. also °*gūḍha* used to depict the Realm of Absolute Reality or Dharma-body (*dharmakāya*) or Tathāgata-embryo (*tathāgatagarbha*) as ‘hidden’ under the husk of countless or all defilements (RatVibh 40, 17, (a)*paryantakleśakośakoṭigūḍhaḥ* and RatVibh 79, 11-12, *sarvakleśakośakoṭigūḍhe* respectively; Takasaki (1966a) in his Correction and Emendation (396-399) reads: *-upagūḍhaḥ* for RatVibh 40, 16-17, *aparyantakleśakośakoṭigūḍhaḥ*).

^{3 2 3} Skt. *kāmavitarkādayaḥ* most likely refers to the canonical triad which begins with thoughts directed at [under the sway of] sensual pleasures (Skt., *kāmavitarka*; Pali, *kāmavitakka*) and continues with thoughts of malice (*vyāpādavitarka*; *vyāpādavitakka*) and thoughts of violence (*vihiṃsāvitarka*; *vihiṃsāvitakka*). For sources and a discussion of this sense of *vitarka/vitakka*, see note 164 above.

^{3 2 4} It is difficult to convey all the nuances of Skt. *tāvat*. Its basic sense is that of ‘so much, so far, so long’, but here *tāvat* also means ‘to begin with’. This indicates that the mundane path is the first of the two topics of the Yogasthāna IV. Though not entirely successful, my rendering tries to capture both shades of meaning.

ADDITIONAL NOTES

① I should like to add a few remarks on the *kimpāka* fruit (referred to in note 54 above) as well as on the *tūla*-cotton and the *karpāsa*-cotton (discussed in note 263 above).

Unfortunately, none of the sources on Indian flora which I have consulted (see Dastur 1964; McCann 1966; Randhawa 1974; Santapau and Henry, [1973] 1983; Majupuria 1988; Pandey 1989) registers any of these Sanskrit terms. However, the following botanical information has some relevance to the notes.

According to Pandey (1989, 53-54), the Sanskrit name of *Trichosanthes palmata* (*Cucurbitaceae* family) is *Mahakala*. The name does not correspond to *kimpāka*, as identified by Monier-Williams. Pandey describes *Trichosanthes palmata* as 'a large climber, commonly found in the Himalayas, upto 5,000 feet' (p. 54). Its 'red coloured poisonous fruit' is apparently used by Hindus of Western India for religious purposes as an ear ornament for the idol *Ganapati* (ibid.). Some details fit the features discussed in note 54 above. It is not excluded the tree was known by more than one name, and *kimpāka* may have been an alternative appellation. Concerning my remark that it is not likely that the tree was familiar to the Tibetans readers, this should be qualified. It appears from Pandey's description that *Trichosanthes palmata* grows up to ca. 1,500 metres. This is certainly lower than the Tibetan plateau (which averages 4,900 metres), but since the tree is 'commonly found in the Himalayas', it may have been known to the Tibetans as well. I still think, nonetheless, that in the light of the canonical intertextuality presented in note 54 above, it is more probable that *shing kim pa ka*'i 'bras bu reflects a reading in the Indian MS used by the Tibetan team.

Concerning the silk-cotton trees, which I have mentioned in relation to the *tūla*-cotton and the *karpāsa*-cotton, it seems that some of the species are used commercially to produce cotton. Thus, the red silk-cotton (*Bombax ceiba*) is used for 'stuffing pillows and mattresses' (Santapau and Henry, [1973] 1983), s.v., p. 24). According to Randhawa (1974, 90), the floss covering the seeds of the yellow silk cotton tree is also used for stuffing mattresses, pillows, and cushions. It would thus appear possible that botanically, *tūla* could have been linked to one or more species of silk-cotton trees. This, however, remains just a hypothesis until firm linguistic evidence is adduced.

For the description of the silk cotton trees, see also McCann 1966, 75, 128, 129, 130. On *Gossypium herbaceum*, see Santapau and Henry, [1973] 1983), s.v., p. 74. On *Gossypium arboreum*, see also Santapau and Henry, [1973] 1983), s.v., p. 74; Majupuria 1988, 251; Pandey 1989, 23.

② The latest instalment of the edition and translation of the *Śrāvabhūmi* prepared by the Śrāvabhūmi Study Group of Taishō University has been published:

Shōmon ji Kenkyūkai 声聞地研究会 ed. and tr., 'Bonbun Shōmon ji (21): Daini yugasho (9) wayaku, kamon' 梵文声聞地 (21) — 第二瑜伽処 (9) 和訳・科文一, *Taishō daigaku sōgō bukkyō kenkyūjo nenpō* 大正大学総合佛教研究所年報 28 (2006): 1-53.

The article has been issued just as I prepare to send my draft to press, which unfortunately makes it impossible to cite and refer to it in this book. With the publication of this instalment, the entire *Yogasthāna II* has been covered. According to the Preface to the article (p. 1), the Group plans to publish the whole edition and translation of this *Yogasthāna* as a separate volume. No doubt, this will constitute a further major contribution to the understanding and study of the *Śrāvabhūmi*.