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DHARMAKĪRTI AND HIS COMMENTATORS ON
YOGIPRATYAKṢA*

I

In the Buddhist Pramāṇa school, perception (*pratyakṣa*) is one of the valid means of cognition (*pramāṇa*). It is defined as free from conceptual construction (*kalpanāpodha*) and non-erroneous (*abhrānta*). Dignāga (ca. 480–540), the founder of this school, divides perception into fourfold: sense-perception (*indriyajñāna*), mental cognition (*mānasajñāna*), self-consciousness (*svasamvedana*), and the cognition of yogins (*yogijñāna*). Among them, the cognition of yogins is the intuition of a thing in itself unassociated with the teacher's instruction.¹ As one of the most difficult concepts in Buddhist philosophy,² this cognition is essential to prove the property of the omniscient being (*sarvajña*) of the Buddha.

Since Dharmakīrti (ca. 600–660), who succeeded and developed the teaching of Dignāga, elaborated yogic intuition (*yogijñāna*) in his works, it has been a crucial topic of heated debate between the Buddhist Pramāṇa and the Hindu Mīmāṃsā schools.³ Evolving over some five centuries of creative philosophical activity (7th–11th), it plays a conspicuous and significant role in the works of the philosophers belonging to these schools. An important issue under discussion with regard to the cognition of yogins is how it fulfills the above-mentioned twofold definition of perception. The aim of my article is to investigate its epistemological structure in Dharmakīrti's works, such as the *Pramāṇavārttika* and the *Nyāyabindu*. In addition, I shall examine the debate on this cognition between his commentators, such as Dharmottara (ca. 750–810) and Prajñākaragupta (about the end of the 8th–the middle of the 9th), and their Hindu counterparts.

II

The cognition of yogins results through the practice of meditation (*bhāvanā*). It is divested of the snares of judgement (*vikalpa*) and is characterized as vivid manifestation (*viśadābhā*). In the *Nyāyabindu*, Dharmakīrti defines this cognition as follows when he enumerates it among the category of perception:

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The cognition of yogins (*yogipratyakṣa*) is the knowledge which is produced on the termination (*paryanta*) of the intensity (*prakarṣa*) of meditation on a true object.⁴

According to Prajñākaragupta's *Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya*, the meditation here is tranquility (*śamatha*) and insight (*vipaśyanā*).⁵ The yogin learns true things, such as the Four Noble Truths, through the Buddha's teaching (*āgama*) and reflects upon their meaning through reasoning (*yukti*). Then he realizes them through tranquility and insight. What Dharmakīrti implies with the above definition is that the process of meditation has three stages: intensity (*prakarṣa*), termination (*paryanta*), and yogic intuition (*yogipratyakṣa*). The three stages denote that the yogin intuits an object through the practice of meditation not at once but gradually after he has formed an intent attention of his mind upon it. It demonstrates that he should practice again and again in order to cultivate complete mental concentration (*samādhi*). The philosophers belonging to the Buddhist Pramāṇa school call this process *krama*.

Among the three stages, that of intensity (*prakarṣa*) is the process of the yogin's repeated forcing of the object of meditation into his consciousness. In this stage, the contemplated object begins and continues to reach a condition of clarity in the yogin's mind.⁶ When the yogin eliminates the obscurations of the image of an object through realization (*bhāvanā*), even that which is not present before his eyes will appear as if being actually present before him. The image gradually becomes clearer until it is completely vivid.⁷

The stage of termination (*paryanta*) is a moment located at the end of intensity. According to Dharmottara, the author of the *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* which is a commentary on Dharmakīrti's *Nyāyabindu*, it is a state of mind in which the object of meditation is manifested as if it were veiled by mica.⁸ That is, the yogin can perceive an object almost as vividly as he sees something in front of him. This stage is a point immediately before the cognition of yogins is reached.

The stage of yogic intuition is a state after the progress of intensity ceases. In this stage, the clarity of the object is complete, and the object of meditation is apprehended with absolute vividness like something perceived by sense-perception (*indriyajñāna*).⁹ For instance, the yogin grasps it just as clearly as though he is looking at a grain on the palm of his hand. Since the clarity reaches perfection, yogic cognition is devoid of conceptual construction (*vikalpa*).

With the investigation of the three stages, Dharmakīrti explicates the cognition of yogins in the context of Buddhist ontology. The Buddhist concept of existence (*sattva*) is by nature without a noumenon (*anātman*). Because everything is unique and non-recurrent, there is no room for

an underlying single substance (*dravya*) as a locus of properties. The philosophers of the Buddhist Pramāṇa school have the view that whatever is existent is momentary. They understand that a moment (*kṣaṇa*) as an entity is real but the continuum (*santāna*) of moments is a result of the commonly shared imagination.

This view is not exceptional for yogic intuition. The cognition in the preceding moment is different from that in the following, and the same applies to its object. Accordingly, Dharmakīrti's meaning of meditation is that for the duration of the practice (*bhāvanā*), the yogin's cognition, within the same continuum (*ekasantāna*), repeatedly grasps its object which is at the same time also undergoing change every moment. During the practice of meditation, each cognition in the moment is mutually connected in the relation of causality. In other words, the cognition at the preceding moment is the cause of that at the following moment, and the cognition at the following moment is the effect of that at the preceding moment. For this reason, the clarity of the preceding moment exerts influence upon that of the following moment. The production of clarity takes place at every moment, gradually coming to completion through the stages of intensity (*prakarṣa*) and termination (*paryanta*). In this way, as the meditation becomes perfected, the cognition of yogins is free from a determining factor (*kalpanāpoḍha*).

III

1. The cognition of yogins has no contact with a real thing and does not even have a direct connection with a mental image that follows from the direct sensory cognition of an external object. The object of yogic intuition is only a fictional concept (*vikalpa*) which cannot denote the true character of reality. For this reason, as far as Buddhist philosophers place yogic intuition in the category of perception, this aspect is contradictory to their definition that perception is devoid of judgement. The point at issue is how the cognition of yogins which is by nature conceptual (*vikalpaka*) can attain indeterminateness (*nirvikalpakatva*).¹⁰ The practice of meditation (*bhāvanā*) is concerned with an unreal object. Then, how can a real thing be vividly manifested in the mind of the yogin through meditation? This problem is that which Kumārila (around 7th c.), a renown Mīmāṃsaka philosopher, argues in opposition to the Buddhist view on the cognition of yogins. He insists that yogic intuition is the result of imagination like wish or remembrance, and so it is not valid and reliable.¹¹

Let us see now on what basis Buddhist philosophers maintain that the cognition of yogins is perception and how they prove that it is indeterminate. For this, it is necessary first of all to understand Dharmakīrti's epistemological project that is based on the distinction between the indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*) and the determinate (*savikalpaka*). According to Dharmakīrti, indeterminate cognition is the knowledge of an object which occurs for the first time, while the determinate is that which grasps what has been once grasped.¹² The former perceives an object as it is, and is free from conceptual construction. On the other hand, the latter is distorted and takes an object that is capable of coalescing with words at the time of the formation of language.¹³ That is, between the twofold cognition that Dharmakīrti divides, the indeterminate has the particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) as its object, while the determinate takes the universal (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*) for its object.¹⁴

If so, what is the difference between the indeterminate and the determinate cognitions? In order to distinguish them, Dharmakīrti employs vivid manifestation (*sphuṭābhatva*) as the criterion.¹⁵

The [cognition] connected with conceptual construction (*vikalpa*) does not have vivid manifestation of an object.¹⁶

To that which is connected to a conception, the object cannot appear vividly. Given a mind that is erroneous, there is no clear [manifestation of its object] for any consciousness that is mixed with words.¹⁷

These sentences show that the presence or the absence of vivid manifestation rests on how a cognition obtains its object. The indeterminate is vivid because it is produced by the presence of its object while the determinate is unclear because it does not rely on the presence of the object it conceives.¹⁸ Dharmottara further explains the reason why the latter does not have vivid manifestation as follows:

As the knowledge, which arose previously and disappeared [now], does not exist at the present moment, so neither actually exists the object of the previously disappeared knowledge at the present moment. Hence, the determinate [cognition] does not appear vivid because grasping the unreal form of an object, it cognizes the object that is not present to [sense-organs].¹⁹

According to the above passage, the determinate cognition does not appear vivid because it does not take something at the present moment. To explicate, when the indeterminate cognition C_1 disappears at the moment T_1 , its object O_1 also disappears at T_1 . However, the object of the determinate continues to exist regardless of the duration of moments because it is a conceptual construction. In other words, its object that is the continuum (*santāna*) of each moment of the object O is not actually real, but exists in the form of its genus (*jāti*), lasting for the moments T_1 – T_n . So, the object of the determinate is beyond the senses, and thus

it is not manifested clearly. It is therefore to the advantage of Buddhist philosophers to convincingly establish the relation of incompatibility (*virodha*) between the judgement and the vividness of cognition for their argument to hold.²⁰ On the basis of this incompatibility, the 10th century Buddhist logician, Durveka Mīśra makes the following logical formula (*prayoga*):

vyāpti: Whatever knowledge is in contact with an object as seen at the time of the formation of language does not appear vivid, like the determinate cognition of an object that was seen long ago and is gone [now].

pakṣadharmatā: And the determinate is in contact with an object being cognized as seen at the time of the formation of language.²¹

The conclusion of this logical formula is that the determinate cognition does not appear vivid. It is the view of the Buddhist Pramāṇa school that the cognition of yogins, which is the result of the practice of meditation, is however manifested quite vividly.²² This Buddhist view is not objected to by their rival Mīmāṃsakas.²³ Through the exclusion of yogic intuition from the realm of the determinate cognition, Buddhist philosophers establish that it is indeterminate. This proves that the cognition of yogins is free from conceptual construction.

2. The vivid manifestation (*sphuṭābhatva*) is essential for cognition to be indeterminate. If so, does it guarantee that whatever is vivid becomes perception? Those who are mad with passion, sorrow or fear see even absent objects as if they were standing firm before him.²⁴ For instance, one who fears snakes acts as if he were seeing one even when he looks at a rope on a dark road. In this way, the vividness is possible with regard to a thing that is not present to senses. Then, does every practice of meditation produce perception, regardless of the fact that its object is real or unreal? In the case that the answer is yes, a thing not at the present moment or not in front of sense-organs would be capable of becoming the object of perception. This problem is related to the reason why the philosophers belonging to the Buddhist Pramāṇa school try to prove that the cognition of yogins is non-erroneous (*abhrānta*).

Since yogic intuition is produced through the practice of meditation, it is different from the cognition of ordinary people. Then, how is its validity established? This intuition, whose object is based on conceptual construction, does not become directly grounded in a real thing. That is, it manifests an object in the form of something non-X as X. For this reason, yogic intuition does not enable the yogin to reach the object, nor to fulfill his purpose.²⁵ So, the problem is one of hallucination.

With regard to this problem, Dharmakīrti provides only partial and brief answers, which seem to be in tension with his general theory of perception. He answers that the cognition of yogins is reliable

and is accepted as perception because it grasps a true object.²⁶ This is accomplished through the yogin's practice after his learning the Buddha's teaching. As Iwata (1976) and Steinkellner (1978) point out,²⁷ however, the non-erroneousness of yogic cognition in Dharmakīrti's answer is based on the fact that it grasps an object that is originally true. Accordingly, it is difficult to say that his reply clears up the above problem.

When the Naiyāyika, Bhāsarvajña (around 10th c.) criticizes Dharmakīrti's definition of yogic intuition, he focuses on this problem and maintains that it is erroneous.

If [Buddhists insist that] the image of an object that was seen, heard, and inferred appears very vivid through the practice of meditation, nevertheless yogic intuition must be erroneous. For something not present (*avidyamāna*) appears in the form of that which is present, like the knowledge in the dream and so on.²⁸

This view of Bhāsarvajña signifies that as far as the cognition of yogins is perception, it is impossible for this cognition to have a past or a future thing as its object. A similar objection has already appeared in Prajñākaragupta's commentary on PV I.138.²⁹ There, he analyzes the objection as follows: (1) If the image of an object at the past or the future moment were grasped at the present moment, it would belong to the present moment because the image which is perceived at the present moment belongs to the moment; (2) If the image of an object at the past or the future moment belonged to the present moment, it would be at the present moment, but how can a thing at the past or future moment exist at the present moment?

For the answer to this objection, Buddhist philosophers examine the meaning of what exists at the present moment.³⁰ As Iwata (1976) quotes in his article,³¹ Prajñākaragupta defines existence (*sattva*) as follows:

Only the direct experience (*sākṣātkaraṇa*) [of a thing] is said to be the existence (*astitva*) of the thing. . . . Even in the case of a thing that is thought to be present [in the actual world, for instance a pot]. . . . Existence is understood only by way of the direct experience (*sākṣātkaraṇa*), but not by other ways.³²

Since the Buddha declared the doctrine of non-self (*anātman*), Buddhists have not accepted the concept of substance (*dravya*). For them, how to define existence is an immediate task to solve. Succeeding and developing the Abhidharmic concept of *kāritra*, philosophers of the Buddhist Pramāṇa school define existence as causal effectiveness (*arthakriyākāritva*). This concept demonstrates that existence is an action, that is 'producing an effect.' If we use the above words of Prajñākaragupta, they offer an explanation of that which exists as a

direct experience to the one who perceives it. So, its definition in this school is different from that in the Mīmāṃsā school, which defines that which exists as a thing's combining with the present moment.³³ As being trustworthy (*saṃvādana*), the Buddhist meaning of existence is the fulfillment of the purpose of a perceiver.

According to Prajñākaragupta, the cognition of a thing at the past or the future moment is the cognition of a thing that is not perceived at the present moment.³⁴ However, that which is not perceived now is applied not to the yogin but to ordinary people.³⁵ For as we saw previously, the yogin is capable of having a direct experience of something not at the present moment through the intensive practice of meditation. That is, the object of perception is different between the yogin and ordinary people. Unlike ordinary people, he goes beyond the realm of time, and manifests the past and the future things at the present moment.³⁶ In this sense, yogic intuition is not an error in which one looks at a thing not present as present.

IV

What has been discussed above leads us the following concluding remarks:

- (1) The cognition of yogins has been occupying a special position in the Buddhist Pramāṇa school. As the link between theory and practice, it became a subject of proof by logicians as well as that of experience by yogins.
- (2) Dharmakīrti tried to define yogic cognition and demonstrate its epistemological structure. He argued that there are three stages of the practice of meditation: intensity, termination, and yogic intuition. Through these stages, the yogin gradually produces the indeterminate cognition in the continuum (*santāna*) of his consciousness.
- (3) The commentators of Dharmakīrti's works, on the other hand, changed their way of dealing with the cognition of yogins. Dharmottara and Prajñākaragupta debated whether this cognition is perception or not, and made an attempt to justify how it fulfills the two conditions of perception, which are freedom from conceptual construction and non-erroneousness. In answer to each of them respectively, these commentators suggested vivid manifestation (*sphuṭābhatva*) and direct experience (*sākṣātkaraṇa*).
- (4) Later, the answer itself became an important topic of argument on the cognition of yogins by Hindu philosophers, such as Vācaspatimiśra.

ABBREVIATIONS

Dhpr	Paṇḍita Durveka Miśra. <i>Dharmottarapradīpa</i> with Dharmakīrti's <i>Nyāyabindu</i> and Dharmottara's <i>Tīkā</i> . Ed. by D. Malvania. Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1971.
NB	Dharmakīrti. <i>Nyāyabindu</i> . See Dhpr.
NBT	Dharmottara. <i>Nyāyabinduṭīkā</i> . See Dhpr.
NBhūṣ	Bhāsarvajña. <i>Nyāyabhūṣaṇa</i> . Ed. by S. Yogīndrananda. Vārāṇasī: Saddarśana Prakāśana Pratiṣṭhānam, 1968.
NK	Vācaspatimiśra. <i>Nyāyakaṇikā</i> . Ed. by M. Goswami. Varanasi: Tara Publications, 1978.
MS	Jaimini. <i>Mīmāṃsāsūtra</i> . Tr. and Ed. M. L. Sandal. Delhi: Montilal Banarsidass, 1980.
PV	Dharmakīrti. <i>Pramāṇavārttika</i> with Manorathanandin's <i>Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti</i> . Ed. by R. Sāṅkrtyāyana. Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1953.
PVBh	Prajñākaragupta. <i>Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya</i> . Ed. by R. Sāṅkrtyāyana. Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1953.
PVV	Manorathanandin. <i>Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti</i> . See PV.
PVin	Dharmakīrti. <i>Pramāṇaviniścaya</i> . See Dreyfus (1997).
PS	Dignāga, <i>Pramāṇasamuccaya</i> . See Hattori (1968).
ŚV	Kumārila Bhaṭṭa. <i>Ślokavārttika</i> . 2nd Ed. by S. K. Ramanatha Sastri. Madras: University of Madras, 1971.

NOTES

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¹ PS I.6: *yoginām gurunirdeśavyatibhinnārthamātradrk*. Since the teacher's instruction, *āgama*, is expressed in words, it is a kind of concept that is the object of inference (*anumāna*).

² See PV III.532d: *acintyā yoginām gatih*.

³ Concerning the position of the Buddhist Pramāṇa school that the cognition of yogins is perception, the 12th century Buddhist logician Mokṣākaragupta introduces the following objections of the Hindus: (1) Meditation is concerned with conceptual constructions and they refer to unreal objects. How then can a real thing vividly manifest itself in the meditation? (2) How can the cognition of yogins, which is by nature conceptual, attain indeterminateness? (3) How can the mind which is momentary be fixed upon one object? (4) When the mind is momentary, by whom and how is the additional property (*viśeṣa*) of yogins attained? (5) How can a man who has a body be emancipated through detachment from passions and so forth? See Kajiyama (1989): 241.

⁴ NB I.11: *bhūtārthabhāvanāprakarṣaparyantajaṃ yogijñānam*.

⁵ See PVBh 327,17: *tathā ca śamathavipaśyanāyuganaddhavāhī margo yoga iti vacanam*. For the details of tranquility and insight with regard to the cognition of yogins, see Prévèreau (1994): 77–79.

⁶ See Dhpr 68,12: *sa ca yatsphuṭatvatadadhikasphuṭatvādinā rūpeṇa tajjñānasyodaya eva*.

⁷ NBT 67,6–7: *yāvad dhi sphuṭābhatvam aparipūrṇaṃ tāvat tasya prakarṣagamanam*.

⁸ NBT 68,4–69,1: *abhrakavyavahitam iva yadā bhāvyaṃnam vastu paśyati sā prakarṣaparyantāvasthā*.

⁹ See Dhpr 68,14–15: *yasmin kāle sphuṭābhatvaṃ bhāvanārthaṃ viṣayasya jñānasyeti prakaranād idam leśato 'sampūrṇaṃ bhavati yad anantaram yogipratyakṣena bhavitavyaṃ tasmin kāle prakarṣasya paryanto 'vasānaṃ jñātavyaḥ*; Dhpr 68,23–24: *tataḥ sa paryanta ucyate yadanantaram prakṛṣyamāṇena na bhavitavyam*.

¹⁰ See also Prévère (1994): 79ff.

¹¹ See ŚV IV.26–30: *atītānāgate 'py arthe sūkṣme vyavahite 'pi ca, pratyakṣam yoginām iṣṭaṃ kaiścin muktātmanām api. vidyamānopalambhatvaṃ asiddhaṃ tatra tān prati, bhaviṣyattvasya vā hetos tadgrāhyair vyabhicāritā, mā bhūtām iti tenāha lokasiddhaṃ sad ity ayam, na lokavyatiriktaṃ hi pratyakṣam yoginām api. pratyakṣatvena tasyāpi vidyamānopalabhanam, satsamprayogajitvaṃ vāpy asmatpratyakṣavad bhavet. teṣāṃ avartamāne 'rthe yā nāmotpadyate matiḥ, pratyakṣam sā tatas tv eva nābhilāṣasmṛtādivat*.

¹² PV II.5a: *ajñātārthaprakāśo vā*. Kajiyama (1989): 211, n. 8.

¹³ NB 69,3–4: *vikalpavijñānaṃ hi saṅketakāladrṣṭatvena vastu gṛhṇac chabdasam-sargayogyam gṛhṇīyāt. saṅketakāladrṣṭatvaṃ ca saṅketakālotpannājnānaviṣayatvam*.

¹⁴ See NB I.12ff. See also Hattori (1968): 24.

¹⁵ It becomes clear in the light of Prajñākaragupta's PVBh that the criterion for determinate and indeterminate rests on the notion of vividness and its incompatibility with conceptual construction. See PVBh 326,24: *spaṣṭābhatvād evāvikalpakaṃ tataḥ pratyakṣam*.

¹⁶ PV III.283ab: *na vikalpānubaddhasyāsti sphuṭārthāvabhāsītā*.

¹⁷ PVin P 5710,259.b.7: *gang gi phyir. rnam rtog rjes su 'brel ba la. don gsal snang ba yod ma yin. rnam par bslad pa'i blo yang rung ste brjod pa dang 'dres pa'i shes pa thams cad la ni don gsal ba nyid ldog pa'i phyir ro*. See Dreyfus (1997): 539, n. 27.

¹⁸ See Dreyfus (1997): 350ff.

¹⁹ NBT 69,4–7: *yathā ca pūrvotpannaṃ vinaṣṭaṃ jñānaṃ sampraty asat, tadvat pūrvavinaṣṭajñānaviṣayatvam api samprati nāsti vastunaḥ. tadasadrūpaṃ vastuno gṛhṇad asannihitārthagrāhītvād asphuṭābhaṃ vikalpakam*.

²⁰ See Dhpr 69,15: *śabdākārasaṃsargo hi sphuṭābhatvavirodhīti*.

²¹ Dhpr 69,30–70,10: *prayogaḥ – yat saṅketakāladrṣṭatayā vastusamsparsījñānaṃ na tat sphuṭābhaṃ, yathā ciradrṣṭanaṣṭavastuvikalpaḥ. saṅketakāladrṣṭatayā ca drṣyamānavastusamsparsī vikalpaḥ*.

²² See PV III.281: *prāg uktaṃ yoginām jñānaṃ teṣāṃ tad bhāvanāmayam, vidhūtakaḥpanājālaṃ spaṣṭam evāvabhāsate*.

²³ For instance, see NK 104,26–27: *satyam, śrutānumānagocaracāriṇī bhāvanā viśadābhavijñānahetuḥ*.

²⁴ See PV III. 282: *kāmaśokabhayonmādacaurasvapnādyupaplutāḥ, abhūtān api paśyanti purato 'vasthitān iva*.

²⁵ The non-erroneousness (*abhrāntva*) is that which is not reversed to the nature of reality which has causal effectiveness (*arthakriyākāritva*). See NBT 41,5–42,1: *abhrāntam arthakriyākṣame vasturūpe 'viparyayas tam ucyate*.

²⁶ See PV III.285–286: *tasmād bhūtām abhūtām vā yad yad evātibhāvyate, bhāvanāpariniṣpattau tat sphuṭākalpadhīphalam. tatra pramāṇaṃ samvādi yat prānīrṇūtavastuvat, tad bhāvanājaṃ pratyakṣam iṣṭam śeṣā upaplavāḥ*.

²⁷ Iwata (1976): 360; Steinkellner (1978): 127–128.

²⁸ NBhūs 172,15–17: *drṣṭaśrutānumitākāraś ca yadi bhāvanābalataḥ spaṣṭa eva pratibhāti, tathā sati bhrāntam eva yogipratyakṣaṃ syād avidyamānasya vidyamānākāratayā pratibhāsanāt, svapnādiñānavat*.

²⁹ See PVBh 110ff. This objection is obviously based on MS I.1.4: *satsamprayoge puruṣasyendriyāṇāṃ buddhijanma tat pratyakṣam animittaṃ vidyamānopalambhanatvāt*.

³⁰ Each different Indian philosophical tradition has a different definition of existence (*sattva*). For instance, the Naiyāyikas define existence as the inherence in reality (*sattvasamavāya*) or the reality as own nature (*svarūpasattva*). On the other hand, the Mīmāṃsakas define it as being the object of valid cognition (*pramāṇaviśayatva*).

³¹ Iwata (1976): 359.

³² See PVBh 112,1–2: *sākṣātkaraṇam evāsya bhāvasyāstitvam ucyate, sarvatra sākṣātkaraṇāt sattvaṃ bhāvāsya gamyate. vartamānābhimatasyāpi padārthātmani stambhāḍau sākṣātkaraṇād eva gamyate tadastitvaṃ nānyataḥ.*

³³ See ŚV IV.20: *yato 'sti tatra dharmo 'yaṃ vidyamānopalambhanam, tasmāt tena prasiddhena gamyatām animittatā.*

³⁴ See Iwata (1976): 358–359.

³⁵ See PVBh 113,7–8: *tasmād atītādi paśyatīti ko 'rthaḥ. anyenādr̥śyamānaṃ paśyati tad dr̥śyamānatayā vartamānaṃ eva tāvatā tad iti na doṣaḥ.*

³⁶ In the case of something that is not in front of the yogin, he goes beyond the realm of space, and has a direct experience of it as if it were present to his sense-organs. See Iwata (1984): 105ff.

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