

LOBSANG DARGYAY

## WHAT IS NON-EXISTENT AND WHAT IS REMANENT IN ŚŪNYATĀ

The question of what remains after śūnyatā is fully realized was addressed by G. M. Nagao,<sup>1</sup> D. S. Ruegg,<sup>2</sup> and S. Yamaguchi.<sup>3</sup>

In light of their achievements this contribution will be minimal. I wish merely to continue the studies initiated by Nagao in his article on 'What Remains in Śūnyatā' and to extend those studies into the field of Tibetan philosophy. In order to provide the appropriate contextual background I shall first summarize the *Smaller Discourse on Emptiness (Cūlasuññata-sutta)*, and secondly, I shall provide an expository account of Nagao's thought. Following that, I shall investigate the various Tibetan interpretations of the crucial sentence "What is remanent in Śūnyatā". The passage dealing with the Tibetan interpretations will focus on two issues: (1) Dol-po-pa's interpretation of "what is remanent in Śūnyatā," in particular in the light of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*; and (2) Tibetan comments on *Ratnagotravibhāga*, I v. 154–155 and its commentary, traditionally attributed to Asaṅga.<sup>4</sup>

### THE CŪLASUÑÑATA-SUTTA AND ITS CONCEPTION OF EMPTINESS

Buddhist thinkers of ancient and modern times have pondered upon what was intended when the *Cūlasuññata-sutta* has the Buddha say:

I, through abiding in emptiness, am now abiding in the fullness thereof.<sup>5</sup>

In what fullness does the Buddha reside, when all phenomena are recognized as empty? Is it the fullness of emptiness and, if so, what does that mean? Another essential sentence in this sutta is:

It is perceived that when something does not exist there, the latter [the place] is empty with regard to the former. Further it is comprehended that something that remains there does exist as a real existent.<sup>6</sup>

This sentence lent itself to various interpretations by Buddhist

thinkers through the ages. In order to compare the sense of later interpretations with that implied in the *Cūḷasuññata-sutta*, I shall summarize the thought of the *Cūḷasuññata-sutta*. This sutta is included in the *Middle Length Sayings* of the Pali Canon.<sup>7</sup>

With a minimum of additions and modifications this sutta was translated into Tibetan and is now part of the Tibetan Kanjur.<sup>8</sup> This is one of the extremely rare cases where the same sūtra is part of the Theravāda tradition as well as of the Tibetan Mahāyāna heritage. In the original language, and also in its Tibetan translation, the second sentence quoted above from the *Cūḷasuññata-sutta* consists mainly in pronouns, which made it all the more suitable for different interpretations. In order to understand the meaning given in the Pali sutta one has to study the context in which the sentence is placed within this sutta. Later Indian, as well as Tibetan Buddhist, philosophers isolated the sentence from its contextual environment and gave it with different meanings.

In order to understand the second crucial sentence according to its initial context I shall analyze the *Cūḷasuññata-sutta*; beginning with a discussion of the first important quotation above from the sutta. Herein Ānanda asks whether he had correctly understood the Buddha saying:

I through abiding in emptiness, am now abiding in the fulness thereof.<sup>9</sup>

In his answer the Buddha explains this sentence by illustrating its meaning through a series of similes. First the Buddha talks about the palace, where he and his disciples reside at this moment, as being empty of elephants, cows, etc., but as being not empty of monks. Thus the monk's awareness is empty of elephants, but is not empty of monks, palace, etc. Then the Buddha applies the same conception to "forest" and "solitude" till he transcends the ordinary world and talks about the "plane of no-thing" which is empty of the plane of infinite awareness. The practising monk experiences this to be the true realization of emptiness, yet, the Buddha points out, there is the plane of "neither-perception nor non-perception", and the plane empty of ignorance. Finally the meditating monk recognizes that the only fact of which the present situation is not empty is that of the six sensory fields associated with the physical body. In other words, through progressing in meditation the monk empties the entire world of

phenomena thought to be inherent components of the world, but what he does not overcome is the physical existence of his body. In the context of the sutta, emptiness is used as a means to purge the mind from all conceptualization, while the reality of the physical world, i.e. the six sensory fields grounded on this body, is seen as not-empty. The concept of voidness, as introduced in this sutta, is not a philosophical theory, but a yogic practice that ends in “fullness”. The underlying basis of emptiness is given in physical things — palace, town, forest, space, earth, etc. — and in mental phenomena — perceptions, infinite awareness, the signless mind, etc. In the context of this sutta, emptiness is not a well-defined philosophical conception, but a spiritual experience whose operational field shifts to ever more sublime planes until every conceptualization is recognized and felt to be part of the conditioned, ephemeral world.

THE YOGĀCĀRA INTERPRETATION OF “WHAT IS  
NON-EXISTENT AND WHAT IS REMANENT IN EMPTINESS”

G. M. Nagao has investigated the Yogācāra interpretation of the *Cūlasuññata-sutta* in detail in his previously mentioned article. I shall summarize the main ideas pointed out therein, as the Yogācāra interpretation is somewhat foundational for various developments within the Buddhist philosophy of Tibet.

The *Madhyānta-vibhāga* discusses, in verses I.1 and 2, the conceptualization of things which do not really exist (*abhūta parikalpa*) and emptiness. When Vasubandhu commented upon these verses he included a quotation in his own interpretation, without disclosing its source. G. M. Nagao comes to the conclusion: “The quotation has to be nothing other than the idea of the *Cūlasuññata-sutta*, the similarity between the sutta and this passage being quite clear.”<sup>10</sup>

In the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*<sup>11</sup> there occurs a sentence which is worded almost identically with that in Vasubandhu’s *Madhyānta vibhāga*-commentary. There, the term “form” (*rūpa*) is also introduced, although its meaning is different from that in the *Cūlasuññata-sutta*, which sees “form” as a mind-born conceptualization. Similar to the Pali sutta, the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* refers to something that remains but which is inaccessible to logical definition.

In the second chapter of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, a work traditionally ascribed to Aśaṅga, we read the following explanation:

When you ask what are the characteristics of emptiness [I answer]: “One sees properly that if something does not exist in something else, the latter is void of the former; one correctly realizes that whatever remains here, exists here. This is the correct, non-erroneous entry into voidness. This [quotation] has to be properly understood. . . . To the question of what it is that does not exist in something else, I reply: “The five skandhas, the elements, the sensory fields, they are not existent as Self and what pertains to the Self (*ātma amiya*), eternal, solid, and unchanging phenomena.” To the question of what it is that remains here, I reply: “The selflessness, that exists here.”<sup>12</sup>

In this passage the absence of factual things has become insignificant, but the non-existence of certain ontological qualities, i.e., the Self and what is pertinent to it, eternity, solidity, unchangeability of all possible phenomena, became the focal point. The entire mental and physical world is seen as lacking these marks. The only phenomenon having the quality of “true being” is Selflessness, i.e., the lack of an independent Self-nature, or — as we may say — of an identity. In the author’s perspective the lack of an independent Self-nature becomes a kind of positive quality which is also described by the terms “existence of No-self” or “emptiness.” We may also put it in another way. All mental and physical phenomena are empty of eternity, permanence, and identity, yet the single phenomenon which is eternal and permanent is the non-existence of eternity, permanence, and identity — what in turn is called emptiness. The same existential situation is viewed from two different perspectives. First the situation is described as lacking certain qualities, while the same situation is qualified as exhibiting the unchanging nature of not possessing the above mentioned qualities. The mere negation gains in some respect an existence of its own.

All these interpretations follow along the line of the *Cūlasuññata-sutta*, although each source presents the idea with different words. G. M. Nagao draws the conclusion: “Indeed, in all the Yogācāra treatises mentioned, the idea of ‘nonexistence’ cum ‘existence of nonexistence’ is given as the basic principle for the interpretation of emptiness in this school. And it may be said that the addition of “existence of nonexistence”, though an object of controversy, has come from “what

remains” as stated in the *Cūḷasuññata*. “What remains”, of course conveys the real meaning of śūnyatā in the school. . . .<sup>13</sup>

#### TIBETAN INTERPRETATIONS

##### (1) *Dol-po-pa's View of Emptiness*

Dol-po-pa (1292—1361) was an original thinker who first followed the Sa-skya tradition of Tibetan Buddhism before he founded his own tradition known as Jo-nang-pa, a school which produced several outstanding scholars but ceased to exist in the 17th century. Dol-po-pa became a much respected scholar, although he is mainly identified with the idea of *gzhan stong*, a concept which later stimulated a lively debate within the Tibetan tradition. In one of his philosophical works he goes even one step further. He comments upon the previously mentioned passage of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* with the following words:

One should comprehend that empty phenomena are non-existent with regard to the base of emptiness and that [therefore] the former is empty of these phenomena. One correctly realizes that what is remanent is the base of emptiness, i.e. the consummate reality which exists eternally.<sup>14</sup>

Asaṅga conceived the lack of an inherent Self-nature as the existence of Selflessness; whereas Dol-po-pa understands the existence of Selflessness as an independent entity. Dol-po-pa visualizes the lack of Self-nature or emptiness as the perfect, accomplished, eternal, luminous being in itself. What previously was a mere negation becomes in Dol-po-pa's view a positive ontological quality.

In order to improve the structure of his philosophy, Dol-po-pa introduces two new terms:

Being empty of a Self-nature (*rang stong*) and

Being empty of an additive (*gzhan stong*).

The first term, empty of a Self-nature, identifies the traditional Buddhist view that all phenomena lack a Self-nature, and Dol-po-pa understands this as a mere negation. By means of the second term, Dol-po-pa views the existential situation from an absolute perspective. That

which remains beyond and behind emptiness, or beyond the absence of Self-nature, is the luminous ground of being. It is void of any “other,” i.e. — additive — the entirety of conceptualized and dependent phenomena. Being empty of an additive is the consummate reality.

In his basic work *Ri chos nges don rgya mtsho*, Dol-po-pa explains that in the following way:

Thus the empty phenomena are to be understood as “empty of a Self” (*rang stong*), and the ground of emptiness is to be understood as “empty of additives” (*gzhan stong*). This is the authentic entry to emptiness, free from error.<sup>15</sup>

Dol-po-pa continues to think along the line of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, but carries the idea further, so that he was labelled “a Tibetan Brahman” by the Russian scholar Obermiller.<sup>16</sup>

## (2) *The Position of the Ratnagotra-vibhāga*

In chap. I, v. 154—155 we read the following statement:

Here there is nothing to be removed and absolutely nothing to be added; the Truth should be perceived as it is, and he who sees the Truth becomes liberated. (p. 154)  
The Essence [of the Buddha] is [by nature] devoid of the accidental [pollutions] which differ from it; but it is by no means devoid of the highest properties which are, essentially, indivisible from it. (p. 155)

The prose commentary, attributed to Asaṅga, expounds:

What is explained by this? There is no defiling element which is to be removed from the Essence of the Tathāgata, perfectly purified by nature, since it is by nature devoid of accidental pollutions. Also there is no purifying element which is to be added to it, since it is by nature indivisible from the pure properties [of the Buddha]. . . . Thus, wherever something is lacking, this is observed as void in that place, whatever remains there, one knows that this being must exist here.<sup>17</sup>

In other words, the *tathāgatagarbha*, which is at the focal point of the entire *Ratnagotra-vibhāga*, is the consummation of reality; nothing can be added and nothing can be removed from it. The question “What is it that cannot be removed and cannot be added?” was answered differently in various interpretations. In the *Ratnagotra-vibhāga* it is said that no defilement can be removed, because of its primary purity, and that no Buddha-quality can be added because of its consummate nature.

G. M. Nagao observed that: “The tenets of the *Ratnagotra* are regarded as rather close to those of the Yogācāras, however . . . its understanding of the passage concerned seems to be fairly different from that of the Yogācāras.”<sup>18</sup>

### (3) *Tsong-kha-pa's Position*

This disagreement had been also noticed by the Tibetan philosophers in the past. In the following passage, I shall first discuss Tsong-kha-pa's position with regard to the statement “What is non-existent and what is remanent in śūnyatā” and then I shall discuss the position held by his disciple rGyal-tshab-rje.

In his commentary on the *Madhyamakāvātāra*, *Dgongs pa rab gsal*<sup>19</sup> Tsong-kha-pa discusses the meaning of “What is remanent” in the light of the “three natures” (*trisvabhāva*) of Yogācāra. He elaborates upon the thought that the perfect (*pariniṣpanna*) is voidness inasmuch as it is void of imagined (*parikalpita*) and based upon dependent (*paratantra*). With these words he summarizes the thought of the Yogācāra. He then goes on to explain that the *Ratnagotra* commentary is inconsistent with the major Yogācāra works, such as the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* and *Madhyāntavibhāga*, and that it must therefore be seen as a Madhyamaka interpretation. He says:

The meaning of “When something does not exist there, the latter . . . [etc]” as explained in the [*Ratnagotra*]-*Uttaratantra* commentary is in total disagreement with the previous two.<sup>20</sup> [But] it is in accordance with the commentarial method of the Madhyamaka; yet I will not elaborate on this point, because I am afraid of the length of this treatise.<sup>21</sup>

This quotation illustrates that Tsong-kha-pa was well aware of the striking disagreement between the *Ratnagotra* commentary and that found in the majority of Yogācāra works.

### (4) *rGyal-tshab-rje's Position*

rGyal-tshab-rje, one of Tsong-kha-pa's most illustrious disciples, pursued his master's intention and commented on the famous phrase “What is remanent” exclusively from the perspective of a Madhyamaka interpretation. When the *Ratnagotra* (I.154) says “Here there is nothing to be removed, and absolutely nothing to be added,” rGyal-tshab-rje interprets the phrase in the following mode:

Because the *tathāgata dhātu* is pure by its own nature in so far as there are no previously existent and now to be removed defilements, no two kinds of Self do exist, which were object or cause for clinging to a Self of persons or phenomena. This is so, because to be free of inherently existent accidental pollution is the very nature of this *dhātu*. When herein (i.e. *Ratnagotra*) the lacking of inherent existence (*rang bzhin gyis grub pa*), the lacking of existence by way of its own nature (*rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa*), and the lacking of existence in its own right (*rang gi ngo bo nyid kyis grub pa*) are explained as the ultimate truth, then one should know that the teaching of this system of two truths is identical with Nāgārjuna's intention. . . . In accordance with this, the wisdom which directly cognizes Selflessness, correctly comprehends that inherently existent phenomena "do not exist on whatever basis and this is known as empty of that". In the post-equiposed phase (*rjes kyī skabs*) one correctly realizes that "the lacking of" inherent existence is "what is remanent" and exists "permanently".<sup>22</sup>

Here, rGyal-tshab-rje understands the explanation of the RGV commentary on v. 154/5 with regard to the two truths as precisely identical with Nāgārjuna's exposition on this subject. He also understands the Sūtra phrase "something does not exist" as something does not inherently exist. The two modes of cognition, as mentioned by rGyal-tshab-rje in the translated passage, refer to (1) the contemplative wisdom acquired during meditation and which sees Selflessness in an unmediated way, i.e., "the equiposed wisdom" (*mnyam bzhag ye shes*; Skr., *samāhitajñāna*), and (2) the "post-equiposed wisdom" (*rjes thob ye shes*; Skr., *prṣṭalabdhajñāna*), which is characterized by an analytical mental process which occurs after the phase of contemplation has come to an end. This interpretation allows rGyal-tshab-rje to see the *Cūllasuññata-sutta* to be in line with Madhyamaka philosophy and to support Tsong-kha-pa's suggestion, which has been discussed before.

### (5) *Gung-thang's Position*

In the 18th century, when the scholastic development in Tibet peaked, the famous dGe-lugs-pa scholar Gung-thang dKon-mchog bstan-pa'i sgron-me compared the statement in the *Ratnagotra* commentary, ascribed to Aśaṅga, with that in rGyal-tshab-rje's *Ratnagotra* commentary and came to the conclusion:

These two [works] do not pursue the same purport, therefore one [of them] does not follow the intention of the root text.<sup>23</sup>

In a subtle way, Gung-thang raises doubts regarding rGyal-tshab-



rje's interpretation which might be called a *tour de force*. Gung-thang expressed his own opinion on the correct interpretation of this problematic sūtra in his *Drang nges mchan*:

[In the RGV] is said that the accidental defilements which obscure the very essence of *tathāgatagarbha* may be removed, because they do not penetrate its nature. Therefore [the *tathāgata*] nature is void of afflictions. When [these obscurations] are removed the purity of its nature becomes the ability to achieve supreme enlightenment, and in this sense it exists always.<sup>24</sup>

In other words, Gung-thang understands the *Cūlasuññata-sutta* phrase "something does not exist" in the light of the RGV that the nature of *tathāgatagarbha* is not affected by afflictions, thus the afflictions do not exist with regard to it, or it is empty of them. The second statement of the *Cūlasuññata-sutta*, "something that remains", is understood by Gung-thang as the purity of the nature of *tathāgatagarbha* which constitutes the ability to realize the supreme enlightenment, a potential which exists always. Thus the mystery remains after we have almost completed a circle in interpreting this remarkable sentence.

#### CONCLUSION

In the various texts the phrase "something does not exist there" was interpreted in the following way: "elephants, cows, etc." (*Cūlasuññata-sutta*), "the imagined, or conceptualized" (Yogācāra tradition), "the five skandhas, the elements, the sensory fields as eternal and solid entities" (*Abhidharmasamuccaya*), "all conventional phenomena" (Dol-po-pa), "inherent reality" (rGyal-tshab-rje), "accidental pollution with regard to the *tathāgatagarbha* (Gung-thang). The phrase "something that remains there does exist as a real existent" was interpreted also in different ways: "monks, palace, world, etc" (*Cūlasuññata-sutta*), "the perfect, or accomplished" (Yogācāra tradition), "the Selflessness" (*Abhidharmasamuccaya*), "the perfect, emptiness exists eternally" (Dol-po-pa), "the lack of inherent reality" (rGyal-tshab-rje), "the purity of *tathāgatagarbha*'s nature" (Gung-thang).

This survey shows that the Buddhist tradition interpreted the same scriptural sentence in radically different ways. Each commentator

attempted to present the scriptural statement in a way which suited best his own philosophical view. It is evident that no agreement with regard to the exegesis of this sentence can be obtained. After all, the Buddha has set up a model in the *Cūlasuññata-sutta*, where he interpreted the statement in a process-manner. There is no definitive description of voidness.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> 'What Remains in Śūnyatā'. A Yogācāra Interpretation of Emptiness, *Mahāyāna Buddhist Meditation*, ed. by Kiyota. Hawaii: n.p., 1978, pp. 66—82.

<sup>2</sup> *La Théorie du Tathāgatagarbha et du Gotra*. (Publications de l'École Française d'Extrême Orient vol. LXX.) Paris: École Française d'Extrême Orient, 1969, pp. 319—346.

<sup>3</sup> *Bukkyō ni okero Mu to U to no Tairon*, (Controversy between Theories of Nonbeing and Being in Buddhism.) Tokyo/Kyoto: Kobundo-shobo, 1941.

<sup>4</sup> *Mahāyāna-Uttaratantra Śāstra-vyākhyā*, Derge Tanjur vol. Phi, Otani no. 4025; Cone Tanjur vol. 44 (Phi) IASWR microfiche. E. Obermiller has translated the Tibetan into English, see *Acta Orientalia*, vol. 9 (Paris 1931). Jikido Takasaki has translated the Sanskrit text into English: *A Study on the Ratnagotravibhāgu (Uttaratantra)* (Serie Orientale Roma 33), 1966.

<sup>5</sup> *Collection of the Middle Length Sayings*, vol. III, tr. by I. B. Horner, p. 147f.

<sup>6</sup> The translation is taken from Nagao's 'What remains in Śūnyatā', p. 68. *Cūlasuññata-sutta* (*op. cit.*, p. 104f): Iti yaṃ hi kho tattha na hoti, tena taṃ suññaṃ samanupassati; yaṃ pana tattha avasitthaṃ hoti, taṃ idam atthiṭṭi pajāti. In its Tibetan version the text reads (*Lha-sa Kanjur*, vol. 71 (Ra), fol. 477a. 6f): gang la gang med pa de des stong ngo / zhes bya bar yang dag par rjes su mthong yang / de la lhag ma gang yod pa de de la yod do // zhes bya bar yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin du rab tu shes te /.

<sup>7</sup> *The Collection of the Middle Length Sayings, Majjhima Nikāya* vol. III, tr. by I. B. Horner. Pali Text Society Translation Series no. 31, rpt. 1967.

<sup>8</sup> *Lha-sa Kanjur* vol. 71 (Ra), f. 476b.3—482a.4, IASWR microfiche.

<sup>9</sup> *Cūlasuññata-sutta* tr. by Horner p. 147f.

<sup>10</sup> G. M. Nagao, 'What Remains in Śūnyatā', p. 70.

<sup>11</sup> Nagao, 'What Remains in Śūnyatā', n. 22.

<sup>12</sup> *Abhidharmasamuccaya* TTP vol. 112, p. 252.3.1ff: stong pa'i mtshan nyid gang zhes na / gang la gang med pa de ni des stong par yang dag par rjes su mthong ba ste / 'di la lhag ma gang yin pa de ni 'dir yod pa'o // zhes yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin du rab tu shes so // 'di ni stong pa nyid la 'jug pa yang dag pa ji lta ba ste / phyin ci ma log pa zhes bya 'o // gang la ci zhig med ce na / phung po dang / khams dang / skye mched rnams la rtag pa dang / brtan pa dang . . . bdag dang bdag gi med do // . . . de la lhag ma yod pa ci zhig ce na / gang bdag med pa nyid de /.

Skr. ed. by P. Pradhan, 1950, p. 40ff, tr. by Walpola Rahula, *Le Compendium de la superdoctrine (philosophie)* (Abhidharmasamuccaya) d'Asaṅga. Paris, 1971, p. 65.

<sup>13</sup> 'What Remains in Śūnyatā', p. 74.

<sup>14</sup> *Ri chos nges don rgya mtsho* by Dol-po-pa, publ. by Dodrup Sangyey, Delhi 1976,

p. 191ff: stong pa'i gzhi gang la stong pa'i chos gang med pa de chos des stong par yang dag par rjes su 'thong (read: mthong) ste / 'di la chos des stong pa'i lhaq ma stong pa'i gzhi gang yin pa chos nyid yongs grub de ni 'dir nam yang yod pa'o // zhes yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin du rab tu shes so //.

<sup>15</sup> *Ri chos nges don rgya mtsho* p. 192: de ltar stong pa'i chos rang stong dang stong pa'i gzhi gzhan stong tu rtogs pa 'di ni stong pa nyid la 'jug pa yang dag pa ji lta ba ste phyin ci ma log pa zhes bya's . . . /.

<sup>16</sup> E. Obermiller, 'The Sublime Science of the Great Vehicle to Salvation Being a Manual of Buddhist Monism', *Acta Orientalia* 9 (1931), 106f.

<sup>17</sup> J. Takasaki, *The Ratnagotra vibhāga*, Serie Orientale Roma 33. Rome: IsMEO 1966, p. 300f.

<sup>18</sup> 'What Remains in Śūnyatā', p. 74.

<sup>19</sup> *bsTan bcos chen po dbu ma la 'jug pa'i rnam bshad dGongs pa rab gsal*, Collected Works of Tsong-kha-pa, vol. ma, ed. by Gelek Demo (New Delhi n.d.); also *gSer phreng*, ed. by Gelek Demo p. 521–23.

<sup>20</sup> *Byang sa*, i.e. *Bodhisattvabhūmi*; and *Dbus mtha'i 'grel pa*, i.e. *Madhyāntavibhāga* commentary ascribed to Vasubandhu.

<sup>21</sup> Tsong-kha-pa, *dGongs pa rab gsal*. Ed. by N. Gelek, n.p., n.d., p. 309: rGyud bla ma'i 'grel bar gang zhig gang na med pa de ni zhes sogs kyi don bkral ba ni / snga ma gnyis dang gtan mi 'dra bar dbu ma'i 'grel tshul du yod de mangs bas 'jigs nas ma bris so /.

<sup>22</sup> *Theg pa chen po rgyud bla ma'i tika* in *Yab sras gsungs 'bum*, vol. 3, IASWR microfiche edition, fol. 161b–162a: gang gi phyir rang bzhin gyis yongs su dag pa de bzhin gshegs pa'i khams 'di la sngar yod gсар du bsal bar bya ba kun nas nyon mongs pa gang zag dang chos kyi bdag tu 'dzin pa'i rgyu mtshan te dmigs pa bdag gnyis 'ga' yang med de / glo bur ba'i dri ma rang bzhin gyis grub pa dang bral ba ni khams 'di'i rang bzhin yin pa'i phyir ro // 'dis rang bzhin gyis grub pas stong pa dang / rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pas stong pa dang / rang gi ngo bo nyid kyis grub pas stong pa don dam pa'i bden par bstan pa na / bden pa gnyis kyi rnam bzhag mgon po Klu-sgrub kyi bzhed pa dang don gcig tu bstan par shes par bya'o // . . . de ltar na rang bzhin gyis grub pa'i chos gang zhig gzhi gang na med pa de ni des stong ngo zhes bdag med mngon sum du rtogs pa'i shes rab kyis yang dag par rjes su mthong la / gang zhig de la lhaq mar gyur pa rang bzhin gyis stong pa de ni de la rtag par yod do zhes / rjes kyi skabs su yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin du shes so / zhes so //.

<sup>23</sup> *Bstan bcos legs par bshad pa'i snying po las sems tsam skor gyi mchan 'grel rtsom 'phro nam rig gzhung brgya'i snang ba*, (short title *Drang nges mchan*), *The Collected Works of Gung-thang*, vol. 11 (Kha). Ed. by N. Gelek. New Delhi: n.p., 1972, p. 827: zhe . . . gsungs pa gnyis gnad gcig tu mi 'gro bas gcig rtsa ba'i dgongs pa ma yin par 'gyur la.

<sup>24</sup> *Drang nges mchan* p. 827: zhes khams bde bar gshegs pa'i snying po de nyid sgrib byed glo bur gyi dri ma rnam par dbye rung yin pas rang bzhin la ma zhugs pa de'i phyir rang bzhin gyi mya ngan gyis stong zhing / de'i shul na bla med byang chub 'grub rung gi yon tan rang bzhin rnam par dag pa'i cha de ni rtag par yod pa la gsungs so //.